


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A HISTORY OF GREECE





A
HISTORY OF GREECE

TO THE
DEATH OF ALEXANDER THE GREAT

BY



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WITH MAPS AND PLANS

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II



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
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CHAPTER I

THE DECLINE AND DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

SECT. 1. NEW POLITICAL COMBINATIONS WITH ARGOS

SPARTA had good reasons for desiring peace; the prospect in the Peloponnesus gave her no little concern. Mantinea had been gradually enlarging her boundaries southwards; and that could not be permitted. Elis was sulky and hostile, because, in a quarrel with Lepreon, Sparta had supported her rival. Far more serious than these minor vexations was the circumstance that the treaty of peace with Argos was about to expire. It had been a consideration of supreme importance for Sparta, when she entered upon the war with Athens, that for the next ten years she was secure on the side of her old Peloponnesian rival. But there was now the chance that Athens and Argos might combine, and, as Argos had not agreed to renew the treaty, there was urgent need to come to terms with Athens. These reasons which recommended the peace to Sparta ought to have prevented Athens from consenting to it. The settlement was a complete failure. Not only did the Corinthians and the other chief allies refuse to accede to it, but the signatories found themselves unable to carry out the terms they had agreed upon. The Chalcidians refused to surrender Amphipolis, and the Spartans could not compel them. Athens therefore justly declined to carry out her part of the bargain. As a way out of this deadlock, the Spartans, impatient at all costs to recover the Sphacterian prisoners, conceived the device of entering into a defensive alliance with their old enemy. This proposal, warmly supported by Nicias,

was accepted, and the captives were at length restored,— Athens still retaining Pylos and Cythera. The alliance was a mistake for Athens; she gained nothing by it, and surrendered the best security she had for the fulfilment of the terms of the Peace.

*Disruption
of the Peloponnesian
League.*

This approximation between Sparta and Athens led directly to the dissolution of the Peloponnesian League. Corinth, Mantinea, and Elis not only considered themselves deserted by their leader, but apprehended that, secured by her alliance with Athens, she would have a free hand in the Peloponnesus and would exercise her power despotically. Accordingly, at the instigation of Corinth, these Peloponnesian states formed an alliance with Argos, who now enters upon the scene. The Chalcidians of Thrace joined; and thus the two great states of Greece stood face to face with a league which refused to recognise the Peace of Nicias. The immediate effect of this organised secession was to tie the hands of the Athenians in Thrace. They prosecuted the siege of Scione, but made no attempt to recover Amphipolis by arms.

*Weakness
of Argos.*

This situation, however, was of brief duration. Though the defensive alliance between Sparta and Athens seems to have developed into a closer bond, there was little reason to fear or hope that the intimacy could be long or strong, seeing that Athens insisted on keeping Cythera and Pylos until Amphipolis should be restored to her, and seeing that in both states the new policy of friendship was opposed by powerful parties. The league of the seceders, moreover, was an unstable combination, and the Corinthians were unsuccessful in their efforts to induce Boeotia and Megara to join. Argos had now a great opportunity to play an important and perhaps decisive part in the affairs of Hellas. But she failed to seize it. The two political parties, the oligarchs and democrats, who, as in other Greek states, competed for power, were both destitute of able men; and Argos, with no firm or skilful hand to steer her, shifted and drifted pitifully before the changing winds.

*War-party
at Sparta
in the
ascendant,
autumn
421 B.C.*

In autumn the anti-Athenian war-party triumphed at Sparta. Of the new Ephors who came into office the most influential belonged to that party. The object of their policy was to form a union with Argos, and so be in a good position to renew the war with Athens. We need not follow their

diplomacy during the winter months, but their first achievement was to make a separate alliance with Boeotia and to induce the Boeotians to demolish the fort of Panacton, hoping thereby to recover Pylos. Now by this alliance Sparta committed a distinct breach of her engagements to Athens; for the two states had agreed that neither should make war or peace without the consent of the other. This consideration caused no scruple to the war-party; and the hope of winning Argos seemed likely to be realised. For, as soon as Argos learned of the treaty between Sparta and Boeotia and the demolition of Panacton, her unwary statesmen hastily and erroneously assumed that Athens was a consenting party to these new events; and without assuring themselves on this point by communicating with Athens, they made precipitate overtures to Sparta—full of alarm lest their city should be left in dangerous isolation. The negotiations proceeded favourably, notwithstanding the difficulties connected with the old contention about Cynuria; and in the meantime the estrangement between Athens and Sparta was growing. The Spartan war-party, however, were anxious to avoid a final breach until they had won back Pylos by diplomacy.¹

But if the war-party at Sparta had changed the situation, Greece had to reckon also with that party at Athens which strongly disapproved of the Peace. The opposition to Nicias was led by Hyperbolus, a man of the same class and same kind of ability as Cleon; a comic poet—and no statesman was such a favourite butt of comedy as Hyperbolus—described him as a Cleon in hyperbole. But the party was now strengthened by the accession of a young man of high birth, brilliant intellect, and no morality, Alcibiades, son of Cleinias. Educated by his kinsman Pericles in democratic traditions, he was endowed by nature with extraordinary beauty and talents, by fortune with an inheritance of wealth which enabled him to indulge an inordinate taste for ostentation. He had shocked his kinsfolk and outraged the city, not by his dissoluteness,

¹ A full contemporary account giving all the details of the futile intrigues and negotiations of the years 421-418 B.C. would be interesting; but it is dull and hardly instructive to follow the meagre outline furnished by Thucydides. The history of these years reminds us of nothing so much as the history of Europe in the third decade of the eighteenth century—a record of futile and momentary political combinations which it is difficult and useless to retain in the memory.

but by the incredible insolence which accompanied it. The numerous anecdotes of his petulance, which no one dared to punish, need not all be true; but they illustrate the fact that undue respect for persons of birth and wealth had not disappeared in the Athenian democracy. Alcibiades was feared and courted, and pursued by lovers of both sexes. He fought with bravery at Delium, where his life was saved by his friend Socrates the philosopher. It was a celebrated friendship. Intellectual power and physical courage were the only points of likeness between them; socially and morally, as well as in favour and fortune, they were as contrasted as two men well could be. Though Socrates took no interest in politics, he was an unequalled dialectician, and an aspiring statesman found his society a good training for the business of political debate. Alcibiades indeed had not in him the stuff of which true statesmen are made; he had not the purpose, the perseverance, or the self-control. An extremely able and dexterous politician he certainly was; but he wanted that balance which a politician, whether scrupulous or unscrupulous, must have in order to be a great statesman. Nor had Alcibiades any sincere belief in the democratic institutions of his country, still less any genuine sympathy with the advanced democratic party, whose cause he espoused. When he said—as Thucydides makes him say—at Sparta, at a later stage of his career, that democracy is “acknowledged folly,” he assuredly expressed what he felt in his heart. Yet at this time his ultimate aim may have been to win such a place as that which Pericles had held, and rule his country without being formally her ruler. At all events he saw his way to power through war and conquest.

The war-party, to which Alcibiades had attached himself as an active member, could now prove triumphantly to the people that the policy of friendship with Sparta which Nicias had pursued was a fatal mistake. It was evident, they could say, that Sparta was never sincere, but had made peace and alliance with Athens simply as a provisional arrangement until she had time to come to terms with Argos. She had not fulfilled the terms of the Peace, and was now demanding the restoration of Pylos in return for a demolished fort. And what was the position of Athens? In consequence of her conciliatory policy, she would now have to face not Sparta alone, but Sparta

and Argos together. To this indictment there was no possible reply—unless the Athenians decided that they would have peace at any cost. But Alcibiades was already plotting to counteract the Spartan negotiations with Argos. He was in correspondence with the Argive democrats, and through his influence the Argives were induced, along with Mantinea and Elis, to send envoys to Athens. He had formed the brilliant idea of a democratic league, in which Athens should secure a continental counterpoise against Sparta. His diplomacy was successful. Athens entered into an alliance with Argos, and her allies Elis and Mantinea, for a hundred years; each of the four contracting states recognising—but not guaranteeing—the rights of the others over subject communities.¹ But though Sparta and Athens were estranged the Peace of Nicias was not formally broken.

The accession of Alcibiades was particularly welcome to the radical party, not so much on account of his family connexions, his diplomatic and rhetorical talents, but because he had a military training and could perform the functions of strategos. Unfitness for the post of strategos was the weak point in the position of men like Hyperbolus and Cleon. When Alcibiades was elected a strategos and Nicias was not re-elected, the prospects of the radical party looked brighter. At the Olympic games his horses won in the chariot-race, and the splendour which he displayed impressed the assembled Greeks with a high idea of the wealth of Athenian citizens. From this festival the Lacedaemonians were entirely excluded on the ground that they had violated the sacred truce by an attack on Lepreon, which they occupied with a garrison.

In the following spring, Alcibiades with a small body of troops appeared in the Peloponnese, in order to consolidate the democratic confederacy which he had created. He had two particular designs. He proposed to impede free communication between the Lacedaemonians and their allies in northern Greece. To effect this he planned a fortress at Rhion, so that the Athenians, having a station on the southern side of the Corinthian gulf, as well as at Naupactus, might control the passage in that region. But he had too few men

¹ A fragment of the stone on which this treaty (given in full by Thucydides) was written was found near the Dionysiac Theatre.

Epidaurian war,
419-8 B.C.


with him, and the Corinthians hindered the execution of the plan. His other design was to gain possession of Epidaurus. He thought that from Epidaurus he could exert pressure on Corinth, and at all events he would secure a convenient line of communication—by Aegina and Epidaurus—between his own city and Argos. Accordingly he induced the Argives to invade the Epidaurian territory. But the Athenians were no longer giving unreserved support to the policy of Alcibiades. They never withdrew their hesitating confidence long or wholly from the cautious Nicias. It is significant that, at the very time when the Argives were attacking Epidaurus at Athenian


Congress of Mantinea,
418 B.C.

prompting, a peace congress assembled at Mantinea, summoned at Athenian instigation. The influence of Nicias was again winning the upper hand; Alcibiades was not re-elected strategos, and during the following year the policy of Athens was marked by those half-measures which seemed to Nicias the highest statesmanship. The alliance with Argos was not broken off; but no adequate support was given to her in the war with Epidaurus.

Spartan invasion of Argolis,
418 B.C.

Sparta, alarmed by the activity of Argos against Epidaurus, resolved to strike a blow, and sent forth in summer an army under king Agis to invade the Argive land. The allies gathered at Phlius; and Corinth, which had no longer any reason to hold aloof, sent a contingent. The Argive troops under Thrasyllus, with their Mantinean and Elean allies, were in every way inferior to the enemy; yet concentrating close to Nemea, they could easily defend the chief pass from the north into the plain of Argos. But Agis outmanœuvred them. Sending the Boeotians along the main road by Nemea, he led his own troops by a difficult mountain path, from the west, and descended into the plain by the valley of the Inachus; the Corinthians and Phliasians he sent over by another pass. Thus the Argives were hemmed in between two armies and cut off from their city. They left their position near Nemea and came down into the plain; the Boeotians appear not to have followed. The soldiers of both Thrasyllus and Agis were confident of victory, but the generals were of another mind. Agis, as well as his antagonist, considered his position precarious, and consequently they came to terms, concluding a truce for four months. On both sides there was a loud outcry





against the generals, and Thrasyllus was nearly stoned to death by his disappointed soldiers.

Athenian forces now arrived at Argos, under Laches and Nicostratus, accompanied by Alcibiades as an ambassador. Stepping beyond his instructions, Alcibiades induced the allies to disregard the truce, on the technical ground that, not having been accepted by the Athenians, it was not valid. The allied troops accordingly crossed the mountains into Arcadia and won Orchomenus. The men of Elis then proposed to move against their own particular foes, the people of Lepreon; and being out-voted they deserted their allies and marched home. The army, thus weakened by the loss of 3000 hoplites, was obliged to hasten southward to protect Mantinea, against which the Lacedaemonians under Agis, along with the men of Tegea, had meanwhile come forth.

And now, at length, a great battle was fought. The exact numbers are not known, but must have approached 10,000 on each side. Coming round the hill of Scope, the spur of Mount Maenalus, which projects into the plain between Tegea and Mantinea, at the point where the territories of the two cities met, the Lacedaemonians found the enemy drawn up for fight and proved their excellent discipline by a rapid formation in the face of the hostile line. They won the battle; but their success was endangered, and its completeness diminished, by a hitch which occurred at the outset. There was a tendency in all Greek armies, when engaging, to push towards the right, each man fearing for his own exposed right side and trying to edge under the screen of his neighbour's shield. Consequently, an army was always inclined to outflank the left wing of the enemy by its own right. On this occasion, Agis observed that the Mantineans, who were on the right wing of the foe, stretched far beyond his own left wing, and fearing it would be disastrously outflanked and surrounded, gave a signal to the troops of his extreme left to make a lateral movement further towards the left; and at the same time he commanded two captains on his right to move their divisions round to fill up the gap thus created. The first order was executed, but the two captains refused to move. The result was that the extreme left was isolated, and utterly routed, while a band of 1000 chosen Argives dashed through the gap. On the right

*Battle of
Mantinea,
418 B.C.
(Scope=
hill of
Mytika.)*

however, the Lacedaemonians were completely victorious over the Athenians and other allies. The Athenians would have been surrounded and utterly at the mercy of their foes, if Agis had not recalled his troops to assist his discomfited left wing. Both Laches and Nicostratus fell.

*Results of
the battle.*

The Lacedaemonians returned home and celebrated the feast of the Carnean Apollo in joy. The victory did much to restore the prestige of Sparta, which had dwindled since the disaster of Sphacteria. The public opinion of Greece had pronounced Sparta to be stupid and inert; it now began to reconsider its judgment. But the victory had direct political results; it transformed the situation in the Peloponnesus. One of those double changes which usually went together, a change in the constitution and a change in foreign policy, was brought about at Argos. The democracy was replaced by an oligarchy, and the alliance with Athens was abandoned for an alliance with Sparta. Mantinea, Elis, and the Achaean towns also went over to the victor. Athens was again isolated.

*Argos joins
Sparta.*

*Ostracism
of Hyper-
bolus, 417
B.C.*

It was probably at this juncture that the advanced democrats in Athens made an attempt to remove from their way the influential man who was their chief opponent, Nicias. It had been due to his counsels that Argos had not been more effectively supported; there was probably a good deal of dissatisfaction at Athens; and, when Hyperbolus proposed that a vote of ostracism should be held, he had good grounds to hope that there would be a decision against Nicias, and no apparent reason to fear for himself. He might calculate that most of the supporters of Nicias would vote against the more dangerous Alcibiades. The calculation was so well grounded that it missed its mark; for Alcibiades, seeing the peril which threatened him, deserted Hyperbolus and the democratic party, and allied himself with Nicias. So it came about that Hyperbolus was ruined by his own machination; all the followers of Nicias and Alcibiades wrote *his* name on their sherds, and he was banished for ten years. His political career had ended. This was the last case of ostracism at Athens; the institution was not abolished, but it became a dead letter. Henceforward it was deemed a sufficient safeguard for the constitution that any man who proposed a measure involving a change in any of the established laws was liable to be prosecuted under the

law known as the *Graphé Paranómōn*, which it was death to transgress.

The new alliance of the pious and punctilious Nicias, champion of peace, with the profane and unstable Alcibiades, bent on enterprises of war, was more unnatural than that between the high-born noble and the lamp-maker. But Nicias seems to have been to some small extent aroused from his policy of inactivity. We find him undertaking an expedition 417 B.C. against Chalcidice, where nothing had been done since the Peace, except the capture of Scione and the execution of all the 421 B.C. male inhabitants.

Nicias failed in an attempt on Amphipolis; but in the following year an enterprise in the southern Aegean was attended with success. The island of Melos had hitherto remained outside the sea-lordship of the Athenians, and Athens, under the influence of Alcibiades, now attacked her. The town of Melos was invested in the summer by land and sea, and surrendered at discretion in the following winter. All the men of military age were put to death, the other inhabitants were enslaved, and the island was colonised by Athenians. *Conquest of Melos, 416 B.C.* *Athenian cleruchs.*

The conquest of Melos is remarkable, not for the rigorous treatment of the Melians, which is merely another example of the inhumanity which we have already met in the cases of Plataea, Mytilene, Scione, but for the unprovoked aggression of Athens, without any tolerable pretext. By the curious device of an imaginary colloquy between Athenian envoys and the Melian government, Thucydides has brought the episode into dramatic relief. In this scene the Athenians assert in frank and shameless words the "law of nature" that the stronger should rule over the weaker. This was a doctrine which it was Hellenic to follow, but barbarous to enunciate in all its nakedness; and in the negotiations which preceded the blockade no Athenian spokesmen would have uttered the undiplomatic crudities which Thucydides ascribes to them. The historian has merely used the dialogue to emphasise the overbearing spirit of the Athenians, flown with insolence, on the eve of an enterprise which was destined to bring signal retribution and humble their city in the dust. Different as Thucydides and Herodotus were in their minds and methods, they had *Emphasis laid by Thucydides on the conquest of Melos.*

both the same, characteristically Hellenic, feeling for a situation like this. The check of Athens rounded the theme of the younger, as the check of Persia had rounded the theme of the elder, historian; and, although Nemesis, who moves openly in the pages of Herodotus, is kept carefully in the background by Thucydides, we are conscious of her influence.

*Temple of
Athena
Polias
(see below,
p. 51).
The As-
clepeum.*

*The
Eleusinian
decree
418 B.C.
(medimnus
= $1\frac{1}{2}$
bushels).*

During the years immediately succeeding the Peace there are some signs that the Athenians turned their attention to matters of religion, which had perhaps been too much neglected during the war. It may have been in these years that they set about the building of a new temple for Athena and Erechtheus, concerning which we shall hear again at a later stage. It may have been at this time that Asclepius, the god of healing, came over with his snake from Epidaurus, and established himself in a sanctuary under the south slope of the Acropolis. And it was probably soon after the Peace that a resolution was carried imposing a new tax upon the fruits of the earth for the maintenance of the worship of Eleusis. The farmers of Attica were required to pay $\frac{1}{600}$ th of every medimnus of barley and $\frac{1}{1200}$ th of every medimnus of wheat. The same burden was imposed upon the allies; and the Council was directed to invite "all Hellenic cities whom it seemed possible to approach on the matter" to send first-fruits likewise.

SECT. 2. THE WESTERN POLICY OF ATHENS

*Alliances
with
Segesta,
c. 454 B.C.,
Leontini,
and
Rhegium,
433 B.C.*

*Thurii
colonised,
443.*

During the fifth century the eyes of Athenian statesmen often wandered to western Greece beyond the seas. We can surmise some oblique glances, as early as the days of Themistocles; and we have seen how under Pericles a western policy definitely began. An alliance was formed with the Elymian town of Segesta, and subsequently treaties of alliance (the stone records are still partly preserved) were concluded (as has been already mentioned) with Leontini and Rhegium. One general object of Athens was to support the Ionian cities against the Dorian, which were predominant in number and power, and especially against Syracuse, the daughter and friend of Corinth. The same purpose of counteracting the Dorian predominance may be detected in the foundation of Thurii. But Thurii did not effect this purpose. The colonists were a mixed

body; other than Athenian elements gained the upper hand; and, in the end, Thurii became rather a Dorian centre and was no support to Athens. It is to be observed that at the time of the foundation of Thurii, and for nigh thirty years more, Athens is seeking merely influence in the west, she has no thought of dominion. The growth of her connexion with Italian and Sicilian affairs was forced upon her by the conditions of commerce and the rivalry of Corinth.

The treaties with Leontini and Rhegium had led to no immediate interference in Sicily on the part of the Athenians. *Condition of Sicily, 427 B.C.* The first action came six years later, on an appeal for help from both cities. Leontini was struggling to preserve her independence against Syracuse, her northern neighbour. All the Dorian cities, with the exception of Acragas and Camarina, were on the side of Syracuse, while Leontini had the support of Rhegium, Catane, Naxos, and Camarina. The continued independence of the Ionian element in western Greece might seem to be seriously at stake. The embassy of the Leontines was accompanied by the greatest of their citizens, Gorgias, the professor of eloquence, whose fame and influence were Panhellenic. We may well believe that when the embassy arrived the Athenians were far more interested in the great man than in his mission; that they thronged in excitement to the Assembly, caring little what he said, but much how he said it. His eloquence indeed was hardly needed to win a favourable answer. Athens was convinced of the expediency of bringing Sicily within the range of her politics. It was important to hinder corn and other help being conveyed from thence to her Peloponnesian enemies; it was important to prevent Syracuse, the friend of Corinth, from raising her head too high; and adventurous imaginations may have already pressed beyond the thought of Athenian influence, and dreamed of Athenian dominion, in the west. Hyperbolus seems to have especially interested himself in the development of a policy in the western Mediterranean. Aristophanes ridicules him for contemplating an enterprise against Carthage herself.

An expedition was sent out, under the command of Laches. *Sicilian expedition under Laches, 427 B.C.* It achieved little, but, if it had been followed up, might have led to much. Messana was induced to join Athens, who thus obtained free navigation of the Straits. The old alliance with

Segesta was renewed, but a severe check was experienced in an attempt to take Inessa. The poor success of this expedition must partly at least be set down to the dishonesty of the general Laches and his treasurer. Cleon seems to have called Laches to account for his defalcations, on his return; and a comic poet jested how Laches ate up the Sicilian cheese—Sicily was famous for her cheese—with the help of his treasurer, the cheese-grater.

*Expedition
of Eury-
medon and
Sophocles,
425 B.C.*

The episode of Pylos and the operations at Corcyra may fairly be regarded as causes which ruined Athenian prospects in Sicily. For these affairs detained the fleet which was bound for the west under the command of Eurymedon and Sophocles, and the delay led to the loss of the one thing which the expedition of Laches had gained, the adhesion of Messina. This city, cleft by adverse political parties, revolted; and the fleet, when at last it came, accomplished nothing worthy of record. Its coming seems rather to have been the occasion for the definite shaping of a movement among almost all the Sicilian states towards peace,—a movement unfavourable to the Athenian designs. When the Athenian generals invited the cities to join in the war against Syracuse, they were

*Congress of
Gela.*

answered by the gathering of a congress at Gela, where delegates from all the Siceliot cities met to discuss the situation and consider the possibility of peace. The man who took the most prominent part at this remarkable congress was Hermocrates of Syracuse. He developed what has been justly described as a Siceliot policy. Sicily is a world by itself, with its own interests and politics, and the Greeks outside Sicily should be considered as strangers and not permitted to make or meddle in the affairs of the island. Let the Sicilian cities settle their own differences among themselves, but combine to withstand intervention from Athens or any other external power. Thus the policy of Hermocrates was neither local nor Panhellenic, but Siceliot. It has been compared to the "Monroe doctrine" of the United States. The policy, indeed, was never realised, and we shall see that Hermocrates himself was driven by circumstances to become eminently untrue to the doctrine which he preached. But the Congress of Gela was not a failure; the policy of peace prevented at the time any serious Athenian intervention. Soon afterwards a sedition

was disastrous to Leontini. Its oligarchs became Syracusan citizens; Leontini ceased to exist as a city and became a Syracusan fortress. Such an incident, following so hard upon the pacification which Syracusan diplomacy had helped to bring about, must have produced a strange impression on the Siceliots. It seemed clear that Syracuse wanted to get rid of the Athenians only for the purpose of tyrannizing over her neighbours. Athens was again invited to intervene, and she did intervene, but not seriously or effectually; and it was not till the year of the conquest of Melos that she resumed her active interest in the politics of western Hellas.

SECT. 3. THE SAILING OF THE SICILIAN EXPEDITION. FIRST OPERATIONS IN SICILY

In that year there arrived at Athens an appeal for help from Segesta, who was at war with her stronger southern neighbour, Selinus. The appeal was supported by the Leontine democrats, who had no longer a city of their own. Athens sent envoys to Sicily, for the purpose of reporting on the situation and spying out the resources of Segesta, which had undertaken, if the Athenians would send an armament, to provide the expenses of the war. The ambassadors returned with sixty talents of uncoined silver and glowing stories of the untold wealth of the people of Segesta. They described the sacred vessels of gold and the rich plate of the private citizens. Alcibiades and all the younger generation were in favour of responding to the appeal; of vigorously espousing the causes of Segesta against Selinus, of the Leontines against Syracuse. Nicias wisely opposed the notion, and set forth the enormous cost of an expedition which should be really effective. The people, however, elated by their recent triumph over Melos, were fascinated by the idea of making new conquests in a distant, unfamiliar world; the ordinary Athenian had very vague ideas of what Sicily meant; and, carried away by dreams of a western empire, he paid no more attention to the discreet counsels of Nicias than to vote a hundred triremes instead of the sixty which were asked for.

*Ambassy of
Segesta,
416 B.C.*

*Athenians
vote
expedition
to Sicily.*

But having committed the imprudence of not listening to Nicias when his caution was, from the highest point of view,

wisdom, the people went on to commit the graver blunder of electing him as a commander of the expedition which he disapproved. He was appointed as General along with Alcibiades and Lamachus. This shows how great was the consideration of his military capacity, and he was doubtless regarded as a safe makeweight against the adventurous spirit of his colleagues. But though Nicias had shown himself capable of carrying out that Periclean strategy which Athens had hitherto adopted, his ability and temperament were wholly unsuited for the conduct of an enterprise of conquest demanding bolder and greater operations.

*The
mutilation
of the
Hermæ,
415 B.C.*

When the expedition was ready to sail in the early summer, a mysterious event delayed it. One morning in May it was found that the square stone figures which stood at the entrance of temples and private houses in Athens, and were known as Hermæ, had been mutilated. The pious Athenians were painfully excited. Such an unheard-of sacrilege seemed an evil omen for the Sicilian enterprise, and it was illogically argued that the act betokened a conspiracy against the state. The enemies of Alcibiades seized the occasion and tried to implicate him in the outrage. It was said that a profane mockery of the Eleusinian Mysteries had been enacted in his house,—a charge which may well have been true; and it was argued that he was the author of the present sacrilege and prime mover in a conspiracy against the democracy. It did not appear why a conspirator should thus advertise his plot. But though the theory hardly hung together, it might be good enough for an excited populace. Alcibiades demanded the right of clearing himself from the charge, before the fleet started. In this case, his acquittal was certain, as he was deemed necessary to the enterprise; and his enemies, aware of this, procured the postponement of his trial till his return.

*Sailing of
the fleet.*

The fleet then set sail, and in the excitement of its starting, the sacrilege was almost forgotten. Thucydides says that no armament so magnificent had ever before been sent out by a single Greek state. There were 134 triremes, and an immense number of smaller attendant vessels; there were 5100 hoplites; and the total number of combatants was well over 30,000. For cavalry they relied on their Sicilian allies; only thirty horse went with the fleet.

A halt was made at Rhegium, where disappointments awaited them. Rhegium adopted a reserved attitude which the Athenians did not expect. The government said that their conduct must be regulated by that of the other Italiot states. This looks as if the Italiots were aiming at a policy of joint interests, such as that which the Siceliots had discussed at the Congress of Gela. In the next place, the Athenians had relied on the wealth of Segesta for supporting their expedition, and they now learned that their spies had been deceived by simple tricks. Gilt vessels of silver had been displayed to them as solid gold; and the Segestaeans, collecting all the plate they could get from their own and other cities, had passed the same service from house to house and led the envoys to believe that each of the hosts who sumptuously entertained them possessed a magnificent service of his own.

This discovery came as an unwelcome surprise to soldiers and commanders alike. It was a serious blow to the enterprise, but no one, not even Nicias, seems to have thought of giving up the enterprise. What then was to be done? A council of war was held at Rhegium. Nicias advocated a course which involved risking and doing as little as possible,—to sail about, make some demonstrations, secure anything that could be secured without trouble, give any help to the Leontines that could be given without danger. Alcibiades proposed that active attempts should be made to win over the Sicilian cities by diplomacy, and that then, having so strengthened their position, they should take steps to force Selinus and Syracuse to do right by Segesta and Leontini. Both Nicias and Alcibiades kept in the forefront the ostensible object of the expedition, to right the wrongs of Leontini and Segesta. But Lamachus, who was no statesman or diplomatist but a plain soldier, regarded the situation from a soldier's point of view. Grasping the fact that Syracuse was the real enemy, the ultimate mark at which the whole enterprise was aimed, he advised that Syracuse should be attacked at once, while her citizens were still unprepared. Fortunately for Syracuse, the bold strategy of Lamachus did not prevail; he had no influence or authority except on the field; and, failing to convince his colleagues, who perhaps contemned him as a mere soldier, he gave his vote to the plan of Alcibiades.

*The
council of
war at
Rhegium.*

*Recall of
Alcibiades.*

Naxos and Catane were won over; the Athenian fleet made a demonstration in the Great Harbour of Syracuse and captured a ship. But nothing more had been done, when a mandate arrived from Athens recalling Alcibiades, to stand his trial for impiety. The people of Athens had reverted to their state of religious agony over the mutilation of the Hermae, and the mystery which encompassed it increased their terrors. A commission of inquiry was appointed; false informations were lodged; numbers of arrests were made. Andocides, a young man of good family, was one of the prisoners, and he at length resolved to confess the crime and give the names of his accomplices. His information was readily believed; the public agitation was tranquillised; and all the prisoners whom he accused were tried and put to death. He was himself pardoned, and soon afterwards left Athens. But it is not certain, after all, whether the information of Andocides was true; Thucydides declares that the truth of the mystery was never explained.

*Meaning of
the Hermae
mystery.*

It was, indeed, never known for certain who the actual perpetrators were; so far the affair remained a mystery. But the purpose of the deed and the source of its inspiration can hardly be doubtful. It was wrought on the eve of the Sicilian expedition, and can have had no other intention than to hinder the expedition from sailing, by working on the superstitions of the people. If we ask then, who above all others were vitally concerned in preventing the sailing of the fleet, the answer is obvious, Corinth and Syracuse. We are justified in inferring that the authors of the outrage—to us their names would be of only subordinate interest—were men suborned by Corinth, in receipt of Corinthian silver. In the main point, the mutilation of the Hermae is assuredly no mystery.

*Impeach-
ment and
condemna-
tion of
Alcibiades.*

The investigations in connexion with the Hermae led to the exposure of other profanations, especially of travesties of the Eleusinian mysteries, in which Alcibiades was involved. His enemies of both parties deemed that it was the time to strike. Thessalus, the son of Cimon, preferred the impeachment, which began thus: "Thessalus, son of Cimon, of the deme Laciadae, impeached Alcibiades, son of Cleinias, of the deme Scambonidae, of wrong-doing in respect to the two

goddesses, Demeter and Core, by mimicking the mysteries and displaying them to his comrades in his own house, wearing a dress like that which a hierophant with the mysteries wears, and calling himself hierophant." The trireme "Salaminia" was sent to summon Alcibiades to return, but with instructions to use no violence. Alcibiades might have refused, but he did not do so. He went with the Salaminia as far as Thurii, where he made his escape and went into voluntary exile. The Athenians condemned him to death, along with some of his kinsfolk, and confiscated his property.

In Sicily, when Alcibiades had gone, the rest of the year was frittered away in a number of small enterprises, which led to nothing. At length, when winter came, Nicias aroused himself to a far more serious undertaking. By a cunning stratagem he lured the Syracusan army to Catane for the purpose of making an attack on the Athenian camp, which they were led to believe they would take unawares, while in the meantime the Athenian host had gone on board the fleet and sailed off to the Great Harbour of Syracuse. Nicias landed and fortified his camp on the south-west side of the harbour, near the point of Dascon, just south of the temple of the Olympian Zeus, which he was scrupulous to treat with profound respect. When the Syracusans returned, a battle was fought, the first battle of the war. The Athenians had the disadvantage of having no cavalry whatever; but the woeful want of discipline which prevailed in the ranks of the enemy outbalanced the advantage they had from 1200 horse. A storm of rain and lightning aided the Athenians to discomfit their untrained antagonists; but the cavalry stood the Syracusans in good stead by protecting their retreat.

A success had now been gained, but the temper of Nicias forbade it to be improved. On the day ensuing, he ordered the whole army to embark and sail back to Catane. He had numbers of excellent reasons,—the winter season, the want of cavalry, of money, of allies; and in the meantime Syracuse was left to make her preparations. "The Athenian fleet and army was to go on falling away from its freshness and vigour. All Sicily was to get more and more accustomed to the sight of the great armada sailing to and fro, its energies frittered away on small and mostly unsuccessful enterprises, and, when

it did strike something like a vigorous blow, not daring to follow it up.”¹

The winter was employed by both parties in seeking allies. The Sicels of the island for the most part joined Athens. Camarina, wooed by both Athens and Syracuse, remained neutral. It is in the Assembly of Camarina that Thucydides makes Hermocrates reassert the doctrine of a purely Siceliot policy, which he had formulated ten years before at Gela, while an Athenian envoy develops in its most naked form the theory of pure self-interest, reminding us of the tone which the Thucydidean Athenians adopted in the Melian dialogue. A train had been laid for the capture of Messana before Alcibiades had been recalled, but when the time came for making the attempt, it failed. Alcibiades began the terrible vengeance which he proposed to wreak upon his country by informing the Syracusan party in Messana of the plot.

*Alcibiades
at Sparta;
his speech.*

It seemed, indeed, as if a fatality dogged Athens in her conduct of the expedition which she had so lightly undertaken. If she had committed the command to Alcibiades and Lamachus, without Nicias, it would probably have been a success, resulting in the capture of Syracuse. But, not content with the unhappy appointment of Nicias, she must go on to pluck the whole soul out of the enterprise by depriving it of Alcibiades. That active diplomatist now threw as much energy into the work of ruining the expedition as he had given to the work of organising it. He went to Sparta, and was present at the Assembly which received a Syracusan embassy, begging for Spartan help. He made a vigorous and effective speech. He exposed the boundless plans of Athenian ambition, aiming at conquests in the west (including Carthage), which should enable them to return and conquer the Peloponnesus. These had perhaps been the dreams of Alcibiades himself; but they had certainly never taken a definite shape in the mind of any sober Athenian statesman. Alcibiades urged the Spartans especially to take two measures: to send at once a Spartan general to Sicily to organise the defence,—a general was far more important than an army; and to fortify Decelea in Attica, a calamity which the Athenians were always dreading. “I know,” said the

¹ Freeman.

renegade, "the secrets of the Athenians." Thucydides shows what defence Alcibiades might have made for his own vindictive—it can hardly be called treacherous—conduct. The description of the Athenian democracy as "acknowledged folly" may well have been a phrase actually used by Alcibiades. Intense hostility animated the exile, but, one asks, Did he act merely to gratify this feeling, or had he not further projects for his own career? If we might trust the speech which Thucydides ascribes to him, his ultimate aim was to win back his country. With Spartan help, presumably, he was to rise on the calamity of Athens, and, we may read between the lines, the "acknowledged folly" was to be abolished. One can hardly see a place for Alcibiades except as a second Pisistratus.

The speech of this powerful advocate turned the balance at a most critical point in the history of Hellas. The Lacedaemonians, who were wavering between the policies of neutrality and intervention, were decided by his advice, and appointed an officer named Gylippus to take command of the Syracusan forces. Corinth too sent ships to the aid of her daughter city.

Since the sailing of the expedition, Athens was in a mood of adventurous speculation and sanguine expectancy, dreaming of some great and wonderful change for the better in her fortunes. Aristophanes made this mood of his countrymen the motive of a fanciful comedy, entitled the *Birds*, which he brought out at the Great Dionysia. Some have sought to detect definite political allusions in the story of the foundation of Cloudeuckootown by the birds of the air, under the direction of two Athenian adventurers, Persuasive and his follower Hopeful; but this is to misapprehend the intention of the drama and to do wrong to the poet's art. The significance of the *Birds* for the historian is that it exhibits with good-humoured banter the temporary mood of the Athenian folk.

The Birds of Aristophanes, 414 B.C., March to April.

SECT. 4. SIEGE OF SYRACUSE, 414 B.C.

The Island of Syracuse, the original settlement of Archias, 414 B.C. always remained the heart and centre of the city. However

Fortification of Achradina ;

of Tyche, c. 463.

the city might extend over the hill above it, the Island was always what the Acropolis was to Athens, what Larisa was to Argos ; it was even called the acropolis, a name which was never given to the hill. But the military importance of the *Epipolae*, the long hill which shuts in the north side of the Great Harbour, could not be ignored, although it was only gradually that the Syracusans came fully to recognise its significance. The water between the Island and the mainland had been filled up ; this was an inducement to the settlement to creep up the height ; and finally the eastern part of the hill, known as *Achradina*, was fortified by a wall running from north to south. At a later period, during the domestic troubles which followed the expulsion of Thrasybulus, the suburb of *Tyche*, north-west of Achradina, was added to the enclosed city. Henceforward the name *Epipolae* was restricted to the rest of the heights, westward from the wall of Tyche and Achradina. It formed a sort of triangle, with this wall as the base and the high point of Euryalus as the vertex.

The Syracusans did something, though not perhaps as much as they might, to prepare for a siege. They reformed their system of military command and elected Hermocrates a general. They fortified the precinct of Apollo Temenites, which was just outside the wall of Achradina, and also strengthened Polichna, the fort south of the hill, near the shrine of Olympian Zeus.

The first brief operation of the Athenians against Syracuse had been made on the table-land west of the Great Harbour. With the second act, which began in the ensuing spring, the scene changes to the north, and the hostilities are enacted on the heights of Epipolae. Hermocrates had realised the necessity of guarding these heights. It was accordingly fixed that a great review should be held of all the fighting population, and a force of 600 was to be chosen for the guard of Epipolae. But the hour had almost passed. At the very moment when the muster was being held below in the meadows, on the banks of the Anapus, the Athenians were close at hand. The fleet had left Catane the night before, steered for the bay on the north side of the Epipolae, and set down the army at a landing-place within less than a mile from the height of Euryalus. The soldiers hastened up the ascent, and were




FIG. 1.

*The
Athenians
seize
Epipolæ.*

masters of Epipolæ before the Syracusan host knew what was happening. The six hundred made an attempt to dislodge them, and were repulsed with great loss. The Athenians then fortified a place called Labdalon, near the north cliffs; they have been criticised for not rather fortifying Euryalus.

*The
Athenian
wall.*

The plan of the siege was to run a wall right across the hill, from the cliffs on the north to the harbour on the south. This would cut off communications by land, while the fleet which was stationed at Thapsus, ready to enter the Great Harbour, would cut off communications by sea. For this purpose, a point was chosen in the centre of the intended line of wall, and a round fort, "the Circle" (*kyklos*), was built there, from which the wall was to be constructed northward and southward. The Syracusans having made a vain attempt to stop the building of the wall, set themselves to build a counter-wall, beginning at the Temenites and running westward, with a view to intercept the southern wall of the Athenians and prevent its reaching the harbour. The Athenians did not try to hinder them, and devoted themselves entirely to the building of their own wall north of the Round Fort; this seemed at first of greater consequence than the southern section, since they had to consider the maintenance of communications with their fleet at Thapsus. But, though they were apparently not concerning themselves with the Syracusan builders, they were really watching for a good opportunity. The carelessness of the Syracusans soon gave the looked-for chance. An attack was made on the counter-wall and it was utterly destroyed. The generals then began to look to the southern section of their own wall, and, without waiting to build it on the side of the Round Fort, they began to fortify the southern cliff, near the temple of Heracles, above the marshy ground on the north-west side of the Great Harbour.

*First
Syracusan
counter-
wall.*

The Syracusans then began a second counter-work, not on the hill, but over this low swampy ground, to hinder the Athenians from bringing their wall down from the cliff to the harbour. This work was not a wall, which would not have been suited to the swampy ground, but a trench with a palisade. At the break of day, the Athenians led by Lamachus descended into the swamp and destroyed the Syracusan

works. But what was gained was more than undone by what followed. Troops sailed out of Syracuse; a battle was fought; and Lamachus—the hero Lamachus, as comic poets called him in derision while he lived, in admiration when he died—exposed himself rashly and was slain. This was the third great blow to the prospect of Athenian success. Nicias had been appointed; Alcibiades had been recalled; now Lamachus was gone. To make things worse, Nicias himself was ill. *Death of Lamachus.*

The southern Athenian wall advanced southward in a double line, and the fleet had now taken up its station in the Great Harbour. The Syracusans, not realising how much they had gained in the death of Lamachus, were prematurely in despair; they changed their generals, and were prepared to make terms. Nicias, strangely swerving from his wonted sobriety, was prematurely elated; he thought that Syracuse was in his hands, and made the fatal mistake of neglecting the completion of the wall on the north side. His neglect was the more culpable as he had received information of the help that was coming for Syracuse from the mother-country. But alike in his normal mood of caution and in his abnormal moment of confidence, Nicias was doomed to do the wrong thing.

All thought of capitulation was abandoned when a Corinthian captain named Gongylus reached Syracuse with the news that Corinthian ships and a Spartan general were on their way. That general had indeed given up the hope of being able to relieve Syracuse, which, from the reports of Athenian success that had reached him, was thought to be past helping; but he had sailed on to the coast of Italy with the aim of saving the Italiot cities. At Locri, Gylippus learned that Syracuse might still be saved, since the northern wall was not yet completed. He immediately sailed to Himera and collected a land force, supplied by Gela, Selinus, and Himera itself, and marched overland to Syracuse. He ascended the hill of Epipolae by the same path on the north side which had been climbed by the Athenian army when they seized the heights; and without meeting any opposition advanced along the north bend of the hill to Tyche and entered the city. Such was the result of the gross neglect of Nicias. If the wall had been finished, the attempt of Gylippus would never have been *Arrival of Gylippus.*

made; if Euryalus had been fortified, the attempt would probably have failed.

*Third
Syracusan
counter-
wall.*

Gylippus immediately undertook the command of the Syracusan army, and inspired the inhabitants with new confidence. He was as unlike the typical Spartan as Nicias was unlike the typical Athenian. He had all the energy and resourcefulness of Brasidas, without that unique soldier's attractive personality. He set himself instantly to the work of the defence, and his first exploit was the capture of the fort Labdalon. But the great object was to prevent the Athenians from hemming in the city by completing the northern section of their wall, and this could be done only by building a new counter-wall. The Athenians themselves began to build vigorously, and there was a race in wall-building between the two armies. As the work went on, attacks were made on both sides with varying success. In the end, the Syracusan builders prevailed; the Athenian wall was turned, and never reached the northern coast. This was not enough for Gylippus. His wall was continued to reach Euryalus, and four forts were erected on the western part of the hill, so that Syracuse could now hinder help from reaching the Athenians by the path by which Gylippus had himself ascended. In the meantime Nicias had occupied Plemmyrion, the headland which, facing the Island, forms the lower lip of the mouth of the Great Harbour. Here he built three forts and established a station for his ships; some of which were now dispatched to lie in wait for the expected fleet from Corinth. The Syracusans made a sort of answer to the occupation of Plemmyrion by sending a force of cavalry to the fort of Polichna to guard the southern coast of the Harbour. But, though the Athenians commanded the south part of Epipolae and the entrance to the Harbour, the Syracusan wall from Tycha to Euryalus had completely changed the aspect of the situation for Syracuse from despair to reasonable hope.

The winter had now come and was occupied with embassies and preparations. Gylippus spent it in raising fresh forces in Sicily. Camarina, so long neutral, at length joined Syracuse, who had in fact all Greek Sicily on her side, except her rival Acragas, who persistently held aloof, and the towns of Naxos and Catane. Appeals of help were again sent to the Pelo-

ponnesus. Corinth was still unremitting in her zeal; and Sparta had sent a force of 600 hoplites—Neodamodes and Helots. Thebes and Thespieae also sent contingents.

We must go back for a moment to Old Greece. The general war is being rekindled there, and the war in Sicily begins to lose the character of a collateral episode and becomes merged in the larger conflict, in which greater interests than those of Syracuse and Sicily are at stake. The Spartans had come to the conclusion that they had been themselves the wrong-doers in the earlier war, and the Athenian successes, especially the capture of Pylos, had been a retribution which they deserved. But now the Athenians had clearly committed a wrong in their aggression on Sicily, and Sparta might with a good conscience go to war against her. The advice of Alcibiades to fortify Decelea was adopted: a fort was built and provided with a garrison under the command of king Agis. From Mt. Lycabettus at Athens one can see the height of Decelea through the gap between Pentelicus on the right and Parnes, of which Decelea is an outlying hill, on the left. It was a good position for reaching all parts of Attica, which could no longer be cultivated, and at the same time maintaining easy communications with Boeotia.

413 B.C.
Occupation
of Decelea
by the
Spartans.

But while the Peloponnesians were carrying the war once more to the very gates of Athens, that city was called upon to send forth a new expedition to the west on a scale similar to the first. Nicias wrote home a plain and unvarnished account of the situation. We are expressly told that he adopted the unusual method of sending a *written* despatch instead of a verbal message; it was all-important that the Athenian Assembly should learn the exact state of the case. He explained that, since the coming of Gylippus and the increase of the numbers of the garrison, and the building of the counter-wall, the besiegers had become themselves besieged. They even feared an attack on their own element the sea, and their ships had become leaky and the crews fallen out of practice. Further successes of the enemy might cut off their supplies, now derived from the cities of Italy. One of two things must be done: the enterprise must be abandoned or a new armament, as strong as the first, must be sent out at once. Nicias also begged for his own recall, on the ground of

Appeal of
Nicias for
help.

the disease from which he suffered. The Athenian people repeated its previous recklessness by voting a second expedition, and by refusing to supersede Nicias, in whom they had a blind and touching trust. They appointed Eurymedon and Demosthenes as commanders of the new armament.

SECT. 5. THE SECOND EXPEDITION

413 B.C.

"The original interference of Athens in the local affairs of Sicily, her appearance to defend Segesta against Selinus and the Leontines against Syracuse, has grown into a gigantic struggle in which the greater part of the Hellenic nation is engaged. The elder stage of the Peloponnesian War has begun again with the addition of a Sicilian war on such a scale as had never been seen before. In that elder stage Sicilian warfare had been a mere appendage to warfare in Old Greece. Now Sicily has become the centre of the struggle, the headquarters of both sides."¹

Sea battle.

For Sicily itself, the struggle was now becoming a question of life and death, such as the Persian invasion had been for Greece. Syracuse, under the guidance of Hermocrates and Gylippus, put forth all her energy to the organisation of a fleet, and in the spring she had a navy numbering eighty triremes. The crews were inexperienced, but they could remember that it was under the pressure of the Persian danger that Athens herself had learned her sea-skill. Gylippus determined to attack the Athenian station at Plemmyrion by land and sea. By sea the Syracusans were defeated, but while the naval battle was being fought in the harbour, a land force under Gylippus had marched round to Plemmyrion and captured the forts on the headland. The Athenian ships were thus forced back to their station close to their double wall on the north of the Harbour, of which the entrance was now commanded by the Syracusans. The Athenians were thus besieged both by land and sea, and could not venture to send ships out of the Harbour except in a number sufficient to resist an attack. Presently the new Syracusan sea-power achieved the important success of capturing off the Italian coast a treasure-fleet which was on its way from Athens.

¹ Freeman.

At length the news came that the great fleet under Eurymedon and Demosthenes was on its way. It consisted of seventy-three triremes; there were 5000 hoplites and immense numbers of light-armed troops. The chance of Syracuse lay in attacking the dispirited forces of Nicias before the help arrived, and it was obviously the policy of Nicias—a congenial policy—to remain inactive. The Syracusans made a simultaneous assault on the walls by land and on the naval station below the walls by sea. The land attack was beaten off, but two days' fighting by sea resulted in a distinct victory for Syracuse. The Great Harbour was too small for the Athenians to win the advantage of their superiority in seamanship, and their ships were not adapted for the kind of sea-warfare which was possible in a narrow space. The effective use of the long light beaks depended on the possibility of manœuvring. The Syracusans had shaped the beaks of their vessels with a view to the narrow space, by making them short and heavy. On the day after the victory, the fleet of Eurymedon and Demosthenes sailed into the Great Harbour.

Demosthenes saw at once that all was over, unless the Syracusan cross-wall were captured. An attempt to carry it from the south was defeated, and the only alternative was to march round the west end of the hill and ascend by the old path near Euryalus. It was a difficult enterprise, guarded as the west part of Epipolæ was by the forts, as well as the wall, and by a picked body of 600 men who were constantly keeping watch. A moonlight night was chosen for the attempt. The Athenians were at first successful. One fort was taken, and the six hundred under Hermocrates himself were repelled. But when one part of their force received a decisive check from the Thespians, the disorder spread to the rest, and they fell back everywhere, driven down the hill on the top of their comrades who had not yet reached the summit. Some, throwing away their shields, leapt from the cliffs. About 2000 were slain.

These failures damped the spirits of the army, and Demosthenes saw that no profit could be won by remaining any longer where they were. The only wise course was to leave the unhealthy marsh, while they still had command of the sea, and before the winter came. At Syracuse they were

*Syracusan
sea-victory.*

*Fruitless
attacks
on the
Syracusan
cross-wall.*

(August.)

merely wasting strength and money. But though Demosthenes had the sense of the army and the sense of the other commanders with him, he could not persuade Nicias to adopt this course. The same quality of nature which had made Nicias oppose the counsel of Lamachus to attack Syracuse now made him oppose the counsel of Demosthenes to leave Syracuse. Fear of responsibility was the dominant note in the character of Nicias. He was afraid of "Pulydamas and the Trojan women," he was afraid of the censure, perhaps the condemnation, of the Athenian Assembly. Nor would he even accept the compromise of retiring to Catane and carrying on the war on a new plan. Demosthenes and Eurymedon, being two to one, should have insisted on instant departure, but they foolishly yielded to the obstinacy of their senior colleague. In a few days, however, events overbore the resolution of Nicias himself. Gylippus arrived at Syracuse with new contingents he had collected in the islands; and Peloponnesian and Boeotian succours, after a long roundabout journey by way of Cyrene, at length reached the Great Harbour. Nicias gave way and everything was ready for departure. But on the night on which they were to start, the enemy suspecting nothing, the full moon suffered an eclipse. The superstitious army regarded the phenomenon as a heavenly warning, and cried out for delay. Nicias was not less superstitious than the sailors. Unluckily his best prophet, Stilbides, was dead, and the other diviners ruled that he must wait either three days or for the next full moon. There was perhaps a difference of opinion among the seers, and Nicias decided to be on the safe side by waiting the longer period. Never was a celestial phenomenon more truly disastrous than that lunar eclipse. With the aid of Nicias, it sealed the doom of the Athenian army.

*Eclipse of
the moon,
Aug. 27.*

*Departure
postponed.*

*Sea-fight
in the
Harbour,
Sept. 3.*

Religious rites occupied the next few days. But meanwhile the Syracusans had learned of the Athenian intention to abandon the siege; their confidence was raised by the implied confession of defeat; and they resolved not to be content with having saved their city, but to destroy the host of the enemy before it could escape. So they drew up their fleet, seventy-six ships, in the Great Harbour for battle; and eighty-six Athenian ships moved out to meet them. The Athenians

were at a disadvantage as before, having no room for manœuvring; and, centre, right, and left, they were defeated. The general Eurymedon was slain. The left wing was driven back on the marshy north-west shore of the harbour, between their own wall and Dascon. A force under Gylippus endeavoured to advance along the swamp of Lysimelea and prevent the crews of their ships from landing, but he was driven off by the Etruscan allies of Athens who had been sent to guard the shore here. Then there was a battle for the ships, and the Syracusans succeeded in dragging away eighteen.

The defeat completed the dejection of the Athenian army; the victory crowned the confidence of their enemies. The one thought of the Athenians was to escape,—the eclipse was totally forgotten; but Syracuse was determined that escape should be made impossible. The mouth of the Great Harbour was barricaded by a line of ships and boats of all kinds and sizes bound together by chains and connected by bridges. The fate of the Athenians depended on their success in breaking through that barrier. They abandoned their posts on the hill and went on board their ships. At this critical moment Nicias revealed the best side of his character. He left nothing undone that could hearten his troops. We are told that, after the usual speech, still thinking, “as men do in the hour of great struggles, that he had not done, that he had not said half enough,”¹ he went round the fleet in a boat, making a personal appeal to the trierarch of each ship. “He spoke to them, as men will at such times, of their wives and children and the gods of their country; for men do not care whether their word sound commonplace, but only think that they may have some effect in the terrible moment.”² The pæan sounded, and the Athenian lines sailed forth together across the bay to attack the barrier. When they reached it, Syracusan vessels came out against them on all sides. The Athenians were driven back into the middle of the harbour, and the battle resolved itself into an endless number of separate conflicts. The battle was long and wavered. The walls of the Island, the slopes of Achradina above, were crowded with women and old men, the shores below with warriors, watching the course of the struggle. Thucydides gives a famous

*Blocking
of the
Harbour.
Sept. 6-8.*

*Last battle
in
Harbour,
Sept. 9.*

¹ Thucydides.

² *Ibid.*

description of the scene ; one would think that he had been an eye-witness. "The fortune of the battle varied, and it was not possible that the spectators on the shore should all receive the same impression of it. Being quite close and having different points of view, they would some of them see their own ships victorious ; their courage would then revive, and they would earnestly call upon the gods not to take from them their hope of deliverance. But others, who saw their ships worsted, cried and shrieked aloud, and were by the sight alone more utterly unnerved than the defeated combatants themselves. Others again who had fixed their gaze on some part of the struggle which was undecided were in a state of excitement still more terrible ; they kept swaying their bodies to and fro in an agony of hope and fear, as the stubborn conflict went on and on ; for at every instant they were all but saved or all but lost. And while the strife hung in the balance, you might hear in the Athenian army at once lamentation, shouting, cries of victory or defeat, and all the various sounds which are wrung from a great host in extremity of danger."¹ Those motions of human passion, suspense, agony, triumph, despair, which swayed to and fro, in the breasts of thousands, round and over the waters of the Great Harbour on that September day, have been lifted out of the tide of time and preserved for ever by the genius of Thucydides.

In the end the Athenians gave way. They were driven back to the shelter of their own wall, chased by the foe. The crews of the remnant of the navy—which amounted to sixty ships—rushed on shore as best they could. The land forces were in a panic ; no such panic had ever been experienced in an Athenian army. Thucydides compares the situation to that of the Spartans at Sphacteria. The generals did not even think of asking for the customary truce to bury the corpses which were strewn over the waters of the bay. Demosthenes proposed that they should make another attempt to pass the barrier at daybreak ; their ships were even now rather more numerous than those of the enemy ; but the men positively refused to embark. Nothing remained but to escape by land. If they had started at once, they would probably have succeeded in reaching shelter at Catane or inland among the

¹ Jowett's translation.

friendly Sicels. But Hermocrates contrived a stratagem to delay their departure, so as to give him time to block the roads. Taking advantage of the known fact that there were persons in Syracuse who intrigued with the besiegers, he sent some horsemen who rode up within earshot of the Athenian camp, and feigning to be friends stated that the roads were guarded and that it would be well to wait and set out better prepared. The message was believed. The Athenians remained the next day, and the Syracusans blocked the roads.

In his picture of the sad start of the Athenians on their forlorn retreat, Thucydides outdoes his wonderful powers of description. They had to tear themselves away from the prayers of their sick and wounded comrades, who were left to the mercy of the enemy. They could hardly make up their minds to go. The bit of hostile soil under the shelter of their walls had come to seem to them like their home. Nicias, notwithstanding his illness, rose to this supreme occasion as he had never risen to another. He tried to cheer and animate the miserable host—whose wretched plight was indeed of his own making—by words of hope. They set forth, Nicias leading the van, Demosthenes the rear, along the western road which crosses the Anapus and passes the modern village of Floridia. The aim was to reach Sicel territory first, and then get to Catane as they could; for it would have been madness to attempt the straight road to Catane round the west of Epipolae under the Syracusan forts. The chief difficulty in their way was a high point called the Acraean cliff, approached by a rugged pass, which begins near Floridia. It was not till the fourth day that, having toiled along the pass under constant annoyance from darters and horsemen, they came in sight of the cliff, and found that the way was barred by a wall, with a garrison of Syracusan hoplites behind it. To attempt to pass was impossible; they retreated on Floridia in a heavy thunderstorm. They now moved southwards, and abandoning the idea of reaching the Sicel hill-land from this point, marched to the Helorine road, which would take them in the direction of Gela. During the sixth day's march a sort of panic seems to have fallen on the rear of the army under Demosthenes; the men lagged far behind and the army was parted in two. Nicias advanced with his division as speedily as he could.

*Retreat of
Athenians,
Sept. 11.*

Sept. 16.

(*R.
Cassibile.*)

(*R.
Elanici,
or Caval-
lata?*)

Sept. 17.

Sept. 18.

(*R. Fal-
conara.*)

*Athenians
surrender.*

There were several streams to cross, and it was all-important to press on before the Syracusans had time to block the passages by walls and palisades. The Helorine road approaches the shore near the point where the river Kakyparis flows into the sea. When they reached the ford, the Athenians found a Syracusan band on the other side raising a fortification. They drove the enemy away without much difficulty and marched as far as the river Erineos, where they encamped for the night. On the next morning a Syracusan herald drew near. He had news to tell. The rear of the army had been surrounded the day before, in the olive garden of Polyzaus, through which the Helorine road passed, and had been forced to surrender. The lives of the 6000 men were to be spared. Demosthenes did not condescend to make terms for himself, and when the capitulation had been arranged he sought death by his own hand, but the enemy, who desired to secure a captive general, intercepted the stroke. Having sent a messenger, under a truce, to assure himself of the truth of the tale, Nicias offered terms to the Syracusans—that the rest of the army should be allowed to go free on condition that Athens should repay the costs of the war, the security being a hostage for every talent. The terms were at once rejected. The Syracusans were bent on achieving the glory of leading the whole army captive. For that day the miserable army remained where it was, worn out with want of food. Next morning they resumed the march and, harassed by the darts of the enemy, made their way to the stream of the Assinaros. Here they found a hostile force on the opposite steep bank. But they cared little for the foe, for they were consumed with intolerable thirst. They rushed down into the bed of the river, struggling with one another to reach the water. The Syracusans who were pursuing came down the banks and slaughtered them unresisting as they drank. The water was soon foul, but, muddy and dyed with blood as it was, they drank notwithstanding and fought for it.

At last Nicias surrendered. He surrendered to Gylippus, for he had more trust in him than in the Syracusans. The slaughter, which was as great as any that had been wrought in the war, was then stayed and the survivors were made prisoners. It seems that a great many of the captives were

appropriated for their own use by the individual victors^{*,†} and their lot may have been comparatively light. But the fate of the state-prisoners was cruel. Seven thousand were thrown into the stone-quarries of Achradina—deep, unroofed dungeons, open to the chills of night and the burning heat of the day—on a miserable allowance of food and water. The allies of the Athenians were kept in this misery for seventy days; the Athenians themselves were doomed to endure the torture for six months longer, throughout the whole winter. Such was the vengeance which Syracuse wreaked upon her invaders. The prisoners who survived the ordeal were put to work in the public prison or sold. Some were rescued by young men who were attracted by their manners. Others owed mitigation of their lot, even freedom, to the power which an Athenian poet exercised over the hearts of men, in Sicily as well as in his own city. Slaves who knew speeches and choruses of the plays of Euripides by heart, and could recite them well, found favour in the sight of their masters; and we hear of those who, after many days, returned to their Athenian homes and thanked the poet for their deliverance.

Some mystery has hung round the fate of the two generals, Demosthenes and Nicias, but there is no doubt that they were put to death without mercy, and some reason to suppose that they were not spared the pain of torture. Hermocrates and Gylippus would have wished to save them, but were powerless in face of the intense feeling of fury against Athens which animated Syracuse in the hour of her triumph. If a man's punishment should be proportionate not to his intentions but to the positive sum of mischief which his conduct has caused, no measure of punishment would have been too great for the deserts of Nicias. His incompetence, his incredible bungling, ruined the expedition and led to the downfall of Athens. But the blunders of Nicias were merely the revelation of his own nature, and for his own nature he could hardly be held accountable. The whole blame rests with the Athenian people, who insisted on his playing a part for which he was utterly unsuited. It has already been observed that one dominant note of the character of Nicias was fear of responsibility. Throughout the whole war there was no post which so absolutely demanded the power of undertaking full responsibility

*Treatment
of the
prisoners.*

*Fate of
Nicias and
Demo-
sthenes.*

as that of chief commander in this great and distant expedition. And yet Nicias was chosen. The selection shows that he was popular as well as respected. He was popular with his army, and he seems to have been hardly a sufficiently strict disciplinarian. It has been well said that in the camp he never forgot that the soldiers whom he commanded had votes in the Ecclesia which they might use against himself when they returned to Athens. Timid as a general, timid as a statesman, hampered by superstition, the decorous Nicias was a brave soldier and an amiable man, whose honourable qualities were the means of leading him into a false position. If he had been less scrupulous and devout, and had been endowed with better brains, he would not have ruined his country. "Given the men a people chooses," it has been said, "the people itself, in its exact worth and worthlessness, is given." In estimating the character of the Athenian people, we must not forget their choice of this hero of conscientious indecision.

*Institution
of the
Assinar-
ian games.*

*The coin-
engravers
of
Syracuse.*

So deep is the pity which the tragic fate of the Athenians excites in us that we almost forget to sympathise with the sons of Syracuse in the joy of their deliverance. Yet they deserve our sympathy; they had passed through a sore trial, and they had destroyed the powerful invader who had come to rob them of their freedom. To celebrate the anniversaries of their terrible victory they instituted games which they called Assinarian, after the river which had witnessed the last scene. In connexion with these games, some beautiful coins were struck. Perhaps there is nothing which enlists our affections for Syracuse so much as her coins. And it was at this very period that she brought the art of engraving coin-dies to perfection. Never in any country, in any age of the world, was the art of engraving on metal practised with such high inspiration and such consummate skill as in Sicily. No holy place in Hellas possessed diviner faces in bronze or marble than the faces which the Sicilian cities circulated on their silver money. The greatest of the Sicilian artists were Syracusan, and among the greatest of the Syracusan were Evaenetus and Cimon. The die-engraver's achievements may seem small, compared with the life-size or colossal works of a sculptor, yet, as creators of the beautiful, Evaenetus and his fellows may claim to stand in the same rank as Phidias. Their heads of Perse-

phone and of the water-nymph Arethusa encircled by dolphins, their wonderful four-horsed chariots, seem to invest Syracuse with a glory to which she hardly attained. In the years after the defeat of Athens there were several issues of large ten-drachm medallions, modelled on those "Damaratean" coins which had commemorated Gelon's victory at Himera.¹ The engraving of these was committed to Cimon and Evaenetos and a nameless artist—perhaps a greater than either—of whom a single medallion, an exquisite Persephone crowned with barley, has been found on the slopes of Aetna.

New issues of "Damaratean," 412-406 B.C.

SECT. 6. CONSEQUENCES OF THE SICILIAN CATASTROPHE

The Sicilian expedition was part of the general aggressive policy of Athens which made her unpopular in Greece. Unjust that policy was; but this enterprise was not more flagrantly unrighteous than some of her other undertakings, and it had the plausible enough pretext of protecting the weaker cities in the west against the stronger. More fruitful is the question whether the expedition was expedient from a purely political point of view. It is often said that it was a wild venture, an instance of a whole people going mad, like the English people in the matter of the Crimean War. It is hard to see how this view can be maintained. If there were ever an enterprise of which the wisdom cannot be judged by the result, it is the enterprise against Syracuse. All the chances were in its favour. If the advice of Lamachus had been taken and Syracuse attacked at once, there cannot be much doubt that Syracuse would have fallen at the outset. If Nicias had not let precious time pass and delayed the completion of the wall to the northern cliff of Epipolae, the doom of the city was sealed, Gylippus could never have entered. The failure was due to nothing in the character of the enterprise itself, but entirely to the initial mistake in the appointment of the general. And it was quite in the nature of things that the Athenian sea-power, predominant in the east, should seek further expansion in the west. An energetic establishment of Athenian influence in that region was recommended by the political situation. It must be remembered that the most

Was the Sicilian expedition a foolish undertaking?

¹ See above, vol. i. p. 328.

serious and abiding hostility with which Athens had to reckon was the commercial rivalry of Corinth; and the close alliance of Corinth with her Dorian daughters and friends in the west was a strong and adequate motive for Athenian intervention. The necessity of a counterweight to Corinthian influence in Sicily and Italy had long ago been recognised; some attempts had been made to meet it; and when peace with Sparta set Athenian forces free for service outside Greece and the Aegean, it was natural that the opportunity should be taken to act effectively in the west.

*Cause of
the failure.*

The infatuation of the Athenian people was shown not in willing the expedition, but in committing it to Nicias—instead of Demosthenes, who was clearly marked out for the task—and then in recalling Alcibiades. These blunders seemed to point to something wrong in the constitution or its working. They did in fact show that an expedition of that kind was liable to be mismanaged when any of the arrangements connected with its execution depended on a popular assembly, or might be interfered with for party purposes.

*Closing
of the
mines of
Laurion,
413 B.C.*

*Gold
coinage at
Athens
(407);
copper
coinage
(406).*

And after the disaster of the Assinaros there was a feeling that some change must be made in the administration. Athens was hard pressed by the Lacedaemonian post at Decelea, which stopped cultivation and became a refuge for deserting slaves. Of these slaves, who numbered about 2000, we can hardly doubt that many belonged to the gangs which worked in the mines of Laurion. In any case, one most disastrous effect of the seizure of Decelea was the closing of the mines; since even southern Attica was at the mercy of the Lacedaemonians. Thus one of the chief sources of Athenian revenue was cut off; she was robbed of her supply of "Laureot owls"; and in a few years we find her melting gold dedicatory offerings to make gold coins, and even coining in copper. The mines of Laurion were not to be opened again till three-quarters of a century had passed.

*Extra-
ordinary
adminis-
tration of
the Pro-
buloi at
Athens.*

Thus the treasury was at a low ebb, and there were no men to replace those who were lost in Sicily. It was felt that the committees of the Council of Five Hundred were hardly competent to conduct the city through such a crisis; a smaller and more permanent body was required; and the chief direction of affairs was entrusted to a board of Ten, named

Probuli, which practically superseded the Council for the time being.

A very important change in the system of taxation was made at the same time. The tribute, already as high as it could be put with impunity, was abolished; and was replaced by a tax of 5 per cent on all imports and exports carried by sea to or from the harbours of the Confederacy. It was calculated that this duty would produce a larger income than the tribute, and it would save the friction which generally occurred in the business of collecting the tribute and caused more than anything else the unpopularity of Athens. But further, the change had a great political significance. The duty was collected in the Piræus as well as elsewhere, and thus fell on Athens herself. This might prove a step towards equalising Athens with her allies, and converting the Confederacy or dominion into a national state.

The financial pressure was shown by the dismissal of a body of Thracian mercenaries who had arrived too late to sail to Sicily. They returned home under the conduct of Diitrephes, who was instructed to employ them, on the road, in any way he could against the enemy. Sailing northward between Euboea and the mainland, they disembarked on the coast of Boeotia, and reaching the small town of Mycalessus at day-break, captured it. "Nothing was ever so unexpected and terrible." The Thracians showed their barbarity in massacring all the inhabitants,—nay, every living thing they saw. They broke into a boys' school and killed all the children.

Reforms did not avert the dangers which threatened Athens. The tidings of the great calamity which had befallen the flower of her youth in Sicily moved Hellas from end to end. The one thought of enemies, neutrals and subjects alike, was to seize the opportunity of shattering the power of Athens irretrievably. Messages came from some of the chief allies, from Euboea, from Lesbos, from Chios, to Agis at Decelea, to the ephors at Sparta, declaring that they were ready to revolt, if a Peloponnesian fleet appeared off their coasts. A fleet was clearly necessary to do the work that was to be done; a naval policy was forced upon Sparta by the case. It was decided that a hundred ships should be equipped, of which half, in equal shares, were to be supplied by Sparta and Boeotia.

Athens also spent the winter in building triremes, and fortified Cape Sunium to protect the arrival of her corn-ships.

*Persia
comes on
the stage
again.*

King Agis while he was at Decelea possessed the right of sending troops wherever he chose. He received the overtures from Euboea and Lesbos and promised assistance. But Spartan interference in these islands was deferred owing to the more pressing demands of Chios, which were addressed directly to Sparta and were backed by the support of a great power, whose voice for many years had not been heard in the sphere of the politics of Hellas. Persia now enters once more upon the stage of Greek history, aiming at the recovery of the coast cities of Asia Minor, and for this purpose playing off one Greek power against another. The Sicilian disaster suggested to Tissaphernes, the satrap of Sardis, and to Pharnabazus, the satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, that it was the moment to wrest from Athens her Asiatic dominions. This must be done by stirring up revolt and by a close alliance with Sparta. Each satrap was anxious to secure for himself the credit of having brought about such a profitable alliance, and each independently sent envoys to Lacedaemon, Pharnabazus urging action in the Hellespont, Tissaphernes supporting the appeal of Chios. The Chian demand, which had the powerful advocacy of Alcibiades, carried the day.

412 B.C.

*Revolt of
Athenian
allies.*

In the following summer the rebellion against Athens actively began. The appearance of a few Spartan ships was the signal for the formal revolt of Chios, and then in conjunction with the Chian fleet they excited Miletus, Teos, Lebedus to follow in the same path. Methymna and Mytilene lost little time in joining the movement and were followed by Cyme and Phocaea. The Athenian historian has words of commendation for the city which played the chief part in this rebellion. "No people," says Thucydides, "as far as I know, except the Chians and Lacedaemonians (but the Chians not equally with the Lacedaemonians), have preserved moderation in prosperity, and in proportion as their city has gained in power have gained also in the stability of their government. In this revolt they may seem to have shown a want of prudence, yet they did not venture upon it until many brave allies were ready to share the peril with them, and until the Athenians themselves seemed to confess that after their

calamity in Sicily the state of their affairs was hopelessly bad. And, if they were deceived through the uncertainty of human things, the error of judgement was common to many who, like them, believed that the Athenian power would speedily be overthrown."¹

This successful beginning led to the Treaty of Miletus *Treaty of Miletus.* between Sparta and Persia. In the hope of humbling to the dust her detested rival, the city of Leonidas now sold to the barbarian the freedom of her fellow-Greeks of Asia. The Persian claim was that Athens had usurped the rights of the Great King for well-nigh seventy years over the Asiatic cities, and that arrears of tribute were owing to him for all that time. Sparta recognised the right of the Great King to all the dominion which belonged to him and his forefathers, and he undertook to supply the pay for the seamen of the Peloponnesian fleet operating on the Asiatic coast, while the war with Athens lasted. It may be said for Sparta that she merely wanted to get the money at the time, and had no intention of honourably carrying out her dishonourable undertaking, but hoped to rescue the Greek cities in the end. But the treaty of Miletus opened up a new path in Greek politics, which was to lead the Persian king to the position of arbiter of Hellas.

Meanwhile Athens had not been idle. Straitened by want of money, she had been forced to pass a measure to touch the reserve fund of 1000 talents. She blockaded a Corinthian fleet, destined for Chios, on the Argolic coast; she laid Chios itself waste, and blockaded the town; she won back Lesbos, and gained some successes at Miletus. But Cnidus rebelled; the Peloponnesians gained an advantage in a naval engagement *Battle of Syme (Jan.?)* at the small island of Syme, and this was followed by the *Warfare in 412-11 B.C.* revolt of Rhodes. Thus by the spring of the next year the situation was that Athens had her northern and Hellespontine confederacy intact, but that on the western coast of Asia little of importance remained to her but Lesbos, Samos, Cos, and Halicarnassus. She was confronted by a formidable Peloponnesian fleet, supported by Persia and by a considerable reinforcement from Sicily—twenty-two vessels under Hermocrates, the return of Syracuse for her deliverance.

It could not be said indeed that all things had gone

¹ Jowett.

*Alcibiades
leaves
Sparta,
412 B.C.
(autumn).*

smoothly between Persia and Lacedaemon. Differences had arisen as to the amount of the subsidies, and a new treaty was concluded in which the rights of the king were less distinctly formulated. In the meantime Alcibiades had been cultivating the friendship of Tissaphernes at Miletus, and had on that account become an object of suspicion at Sparta. He had a bitter enemy in king Agis, whose wife he had seduced. Seeing that his life was in danger, he had left Miletus and gone to the court of the satrap, where he began a new series of machinations with a view to his own return to Athens. Indeed his work at Sparta had now been done, and political changes which were in the air at Athens invited the formation of new schemes. The man who had done much to bring about the alliance of Tissaphernes with Sparta now set himself to dissolve that union and bring about an understanding between the satrap and Athens. It was a matter of supreme moment to Athens to break the formidable union of Persia with her enemies, and the accomplishment of this service would go far to restore Alcibiades to his country.

SECT. 7. THE OLIGARCHIC REVOLUTION

*The
Lysistrata
of Aristophanes,
411 B.C.,
Jan.-Feb.*

At Athens in these months there was distress, fear, and discontent. How deeply the people felt the pressure of the long war is uttered in the comedy of *Lysistrata* or "Dame Disbander" which the poet Aristophanes brought out at this crisis. The heroine unites all the women of the belligerent cities of Greece into a league to force the men to make peace. Under the ribald humour there pierces here and there a note of pathos not to be found in the poet's earlier peace plays, the *Acharnians* and the *Peace*. War is not a time for marrying and giving in marriage. "Never mind us married women," says Lysistrata; "it is the thought of the maidens growing old at home that goes to my heart." "Do not men grow old too?" asks a Proboulos who argues with her. "Ah, but it is not the same thing. A man, though his hair be gray, can soon pick up a young girl; but a woman's season is short, and, if she miss her chance then, no one will marry her."

But the fear of Persia was the shadow which brooded darkest over Athens at this time, and there was also a lurking

suspicion of treachery, a dread that the oligarchical party were planning a revolution or even intriguing with the enemy at Decelea. Two months after the *Lysistrata*, at the great feast of Dionysus, Aristophanes brought out a play whose plot had nothing to do with politics—the “Celebrants of the Thesmophoria.” But the fears that were in the hearts of many were echoed by the poet, when his chorus called upon Athena, “the sole keeper of our city,” to come as *the hater of tyrants*.

Thesmo-
phoria-
zusae
(March to
April,
411 B.C.).

Lovers of the democracy might well pray to the guardian lady of the city. The opportunity for which the oligarchs had waited so long had come at last. For outside their own ranks there was a large section of influential men who were dissatisfied with the existing forms of government and, though opposed to oligarchy, desired a modification of the constitution. There was a fair show of reason for arguing that the foreign policy had been mismanaged by the democracy, and that men of education and knowledge had not a sufficient influence on the conduct of affairs. The chief of those who desired to see the establishment of a moderate polity—neither an extreme democracy nor an oligarchy, but partaking of both—was Theramenes, whose father Hagnon was one of the Probuli. The watchword of Theramenes and his party was “the old constitution of our fathers.” By this they meant not the constitution of Solon, but the constitution before Solon. They interpreted the whole history of Athens in accordance with their political views. They condemned Solon as the author of democracy, the first of a long line of mischievous demagogues; they made out that the Areopagus, and not Themistocles, was the hero of Salamis; they branded Aristides, founder of the Delian confederacy, for organising a system which fed 20,000 idlers on the allied cities; they represented Pericles as a man of no ideas of his own, but depending upon others to prompt him. After two centuries of evil government, the Athenians must go back to the times before Solon and revive in some new form the constitution of Dracon. This “constitution of Dracon,” of which the chief feature was a Council of Four Hundred, had never existed; it was fathered upon Dracon by Theramenes and his friends.

The
moderate
revolu-
tionists.

Thera-
menes.
ἡ πατρίος
πολιτεία
(Dracon's
constitu-
tion).

The extreme oligarchs, though the ideal of Theramenes was

Antiphon.

not theirs, were ready in the first instance to act in concert with the moderate party for the purpose of upsetting the democracy. The soul of the plot was Antiphon of Rhamnus, an eloquent orator and advocate, who had made his mark in the days of Cleon. He was unpopular, on account of his undisguised oligarchical views; the historian Thucydides describes him as "a man who in virtue fell short of none of his contemporaries"; and by *virtue* is meant disinterested and able devotion to his party. Other active conspirators were Pisander, who had been in old days a partisan of Cleon, and Phrynichus, who was one of the commanders of the fleet stationed at Samos. The prospects of the movement were good; it was favoured by the Probuli and by most of the officers of the fleet. Moreover, the Athenians—as they had shown already by the appointment of the Probuli—were in a temper, with the fear of Persia before their eyes, to sacrifice their constitution if such a sacrifice would save the city. Alcibiades had entered into negotiations with the officers at Samos, promising to secure an alliance with Tissaphernes, but representing the abolition of democracy as a necessary condition. Most of the oligarchical conspirators were pleased with the scheme, and even the army was seduced by the idea of receiving pay from the Great King. Some indeed of the more sagacious thought they saw through the designs of Alcibiades; and Phrynichus, who aspired himself to be the leader of the revolution, detected a rival and tried by various intrigues to thwart him. Alcibiades was certainly no friend of oligarchy; but it was his policy in any case to upset the existing democracy, which would never recall him. If an oligarchy were established, he might intervene to restore the democracy, and in return for such a service all would be forgiven. But he would have to be guided by events.

*Pisandros
at Athens.*

Pisander was sent to Athens to prepare the way for the return of Alcibiades and a modification of the democracy. The people were at first indignant at the proposals to change the constitution and recall the renegade; the Eumolpidae denounced the notion of having any dealings with the profaner of the Mysteries. But the cogent argument that the safety of Athens depended on separating Persia from the Peloponnesians, and that this could be managed only by Alcibiades, and that the Great King would not trust Athens so long as she was

governed by a popular constitution, had its effect; and there was moreover powerful but secret influence at work through the Hetaeriae or political clubs. It was voted that Pisander and other envoys should be sent to negotiate a treaty with (*? Feb.*) Tissaphernes and arrange matters with Alcibiades.

It appeared at once that Alcibiades had promised more than he could perform. There had indeed been a serious rupture between Tissaphernes and Sparta. Lichas, a Spartan commissioner who conferred with the satrap, denounced the terms of the treaties. He pointed out the monstrous consequences of the clause which assigned to the king power over all the countries which his ancestors had held; for this would involve Persian dominion over Thessaly and other lands of northern Greece. On such terms, he said, we will not have our fleet paid, and he asked for a new treaty. Tissaphernes departed in anger. But when it came to a question of union with Athens, Tissaphernes showed that he did not wish to break with the Peloponnesians. He proposed impossible conditions to the Athenian envoys, and then made a new treaty with the Spartans, modifying the clause to which Lichas objected. The territory which the Spartans recognised as Persian was now expressly confined to Asia.

But though the reasons for a revolution, so far as they concerned Tissaphernes and Alcibiades, seemed thus to be removed, the preparations had advanced so far that the result of the mission of Pisander produced no effect on the course of events. The conspirators did not scruple to use menaces and even violence; Androcles, a strong democrat, who had been prominent in procuring the condemnation of Alcibiades, was murdered. Some others of less note were made away with in like manner; and there was a general feeling of fear and mistrust in the city. But there was a widespread conviction that the existence of Athens was at stake and that some change in the constitution was inevitable. The news that Abydus and Lampsacus had revolted may have hastened the final act. The revolution was peaceably effected through the co-operation of the Ten Probuli, with the most punctilious regard for legal forms. A decree was passed that the Probuli and twenty others chosen by the people should form a commission of thirty who should jointly devise proposals for the safety of the state

*Sparta and
Tissaphernes.*

*The re-
volution at
Athens.*

*(End of
April.)*

*(April to
May,
411 B.C.)*

and lay them before the Assembly on a fixed day. When the day came, the Assembly met at the temple of Poseidon at Colonus, about a mile from the town. After preliminary measures to secure impunity for a proposal involving a subversion of existing laws, a radical change was brought forward and carried. The sovereign Assembly was to consist in future not of the whole people, but of a body of about Five Thousand, those who were strongest physically and financially. A hundred men were to be chosen, ten by each tribe, for the purpose of electing and enrolling the Five Thousand. Pay for almost all public offices was to be abolished. To these revolutionary measures a saving clause was attached: they were to remain in force "as long as the war lasts"; and thus the people was more easily induced to pass them.

(May.)

*Scheme of
a polity.*

But this was only preliminary; a constitution had still to be framed. When the Five Thousand were elected, they chose a commission of one hundred men to draw up a constitution. The scheme which they framed is highly remarkable as a criticism on certain defects in the constitution which was now to be overthrown. The body of Five Thousand were not to act as an Assembly; there was in fact to be no Assembly. The Five Thousand were to be divided into four parts, and each part was to act as Council for a year in turn. The Council would elect the higher magistrates from its own number. Thus the difficulties of administration which arose in the double system, where the Council's action was hampered by the Assembly, would be done away with; and the inclusion of the generals and magistrates in the Council was a necessary consequence. Under the democracy, the holders of office could influence the Assembly against the Council; under the new scheme there would be no room for such collisions.

*Council of
Four
Hundred.*

One fatal defect in this scheme was the size of the administrative body, and if it had been tried we may be sure that it would not have worked. But it was never tried. It passed the Assembly as a scheme to come into force in the future; but in the meantime a further proposal of the Hundred commissioners enacted that the state should be administered by a Council of Four Hundred, in which each of the ten tribes was to be represented by forty members. It would seem, but it is not quite certain, that the election of the

Council was managed in the following way. The Assembly which created it chose five men under the title of *presidents*, 5 *proedroi*, who were empowered to nominate one hundred councillors, and each of these councillors co-opted three others; but both the presidents in their nomination and the one hundred councillors in their co-option were limited to a number of candidates who were previously chosen by the tribes. The Four Hundred were instituted as merely a provisional government, but the entire administration was placed in their hands, the management of the finances, and the appointment of the magistrates. The Five Thousand were to meet only when summoned by the Four Hundred, so that the Assembly ceased to have any significance, and the provisional constitution was an unadulterated oligarchy. The Council of Four Hundred was proclaimed to be a revival of the imaginary constitution of Dracon, under which Athens flourished before demagogues led her into evil paths; but the whole fabric of Cleisthenes, the ten tribes and the demes, was retained. The existing Council of Five Hundred went out of office before the end of the civil year, and seven days later the administration of the Four Hundred began. Throughout these transactions intimidation was freely used by the conspirators, and we are told that they went with hidden daggers into the council-chamber and forced the Five Hundred to retire. Thucydides admires the ability of the men who carried out this revolution. "An easy thing it certainly was not, one hundred years after the fall of the tyrants, to destroy the liberties of the Athenian people, who were not only a free, but during more than one-half of this time had been an imperial, people."¹

Council of Five Hundred goes out of office, 14 Thargelion (end of May); Four Hundred enter on office, 22 Thargelion, 411 B.C.

It may be asked why a provisional government was introduced, instead of proceeding at once to the establishment of the permanent constitution which the Hundred commissioners had framed. Here we touch upon the inwardness of the political situation: the two constitutions betray the double influence at work in the revolution. The establishment of the Four Hundred was a concession made to Antiphon and the oligarchs by Theramenes and the moderates, who regarded it as only preliminary; while the oligarchs hoped to render it permanent.

¹ Jowett.

SECT. 8. FALL OF THE FOUR HUNDRED. THE POLITY.
THE DEMOCRACY RESTORED

*Rule of the
Four
Hundred,
June-Sept.*

For more than three months the Four Hundred governed the city with a high hand, and then they were overthrown. Their success had been largely due to the absence of so many of the most democratic citizens in the fleet at Samos; and it was through the attitude of the fleet that their fall was brought about. The sailors rose against the oligarchic officers and the oligarchs of Samos, who were conspiring against the popular party and had murdered the exile Hyperbolus. The chief leaders of this reaction were Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, who persuaded the soldiers and sailors to proclaim formally their adhesion to the democracy and their hostility to the Four Hundred. The Assembly, which had been abolished at Athens, was called into being at Samos, and the army, representing the Athenian people, deposed the Generals and elected others. The Athenians at Samos felt that they were in as good a position as the Athenians at Athens, and they hoped still to obtain the alliance of Persia, through the good offices of Alcibiades, whose recall and pardon were formally voted. Thrasybulus fetched Alcibiades to Samos, and he was elected a General. The hoped-for alliance with Persia was not effected, but it was at least something that Tissaphernes did not use the large Phoenician fleet which he had at Aspendus against the Athenians, and that his relations with the Peloponnesians were becoming daily worse. He went to Aspendus, but he never brought the ships, and it was a matter of speculation what the object of his journey was. Thucydides records his own belief that Tissaphernes "wanted to wear out and to neutralise the Hellenic forces; his object was to damage them both, while he was losing time in going to Aspendus, and to paralyse their action and not strengthen either of them by his alliance. For if he had chosen to finish the war, finished it might have been once for all, as any one may see."¹ The Athenians at Samos now proposed to sail straight to Athens and destroy the Four Hundred. The proposal shows how much the fleet despised the Peloponnesian navy, which, under

*The policy
of Tissa-
phernes.*

¹ Jowett.

its incompetent admiral Astyochus, had been spending the summer in doing nothing. But to leave Samos would have been madness, and Alcibiades saved them from the blunder of sacrificing Ionia and the Hellespont. Negotiations were begun with the oligarchs at Athens, and Alcibiades expressed himself satisfied with the Assembly of Five Thousand, but insisted that the Four Hundred should be abolished.

As a matter of fact the overtures from Samos were welcome to the majority of the Four Hundred, who were dissatisfied with their colleagues and their own position. The nature of an oligarchy which supplants a democracy was beginning to show itself. "The instant an oligarchy is established," says Thucydides, "the promoters of it disdain mere equality, and everybody thinks that he ought to be far above everybody else. Whereas in a democracy, when an election is made, a man is less disappointed at a failure because he has not been competing with his equals."¹ Moreover, the Four Hundred were at first professedly established as merely a temporary government, preliminary to the establishment of a polity which would be less an oligarchy than a qualified democracy. Such a polity was the ideal of Theramenes, and he was impatient to constitute it. Thus there was a cleavage in the Four Hundred, the extreme oligarchs on one side, led by Antiphon and Phrynichus, the moderate reformers on the other, led by Theramenes. While the moderates had the support of the army at Samos behind them, the extreme party looked to the enemy for support and sent envoys to Sparta for the purpose of concluding a peace. In the meantime they fortified Eetionea, the mole which formed the northern side of the entrance to the Great Harbour of Piraeus. The object was to command the entrance so as to be able either to admit the Lacedaemonians or to exclude the fleet of Samos.

When the envoys returned from Sparta without having made terms, and when a Peloponnesian squadron was seen in the Saronic gulf, the movement against the oligarchs took shape. Phrynichus was slain by foreign assassins in the market-place. The soldiers who were employed in building the fort at Eetionea were instigated by Theramenes to declare against the oligarchy, and, after a great tumult at the Piraeus,

¹ Jowett.

the walls of the fort were pulled down, to the cry of "Whoever wishes the Five Thousand, and not the Four Hundred, to rule, let him come and help." Nobody in the crowd really knew whether the Five Thousand existed as an actually constituted body or not. When the fort was demolished, an Assembly was held in the theatre on the slope of Munychia; the agitation subsided, and peaceable negotiations with the Four Hundred ensued. A day was fixed for an Assembly in the theatre of Dionysus, to discuss a settlement on the basis of the constitution of the Five Thousand. But on the very day, just as the Assembly was about to meet, the appearance of a Lacedaemonian squadron, which had been hovering about, off the coast of Salamis, produced a temporary panic and a general rush to the Piraeus. It was only a fright, so far as the Piraeus was concerned, but there were other serious dangers ahead, as every one saw. The safety of Euboea was threatened, and the Athenians depended entirely on Euboea, now that they had lost Attica. The Lacedaemonian fleet—forty-two ships under Agesandridas—doubled Sunium and sailed to Oropus. The Athenians sent thirty-six ships under Thymochares to Eretria, where they were forced to fight at once and were utterly defeated. All Euboea then revolted, except Oreus in the north, which was a settlement of Athenian cleruchs.

*Revolt of
Euboea
(early in
September).*

At no moment perhaps—since the Persian War—was the situation at Athens so alarming. She had no reserve of ships, the army at Samos was hostile, Euboea, from which she derived her supplies, was lost, and there was feud and sedition in the city. It was a moment which might have inspired the Lacedaemonians to operate with a little vigour both by land and sea. Athens could not have resisted a combined attack of Agis from Decelea and Agesandridas at the Piraeus. But the Lacedaemonians were, as Thucydides observes, very convenient enemies, and they let the opportunity slip. The battle of Eretria struck, however, the hour of doom for the oligarchs. An Assembly in the Pnyx deposed the Four Hundred, and voted that the government should be placed in the hands of a body consisting of all those who could furnish themselves with arms, which body should be called the Five Thousand. Legislators (*nomothetae*) were appointed to draw

*(Sept.)
"Polity"
or moderate
democracy
established
at Athens.*

up the details of the constitution, and all pay for offices was abolished. Most of the oligarchs escaped to Decelea, and one of them betrayed the fort of Oenoe on the frontier of Boeotia to the enemy. Two—Antiphon and Archeptolemus—were executed.

The chief promoter of the new constitution was Theramenes. It was a constitution such as he had conceived from the beginning, though apparently not actually the same as that which had been proposed by the Hundred commissioners. Thucydides praises it as a constitution in which the rule of the many and the rule of the few were fairly tempered. It was the realisation of the ultimate intentions of most of those who had promoted the original resolution. It is certain that Theramenes, from the very beginning, desired to organise a polity, with democracy and oligarchy duly mixed; his acquiescence in a temporary oligarchy was a mere matter of necessity; and the nickname of *Cothurnus*—the loose buskin that fits either foot—given to him by the oligarchs was not deserved.

In the meantime the supine Spartan admiral Astyochus had been superseded by Mindarus, and the Peloponnesian fleet, invited by Pharnabazus, sailed for the Hellespont. The Athenian fleet under Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus followed, and forced them to fight in the straits. The Athenians, with seventy-six ships, were extended along the shore of the Chersonese, and the object of the Peloponnesians, who had ten more ships, was to outflank and so prevent the enemy from sailing out of the straits, and at the same time to press their centre in upon the land. The Athenians, to thwart this intention, extended their own right wing, and in doing so weakened the whole line. The Peloponnesians were victorious on the centre, but Thrasybulus, who was on the right wing, took advantage of their disorder in the moment of victory and threw them into panic. The engagement on the Athenian left was round the Cape of Cynossema, out of sight of the rest of the battle, and resulted after hard fighting in the repulse of the Peloponnesians. This victory heartened the Athenians; it was followed immediately by the recovery of Cyzicus, which had revolted. Mindarus had to send for the squadron which lay in the waters of Euboea; but only a remnant reached

*Battle of
Cynossema,
411 B.C.*

him: the rest of the ships were lost in a storm off Mt. Athos. Another Athenian success at Abydus closed the military operations of the year. Tissaphernes was ill satisfied with the success of Athens, and when Alcibiades paid him a visit at Sardis during the winter, he arrested him. But Alcibiades made his escape.

*Battle of
Cyzicus,
410 B.C.*

The Peloponnesians were now vigorously assisted by Pharnabazus, who was a far more valuable and trustworthy ally than Tissaphernes. In the spring Mindarus laid siege to Cyzicus, and the satrap supported him with an army. The Athenian fleet of eighty-six ships succeeded in passing the Hellespont unseen, and in three divisions, under Alcibiades, Theramenes, and Thrasybulus, took Mindarus by surprise. After a hard-fought battle both by land and sea, the Athenians were entirely victorious, Mindarus was slain, and about sixty triremes were taken or sunk. This annihilated the Peloponnesian navy. A laconic despatch, announcing the defeat to the Spartan ephors, was intercepted by the Athenians: "Our success is over; Mindarus is slain; the men are starving; we know not what to do." Sparta immediately made proposals of peace to Athens on the basis of the *status quo*. It would have been wise of Athens to accept the offer, and obtain relief from the pressure of the garrison at Decelea. But there is no doubt that the feeling in the navy was entirely against a peace which did not include the restoration of the power of Athens in the Aegean and Asia Minor; and the victory of Cyzicus seemed to assure the promise of its speedy recovery, notwithstanding the purse of Pharnabazus. The Spartan overtures were rejected.

*Restora-
tion of
Athenian
democracy.*

The victory of Cyzicus led to a restoration of the unity of the Athenian state, which for a year had been divided into two parts, centred in Athens and Samos. The democratic party at Athens, encouraged by the success of the thoroughly democratic navy, were able to upset the polity of Theramenes and restore the democracy with the unlimited franchise and the Cleisthenic Council of Five Hundred. The most prominent of the leaders of this movement was Cleophon the lyremaker, a man of the same class as Hyperbolus and Cleon, and endowed with talents of the same order. Like Cleon he was a strong imperialist, and he was now the

mouthpiece of the prevailing sentiment for war. His financial ability seems to have been no less remarkable than that of Cleon. The remuneration of offices, which was an essential part of the Athenian democracy, was revived as a matter of course; but Cleophon instituted a new payment, for which his name was best remembered by posterity. This was the "Two-obol payment." Though we know that it was introduced by Cleophon, it is not recorded for what purpose it was paid or who received it. Some have supposed that it was simply the wage of the judges,—that the old fee of three obols was revived in the reduced form of two obols. But this can hardly be the case. The two-obol payment is mentioned in a manner which implies that it was something completely novel. The probability is that it was a disbursement intended to relieve the terrible pressure of the protracted war upon the poor citizens whose means of livelihood was reduced or cut off by the presence of the enemy in Attica; and we may guess that the pension of two obols a day was paid to all who were not in the receipt of other public money for their services in the field, on shipboard, or in the law courts. To give employment to the indigent by public works was another part of the policy of Cleophon, who herein followed the example of Pericles. In the first years of this statesman's influence the building of a new temple of Athena on the Acropolis was brought to a completion. It rose close to the north cliff, on the place of the oldest of all the temples on her hill, the house which from the beginning she shared with Erechtheus. He shared the new temple too,—or the old temple, as it might well be called, since, though younger than the Parthenon, it stood on the elder site and held the ancient wooden statue of the goddess and sheltered those two significant emblems, her own olive and her rival's salt-spring. Athena had now two noble mansions. But the newer building on the older site was burned down by chance about two years after its completion, and was not rebuilt for some time, so that the ruins of the temple which still stand are not, stone for stone, a memorial of the days of Cleophon. But it is well to remember that it was in years of sore need that the graceful Ionic temple with the Porch of the Maidens was built in its first shape.

The years following the rejection of the Spartan overtures

Diobelia.

The new temple of Athena Polias (so-called Erechtheum).

Recovery of Thasos ; occupation of Chrysopolis, 410 B.C. ; recovery of Colophon by Thrasyllus, 409 B.C. ; Athenians lose Pylus and Nisaea, 409 B.C. ; capture of Chalcedon and Byzantium, 408.

were marked by operations in the Propontis and its neighbourhood. The Athenians, under the able and strenuous leadership of Alcibiades, slowly gained ground. Thasos and Selymbria were won back. At Chrysopolis a toll station was established at which ships coming from the Euxine had to pay one-tenth of the value of their freight. Then Chalcedon was besieged and made tributary ; and finally Byzantium was starved into capitulation, so that Athens once more completely commanded the Bosphorus. Meanwhile Pharnabazus had made an arrangement to conduct Athenian envoys to Susa for the purpose of coming to terms with the Great King. Nearer home, Athens lost Nisaea to the Megarians ; and Pylus was at length recovered by Sparta.

*Three periods of union between Persia and Peloponnesians :
(1) 412-11,
(2) 410-7,
(3) 407-5.*

As the distinctive feature of the last eight years of the Peloponnesian War was the combination between Persia and Sparta, we may divide this period into three parts, according to the nature of the Persian co-operation. During the first two years it is the satrap Tissaphernes who supports the Peloponnesian operations, and Athens loses nearly all Ionia. Then the satrap Pharnabazus takes the place of Tissaphernes as the active ally of the Peloponnesians ; the military operations are chiefly in the Hellespont ; and Athens gradually recovers many of her losses. But the affairs of the west had begun to engage the attention of the Great King, Darius, who, aware that the jealousy of the two satraps hinders an effective policy, sends down his younger son Cyrus to take the place of Tissaphernes at Sardis, with jurisdiction over Cappadocia, Phrygia, and Lydia. The government of Tissaphernes is confined to Caria. The arrival of Cyrus on the scene marks a new turning-point in the progress of the war.

Gorgias at Olympia, 408 B.C. (July to August).

It was a strange sight to see the common enemy of Hellas ranged along with the victors of Plataea against the victors of Salamis. It was a shock to men of Panhellenic feeling, and it was fitting that at the great Panhellenic gathering at Olympia a voice of protest should be raised. Men of western Hellas beyond the sea could look with a calmer view on the politics of the east, and it was a man of western Hellas, the Leontine Gorgias himself, who lifted up an eloquent voice against the wooing of Persian favour by Greek states. "Rather," he said, "go to war against Persia."

SECT. 9. DOWNFALL OF THE ATHENIAN EMPIRE

Prince Cyrus was zealous ; but his zeal to intervene actively *Lysander.* and furnish pay to the Peloponnesian seamen might have been of little use, were it not for the simultaneous appointment of a new Spartan admiral, who possessed distinguished ability and inordinate ambition. This was Lysander, who was destined to bring the long war to its close. He gained the confidence of his seamen by his care for their interests, and he won much influence over Cyrus by being absolutely proof against the temptation of bribes,—a quality at which an oriental greatly marvelled. In prosecuting the aims of his ambition Lysander was perfectly unscrupulous, and he was a skilful diplomatist as well as an able general.

While Cyrus and Lysander were negotiating, Alcibiades, *Alcibiades at Athens, summer, 407 B.C.* after an exile of eight years, had returned to his native city. He had been elected strategos, and had received an enthusiastic welcome. Time had, in some measure, dulled the sense of the terrible injuries which he had inflicted on his country, and his share in the recent recovery of the Hellespontine cities had partly at least atoned. But it was rather hope for future benefits than forgiveness for past wrongs that moved the Athenians to let bygones be bygones. They trusted in his capacity as a general, and they thought that by his diplomatic skill they might still be able to come to terms with Persia. So a decree was passed, giving him full powers for the conduct of the war, and he was solemnly freed from the curse which rested upon him as profaner of the Eleusinian rites. He had an opportunity of making his peace with the divinities of Eleusis. Ever since the occupation of Decelea, which he had done so much to bring about, the annual procession from Athens along the Sacred Way to the Eleusinian shrine had been suspended, and the mystic Iacchus had been conveyed by sea. Under the auspices of Alcibiades, who protected the *(September.)* procession by an escort of troops, the solemnity was once more celebrated in the usual way. It is possible that, if he had been bold enough to seize the opportunity of this tide of popularity, he might have established a tyranny at Athens ; but he probably thought that such a venture would hardly be

*Battle of
Notion,
autumn,
407 B.C.*

safe until he achieved further military or diplomatic successes. The opportunity was lost and did not recur. A slight incident completely changed the current of feeling in Athens. An Athenian fleet was at Notion, keeping guard on Ephesus, and Lysander succeeded in defeating it and capturing fifteen ships. Though Alcibiades was not present at the battle, he was responsible, and he lost his prestige at Athens, where the tidings of a decisive victory was confidently expected. New generals were appointed immediately, and Alcibiades withdrew to a castle on the Hellespont which he had provided for himself as a refuge in case of need. Conon succeeded him in the chief command of the navy.

*Battle of
Arginusæ,
406 B.C.*

The Peloponnesians during the following winter organised a fleet of greater strength than they had had for many years—140 ships; but Lysander had to make place for a new admiral, Callicratidas. The Peloponnesians at first carried all before them. The fort of Delphinion in Chios, and the town of Methymna in Lesbos were taken; Conon, who had only seventy ships, was forced into a battle outside Mytilene and lost thirty triremes in the action. The remainder were blockaded in the harbour of Mytilene. The situation was critical, and Athens did not underrate the danger. The gold and silver dedications in the temples of the Acropolis were melted to defray the costs of a new armament; freedom was promised to slaves, citizenship to resident aliens, for their services in the emergency; and at the end of a month Athens and her allies sent a fleet of 150 triremes to relieve Mytilene. Callicratidas, who had now 170 ships, left 50 to maintain the blockade and sailed with the rest to meet the foe. A great battle was fought near the islets of the Arginusæ, south of Lesbos, and the Athenians were victorious. Seventy Spartan ships were sunk or taken, and Callicratidas was slain. An untimely north wind hindered the victors from rescuing the crews of their wrecked ships, as well as from sailing to Mytilene to destroy the rest of the hostile fleet.

*Trial of
the
generals.*

The success had not been won without a certain sacrifice; twenty-five ships had been lost with their crews. It was believed that many of the men, floating about on the wreckage, might have been saved if the officers had taken proper measures. The commanders were blamed; the matter was

taken up by politicians at Athens; the generals were suspended from their office and summoned to render an account of their conduct. They shifted the blame on the trierarchs; and the trierarchs, one of whom was Theramenes, in order to shield themselves, accused the generals of not having issued the orders for rescue until the high wind made the execution impossible. We are not in a position to judge the question; for the decision must entirely depend on the details of the situation, and as to the details we have no certainty. It is not clear, for instance, whether the storm was sufficiently violent to prevent any attempt at a rescue. The presumption is, however, that the Athenian people were right in the conviction that there had been criminal negligence somewhere, and the natural emotion of indignation which they felt betrayed them into committing a crime themselves. The question was judged by the Assembly, and not by the ordinary courts. Two sittings were held, and the eight generals who had been present at Arginusae were condemned to death and confiscation of property. Six, including Thrasyllus and Pericles, son of the great statesman, were executed; the other two had prudently kept out of the way. Whatever were the rights of the case, the penalty was unduly severe; but the worst feature of the proceedings was that the Assembly violated a recognised usage¹ of the city by pronouncing sentence on all the accused together, instead of judging the case of each separately. Formally illegal indeed it was not; for the supporters of the generals had not the courage to apply the *Graphe Paranomon*. Protests had no effect on the excited multitude, thirsty for vengeance. It was an interesting incident that the philosopher Socrates, who happened on the fatal day to be one of the prytaneis, objected to putting the motion. All constitutions, democracy like oligarchy and monarchy, have their own dangers and injustices; this episode illustrates the gravest kind of injustice which a primary Assembly, swayed by a sudden current of violent feeling and unchecked by any responsibility, sometimes commits,—and repents.

The victory of Arginusae restored to the Athenians the command of the eastern Aegean, and induced the Lacedaemonians to repeat the same propositions of peace which they

¹ The principle was formulated in the Psephism of Cannōnus.

*Conspiracy
of the
straw-
bearers at
Chios.*

had made four years ago after the battle of Cyzicus: namely, that Decelea should be evacuated and that otherwise each party should remain just as it was. Through the influence of the demagogue Cleophon, who is said to have come into the Assembly drunk, the offer was rejected. Nothing was left for the Spartans but to reorganise their fleet. Eteonicus had gathered together the remnants of the ships and gone to Chios, but he was unable to pay the seamen, who were forced to work as labourers on the fields of Chian farmers. In the winter this means of support failed, and threatened by starvation, they formed a conspiracy to pillage the town of Chios. The conspirators agreed to wear a straw in order to recognise one another. Eteonicus discovered the plot, but there were so many straw-bearers that he shrank from an open conflict, and devised a stratagem. Walking through the streets of Chios, attended by fifteen armed men, he met a man who suffered from ophthalmia, coming out of a surgeon's house, and seeing that he wore a straw, ordered him to be put to death. A crowd gathered and demanded why the man was put to death; the reply was, "Because he wore a straw." When the news spread, every straw-bearer was so frightened that he threw his straw away. The Chians then consented to supply a month's pay for the men, who were immediately embarked.

*Lysander
in
command
again,
405 B.C.*

*His
influence
with Cyrus.*

This incident shows that money had ceased to flow in from Persia. It was generally felt that if further Persian co-operation was to be secured and the Peloponnesian cause to be restored, the command of the fleet must again be entrusted to Lysander. But there was a law at Sparta that no man could be navarch a second time. On this occasion the law was evaded by sending Lysander out as secretary, but on the understanding that the actual command lay with him and not with the nominal admiral. Lysander visited Cyrus at Sardis, asserted his old influence over him, and obtained the money he required. With the help of organised parties in the various cities, he soon fitted out a fleet. An unlooked-for event gave him still greater power and prestige. King Darius was very ill, his death was expected, and Cyrus was called to his bedside. During his absence, Cyrus entrusted to his friend Lysander the administration of his satrapy, and the tribute. He knew that money was no temptation to this exceptional

Spartan, and he feared to trust such power to a Persian noble.

With these resources behind him, Lysander speedily proved his ability. Attacked at Ephesus by the Athenian fleet under Conon, he declined battle; then, when the enemy had dispersed, he sailed forth, first to Rhodes, and then across the Aegean to the coast of Attica, where he had a consultation with Agis. Recrossing the Aegean, he made for the Hellespont and laid siege to Lampsacus. The Athenian fleet of 180 ships reunited and followed him thither. Lampsacus had been taken before they reached Sestos, but they determined now to force him to accept the battle which he had refused at Ephesus, and with this view proceeded along the coast till they reached Aegospotami, "Goat's rivers," an open beach without harbourage, over against Lampsacus. It was a bad position, as all the provisions had to be fetched from Sestos at a distance of about two miles, while the Peloponnesian fleet was in an excellent harbour with a well-supplied town behind. Sailing across the strait, the Athenians found the enemy drawn up for battle but under orders not to move until they were attacked, and in such a strong position that an attack would have been unwise. They were obliged to return to Aegospotami. For four days the same thing happened. Each day the Athenian fleet sailed across the strait and endeavoured to lure Lysander into an engagement; each day its efforts were fruitless. From his castle in the neighbourhood Alcibiades descried the dangerous position of the Athenians, and riding over to Aegospotami earnestly counselled the generals to move to Sestos. His sound advice was received with coldness, perhaps with insult. When the fleet returned from its daily cruise to Lampsacus, the seamen used to disembark and scatter on the shore. On the fifth day Lysander sent scout ships which, as soon as the Athenian crews had gone ashore for their meal, were to flash a bright shield as a signal. When the signal was given, the whole Peloponnesian squadron, consisting of about 200 galleys, rowed rapidly across the strait and found the Athenian fleet defenceless. There was no battle, no resistance. Twenty ships, which were in a condition to fight, escaped; the remaining 160 were captured at once. It was generally believed that there was treachery among the generals, and it is possible

*Victory of
Lysander
at Aegospotami
(end of
summer,
405 B.C.).*

that Adeimantus, who was taken prisoner and spared, had been bribed by Lysander. All the Athenians who were taken, to the number of three or four thousand, were put to death. The chief commander Conon, who was not among the unready, succeeded in getting away. Greek ships usually unshipped their sails when they prepared for a naval battle, and the sails of the Peloponnesian triremes had been deposited at Cape Abarnis, near Lampsacus. Informed of this, Conon boldly shot across to Abarnis, seized the sails, and so deprived Lysander of the power of an effective pursuit. It would have been madness for the responsible commander to return to Athens with the tidings of such a terrible disaster; and Conon, sending home twelve of the twenty triremes which had escaped, sailed himself with the rest to the protection of Evagoras, the king of Salamis in Cyprus. Never was a decisive victory gained with such small sacrifice as that which Lysander gained at Aegospotami.

*Situation
at Athens.*

The tidings of ruin reached the Piraeus at night, and "on that night not a man slept." The city remembered the cruel measure which it had once and again meted out to others, as to Melos and Scione, and shuddered at the thought that even such measure might now be meted out to itself. It was hard for the Athenians to realise that at one blow their sea-power was annihilated, and they had now to make preparations for sustaining a siege. But the blockade was deferred by the policy of Lysander. He did not intend to attack Athens but to starve it into surrender, and with this view he drove all the Athenian cleruchs whom he found in the islands to Athens, in order to swell the starving population. Having completed the subjugation of the Athenian empire in the Hellespont and Thrace, and ordered affairs in those regions, Lysander sailed at length into the Saronic gulf with 150 ships, occupied Aegina, and blockaded the Piraeus. At the same time the Spartan king Pausanias entered Attica, and, joining forces with Agis, encamped in the Academe, west of the city. But the walls were too strong to attack, and at the beginning of winter the army withdrew, while the fleet remained near the Piraeus. As provisions began to fail, the Athenians made a proposal of peace, offering to resign their empire and become allies of Lacedaemon. The envoys were turned back at Sellasia; they

would not be received by the ephors unless they brought more acceptable terms; and it was intimated that the demolition of the Long Walls for a length of ten stades was an indispensable condition of peace. It was folly to resist, yet the Athenians resisted. The demagogue Cleophon, who had twice hindered the conclusion of peace when it might have been made with honour, first after Cyzicus, then after Arginusae, now hindered it again when it could be made only with humiliation. An absurd decree was passed that no one should ever propose to accept such terms. But the danger was that such obstinacy would drive the enemy into insisting on an unconditional surrender; for the situation was hopeless. Theramenes undertook to visit Lysander and endeavour to obtain more favourable conditions, or at all events to discover how matters lay. His real object was to gain time and let the people come to their senses. He remained three months with Lysander, and when he returned to Athens, he found the citizens prepared to submit on any terms whatever. People were dying of famine, and the reaction of feeling had been marked by the execution of Cleophon, who was condemned on the charge of evading military service. Theramenes was sent to Sparta with full powers. It is interesting to find that during these anxious months a decree was passed recalling to Athens an illustrious citizen, who had been found wanting as a general, but whose genius was to make immortal the war now drawing to its close—the historian Thucydides.

*Athens
submits.*

An assembly of the Peloponnesian allies was called together at Sparta to determine how they should deal with the fallen foe. The general sentiment was that no mercy should be shown; that Athens should be utterly destroyed and the whole people sold into slavery. But Sparta never felt the same bitterness towards Athens as that which animated Corinth and Thebes; she was neither a neighbour nor a commercial rival. The destruction of Athens might have been politically profitable, but Sparta, with all her faults, could on occasion rise to nobler views. She resolutely rejected the barbarous proposal of the Confederacy; she would not blot out a Greek city which had done such noble services to Greece against the Persian invader. That was more than two generations ago, but it was not to be forgotten; Athens was saved

*Conditions
of Peace
imposed on
Athenians.*

404 B.C.
April.

by her past. The terms of the Peace were: the Long Walls and fortifications of the Piræus were to be destroyed; the Athenians lost all their foreign possessions, but remained independent, confined to Attica and Salamis; their whole fleet was forfeited; all exiles were allowed to return; Athens became the ally of Sparta, pledged to follow her leadership. When the terms were ratified, Lysander sailed into the Piræus. The demolition of the Long Walls immediately began. The Athenians and their conquerors together pulled them down to the music of flute-players; and the jubilant allies thought that freedom had at length dawned for the Greeks. Lysander permitted Athens to retain twelve triremes, and, having inaugurated the destruction of the fortifications, sailed off to reduce Samos.

It is not to be supposed that all Athenians were dejected and wretched at the terrible humiliation which had befallen their native city. There were numerous exiles who owed their return to her calamity; and the extreme oligarchic party rejoiced in the foreign occupation, regarding it as an opportunity for the subversion of the democracy and the re-establishment of a constitution like that which had been tried after the Sicilian expedition. Theramenes looked forward to making a new attempt to introduce his favourite polity. Of the exiles, the most prominent and determined was Critias, son of Callaeschrus, and a member of the same family as the lawgiver Solon. He was a man of many parts, a pupil of Gorgias and a companion of Socrates, an orator, a poet, and a philosopher. A combination was formed between the exiles and the home oligarchs; a common plan of action was organised; and the chief democratic leaders were presently seized and imprisoned.

*Institution
of the
Thirty
by the
psephism of
Dracontides
(summer,
404).*

The intervention of Lysander was then invoked for the establishing of a new constitution, and awed by his presence, the Assembly passed a measure proposed by Dracontides, that a body of Thirty should be nominated, for the purpose of drawing up laws and managing public affairs until the code should be completed. The oligarchs did not take the trouble of repealing the Graphe Paranomon before the introduction of the measure; they felt sure of their power. Critias, Theramenes, and Dracontides were among the Thirty who were appointed.

The ruin of the power of Athens had fallen out to the

advantage of the oligarchical party, and it has even been suspected that the oligarchs had for many years past deliberately planned to place the city at the mercy of the enemy, for the ulterior purpose of destroying the democracy. The part played by Theramenes in the condemnation of the generals who had the indiscretion to win Arginusae, the parts he subsequently played in negotiating the Peace and in establishing the oligarchy, the serious suspicions of treachery in connexion with the disaster of Aegospotami, have especially suggested this conjecture. The attempt of the Four Hundred on a previous occasion to come to terms with Sparta may be taken into account, and the comparatively lenient terms imposed on Athens might seem to point in the same direction. One thing seems certain. The oligarchic party had been distinctly aiming at peace, and the repeated opposition of Cleophon (impolitic, as we have seen) indicates that he suspected oligarchical designs. It must also be admitted that the conduct of the Athenians in fixing their station at Aegospotami, and delivering themselves to the foe like sheep led to the altar, argues a measure of folly which seems almost incredible, if there were not treachery behind; and the suspicion is confirmed by the clemency shown to Adeimantus. It must, however, be acknowledged that it is hard to understand how the treason could have been effectually carried out without the connivance of Conon, the commander-in-chief; yet no suspicion seems to have been attached to him. The whole problem of the oligarchic intrigues of the last eight years of the war remains wrapped in far greater mystery than the mutilation of the Hermae.

SECT. 10. RULE OF THE THIRTY AND RESTORATION OF THE DEMOCRACY

The purpose for which the Thirty had been appointed was to frame a new constitution; their powers, as a governing body, were only to last until they had completed their legislative work. The more part of them, however, with Critias, who was the master spirit, had no serious thoughts of constructing a constitution; they regarded this as merely a pretext for getting into power; and their only object was to retain the power in

*Rule of the
Thirty,
c. Sept. 404
to May 403.*

their own hands, establishing a simple oligarchy. In this, however, they were not absolutely unanimous. One of them at least, Theramenes, had no taste for pure oligarchy, but was still genuinely intent on framing a polity, tempered of both oligarchic and democratic elements. This dissension in the views of the two ablest men, Critias and Theramenes, soon led to fatal disunion.

*First
measures.*

The first measures of the Thirty were, however, carried out with cordial unanimity. A Council of Five Hundred, consisting of strong supporters of oligarchy, was appointed, and invested with the judicial functions which had before belonged to the people. A body of Eleven, under the command of Satyrus, a violent, unscrupulous man, was appointed for police duties; and the guard of the Piræus was committed to a body of Ten. The chief democrats, who on the fall of Athens had opposed the establishment of an oligarchy, were then seized, tried by the Council, and condemned to death for conspiracy.

Disunion.

So far there was unanimity; but at this point Theramenes would have stopped. At such times, moderate counsels have small chance of winning, ranged beside the extreme policies of resolute men like Critias, who had come back in a bitter and revengeful spirit against democracy, relentlessly resolved to exercise an absolute despotism and expunge all elements of popular opposition. A polity on the broad basis which Theramenes desired was as obnoxious to Critias as the old democracy; into which, he was convinced, it would soon deviate. He and his colleagues were therefore afraid of all prominent citizens of moderate views, whether democratic or oligarchic, who were awaiting with impatience the constitution which the Thirty had been appointed to prepare,—the men on whom the polity of Theramenes, if it came into existence, would mainly rest.

The Thirty had announced as part of their programme that they would purge the city of wrong-doers. They put to death a number of men of bad character, including some notorious informers; but they presently proceeded to execute, with or without trial, not only prominent democrats, but also men of oligarchical views who, though unfriendly to democracy, were also unfriendly to injustice and illegality. Among the latter victims was Niceratus, the son of Nicias. The man whom

perhaps they had most reason to fear, Alcibiades, was beyond the seas, but they seem to have found a means to reach him. After the fall of Athens he had fled from his Hellespontine castle to the protection of Pharnabazus. The oligarchs passed a decree of banishment against him, and soon afterwards he was murdered. A certain mystery surrounds his death, but it would seem to be certain that it was brought about by the order of Pharnabazus, who acted at the suggestion of Lysander, and it was said that Lysander was instigated by the tyrants of Athens. *Death of Alcibiades.*

To the motives of fear and revenge was soon added the *Tyranny.* appetite for plunder; and some men were executed because they were rich, while many fled, happy to escape with their lives. Even metics, who had little to do with politics, were despoiled; thus the speech-writer Lysias and his brother Polemarchus, who kept a lucrative manufactory of shields, were arrested, and while Lysias succeeded in making his escape, Polemarchus was put to death. And while many Athenians were removed by hemlock or driven into banishment, others were required to assist in the revolting service of arresting fellow-citizens, in order that they might thereby become accomplices in the guilt of the government. Thus the philosopher Socrates and four others were commanded with severe threats to arrest an honest citizen, Leon of Salamis. Socrates refused without hesitation to do the bidding of the tyrants; the others were not so brave. Yet Socrates was not punished for his defiance; and this immunity was perhaps due to some feeling of piety in the heart of Critias, who had been one of his pupil-companions; a feeling which might be safely indulged, as the philosopher was neither wealthy nor popular.

To these judicial murders and this organised system of *Attitude of* plundering, Theramenes was unreservedly opposed. *Theramen-* The majority of the Council shared his disapprobation; and he would have been able to establish a moderate constitution, but for the ability and strength of Critias. His representations, indeed, induced the Thirty to broaden the basis on which their power rested by creating a body of 3000 citizens, who had the privilege of bearing arms and the right of being tried by the Council. All outside that body were liable to be condemned to death by sentence of the Thirty, without a trial. The

body of 3000 had practically no political rights, and were chosen so far as possible from known partisans of the government, the staunchest of whom were the thousand knights. This measure naturally did not satisfy Theramenes; his suggestions had, in fact, been used with a purpose very different from his,—to secure, not to alter, the government.

The exiles.

In the meantime the exiles whom the oligarchy had driven from Athens were not idle. They had found refuge in those neighbouring states—Corinth, Megara, and Thebes—which had been bitter foes of Athens, but were now undergoing a considerable change of feeling. Dissatisfaction with the high-handed proceedings of Sparta, who would not give them a share in the spoils of the war, had disposed them to look with more favour on their fallen enemy, and to feel disgust at the proceedings of the Thirty, who were under the aegis of Lysander. They were therefore not only ready to grant hospitality to Athenian exiles, but to lend some help towards delivering their city from the oppression of the tyrants. The first step was made from Thebes. Thrasybulus and Anytus, with a band of seventy exiles, seized the Attic fortress of Phyle, in the Parnes range, close to the Boeotian frontier, and put into a state of defence the strong stone walls, whose ruins are still there. The Thirty led out their forces—their faithful knights and Three Thousand hoplites—and sat down to blockade the stronghold. But a timely snowstorm broke up the blockade; the army retired to Athens; and for the next three months or more nothing further was done against Thrasybulus and the men of Phyle.

Thrasybulus seizes Phyle, c. Dec. 404. First expedition of the Thirty against Thrasybulus, Dec. 404 or Jan. 403.

Death of Theramenes, c. Jan. 403.

The oligarchs were now in a dangerous position, menaced without by an enemy against whom their attack had failed, menaced within by a strong opposition. They saw that the influence of Theramenes, who was thoroughly dissatisfied with their policy, would be thrown into the scale against them, and they resolved to get rid of him. Having posted a number of devoted creatures, armed with hidden daggers, near the railing of the council-house, Critias arose in the assembled Council and denounced Theramenes as a traitor and conspirator against the state,—a man who could not be trusted an inch, in view of those repeated tergiversations which had won him the nickname of the “Buskin.” The reply of Theramenes, denouncing

the impolicy of Critias and his colleagues, is said to have been received with applause by most of the Council, who really sympathised with him. Critias, seeing that he would be acquitted by the Council, resorted to an extreme measure. He struck the name of Theramenes out of the list of the Three Thousand;¹ and then along with his colleagues condemned him to death, since those who were not included in the list could not claim the right of trial. Theramenes leapt on the sacred Hearth and appealed for protection to the Council; but the Council was stupefied with terror, and at the command of Critias the Eleven entered and dragged the suppliant from the altar. He was borne away to prison; the hemlock was immediately administered; and when he had drunk, he tossed out a drop that remained at the bottom of the cup, as banqueters used to do in the game of kottabos, exclaiming, "This drop for the gentle Critias!" There had perhaps been a dose of truth in the reproaches which the gentle Critias had hurled at him across the floor of the council-chamber. Theramenes may have been shifty and unscrupulous where means and methods were concerned. But in his main object he was perfectly sincere. He was sincere in desiring to establish a moderate polity which should unite the merits of both oligarchy and democracy, and avoid their defects. There can be no question that he was honestly interested in trying this political experiment. And the very nature of this policy involved an appearance of insincerity and gave rise to suspicion. It led him to oscillate between the democratic and oligarchical parties, seeking to gain influence and support in both, with a view to the ultimate realisation of his middle plan. And thus the democrats suspected him as an oligarch, the oligarchs distrusted him as a democrat. In judging Theramenes, it seems fair to remember that a politician who in unsettled times desires to direct the state into a middle course between two opposite extremes can hardly avoid oscillation more or less, can rarely escape the imputation of the Buskin.

After the death of Theramenes, the Thirty succeeded in

¹ An appearance of legality seems to have been given to this act. A law was passed—presumably on the spot—that persons who had opposed the Four Hundred in 411 B.C., or taken part in destroying the fort at Eetionea, should be excluded from the constitution.

*Spartan
garrison
occupies the
Acropolis.*

disarming, by means of a stratagem, all the citizens who were not enrolled in the list of the Three Thousand, and expelled them from the city. But with a foe on Attic ground, growing in numbers every day, Critias and his fellows felt themselves so insecure, that they took the step of sending an embassy to Sparta, to ask for a Lacedaemonian garrison. The request was granted, and 700 men, under Callibius, were introduced into the Acropolis. The Thirty would never have resorted to this measure except under the dire pressure of necessity; for not only was it unpopular, but they had to pay the strangers out of their own chest.

*Second
expedition
against
Phyle,
beginning
of May,
403 B.C.*

It was perhaps in the first days of the month of May that it was resolved to make a second attempt to dislodge the democrats from Phyle. A band of the knights and the Spartan garrison sallied forth; but near Acharnae they were surprised at night and routed with great loss by Thrasybulus. This incident produced considerable alarm at Athens, and the Thirty had reason to fear that many of their partisans were wavering. Deciding to secure an eventual place of refuge in case Athens should become untenable, they seized Eleusis and put about 300 Eleusinians to death. This measure had hardly been carried out when Thrasybulus descended from Phyle and seized the Piraeus. He had now about 1000 men, but the Piraeus, without fortifications, was not an easy place to defend. He drew up his forces on the hill of Munychia, occupying the temples of Artemis and the Thracian goddess Bendis, which stood at the summit of a steep street; highest of all stood the darters and slingers, ready to shoot over the heads of the hoplites. Thus posted, with his prophet by his side, Thrasybulus awaited the attack of the Thirty, who had led down all their forces to the Piraeus. A shower of darts descended

*Battle of
Munychia.*

on their heads as they mounted the hill, and, while they wavered for a moment under the missiles, the hoplites rushed down on them, led by the prophet, who had foretold his own death in the battle and was the first to perish. Seventy of the enemy were slain; among them Critias himself. During the truce which was then granted for taking up the dead, the citizens on either side held some converse with one another, and Cleocritus, the herald of the Eleusinian Mystae, impressive both by his loud voice and by his sacred calling, addressed the

*Death of
Critias.*

adherents of the Thirty: "Fellow-citizens, why seek ye to slay us? why do ye force us into exile? us who never did you wrong. We have shared in the same religious rites and festivals; we have been your schoolfellows and choir-fellows; we have fought with you by land and sea for freedom. We adjure you, by our common gods, abandon the cause of the Thirty, monsters of impiety, who for their own gains have slain in eight months more Athenians than the Peloponnesians slew in a war of ten years. Believe that we have shed as many tears as you for those who have now fallen." This general appeal, and individual appeals in the same tone, at such an affecting moment, must have produced an effect upon the half-hearted soldiers of the Thirty, who had now lost their able and violent leader. There was dissension and discord not only among the Three Thousand and the Council, but among the Thirty themselves. It was felt that the government of the Thirty could no longer be maintained, and that if the oligarchy was to be rescued a new government must be installed. A general meeting of the Three Thousand deposed the Thirty and instituted in their stead a body of Ten, one from each tribe. One member of the Thirty was re-elected as a member of the new government, but the rest withdrew to the refuge which they had provided for themselves at Eleusis. The new body of Ten represented the views of those who were genuinely devoted to oligarchy, but disapproved of the extreme policy of Critias and his fellows. They failed to come to terms with Thrasybulus, who was every day receiving reinforcements both in men and arms; the civil war continued; and it soon appeared that it would be impossible for Athens to hold out against the democrats in the Piræus without foreign aid.

An embassy was accordingly dispatched by the Ten to Sparta; and about the same time the remnant of the Thirty at Eleusis sent a message on their own account for the same purpose. Both embassies represented the democrats at Piræus as rebels against the power of Sparta. The Lacedæmonian government, through the influence of Lysander, was induced to intervene in support of the Ten. Lysander assembled an army at Eleusis, and forty ships were sent under Libys to cut off the supplies which the democrats received by sea. The outlook was now gloomy for Thrasybulus and his company;

*The first
board of
Ten.*

*Oligarchs
appeal to
Sparta
(late
spring,
403).
Sparta
intervenes.*

*Pausanias
in
command.*

*Second
board of
Ten.*

*End of the
civil war
in Attica.*

*September
403 B.C.*

*Nomothetes
appointed.
Pro-
visional
arrange-
ment.*

but they were rescued by a disunion within the Lacedaemonian state. The influence of Lysander, which had been for the last years supreme, was perceptibly declining; the king Pausanias was his declared opponent; and many others of the governing class were jealous of his power, vexed at his arrogance, perhaps suspicious of his designs. The oligarchies which he had created at Athens and in the other cities of the Athenian empire had disgraced themselves by misgovernment and bloodshed; and the disgrace was reflected upon the fame of their creator. Lysander had hardly begun his work when Pausanias persuaded the ephors to entrust to himself the commission of restoring tranquillity at Athens; and Lysander had the humiliation of handing over to his rival the army which he had mustered. A defeat convinced Thrasybulus that it would be wise to negotiate; and on the other hand Pausanias deposed the irreconcilable Ten, and caused it to be replaced by another Ten of more moderate views. Both parties then, the city and the Piraeus alike, submitted themselves to Spartan intervention, and Sparta, under the auspices of king Pausanias, acquitted herself uncommonly well. A commission of fifteen was sent from Lacedaemon to assist the king, and a reconciliation was brought about. The terms were a general and mutual pardon for all past acts; from which were excepted only the Thirty, the Ten who had held the Piraeus under the Thirty, the Eleven who had carried out the judicial murders perpetrated by the Thirty, and the Ten who had succeeded the Thirty. All these excepted persons were required to give an account of their acts if they wished to remain at Athens. Eleusis was to form an independent state, and any Athenian who chose might migrate to Eleusis within a specified time.

The evil dream of Athens was at last over: a year and a half of oligarchical tyranny, and foreign soldiery on the Acropolis. She owed her deliverance to the energy of Thrasybulus and the discretion of Pausanias. Pausanias displayed his discretion further by not meddling with the reconciled parties in their settlement of the constitution. It was decreed, on the motion of Tisamenus, that "lawgivers" should be appointed to revise the constitution, and that in the meantime the state should be administered according to "the

laws of Solon and the institutions of Dracon." The union of the two names is significant of the conciliation. Provisionally, then, the franchise was limited to those who belonged to the first three Solonian classes—those who could at least serve as hoplites. It is noteworthy that there was an idea afloat of making the possession of landed property a qualification for political rights. But it was a totally unpractical idea. Such a test would have excluded rich men; it would have included many of the fourth class. In the end, no new experiment was tried. The lawgivers restored the old democracy with its unlimited franchise, and Athens entered upon a new stage of her career. The amnesty was faithfully kept; the democrats did not revenge themselves on the supporters of the oligarchical tyranny. But it was easier to forgive than forget; and for many years after the reconciliation a distinction was drawn, though not officially, yet in the ordinary intercourse of life, between the "men of the city" and the "men of the Piræus"—the men who had fought for freedom and those who had fought against it. That was almost inevitable; and so long as the oligarchs held Eleusis, there might even be some ground for suspecting the loyalty of their old supporters. After about two years of independent existence, Eleusis was attacked by Athens; the Eleusinian generals were captured and put to death, and the town resumed its old place as part of Attica. Henceforward, for well-nigh three generations, the Athenian democracy was perfectly secure from the danger or fear of an oligarchical revolution. That hideous nightmare of the Thirty had established it on a firmer base than ever.

(See below,
p. 156.)

CHAPTER II

THE SPARTAN SUPREMACY AND THE PERSIAN WAR

SECT. 1. THE SPARTAN SUPREMACY

*Sparta
drawn into
founding
an empire.*

SPARTA had achieved the task which she had been pressed to undertake, and had undertaken somewhat reluctantly—the destruction of the Athenian empire. It was a task which, though not imposed by the unanimous voice of Greece, appealed to a most deeply seated sentiment of the Greeks, their love of political independence. The Athenian empire had been an outrage on that sentiment, and, apart from all calculations of particular interest, the humiliation of the great offender must have been regarded, even by those who were not her enemies, with an involuntary satisfaction. The avowed aim of Sparta throughout had been to restore their liberty to those states which had been “enslaved” by Athens, and protect the liberty of those whom her ambition threatened. Now that this object was accomplished as fully as could be desired, it would have been correct for Sparta to retire into her old position, leaving the cities which had belonged to the Athenian empire to arrange their own affairs,—if her deeds were to be in accordance with her professions. The alternative course for a state in the position of Sparta was to enter frankly upon the Athenian inheritance, and pursue the aims and policy of Athens as an imperial power. Other states might have adopted this course with advantage both to themselves and Greece; for Sparta it was impossible. And so when Sparta, unable from the nature of her institutions and the character of her genius to tread in the footsteps of her fallen rival,

nevertheless resolved to take under her own dominion the cities which she had gone forth to deliver from all dominion, she not only cynically set aside her high moral professions, but entered on a path of ambition which led to calamity for herself and distress for Greece. The main feature of Greek history for the thirty years after Aegospotami is Sparta's pursuit of a policy of aggrandisement beyond the Peloponnesus; the opposition which this policy calls forth leads both to the revival of Athens as a great power and to the rise of Thebes. In the end Sparta is forced to retire into the purely Peloponnesian position for which her institutions fitted her. In the making of those institutions an activity beyond the Peloponnesus had not been contemplated; and they were too rigid to be adapted to the enlarged sphere of an Aegean dominion. Nothing short of a complete revolution in the Spartan state could have rendered her essay in empire a success; but the narrow Spartan system was too firmly based in the narrow Spartan character to suffer such a revolution.

We may wonder how far the general who had placed his country in the position of arbitress of Greece appreciated the difficulty of reconciling the political character of Lacedaemon with the rôle of an imperial city. Un-Spartan as he was in many respects, Lysander had possibly more enlightened views as to the administration of an empire than his countrymen. A story is told that when Callibius, the Spartan harmost of Athens, was knocked down by a young athlete whom he had insulted, and appealed to Lysander, he was told that he did not know how to govern freemen. To deal with freemen abroad was what the average Spartan could not do; and it was such men as Callibius that Lysander had to use for the establishment of the empire which he had resolved to found. In each of the cities which had passed from Athenian into Spartan control, a government of ten members was set up, and its authority was maintained by a Lacedaemonian *harmost* with a Lacedaemonian garrison. The cities were thus given over to a two-fold oppression. The foreign governors were rapacious and were practically free from home control; the native oligarchies were generally tyrannical, and got rid of their political opponents by judicial murders; and both decarchs and harmost played into each other's hands. Lysander exercised

*Unfitness
of Sparta
for empire.*

*Dec-
archies.
Harmosts
(= "regu-
lators").*

with a high hand and without farsightedness the dictatorship which was his for the time and might at any hour be taken from him. He was solely concerned to impose a firm military despotism on the states which had been rescued from the Athenian Confederacy.

*Contrast
between
Athenian
and
Spartan
empires.*

It is obvious that the Athenian and Spartan empires had little in common. They were, first of all, sharply contrasted through the fact that the Spartan policy was justified by no public object like that to which the Confederacy owed its origin. And this contrast was all the more flagrant, considering that after the battle of Aegospotami there was the same demand for a Panhellenic confederacy, with the object of protecting the Asiatic Greeks from Persia, as there had been after the battle of Mycale. But so far from connecting her supremacy with such an object, Sparta had abandoned the Asiatic Greeks to the Great King as the price of Persian help. Athens had won her power as the champion of the eastern Greeks; Sparta had secured her supremacy by betraying them. In the second place, the methods of the two states in exercising their power were totally different. The grievances against Athens, though real, were mainly of a sentimental nature. The worst Athens had done was to deprive some Confederate cities of autonomy; there were no complaints of tyranny, rapine, or oppression. But under the Lacedaemonian supremacy men suffered from positive acts of injustice and violence, and might seek in vain at Sparta for redress. The spirit of the system which Lysander instituted may be judged from the statement that the will of any Spartan citizen was regarded as law in the subject states. The statement comes from a friend of Lacedaemon.

*Lysander's
recall.*

The position of power which Lysander had attained in the eyes of the world, and enjoyed without moderation, could not fail to excite jealousy and apprehension at Sparta itself. He held a sort of royal court at Samos, and the Samians accorded him divine honours by calling after his name a feast which had hitherto been a feast of Hera. He was recalled to Sparta, and he obeyed the summons, bearing a letter from the satrap Pharnabazus to justify him. But when it was opened, instead of being an encomium, it was found to be a deed of accusation; and Lysander was covered with ridicule as the victim of a

Persian trick. He was permitted to escape from the situa- 403 B.C.
 tion on the plea of visiting the temple of Zeus Ammon in
 the Libyan oasis, in accordance with a vow. But his work
 remained. Lacedaemon upheld her uncongenial military des-
 potism, modifying Lysander's system only so far as not to
 insist on the maintenance of the decarchies, but to permit the
 cities to substitute other forms of government, under the aegis
 of the harmost. Financially, the empire was so constituted as
 to secure an income of a thousand talents to meet the expenses
 of Sparta in maintaining her system. The receipt of such an
 income was a political innovation, and its administration
 involved money transactions of a nature and on a scale which
 would have been severely condemned by "Lycurgus." The
 admission into the treasury of a large sum of gold and silver
 which had been brought to Sparta by Lysander was a distinct
 breach of the Lysurgian discipline. Thus, inflexible as the
 Spartan system was, the necessities of empire compelled it to
 yield at one point, and a point where attack is wont to be
 especially insidious.

The supremacy of Sparta lasted for a generation, though 404-371
 with intervals in which it was not effective; and its history B.C.
 for more than half of the period is mainly determined by her
 relations with Persia. As it had been through Persia that
 she won her supremacy, so it was through Persia that she lost 394 B.C.
 it, and through Persia that she once more regained it. 387-6 B.C.

SECT. 2. THE REBELLION OF CYRUS AND THE MARCH OF THE TEN THOUSAND

We now come to an episode which takes us into the domestic history of Persia, out of the limits of Greek geo- *Cyrus and*
 graphy into the heart of the Persian empire. On the death *Tissa-*
 of Darius, his eldest son Artaxerxes had succeeded to the *phernes.*
 throne, notwithstanding the plots of his mother Parysatis, who
 attempted to secure it for her younger and favourite son Cyrus.
 In these transactions Tissaphernes had supported Artaxerxes,
 and when Cyrus returned to his satrapy in Asia Minor,
 Tissaphernes was set to watch him. False suspicions and
 calumnies frequently lead to the actual perpetration of the


crimes which they attribute; and perhaps if he had not been suspected, Cyrus would not have formed the plan of subverting his brother and seizing the kingship. But it is far more likely that from the first Cyrus had hoped and resolved to succeed to his father's throne. For his success he relied largely on an army of Greek mercenaries which he began to enlist. The revolutions which had passed over Greek cities in recent years, both in Asia and Europe, threw into the military market large numbers of strong men eager for employment and pay. They were recruited for the prince's service by Clearchus, a Spartan, who had held the post of harmost, but had been repudiated and expelled by the ephors when he attempted to make himself tyrant of Byzantium, like a new Pausanias. Moreover, the Lacedaemonian government, which owed much to Cyrus, was induced to support him secretly, and sent him—avowedly for another purpose—seven hundred hoplites. The army which Cyrus mustered when he set forth on his march to Susa amounted to 100,000 oriental troops, and about 13,000 Greeks, of which 10,600 were hoplites.

*Cyrus
takes the
field,
spring,
401 B.C.*

Xenophon.

The purpose of the march was at first carefully concealed from the troops, nor was the secret communicated to any of the officers except Clearchus. The hill tribes of Pisidia were often troublesome to Persian satraps, and their reduction furnished a convenient pretext. Among those who were induced, by the prospect of high pay under the generous Persian prince, to join this Pisidian campaign was Xenophon, an Athenian knight, who was one of the pupils and companions of the philosopher Socrates. His famous history of the *Anabasis* or Up-going of the Greeks with Cyrus, and their subsequent retreat, has rendered the expedition a household word. The charm of the *Anabasis* depends on the simple directness and fulness with which the story is told, and the great interest of the story consists in its breaking new ground. For the first time we are privileged to follow step by step a journey through the inner parts of Asia Minor, into the heart of the Persian empire beyond the Euphrates and the Tigris. There is a charm of actuality in the early chapters, with their recurring phrases, like brief entries in a diary,—the days' marches from one city to another, the number of parasangs, and the lengths of the halts, all duly set out. "Hence Cyrus marches two





stages, ten parasangs, to Peltae, an inhabited city ; and here he remained three days."

Setting forth from Sardis, Cyrus took the south-easterly road, which led across the upper Maeander to the Phrygian Colossae, where he was joined by the troops of one of his Greek captains, the Thessalian Menon ; and thence onward to Celaenae, where he awaited the arrival of Clearchus. So far, the march had been straight to the ostensible destination, the country of Pisidia ; but now Cyrus turned in the opposite direction, and, descending the Maeander, marched northward to Peltae and Ceramon Agora or Potters' Mart. Then eastward, to the city called Cayster-Plain, close to the fort of Ipsus. Here the Greeks demanded their arrears of pay, and Cyrus had no money to satisfy them. But he was relieved from the difficulty, which might well have proved fatal to his enterprise, by the Cilician queen Epyaxa, wife of Syennesis, who arrived well laden with money. Her coming must have been connected with private negotiations between Cyrus and the Cilician governor. As the route of Cyrus lay through Cilicia, a country barred on all sides by difficult passes, it was of the greatest moment for Cyrus to come to an understanding with the ruler ; and on the other hand it was the policy of Syennesis so to order his ways that whether Cyrus succeeded or failed he might in either event be safe. As the plan of Cyrus was still a secret, it was a prudent policy to entrust the delicate negotiations to no one less safe than the queen. Having pacified the demands of his Greek mercenaries, Cyrus proceeded (by Thymbrion and Tyriaeon) to Iconium ; and thence by the road, which describes a great southern curve through Lycaonia, to Tyana. The Greeks were allowed to plunder Lycaonia, a rough country with rough people, as they passed through it. The arrangement with Syennesis seems to have been that he should make a display of resisting Cyrus, and Cyrus make a display of circumventing him. To carry out this arrangement, Menon's division, accompanied by the queen Epyaxa, diverged from the route followed by the rest of the army, and crossed the Taurus into Cilicia by a shorter route. Perhaps they struck off at Barata and passed by Laranda, on a road that led to Soli. Thus Syennesis, who, as a loyal servant of the Great King, hastened to occupy the

*March
through
Asia
Minor.*

*Ceramon
Agora
(now Iskam
Keui).*

Tarsus.

Cilician gates, the pass for which the main army of Cyrus was making, found himself taken in the rear by Menon. It was therefore useless to remain in the pass, and he retreated to a mountain stronghold: what more could a loyal servant of the Great King be expected to do? The army of Cyrus then coming up from Tyana, by Podandus, found the impregnable pass open, and descended safely to Tarsus, where it met Menon. The city and palace of the prince of Cilicia were pillaged; this perhaps was part of the pretence. It was at all events safe now for Syennesis to enter into a contract with Cyrus (a compulsory contract, the Great King would understand) to supply some money and men.

*Greeks
refuse to
proceed
further;*

It must have been dawning on the Greek troops for some time past, and at Tarsus they no longer felt any doubt, that they had been deceived as to their ultimate destination. They had long ago passed Pisidia, the ostensible object of their march, and the true object was now clear to them. They flatly refused to advance further. It was a small thing to be asked to take the field against the forces of the Great King; but it was no such light matter to be asked to undertake a march of three months into the centre of Asia. To be at a distance of three months from the sea-coast was a terrible idea for a Greek. Clearchus, a strict disciplinarian—a man of grim feature and harsh voice, unpopular with his men—thought to repress the mutiny by severity; but the mutiny was too general to be quelled by coercion. Then he resorted to a stratagem, which he carried out with admirable adroitness. Calling his soldiers together, he stood for some time weeping before he spoke. He then set forth the cruel dilemma in which their conduct had placed him: he must either break his plighted faith with Cyrus or desert them; but he did not hesitate to choose; whatever happened, he would stand by them, who were “his country, his friends, and his allies.” This speech created a favourable impression, which was confirmed when Cyrus sent to demand an interview with Clearchus and Clearchus publicly refused to go. But the delight of the troops was changed into perplexity when Clearchus asked them what they proposed to do: they were no longer the soldiers of Cyrus, and could not look to him for pay, provisions, or help. He (Clearchus) would stand by

*but are
persuaded
by
Clearchus.*

them, but he declined to command them or advise them. The soldiers—some of them in the secret confidence of their captain—discussed the difficulty, and it was decided to send a deputation to Cyrus, to ask him to declare definitely his real intentions. Cyrus told the deputation that his purpose was to march against his enemy Abrocomas—Persian general in Syria—who was now on the Euphrates, and offered higher pay to the Greeks, a daric and a half instead of a daric a month. (Doric a month = c. 9d. a day.) The soldiers, finding themselves in an awkward pass, agreed to continue the march,—reluctant, but hardly seeing any other way out of the difficulty; though many of them must have shrewdly suspected that they would deal with Abrocomas on the Euphrates even as they had dealt with the hillmen of Pisidia.

The march was now eastward by Adana and Mopsuestia, across the rivers Sarus and Pyramus, and then along the coast to Issus, where Cyrus found his fleet. Issus: new reinforcements. It brought him 700 hoplites sent by the Lacedaemonians. Here too he was reinforced by 400 Greek mercenaries who had deserted from the service of the Persian general Abrocomas, the enemy of Cyrus, who had fled to the Euphrates, instead of holding the difficult and fortified passes from Cilicia into Syria, as a loyal general of the Great King should have done. So Cyrus now, with his Greek troops increased to the total number of 14,000, passed with as much ease through the Syrian gates, owing to the cowardly flight of Abrocomas, as he had before passed through the Cilician gates, owing to the prudent collusion of Syennesis. The Syrian gates are a narrow pass between the end of Mount Amanus and the sea, part of the coast road from Issus to Myriandrus. At Myriandrus the Greeks bade good-bye to the sea, little knowing how many days would pass, how many terrible things befall them, before they hailed it again. They crossed Mount Amanus by the pass of Beilan, which Abrocomas ought to have guarded, and in a twelve days' march, passing by the park and palace of Belesys, satrap of Syria, they reached Thapsacus and beheld the famous Euphrates. Arrival at Thapsacus. Here a new explanation was necessary as to the object of the march, and Cyrus had at last to own that Babylon was the goal,—that the foe against whom he led the army was the Great King himself. The Greek troops murmured loudly and

refused to cross the river; but their murmurings here were not like their murmurs at Tarsus, for they had guessed the truth long since; and their complaints were only designed to extort promises from Cyrus. The prince agreed to give each man a present of five minae at the end of the expedition—more than a year's pay at the high rate of a daric and a half. But while the rest of the Greeks were making their bargain, Menon stole a march on them, inducing his own troops to cross the river first—a good example, for which Cyrus would owe him and his troops particular thanks. Abrocomas had burned the ships, but the Euphrates was—a very unusual circumstance at that season—shallow enough to be forded; a fact of which Abrocomas was conceivably aware. The army accordingly crossed on foot and continued the march along the left bank; an agreeable march until they reached the river Chaboras, beyond which the desert of “Arabia” began: a plain, Xenophon describes it, smooth as a sea, treeless; only wormwood and scented shrubs for vegetation, but alive with all kinds of beasts strange to Greek eyes, wild asses and ostriches, antelopes and bustards. The tramp through the desert lasted thirteen days, and then they reached Pylae, at the edge of the land of Babylonia, fertile then with its artificial irrigation, now mostly a barren wilderness. Soon after they passed Pylae, they became aware that a large host had been moving in front, ravaging the country before them.

*Prepara-
tions of
Artax-
erxes.*

Artaxerxes on his part had made somewhat tardy preparations to receive the invaders. It seems indeed to have been hardly conceived at the Persian court that the army of Cyrus would ever succeed in reaching Babylonia. The city of Babylon was protected by a double defence against an enemy approaching from the north,—by a line of wall and a line of water, both connecting the Euphrates with the Tigris. The enemy would first have to pass the Wall of Media, 100 feet high and 20 feet broad, built of bricks with bitumen cement; and they would then have to cross the Royal Canal, before they could reach the gates of Babylon. To these two lines of defence a third was now added, in the form of a trench about forty miles long, joining at one end the Wall of Media and at the other the Euphrates, where a space of not more than seven yards was left between the trench and the river. To defend a

country so abundantly guarded by artificial fortifications, the king was able to muster immediately an army of about 400,000; but this did not seem enough when the danger became imminent, and orders were sent to Media that the troops of that province should come to the aid of Babylonia. There was some delay in the arrival of these forces, and Artaxerxes probably did not wish to risk an action until their arrival had made his immense superiority in numbers overwhelming. This may explain the extraordinary circumstance that when the army of Cyrus came to the foss which had been dug expressly to keep them out, they found it undefended, and walked at their ease over the narrow passage between the trench and the river.

But now it was hardly possible for Artaxerxes to let his
foes advance further, though there was still no sign of the
troops from the east. Two days after passing the trench, the
army of Cyrus reached the village of Cunaxa, and suddenly
learned that the king's host was approaching. The oriental
troops under Ariaeus formed the left wing of Cyrus, who him-
self occupied the centre with a squadron of cavalry; the Greeks
were on the right, resting on the river Euphrates. The Persian
left wing, commanded by Tissaphernes, consisted of cavalry,
bowmen, and Egyptian footmen, with a row of scythe-armed
chariots in front. The king was in the centre with a strong
bodyguard of horse. Cyrus knew the oriental character, and
he knew that if the king fell or fled, the battle would be
decided and his own cause won. He accordingly formed a
plan of battle which would almost certainly have been success-
ful, if it had been adopted. He proposed that the Greeks
should shift their position further to the left,—to a consider-
able distance from the river,—so that they might immediately
attack the enemy's centre where the king was stationed. But
Clearchus, to whom Cyrus signified his wishes, made decided
objections to this bold and wise plan. Unable to rise, like
Cyrus, to the full bearings of the situation, he ruined the
cause of his master by pedantically or timorously adhering to
the precepts of Greek drill-sergeants, that it is fatal for the
right wing to allow itself to be outflanked. And besides the
consideration which Cyrus had in view, the advantage of
bringing about with all speed the flight of Artaxerxes, there

*Battle of
Cunaxa
(summer,
401).*

*Greeks
victorious ;*

was another consideration which would not have occurred to Cyrus, but which ought to have occurred to Clearchus. The safety of Cyrus himself was a matter of the first importance to the Greeks,—how important we shall see in the sequel. It was useless for the Greeks to cut down every single man in the Persian left, if while they were sweeping all before them the prince for whom they fought were slain. Cyrus did not press the matter, and left it to Clearchus to make his own dispositions. The onset of the Greeks struck their enemies with panic before a blow was struck. On the other side, the Persian right, which far outflanked the left wing of Cyrus, was wheeled round, so as to take the troops of Ariaeus in the rear. Then Cyrus, who was already receiving congratulations as if he were king on account of the success of the Greeks, dashed forward with his 600 horse against the 6000 who surrounded Artaxerxes. The impetuous charge broke up the guard, and, if the prince had kept command over his passions, he would have been the Great King within an hour. But unluckily he caught sight of his brother, whom he hated with his whole soul, amid the flying bodyguard. The bitter passion of hatred overmastered him, and he galloped forward, with a few followers, to slay Artaxerxes with his own hand. He had the satisfaction of wounding him slightly with a javelin ; but, in the mellay which ensued, he was himself wounded in the eye by a Carian soldier, and falling from his horse, was presently slain. The news of his death was the signal for the flight of his Asiatic troops.

*Cyrus
slain.*

*The work
of Ctesias.*

The vivid narrative of Xenophon, who took part in the battle, preserves the memory of these remarkable events. At the time he saw little of the battle, and he could have known little of the arrangements and movements of the Persians. But before he wrote his own book, he had the advantage of reading a book written by another Greek, who had also witnessed those remarkable events, but from the other side. This was Ctesias, the court physician, who was present at the battle and cured Artaxerxes of the breast-wound which Cyrus had dealt him. The book of Ctesias is lost, but some bits of his story have drifted down to us in the works of later writers who had read it, and afford us a glimpse or two into the Great King's camp and court about this eventful time.

For the Greek band, which now found itself in the heart of Persia, girt about by enemies on every side, the death of Cyrus was an immediate and crushing calamity. But for Greece it was probably a stroke of good fortune,—though Sparta herself had blessed the enterprise. Cyrus was a prince whose ability was well-nigh equal to his ambition. He had proved his capacity by his early successes as satrap; by the organisation of his expedition, which demanded an exceptional union of policy and vigour, in meeting difficulties and surmounting dangers; by his recognition of the value of the Greek soldier. Under such a sovereign, the Persian realm would have thriven and waxed great, and become once more a menace to the freedom of the European Greeks. Who can tell what dreams that ambitious brain might have cherished, dreams of universal conquest to be achieved at the head of an invincible army of Grecian foot-lancers? And in days when mercenary service was coming into fashion, the service of Cyrus would have been popular. Whatever oriental craft and cruelty lurked beneath, he had not only a frank and attractive manner, but a generous nature, which completely won such an honest Greek as Xenophon, the soldier and historian. He knew how to appreciate the Greeks, as none of his country ever knew before; he recognised their superiority to the Asiatics in the military qualities of steadfastness and discipline; and this undisguised appreciation was a flattery which they were unable to resist. If Cyrus had come to the throne, his energy and policy would certainly have been felt in the Aegean world; the Greeks would not have been left for the next two generations to shape their own destinies, as they did, little affected by the languid interventions of Artaxerxes. Perhaps the stubborn stupidity of Clearchus on the field of Cunaxa, with his hard-and-fast precepts of Greek drill-sergeants, saved Hellas from becoming a Persian satrapy.

But such speculations would have brought little comfort, could they have occurred, to the 10,000 Greeks who, flushed with the excitement of pursuit, returned to hear that the rest of their army had been defeated, to find their camp pillaged, and then to learn on the following morning that Cyrus was dead. The habit of self-imposed discipline which Cyrus knew so well how to value stood the Greeks in good stead at this

grave crisis; and their easy victory had given them confidence. They refused to surrender, at the summons of Artaxerxes. For him their presence was extremely awkward, like a hostile city in the midst of his land; and his first object was at all hazards to get them out of Babylonia. He therefore parleyed with them, and supplied them with provisions. The only desire of the Greeks was to make all the haste they could homeward. By the road they had come it was nearly 1500 miles to Sardis; but that road was impracticable; for they could not traverse the desert again unprovisioned. Without guides, without any geographical knowledge—not knowing so much as the course of the Tigris—they had no alternative but to embrace the proposal of Tissaphernes, who undertook to guide them home by another road, on which they would be able to obtain provisions. Following him—but well in the rear of his troops—the Greeks passed the Wall of Media, and crossed two navigable canals, before they reached the Tigris, which they passed by its only bridge, close to Sittace. Their course then lay northward, up the left bank of the Tigris. They passed from Babylonia into Media, and, crossing the lesser Zab, reached the banks of the greater Zab without any incident of consequence. But here the distrust and suspicion which smouldered between the Greek and the Persian camps almost broke into a flame of hostility, and Clearchus was driven into seeking an explanation with Tissaphernes. The frankness of the satrap disarmed the suspicions of Clearchus; Tissaphernes admitted that some persons had attempted to poison his mind against the Greeks, but promised to reveal the names of the calumniators, if the Greek generals and captains came to his tent the next day. Clearchus readily consented, and induced his four fellow-generals—Agias, Menon, Proxenus, and Socrates—to go to Tissaphernes, though such blind confidence was ill justified by the character of the crafty satrap. It was a fatal blunder—the second great blunder Clearchus had made—to place all the Greek commanders helplessly in the power of the Persian. Clearchus had been throughout an enemy of the Thessalian Menon; and it may be that he suspected Menon of treason, and that his desire to convict his rival in the tent of Tissaphernes blinded his better judgement. The five generals went, with twenty captains and some soldiers;

*Treacher-
ous seizure
of
Clearchus
and the
generals.*

the captains and soldiers were cut down, and the generals were fettered and sent to the Persian court, where they were all put to death.

Tissaphernes had no intention of attacking the Greek army. He had led them to a place from which it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to return to Greece, and he imagined that when they found themselves without any responsible commanders they would immediately surrender. But if in the first moments of dismay the prospect seemed hopeless, the Greeks speedily rallied their courage, chose new generals, and resumed their northward march. It was the Athenian Xenophon, a man of ready speech and great presence of mind, who did most to infuse new spirit into the army and guide it amidst the perils and difficulties which now beset it. Though he had no rank, being merely a volunteer, he was elected a general, and his power of persuasion, united with practical sense, won for him a remarkable ascendancy over the men. He tells us how, on the first dreary night after the betrayal of the generals, he dreamed that he saw a thunderbolt striking his father's house and flames wrapping the walls about. This dream gave him his inspiration. He interpreted it of the plight in which he and his fellows were; the house was in extreme danger, but the light was a sign of hope. And then the thought was borne in on him that it was foolish to wait for others to take the lead, that it would be well to make a start himself.

It was bold indeed to undertake a march of uncertain length—terribly long—without guides and with inexperienced officers, over unknown rivers and uncouth mountains, through the lands of barbarous folks. The alternative would have been to found a Greek city in the centre of Media; but this had no attraction: the hearts of all were set upon returning to the Greek world. It would be long to tell the full diary of the adventures of their retreat; it is a chronicle of courage, discipline, and reasonableness in the face of perils which nothing but the exercise of those qualities in an unusual measure would have been able to surmount. Their march to the Carduchian mountains, which form the northern boundary of Media, was harassed by the army of Tissaphernes, who, however, never ventured on a pitched battle. When they entered Carduchia, *Kurdistan*.

*Buhtan-
Tchai.*

*They cross
the Kara
Su and
Murad Su.*

Gumish.

*Reach the
Euxine
Sea.*

the Greeks passed out of the Persian empire; for the men of these mountains were independent, wedged in between the satrapies of Media and Armenia. The passage through this wild country was the most dangerous and destructive part of the whole retreat. The savage hillsmen were implacably hostile, and it was easy for them to defend the narrow precipitous passes against an army laden with baggage, and fearing, at every turn of the winding roads, to be crushed by rocky masses which the enemy rolled down from the heights above. After much suffering and loss of life, they reached the stream of the Centrites, a tributary of the Tigris, which divides Carduchia from Armenia. The news of their coming had gone before; and they found the opposite bank lined with the forces of Tiribazus, the Armenian satrap. The Carduchian hillsmen were hanging on their rear, and it needed a clever stratagem to cross the river safely. It was now the month of December, and the march lay through the snows of wintry Armenia. They had sore struggles with cold and hunger; but they went unmolested, for they had made a compact with Tiribazus, undertaking to abstain from pillage. The direction of the march lay north-westward; they crossed the two branches of the Euphrates, and their route perhaps partly corresponded to that which a traveller follows at the present day from Tavriz to Erzerum. When they had made their way through the territories of the martial Chalybes and other hostile peoples, they reached a city—a sign that at last they were once more on the fringe of civilisation. It was the city of Gymnias, a thriving place which perhaps owed its existence to neighbouring silver mines. Here they had a friendly welcome, and learned with delight that they were not many days' journey south of Trapezus. A guide undertook that they should have sight of the sea after a five days' march. "And on the fifth day they came to Mount Theches, and when the van reached the summit a great cry arose. When Xenophon and the rear heard it, they thought that an enemy was attacking in front; but when the cry increased as fresh men continually came up to the summit, Xenophon thought it must be something more serious, and galloped forward to the front with his cavalry. When he drew near, he heard what the cry was—*The Sea, the Sea!*" The sight of the sea, to which they had said

farewell at Myriandrus, and which they had so often despaired of ever again beholding, was an assurance of safety at last attained. The night watches in the plains of Babylonia or by the rivers of Media, the wild faces in the Carduchian mountains, the bleak highlands of Armenia, might now fade into the semblances of an evil dream.

A few more days brought the army to Trapezus—to Greek soil and to the very shore of the sea. Here they rested for a month, supporting themselves by plundering the Colchian natives, who dwelled in the hills round about, while the Greeks of Trapezus supplied a market. Here they celebrated games and offered their sacrifices of thanksgiving to Zeus Soter,—in fulfilment of a vow they had made on that terrible night on the Zab after the loss of their generals.

At Trapezus (first months of 400 B.C.).

Ten thousand Greek soldiers dropt down from the mountains, like a sudden thunderbolt from heaven, were a surprise which must have caused strange perplexity to the Greeks of the coast,—to Trapezus and her sister Cerasus, and to their common mother Sinope. It was a somewhat alarming problem: so many soldiers, mostly hoplites, steeled by an ordeal of experience such as few men had ever passed, but not quite certain as to what their next step should be, suddenly knocking at one's gates. And they were not an ordinary army, but rather a democracy of ten thousand citizens equipped as soldiers, serving no king, responsible to no state, a law unto themselves, electing their officers and deciding all matters of importance in a sovereign popular assembly,—as it were, a great moving city, moving along the shores of the Euxine; what might it, what might it not, do? For one thing, it might easily plant itself on some likely site within the range of Sinope's influence, and conceivably out-top Sinope herself.

The Ten Thousand themselves thought only of home—the Aegean and the Greek world. Could they have procured ships at once, they would not have tarried to perplex Sinope and her daughter cities. To Xenophon, who foresaw more or less dimly the difficulties which would beset the army on its return to Greece, the idea of seizing some native town like Phasis and founding a colony, in which he might amass riches and enjoy power, was not unwelcome; but when it was known that he contemplated such a plan, though he never proposed it, he

Xenophon thinks of founding a new city.

well-nigh forfeited his influence with the army. In truth, a colony at Phasis, in the land of the Golden Fleece, founded by the practical Xenophon, might have been the best solution of the fate of the Ten Thousand. The difficulties which they had now to face were of a different kind from those which they had so successfully surmounted, demanding not so much endurance and bravery as tact and discretion. Now that they were no longer in daily danger of sheer destruction, the motive for cohesion had lost much of its strength. If we remember that the army was composed of men of different Greek nationalities, brought together by chance, and that it was now united by no bond of common allegiance but was purely a voluntary association, the wonder is that it was not completely disorganised and scattered long before it reached Byzantium. It is true that the discipline sensibly and inevitably declined; and it is true that the host dissolved itself at Heraclea into three separate bands, though only to be presently reunited. But it is a remarkable spectacle, this large society of soldiers managing their own affairs, deciding what they would do, determining where they would go, seldom failing to listen to the voice of reason in their Assemblies, whether it was the voice of Xenophon or of another.

The last stages of the retreat, from Trapezus to Chalcedon, were accomplished partly by sea, partly by land, and were marked by delays, disappointments, and disorders. It might be expected that on reaching Chalcedon the army would have dispersed, each man hastening to return to his own city. But they were satisfied to be well within the Greek world once more, and they wanted to replenish their empty purses before they went home. So they still held together, ready to place their arms at the disposal of any power who would pay them. To Pharnabazus, the satrap of the Hellespontine province of Persia, the arrival of men who had defied the power of the Great King was a source of alarm. He bribed the Lacedaemonian admiral Anaxibius, who was stationed at the Bosphorus, to induce the Ten Thousand to cross over into Europe. Anaxibius compassed this by promises of high pay; but the troops, who were admitted into Byzantium, would have pillaged the city when they discovered that they had been deluded, if Xenophon's presence of mind and persuasive

*Cohesion of
the army.*

*It reaches
Chalcedon.*

*At By-
zantium.*

speech had not once more saved them from their first impulse. After this they took service under a Thracian prince—Seuthes was his name—who employed them to reduce some rebellious tribes. Seuthes was more perfidious than Anaxibius, for he cheated them of the pay which they had actually earned. But better times were coming. War broke out—as we shall presently see—between Lacedaemon and Persia, and the Lacedaemonians wanted fighting men. The impoverished army of Cyrus, now reduced to the number of 6000, crossed back into Asia, and received an advance of pay. Here our interest in them ends, if it did not already end when they reached Trapezus,—our interest in all of them, at least, except Xenophon. Once and again Xenophon had intended to leave the army since its return to civilisation, and he had steadfastly refused all proposals to elect him commander; but his strong ascendancy among the soldiers and his consequent power to help them had rendered it impossible for him on each occasion to abandon them in their difficulties. Now he was at last released, and returned to Athens with a considerable sum of money. It is probable that his native city, where his master Socrates had recently suffered death, proved uncongenial to him; for he soon went back to Asia to fight with his old comrades against the Persians. When Athens presently became an ally of Persia against Sparta, Xenophon was banished, and more than twenty years of his life were spent at Scillus, a Triphylian village, where the Spartans gave him a home. Afterwards the sentence of exile was revoked, and his last years were passed at Athens.

*Employed
by Sparta,
399 B.C.*

*Career of
Xenophon.*

*Xenophon
lives at
Scillus in
Triphylia
till 370
B.C.*

On a country estate near that Triphylian village, not far from Olympia, Xenophon settled down into a quiet life, with abundant leisure for literature; and composed, among other things of less account, the narrative of that memorable adventure in which Xenophon the Athenian had played such a leading part. Of the environment of his country life in quiet Triphylia he has given a glimpse, showing us how he imprinted his own personality on the place. He had deposited in the great temple of Artemis at Ephesus a portion of a ransom of some captives taken during the retreat, to be reserved for the service of the goddess. This deposit was restored to him at Scillus, and with the money Xenophon bought a suitable place

for a sanctuary of Ephesian Artemis. "A river Selinus flows through the place, just as at Ephesus a river Selinus flows past the temple; and in both streams there are fishes and shell-fishes, but in the place at Scillus there is also all manner of game. And Xenophon made an altar and a temple, with the sacred money, and henceforward he used every year offer to the goddess a tithe of the fruits of his estate, and all the citizens and neighbours, men and women, took part in the feast. They camped in tents, and the goddess furnished them with meal, bread, wine, and sweetmeats, and with a share of the hallowed dole of the sacrifice, and with a share of the game. For Xenophon's lads and the lads of the neighbours used to hunt quarry for the feast, and men who liked would join in the chase. There was game both in the consecrated estate and in Mount Pholoe, wild swine, and gazelles, and stags. That estate has meadowland and wooded hills—good pasture for swine and goats, for cattle and horses; and the beasts of those who fare from Sparta to the Olympian festival—for the road wends through the place—have their fill of feasting. The temple, which is girt by a plantation of fruit trees, is a small model of the great temple of Ephesus; and the cypress-wood image is made in the fashion of the Ephesian image of gold." Here Xenophon could lead a happy, uneventful life, devoted to sport and literature and the service of the gods.

*Signifi-
cance
of the
expedition
of Cyrus.*

At a casual glance the expedition of Cyrus may appear to belong not to Greek but to Persian history; and the retreat of the Ten Thousand may be deemed matter for a book of adventures, and a digression which needs some excuse in a history of Greece. But the story of the up-going and the home-coming of Xenophon and his fellows is in truth no digression. It has been already pointed out how vitally the interests of Hellas, according to human calculation, were involved in the issue of Cunaxa; and how, if the arbitrament of fortune on that battlefield had been other, the future of Greece might have been other too. But the whole episode—the up-going, the battle, and the home-coming—has an importance, by no means problematical, which secures it a certain and conspicuous place in the procession of Grecian history. It is an epilogue to the invasion of Xerxes and a prologue to

the conquest of Alexander. The Great King had carried his arms into Greece, and Greece had driven him back; that was a leading epoch in the combat between Asia and Europe. The next epoch will be the retribution. The Greeks will carry their arms into Persia, and Persia will fail to repel them. The success of Alexander will be the answer to the defeat of Xerxes. For this answer the world has to wait for five generations; but in the meanwhile the expedition of the soldiers of Cyrus is a prediction, vouchsafed as it were by history, what the answer is to be. Xenophon's *Anabasis* is the continuation of Herodotus; Xenophon and his band are the reconnoiters who forerun Alexander. And this significance of the adventure, as a victory of Greece over Persia, was immediately understood. A small company of soldiers had marched unopposed to the centre of the Persian empire, where no Greek army had ever won its way before; they had defeated almost without a blow the overwhelming forces of the king within a few miles of his capital; and they had returned safely, having escaped from the hostile multitudes, which did not once dare to withstand their spears in open warfare. Such a display of Persian impotence surprised the world; and Greece might well despise the power whose resources a band of strangers had so successfully defied. No Hellenic city indeed had won a triumph over the barbarian; but all Hellenic cities alike had reason to be stirred by pride at a brilliant demonstration of the superior excellence of the Greek to the Asiatic in courage, discipline, and capacity. The lesson had, as we shall see, its immediate consequences. Only a year or two passed, and it inspired a Spartan king—a man, indeed, of poor ability and slight performance—to attempt to achieve the task which fate reserved for Alexander. But the moral effect of the *Anabasis* was lasting, and of greater import than the futile warfare of Agesilaus. Considering these bearings, we shall have not said too much if we say that the episode of the Ten Thousand, though a private enterprise so far as Hellas was concerned, and though enacted beyond the limits of the Hellenic world, yet occupies a more eminent place on the highway of Grecian history than the contemporary transactions of Athens and Sparta and the other states of Greece.

SECT. 3. WAR OF SPARTA WITH PERSIA

Tissaphernes, as commander of Asia, plans to recover the Greek cities,

which appeal to Sparta.

Sparta sends an army, 400 B.C.,

under Thibron (400-399 B.C.), who is succeeded by Dercyllidas (399 B.C.)

The enterprise of Cyrus had immediately affected the position and prospects of the Greek cities of Ionia. In accordance with their contract the Spartans had handed over the Asiatic cities to Persia, retaining only Abydus, on account of its strategic importance. Cyrus, however, bidding for Greek support, had instigated the Ionian cities to revolt from their satrap, Tissaphernes, and to place themselves under his protection. Tissaphernes was in time to save Miletus; but all the other cities received Greek garrisons, and thus, when Cyrus disappeared into the interior of Asia, they had practically passed out of Persian control. After the defeat of Cyrus at Cunaxa, Tissaphernes returned to the Aegean coast as governor of all the districts which had been under Cyrus, and with the general title of commander of Further Asia, implying supremacy over the adjacent satrapies. His first concern was to recover the Greek cities of the coast, and he attacked Cyme. The Asiatic Greeks were greatly alarmed, and they sent to Sparta an appeal for her protection.

The relations of Sparta to Persia were no longer the same; since the help given to Cyrus was an act of war against the king. The successful march of the Ten Thousand inspired Greece with a feeling of contempt for the strength of the Persian empire. The opportunity of plundering the wealthy satrapies of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes was a bait for Spartan cupidity; the prospect of gaining signal successes against Persia appealed to Spartan ambition. These considerations induced Sparta to send an army to Asia, and this army was increased by the remains of the famous Ten Thousand, who (as already stated) crossed over from Thrace and entered the service of Sparta. Much might have been accomplished with a competent commander, but the general Thibron was unable to maintain discipline among his men, and the few successes achieved fell far short of Sparta's reasonable hopes. Thibron was superseded by Dercyllidas, a man who had the repute of being unusually wily. Taking advantage of a misunderstanding between the two satraps, Dercyllidas made a truce with Tissaphernes and marched with all his forces into

the province of Pharnabazus, against whom he had a personal grudge. A recent occurrence rendered it possible for him to get into his hands the Troad—or Aeolis, as it was called—with speed and ease. The government of this region had been granted by Pharnabazus to Zenis, a native of Dardanus. When he died, leaving a widow, a son, and daughter, Pharnabazus was about to choose another subsatrap; but the widow, whose name was Mania, presented a petition that she should be permitted to fill the post which her husband had held. “My husband,” she argued, “paid his tribute punctually, and you thanked him for it. If I do as well, why should you appoint another? If I am found unsatisfactory, you can remove me at any moment.” She fortified her arguments by large presents of money to the satrap, his officers, and concubines; and won her request. She gave Pharnabazus full satisfaction by her regular payments of tribute, and under her vigorous administration the Aeolid became a rich and well-defended land. A body of Greek mercenaries was maintained in her service, and immense treasures were stored in the strong mountain fortresses of Scepsis, Gergis, and Cebren. She even reduced some coast towns in the south of the Troad, and took part herself, like the Carian Artemisia, in military expeditions. But she had for son-in-law an ungrateful traitor, Meidias of Scepsis, whom she treated with trust and affection. In order to possess himself of her power, he strangled her, then killed her son, and laid hold of the three fortresses which controlled the district, along with all the treasure. But Pharnabazus refused to recognise the murderer of Mania, and sent back the gifts of Meidias with the message: “Keep them till I come to seize both them and you. Life would not be worth living if I avenged not the death of Mania.”

As Meidias was expecting with alarm the vengeance of Pharnabazus, the Spartan army appeared on the scene. Dercyllidas became master of the Aeolid without any opposition, since the garrisons of the cities did not acknowledge Meidias, —excepting only the forts of Scepsis, Gergis, and Cebren. The garrison of Cebren soon surrendered; at Scepsis, Meidias came forth to a conference, and Dercyllidas, without waiting to confer, marched up to the gates of the town, so that Meidias, in the power of the enemy, could do nothing but order them to be opened; and his unwilling orders likewise threw open the gates of

Gergis. His own private property was restored to Meidias, but all the treasures of Mania were appropriated by the Spartan general; for the property of Mania belonged to her master Pharnabazus, and was therefore the legitimate booty of the satrap's enemy. This booty supplied Dercyllidas with pay for his eight thousand soldiers for nearly a year; and it was noticed that the conduct of the heroes of the Anabasis showed a signal improvement from this time forward. The Aeolid now served the Spartans against the satrapy of Pharnabazus somewhat as Decelea had served them in Attica; it was a fortified district in the enemy's country. Sparta, hoping that these successes would induce Persia to make terms and

(398 B.C.) acquiesce in the freedom of the Greek cities, concluded truces with Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus, and sent up ambassadors

(398 B.C.) to Susa to treat with the Great King. Dercyllidas meanwhile crossed into Europe and occupied himself with restoring the cross-wall which defended Sestos and the other cities of the Chersonese against the incursions of the Thracians, the inhabitants gladly furnishing pay and food to the army. On

besieges and captures Atarneus (398-7 B.C.); goes to Caria (397 B.C.). returning to Asia, the Spartan commander captured, after a long siege, the strong town of Atarneus. Then by special orders from home he proceeded to Caria.

The Spartan overtures were heard unfavourably at Susa, for the king had been persuaded by his able satrap Pharnabazus to prosecute the war by sea. The Spartans could not cope in mere numbers with the fleet which Phoenicia and Cyprus could furnish him; but everything would depend on the commander. Here fortune played into his hands. There was an enemy of Sparta, an experienced naval officer, who was ready to compass heaven and earth to work the downfall of her supremacy.

Conon, The Athenian admiral Conon, whom we last saw escaping from the surprise of Aegospotami, was burning to avenge the disgrace of that fatal day. He had found hospitality and protection at the court of Evagoras, king of the Cyprian Salamis; and through him had entered into communication with Ctesias, the Greek physician, whom we already met at Cunaxa. Ctesias had the ear of the queen-mother Parysatis, and through her influence and the advice of Pharnabazus

appointed commander of a Persian fleet. Conon was appointed to command a fleet of 300 ships which was prepared in Phoenicia and Cilicia. Under his command,

such a numerous navy was extremely formidable, but the Lacedaemonian government does not seem to have realised the danger, owing perhaps to their experience of the ineffectiveness of previous Persian armaments; and they committed the mistake of throwing all their vigour into the land warfare, and neglecting their sea-power, which was absolutely vital for the maintenance of their supremacy. But when Conon, not waiting for the complete equipment of the fleet, sailed to Caunus in Caria with forty ships, the Spartans were obliged to move. They sent a fleet of 120 ships under Pharax to blockade Caunus and Conon's galleys in the harbour, and ordered Dercyllidas to Caria. The joint forces of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus first raised the siege of Caunus and then confronted Dercyllidas in the valley of the Maeander. A panic which seized some of the troops of the Spartan general might have been fatal, but the reputation of the Ten Thousand, whose valour Tissaphernes had experienced, rendered that satrap unwilling to risk a battle, and a conference issued in an armistice. But Sparta had now decided to conduct the war against Persia with greater vigour and on a larger scale; and Dercyllidas had to make way for no less a successor than one of the Spartan kings.

Agesilaus, who now comes upon the scene, had been recently raised to the regal dignity in unusual circumstances. When Lysander retired from public affairs to visit the temple of Zeus Ammon, he had neither discarded ambition nor lost his influence. He conceived the plan of making a change in the Spartan constitution which can hardly be described as less than revolutionary. The idea was that the kingship should be no longer confined to the Eurysthenid and Proclid families in which it was hereditary by law, but that the kings should be elected from all Heraclids. The Spartan king was not a king in our sense of the word; he was not a sovereign, he was rather a grand officer of state; but the scheme to make the office elective, instead of hereditary, was nevertheless momentous. It meant immediately that Lysander should hold the military functions which belonged to the kings, the command of the army abroad, *for life*; he could no longer be deposed or recalled at the end of a term of office. And in the hands of a man like Lysander this permanent office might become

something very different from what it was in the hands of the ordinary Proclid or Eurysthenid; the proportion between the power of king and ephor might be considerably shifted. Lysander's project might well have proved the first step to a sort of *principate*; which might have partially adapted Spartan institutions to the requirements of an imperial state. Lysander did not conceive the possibility of carrying this bold innovation by a *coup d'état*; his plan was to bring religious influence to bear on the authorities; and he secretly employed his absence from Sparta in attempting to enlist the most important oracles in favour of his design. But the oracles received his proposal coldly; it sounded far too audacious. He succeeded, however, in winning over some of the Delphic priests, who aided him to invent oracles for his purpose: a rumour was spread that certain sacred and ancient records were preserved at Delphi, never to be revealed until a son of Apollo appeared to claim them; and at the same time people began to hear of the existence of a youth named Silenus, whose mother vouched that Apollo was his sire. But the ingenious plot broke down at the last moment; one of the confederates did not play his part; and the oracles bearing on the Spartan kingship were never revealed. Lysander then abandoned his revolutionary idea, and took advantage of the death of king Agis to secure the sceptre for a man whom he calculated he could direct and control. The kingship descended, in the natural course, on Leotychidas, the son of Agis; but it was commonly believed that this youth was illegitimate, being really the son of Alcibiades. There were doubts on the matter; but the suspicion was strong enough to enable the half-brother of Agis, Agesilaus, supported by the influence of Lysander, to oust his nephew and assume the sceptre.

*The plot
abandoned.*

*Accession
of
Agesilaus,
398 B.C.*

*His
character.*

Lysander was deceived in his man; the new king was not of the metal to be the kingmaker's tool. Agesilaus had hitherto shown only one side of his character. He had observed all the ordinances of Lycurgus from his youth up; had performed all duties with cheerful obedience; had shown himself singularly docile and gentle; had never asserted or put himself forward among his fellow-citizens. But the mask of Spartan discipline covered a latent spirit of pride and ambition which no one suspected. Agesilaus, though strong and

courageous, was of insignificant stature and lame. When he claimed the throne, an objection was raised on the ground of his deformity; for an oracle had once solemnly warned Lacedaemon to beware of a halt reign. But like all sacred weapons this oracle could be blunted or actually turned against the adversaries. The god did not mean, said Lysander, physical lameness; but the reign of one who was not truly descended from Heracles. Yet those Spartans who believed in literal interpretation of divine words were ill content with the preference of Agesilaus.

The new king displayed remarkable discretion and policy by his general demeanour of deferential respect to the other authorities. This had the greater effect, as the kings were generally wont to make up by their haughty manners for their want of real power. Agesilaus made himself popular with everybody, and he maintained as king the simplicity which had marked his life as a private citizen. He was unswervingly true to his friends; but this virtue declined to vice, when he upheld his partisans in acts of injustice.

Not long after his accession, a serious incident occurred which gives us a glimpse of the social condition of the Lacedaemonian state at this period and shows that while the government was struggling to maintain its empire abroad, it was menaced at home by dangers which the existence of that empire rendered graver every year. Commerce with the outside world and acquisition of money had promoted considerable inequalities in wealth; and in consequence the number of Peers or fully enfranchised Spartan citizens was constantly diminishing, while the class of those who had become too poor to pay their scot to the *syssitia* was proportionally growing. These disqualified citizens were not degraded to the rank of *Perioeci*; they formed a separate class and were named *Inferiors* (Hypo-meîas). *Domestic condition of Sparta.* *The Inferiors (Hypo-meîas).* a stroke of luck might at any moment enable one of them to pay his subscription, and restore him to full citizenship. But the Inferiors naturally formed a class of malcontents; and the narrow, ever-narrowing, oligarchy of Peers had to fear that they might make common cause with the *Perioeci* and Helots and conspire against the state. Such a conspiracy was hatched, but was detected in its first stage through the efficient system of secret police which was

*Conspiracy
of Cinadon
397 B.C.*

established at Sparta. The prime mover seems to have been a young man of the Inferior class named Cinadon, of great strength and bravery. The ephors learned from an informer that Cinadon had called his attention in the market-place to the small number of *Spartans* compared with the multitude of their *enemies*—one perhaps in a hundred. All alike, Inferiors, Neodamodes, Perioeci, Helots, were, according to Cinadon, his accomplices; “for hear any of them talk about the Spartans, he talks as if he could eat them raw.” And when Cinadon was asked where the conspirators would find arms, he pointed to the shops of the ironsmiths in the market-place, and added that every workman and husbandman possessed tools. On the ground of information which was perhaps more precise than this, the ephors sent for Cinadon, whom they had often employed on police service, and sent him on a mission of this kind, but with an escort which arrested him on the road, put him to the torture, and wrung from him the names of his accomplices. It would have been dangerous to arrest him in Sparta and so spread the alarm before the names of the others were known. Asked why he conspired, Cinadon said: “I wished to be inferior to none in Sparta.” He was scourged round the city, and put to death with his fellows.

Recollecting the histories of other states we cannot forbear wondering that an ambitious general like Lysander did not attempt to use for his own purposes this mass of discontent, into which Cinadon’s abortive conspiracy opens a glimpse. There was something in the Spartan air which made a peer rarely capable of disloyalty to the privileges of his own class.

SECT. 4. ASIATIC CAMPAIGNS OF AGESILAUS. BATTLE OF CNIDUS

396 B.C.

It was arranged that Agesilaus should take the place of Dercyllidas; that he should take with him a force of 2000 Neodamodes, and a military council of thirty Spartans, including Lysander.

In the Spartan projects at this juncture we can observe very clearly the effect of the episode of the expedition of Cyrus and the Ten Thousand in revolutionising the attitude of Greece towards Persia and spreading the idea that Persia was

really weak. The Spartan leaders seemed to have regarded the lands of the Great King as a field of easy conquest for a bold Greek. King Agesilaus, especially, who now began to disclose the consuming quality of ambition, dreamed of dethroning the Great King himself, and felt no doubt that he would at least speedily deliver the Asiatic coast from Persian control. But he lived sixty years too soon; and in any case this respectable Spartan was not the man to settle the "eternal question." He regarded himself as a new Agamemnon going forth to capture a new Troy; and, to make the illusion of resemblance complete, he sailed with part of his army to Aulis, to offer sacrifice there in the temple of Artemis as the "king of men" had done before the sailing of the Greeks to Ilium. If Agesilaus had subverted the Persian empire, the sacrifice at Aulis would have seemed an interesting instance of a great man's confidence in his own star. But the performance of Agesilaus can only provoke the mirth of history, especially as the solemnity was not successfully carried out. The Spartan king had not asked the permission of the Thebans to sacrifice in the temple; and a body of armed men interrupted the proceedings and compelled him to desist. It was an insult which Agesilaus never forgave to Thebes.

*Highflying
plans of
Agesilaus;*

*his display
at Aulis.*

Lysander expected that the real command in the war would devolve upon himself, and on arriving in Asia he acted on that assumption. He was soon undeceived. Agesilaus had no intention of being merely a nominal chief; and he checked his councillor's self-sufficiency by invariably refusing the petitions which were presented to him through Lysander. This policy was effectual; Lysander, smarting under the humiliation, was sent at his own request on a separate mission to the Hellespont, where he did useful work for Sparta. The satraps in the meantime had renewed with Agesilaus the truce they had made with Dercyllidas, but it was soon broken by Tissaphernes. Agesilaus made a feint of marching into Caria, and then suddenly, when Tissaphernes had completed his dispositions for defence, turned northwards to Phrygia and invaded the satrapy of Pharnabazus. Here he accomplished nothing of abiding importance but secured a vast quantity of booty, with which he enriched his friends and favourites—it was no temptation to himself. The

*Campaign
of Agesi-
laus in
Phrygia
(autumn).*

*Anecdotes
of
Agésilau8.*

historian Xenophon, who has left us a special work on the life and character of Agésilau8, tells many anecdotes of this campaign, to illustrate the merits of his hero. Those incidents which bring out his humanity have more than a personal interest for us; they must be taken in connexion with the general fact that the Greeks of the fourth century were more humane than the Greeks of the fifth. We are told that Agésilau8 protected his captives against ill-usage; they were to be treated as men, not as criminals. Sometimes slave-merchants, fleeing out of the way of his army, abandoned on the roadside little children whom they had bought. Instead of leaving these to perish by wolves or hunger, Agésilau8 had them removed and given in charge to natives who were too old to be carried into captivity. But Agésilau8 did not scruple to use the captives, without regard to their feelings, as "object-lessons" for his own soldiers. At Ephesus, where the winter was passed in drill, he conceived the idea of showing his troops the difference between good and bad training. He caused the prisoners to be put up for auction naked, so that the Greek soldiers might see the inferior muscles, the white skin, and the soft limbs of the Asiatics whose bodies were never exposed to the weather nor hardened by regular gymnastic discipline. The spectacle impressed the Greeks with their own superiority; but it was an outrage, though not intended as such, on the captives; for, while all Greeks habitually stripped for exercise, Asiatics think it a shame to be seen naked.

*Campaign
in Lydia.
395 B.C.
(spring).*

*Death of
Tissaphernes.*

Having organised a force of cavalry during the winter, Agésilau8 took the field in spring, and gained a victory over Tissaphernes on the Pactolus, near Sardis. The general ill-success of Tissaphernes was made a matter of complaint at Susa. The queen-mother Parysatis, who had never forgiven him for the part he played in the disaster of her beloved Cyrus, made all efforts to procure his downfall; and Tithraustes was sent to the coast to succeed him and put him to death. An offer was now made by Tithraustes to Agésilau8, which it would have been wise to accept. He was required to leave Asia, on condition that the Greek cities should enjoy complete autonomy, paying only their original tribute to Persia. Agésilau8 could not agree without consulting his

government at home, and an armistice of six months was concluded,—an armistice with Tithraustes, not with Persia; for Agesilaus was left free to turn his arms against Pharnabazus.

In his second campaign in Phrygia, the Spartan king was supported by a Paphlagonian prince named Otys, as well as by Spithridates, a Persian noble whom Lysander had induced to revolt. The province was ravaged up to the walls of Dascyion, where Pharnabazus resided, and the Spartan troops wintered in the rich parks of the neighbourhood, well supplied with birds and fish. The train of Pharnabazus, who moved about the country with all his furniture, was captured; but a dispute over the spoil alienated the oriental allies of Agesilaus, who was the more deeply chagrined at their departure, as he was violently in love with a beautiful youth, the son of Spithridates. The Greek occupation of Phrygia was brought to an end by an interesting scene—an interview between the Persian satrap and the Lacedaemonian general. Agesilaus arrived first at the appointed place and sat down on the grass to wait. Then the servants of Pharnabazus appeared and began to spread luxurious carpets for their master. But Pharnabazus seeing the simple seat of Agesilaus went and sat down beside him. They shook hands, and Pharnabazus made a speech of dignified remonstrance. “I was the faithful ally of Sparta when she was at war with Athens; I helped her to victory; I never played her false, like Tissaphernes; and now, for all this, you have brought me to such a plight that I cannot get a dinner in my own province save by picking up what you leave. All my parks and hunting grounds and houses you have ravaged or burnt. Is this justice or gratitude?” After a long silence, Agesilaus explained that being at war with the Great King he had to treat all Persian territory as hostile; but invited the satrap to throw off his allegiance and become an ally of Sparta. “If the king sends another governor and puts me under him,” said Pharnabazus, “then I shall be glad to become your friend and ally; but now, while I hold this post of command for him, I shall make war upon you with all my strength.” Agesilaus was delighted with this becoming reply. “I will quit your territory at once,” he said, “and will respect it in future, so long as I have others to make war upon.” Farewells were said and Pharnabazus

*Second
invasion of
the satrapy
of Pharna-
bazus by
Agesilaus
(autumn).*

rode away; but his handsome son, dropping behind, said to Agesilaus, "I make you my guest," and gave him a javelin. Agesilaus accepted the proffered friendship and gave in exchange the ornaments of his secretary's horse. The incident had a sequel. In later years this young Persian, ill-treated by his brothers, fled for refuge to Greece, and did not seek in vain the protection of his guest-friend Agesilaus.

His success in Phrygia rendered Agesilaus more than ever disposed to attempt conquests in the interior of Asia Minor. But in the meantime he had mismanaged matters of greater moment. Before he marched against Pharnabazus, he had received a message from Sparta, committing to him the supreme command by sea. The preparation of an adequate fleet was urgent. Conon, with eighty sail—the rest of the armament was not yet completed—had induced Rhodes to revolt and had captured a corn fleet which an Egyptian prince had dispatched to the Lacedaemonians. Agesilaus took measures for the equipment of a fleet of 120 triremes at the expense of the cities of the islands and coast-land; but he committed the blunder of entrusting the command to Pisander, his brother-in-law, a man of no experience. After his Phrygian expedition, Agesilaus had been himself recalled to Europe for reasons which will presently be related; while Pharnabazus went to discharge the functions of joint-admiral with Conon, who had visited Susa in person, to stimulate Persian zeal and obtain the necessary funds. In the middle of the summer the fleet of Conon and Pharnabazus, having left Cilician waters, appeared off the coast of the Cnidian peninsula. The numbers are uncertain, but the Persian fleet was overwhelmingly larger than that of Pisander, who sailed out from Cnidus to oppose it with desperate courage. The result could not be doubtful. Pisander's Asiatic contingents deserted him without fighting, and of the rest the greater part were taken or sunk. Pisander fell in the action. The Greek cities of Asia expelled the Spartan garrisons and acknowledged the overlordship of Persia. Thus Conon, in the guise of a Persian admiral, avenged Athens and undid the victory of the Aegospotami in a battle which was almost as easily won. The maritime power of Sparta was destroyed, and the unstable foundations of her empire undermined.

*Battle of
Cnidus
(Aug.
394 B.C.)*

SECT. 5. SPARTA AT THE GATES OF THE PELOPONNESUS
(THE "CORINTHIAN WAR")

At the same time, she was suffering serious checks nearer home. While Agesilaus was meditating his wonderful schemes against Persia, war had broken out in Greece between Sparta and her allies; and the turn it took rendered it imperative to recall him from Asia. It is necessary to go back a little to explain.

After the battle of the Goat's River, Sparta had kept for herself all the fruits of victory. She had taken over the maritime empire of her prostrate foe, and enjoyed its tribute. Her allies had got nothing; and yet they had made far greater sacrifices than Sparta herself throughout the Peloponnesian war. Any demands made by Corinth and other allies who had borne the burden and heat of those years were haughtily rejected. Lacedaemon felt herself strong enough to treat her former friends with contempt. She further exhibited her despotic temper by her proceedings within the Peloponnesus against those who had displeased her. Elis had given her repeated and recent grounds of offence, and Elis was now chastised. King Agis invaded and ravaged the country, and imposed severe conditions on the Eleans. They were deprived of their Triphylian territory, of Cyllene their port, and of other places; and were compelled to pull down the incomplete fortifications of their city. The only grace accorded to them was that they should still have the privilege of conducting the Olympian festival. The Spartans indulged another grudge by expelling from Naupactus and Cephallenia the residue of the Messenians, who had settled in those places. *Fate of Elis, 399 B.C.*

The exercise of authority within the Peloponnesus was regarded by Sparta as an ordering of her own domain; but she also began vigorously to assert her power in the north of Greece. She resuscitated into new life her colony of Heraclea, near Thermopylae, and pushing into Thessaly she placed a Lacedaemonian garrison and harpost in Pharsalus. *Spartan activity north of Thermopylae.*

When war broke out between Persia and Sparta, it was the policy of Persia to excite a war in Greece against her enemy, and fan the smouldering discontent of the secondary Greek *Mission of Titraustes, 395 B.C.*

*Outbreak
of war in
Boeotia.*

powers into a flame. The satrap Tithraustes sent a Rhodian agent, named Timocrates, with fifty talents to bribe the leading statesmen of the chief cities to join Persia in a league of hostility against Sparta. Timocrates visited Argos, Corinth, and Thebes, and gained over some of the most influential people. But it really required only an assurance of Persian co-operation, and then a favourable occasion, to raise a general resistance to the ascendancy of Lacedaemon. The first aggression, however, came from Lacedaemon herself. A trifle, a border dispute between Phocis and Opuntian Locris, furnished the occasion, the Locrians appealing to Thebes, the Phocians to Lacedaemon, for support. The Lacedaemonians, according to their friend Xenophon, rejoiced to have a pretext for attacking Thebes and chastising her insolence. A double invasion of Boeotia was arranged, king Pausanias advancing from the south, and Lysander coming down from Heraclea, on the north.

*Athens
combines
with
Thebes.*

Thus threatened, Thebes turned for aid to her old enemy for whose utter destruction she had pleaded a few years ago. Athens had been steadily recovering a measure of her prosperity; the oligarchical party seems to have already merged its own ambitions in loyalty to the democratic majority which had shown such generosity in the day of its triumph; and in the debate on the Theban request for aid, men of all parties alike voted to seize the opportunity for attempting to break free from Spartan rule. The decision was felt to be bold, since the Piræus was unfortified; but there was also a feeling that the tide was at the flood—Conon was sailing the south-eastern seas, Rhodes had revolted,—the moment must not be lost. So there was concluded an "eternal alliance between the Boeotians and Athenians"; the phrase, pregnant with the irony of history, has been preserved on a fragment of the original treaty-stone, and it shows at least the enthusiastic hopes of the hour.

*Siege of
Haliartus.*

When Lysander approached Boeotia, he was joined by Orchomenus, which was always bitterly hostile to Theban supremacy in Boeotia. He and Pausanias had arranged to meet near Haliartus, which is about half-way between Thebes and Orchomenus. It is uncertain whether Lysander was too soon or Pausanias too late; but Lysander arrived in the district of Haliartus first and attacked the town. From their

battlements the men of Haliartus could descry a band of Thebans coming along the road from Thebes, some time before the danger was visible to their assailants; and they suddenly sallied forth from the gates. Taken by surprise and attacked on both sides, Lysander's men were driven back, and Lysander was slain. His death was a loss to Sparta, which she could not make good. He had made her empire such as it was; and she had no other man of first-rate ability. But the death of the Spartan Lysander was no loss to Greece.

*Death of
Lysander.*

Pausanias soon came up, and his first object was to recover the corse of his dead colleague. He was strong enough to extort this from the Thebans and Haliartians, but an Athenian army came up at the same moment to their assistance, under the leadership of Thrasybulus. Pausanias was in a difficult predicament. To fight meant to incur defeat; but to acknowledge weakness by asking for a burial truce was galling to Spartan pride. A council of war, however, decided to beg for a truce; and, when the Thebans, contrary to usage, would grant it only on condition that the Peloponnesian army should leave Boeotia, the terms were accepted. The Spartans vented their sorrow for the loss of Lysander in anger against their king. He was condemned to death for having failed to keep tryst with Lysander and for having declined battle. It is not clear whether the first charge was well founded; as for the second, no prudent general could have acted otherwise. Pausanias, who had discreetly refrained from returning to Sparta, spent the rest of his life as an exile at Tegea.

The result of this double blow to the Spartans—their prestige tarnished and their ablest general fallen—was the conclusion of a league against her by the four most important states. Thebes and Athens were now joined by Corinth and Argos. This alliance was soon increased by the adhesion of the Euboeans, the Acarnanians, the Chalcidians of Thrace, and other minor states. Perhaps the most active spirit in this insurgent movement was the Theban Ismenias. This leader succeeded in expelling the Spartans from their northern post Heraclea, and spreading the Theban alliance among the peoples of those regions. Sparta lost her foothold in Thessaly, and the Phocians, who were under the protection of a Spartan harmost, were defeated.

*Confeder-
ation
against
Sparta.*

*The Confederates
at the
Isthmus,
spring,
394 B.C.*

*Battle of
Corinth
(July).*

*Return of
Agesilaus
to Europe.*

Thus the situation of Greece and the prospects of Sparta were completely changed. The allies, when spring came, gathered together their forces¹ at the Isthmus, and it was proposed by one bold Corinthian to march straight on Sparta and "burn out the wasps in their nest." But the Lacedaemonians were already advancing through Arcadia to Sicyon, from which place they crossed over, by Nemea, to the southern shores of the Saronic gulf—a movement somewhat hampered by the allies, who had reached Nemea. The allies then took up a post near Corinth, and a battle was fought. The number of combatants on each side was unusually large for a Greek battle. The Spartans on their wing decisively routed the Athenians, and though on the other wing their subjects were routed, it was distinctly a Spartan victory. The losses of the Confederates were more than twice as great as those of their foes. Some unrecorded feat of arms was achieved in this battle by five Athenian horsemen who lost their lives; and in the burying-ground outside the Dipylon Gate of Athens, we may still see the funeral monument of one of these "five knights," Dexileos, a youth of twenty, who is portrayed, according to Greek habit, not in the moment of his death but in the moment of victory, spearing a hoplite who has fallen under his horse's hoofs. Strategically, the Confederates lost nothing, the victors gained nothing by the battle of Corinth. The Isthmus was left under the control of the Confederates, who were now free to oppose Agesilaus in Boeotia.

For Agesilaus was bearing down on Boeotia. The battle of Haliartus and the events which followed had decided the ephors to recall him from Asia, his presence being more pressingly needed in Europe; and with a heavy heart he was constrained to abandon his dazzling visions of Persian conquest. Agamemnon had to return to Mycenae without having taken Troy. He marched overland by a route which no army had traversed since the expedition of Xerxes, through Thrace and Macedonia. At Amphipolis he received the news of the victory of Corinth, not excessively inspiring. But even as he marched the fate of his country's empire was being decided.

¹ Amounting altogether to 24,000 hoplites, 1550 cavalry, besides light troops. The Lacedaemonian forces at the battle of Corinth were 13,500 hoplites, 600 cavalry.

The victory of Conon at Cnidus was the knell of the ambitions of Agesilaus. When his army reached Chaeronea the sun suffered an eclipse; and the meaning of the phenomenon was explained by the news, which presently arrived, of the battle of Cnidus. To conceal from his army the full import of this news was the first duty of the general; and the second was to hasten on a battle, while it could still be concealed. Agesilaus had been reinforced by some contingents from Lacedaemon, as well as by troops from Phocis and Orchomenus; but his main force consisted of the soldiers whom he had brought from Asia, among whom were some of the famous Ten Thousand, including Xenophon himself. The Confederate army which had fought at Corinth was now in Boeotia, though hardly in the same strength, as a garrison must have been left to defend their important position near the Isthmus. The Confederates established their camp in the district of Coronea, a favourable spot for blocking against a foe the road which leads to Thebes from Phocis and the valley of the Cephissus. On the field where the Boeotians had thrown off Athenian rule half a century before, Athenians and Boeotians now joined to throw off the domination of Lacedaemon. Agesilaus advanced from the Cephissus. He commanded his own right wing, and the Argives who were on the Confederate left fled before him without striking a blow. On the other side, the Thebans on the Confederate right routed the Orchomenians on the Lacedaemonian left. Then the two victorious right wings wheeling round met each other, and the business of the day began. The object of Agesilaus was to prevent the Thebans from joining and rallying their friends. The encounter of the hoplites is described as incomparably terrible by Xenophon, who was himself engaged in it. Agesilaus, whose bodily size was hardly equal to such a fray, was trodden underfoot, and rescued by the bravery of his bodyguard. The pressure of the deep column of the Thebans pushed a way through the Lacedaemonian array. Agesilaus was left master of the field; he erected a trophy; and the Confederates asked for the burial truce. But though the battle of Coronea, like the battle of Corinth, was a technical victory for the Spartans, history must here again offer her congratulations to the side which was, superficially, defeated. In the chief action of the day, the

*Eclipse
of sun,
Aug. 14,
394 B.C.*

*Battle of
Coronea,
394 B.C.*

Thebans had displayed superiority and thwarted the attempt of their enemy to cut them off. It was a great moral encouragement to Thebes for future warfare with Lacedaemon. And immediately, it was a distinct success for the Confederates. When an aggressor cannot follow up his victory, the victory is strategically equivalent to a repulse. Agesilaus immediately evacuated Boeotia—that was the result of Coronea. He crossed over to the Peloponnesus from Delphi, as the Confederates commanded the road by Corinth.

*Spartans
blockaded
in the Peloponnesus.*

It was round Corinth that the struggle of the next years mainly centred, in fitting accordance with the object of the war. Sparta was fighting for domination beyond the Peloponnesus; her enemies were fighting to keep her within the Peloponnesus. The most effective way of accomplishing this design was to hold the gates of the peninsula, between the Corinthian and Saronic gulfs, and not let her pass out. With this view long walls were built binding Corinth, on the one hand with its western port Lechaeon, and on the other with its eastern port at Cenchreae. Thus none could pass from the Peloponnesus into northern Greece without dealing with the defenders of these fortifications. Never had Lacedaemon been more helpless; almost a prisoner in her peninsula, and her maritime empire dissolved. This momentary paralysis of Lacedaemon proved the salvation of Athens.

*393 B.C.
Pharnabazus on
the Greek coast.*

The restoration of Athens to her place among the independent powers of Greece at this juncture came about by curious means. The satrap Pharnabazus who had done so much to aid Lysander in destroying her, now helped to bring about her resurrection. He had not forgiven Sparta for the injury which Agesilaus had inflicted on his province, and this rankling resentment was kept alive by the circumstance that, while the other Asiatic cities had unanimously declared against Sparta after the battle of Cnidus, Abydus alone held out against himself under the Spartan Dercyllidas. He exhibited his wrath by accompanying Conon and the fleet, in the following spring, to the shores of Greece, to ravage the Spartan territory and to encourage and support the Confederates. A Persian satrap within sight of Corinth and Salamis was a strange sight for Greece. His revengefulness stood Athens in good stead. When he returned home, he allowed Conon to retain the fleet

and make use of it to rebuild the Long Walls of Athens and fortify the Piraeus. He even supplied money to inflict this crushing blow on Sparta, a blow which completely undid the chief result of the Peloponnesian war. The two long parallel walls connecting Athens with the Piraeus were rebuilt;¹ the port was again made defensible; and the Athenians could feel once more that they were a free and independent people in the Grecian world. Conon, who had wrought out their deliverance, erected a temple to the Cnidian Aphrodite in the Piraeus, as a monument of his great victory. Never since the day of Salamis was there such cause for rejoicing at Athens as when the fortifications were completed at the end of the autumn. As rebuilder of the walls Conon might claim to be a second Themistocles. But the comparison only reminds us of the change which had come over Greece in a hundred years. It was through Persian support that Athens now, under the auspices of Conon, regained in part the position which she had won by her championship of Hellas against Persia under the auspices of Themistocles. She did not regain her former ascendancy or her former empire, but she was restored to an equality with the other powerful states of Greece; she could feel herself the peer of Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, and of Sparta, now that Sparta had fallen from her high estate. The Athenians could now calmly maintain that defiance which they had boldly offered to Sparta by their alliance with Thebes. About the same time the northern islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros seem to have been reunited to Athens, and she recovered her control of Delos which the Spartans had taken from her. Chios too became her ally.

It was of vital importance to the Lacedaemonians to gain command of the gates of the Peloponnesus by capturing some part of the line of defence; and thus Corinth becomes the centre of interest. The Lacedaemonians established their headquarters at Sicyon, and from this base made a series of efforts to break through the lines of Corinth—efforts which were ultimately successful. Unluckily the chronology is obscure; and it cannot be decided whether these operations were partly concurrent with, or altogether subsequent to, the

¹ The building of the walls was begun before the battle of Cnidus; the completion was due to Conon.

*Rebuilding
of the Long
Walls of
Athens.*

*Union of
Corinth
and Argos
(392 B.C.).*

rebuilding of the Long Walls of Athens. In Corinth itself there was a considerable party favourable to Sparta. This party seems to have arranged a plot for violently overthrowing the oligarchy which was in power; but the design was suspected and prevented by the government, who caused the friends of Sparta to be massacred in cold blood, in the market-place and theatre, on the last day of the feast of Euclea. The Corinthian government at the same time drew closer the bonds which attached it to the enemies of Sparta. By a remarkable measure Corinth and Argos united themselves into a federal state; the boundary pillars were pulled up; the citizens enjoyed common rights. It would be interesting to know how this federal constitution was framed; but such an union had no elements of endurance; it was merely a political expedient.

*Praxitas
at Corinth.*

A considerable number of the philo-Laconian party had escaped; some still remained in the city; and these now managed to open a gate in the western wall and admit Praxitas, the commander at Sicyon, with a Lacedaemonian *mora* of 600 hoplites. Praxitas secured his position between the two walls by constructing a ditch and palisade, across the intermural space, on the side of Corinth. The Corinthians and their allies came down from the city; the palisade was torn up; a battle was fought; and the Lacedaemonians, completely victorious, captured the town of Lechaeon, though not the port. Praxitas then pulled down part of the walls, and made incursions into the Corinthian territory on the side of the Saronic bay. But when winter set in, he disbanded his army, without making any provision for keeping the command of the Isthmus; and the Athenians came, with carpenters and masons, and repaired the breach in the walls.

*Battle of
the Long
Walls.*

*Mercenary
troops :
their grow-
ing im-
portance.*

A warfare of raids was at the same time constantly carried on by the hostile parties, from their posts at Corinth and Sicyon. In this warfare a force of mercenaries, trained and commanded by the Athenian Iphicrates, was especially conspicuous. They were armed as peltasts, with light shield and javelin, and this armour was far better suited for the conditions of camp life and the duties of the professional soldier, than the armour of a hoplite. The employment of mercenaries had been growing,—destined ultimately to supplant the institution of citizen armies. It was the wilder parts of Greece, like

Crete, Aetolia, Acarnania, that chiefly supplied the mercenary troops. Iphicrates of Rhamnus, an officer of great energy and talent, recognised the importance of the professional peltast as a new element in Hellenic warfare, and immortalised his name in military history by reforming the peltast's equipment. His improvements consisted in lengthening the sword and the javelin, and introducing a kind of light leggings, known as "Iphicratid" boots. It is difficult to appreciate the full import of these changes; but they were clearly meant to unite effectiveness of attack with rapidity of motion.

This enterprising officer and his peltasts won the chief honours of the "Corinthian War." Agesilaus had been sent out to gain some more permanent successes than those which had been achieved by Praxitas. His brother Teleutias co-operated with him by sea; the Long Walls were stormed, and the port of Lechaeon was captured. In the following year he went forth again. It was the time of the Isthmian festival, and the games were about to be held in the precincts of Poseidon at Isthmus. Agesilaus marched thither, interrupted the Corinthians and Argives who were beginning the celebration, and presided at the contest himself. When he retired, the Corinthians came and celebrated the festival over again; some athletes won the same race twice.

Agesilaus then captured the port of Piraeon, on the promontory which forms the northern side of the inmost recess of the Corinthian gulf. The importance of this capture lay in the fact that Piraeon connected Corinth with her allies in Boeotia; its occupation was a threat to Boeotia; and the Boeotians immediately sent envoys to Agesilaus. The position was now reversed: the Spartans commanded the Isthmus passage, and by possessing Sicyon, Piraeon, Lechaeon, as well as Sidon and Crommyon on the Saronic gulf, they entirely closed in Corinth, except on the side of Argolis. If Agesilaus felt himself the arbiter of Greece, his triumph was short. The situation was rescued by Iphicrates.

In the garrison at Lechaeon there were some men of Amyclae, whose custom and privilege it was to return to their native place to keep the local feast of Hyacinthus. The time of this feast was now at hand, and they set out to return home by Sicyon and Arcadia, the only way open to them.

*Reforms of
Iphicrates.*

*Agesilaus
captures
Lechaeon,
391 B.C.*

*(390 B.C.,
spring.)*

*Spartans
capture
Piraeon.*

*The light
troops of
Iphicrates
vanquish
Spartan
hoplites.*

But as it was not safe for a handful of men to march under the walls of Corinth, they were escorted most of the way to Sicyon by a *mora* of 600 Lacedaemonian hoplites. As this escort was returning to Lechaeon, Iphicrates and his peltasts issued from the gates of Corinth and attacked them. The heavy spearmen were worn out by the repeated assaults of the light troops with which they were unable to cope, and a large number were destroyed. This event, though less striking and important, bore a resemblance to the famous calamity of Sphacteria. In both cases, Spartan warriors had been discomfited in the same way by the continuous attacks of inaccessible light troops; and in both cases a blow was dealt to the military prestige of Lacedaemon. The success of Iphicrates was a suggestive sign of the future which might be in store for the professional peltast. To Agesilaus the news came at a moment when he was regarding with triumphant arrogance his captives and the Theban envoys. His pride was changed into chagrin; the army was plunged into sorrow; and only the relatives of those soldiers who had fallen in the battle moved about with the jubilant air of victors. Leaving another division as a garrison in Lechaeon, Agesilaus returned home, skulking through Sicyon and the Arcadian cities at night, in order to avoid unkind remarks. Piraeon, Sidon, and Cromnyon were soon recovered by Iphicrates; and the garrison of Lechaeon seems to have done no more than keep the gates of the Peloponnesus open. This was the result of the "Corinthian" war. Sparta had succeeded in breaking down the barrier which was to shut her out from North Greece; but she had sustained a serious loss and damage to her reputation.

SECT. 6. THE KING'S PEACE

*Efforts
towards
a peace.
392 B.C.*

We must now turn from the Isthmus of Corinth to the eastern coasts of the Aegean. The Lacedaemonians ascribed the success of their opponents to the support of Persia, and drew the conclusion that their chance lay in detaching Persia to their own side. With this view they had dispatched Antalcidas to open negotiations with Tiribazus. The proposals of Sparta were (1) that the Hellenic cities of Asia should be subjects of the king; this was the price of Persian help; (2)

that all other Hellenic cities should be independent; this was aimed at the Confederates—at the supremacy of Thebes in Boeotia, and at the union of Corinth with Argos. The Athenians and their allies sent Conon and other envoys to counteract the mission of Antalcidas, and perhaps it was at this time also that they sent the orator Andocides to Sparta to consider terms of peace. Both the mission of Andocides and the mission of Antalcidas were alike unsuccessful. Tiribazus, who was favourable to Sparta and threw Conon into prison, was recalled; and his successor Struthas had no Spartan leanings. The object of Antalcidas was indeed ultimately reached, but its attainment was postponed for four or five years, and the war went on as before.

The military events of these years are not of great interest; our knowledge of them is meagre. In Asia, the Spartan cause *Warfare in Asia:* revives. Thibron is sent out once more, and though he sustains a severe defeat at the hands of Struthas, it is not until he has won over Ephesus, Magnesia, and Priene. Soon Cnidus and Samos follow the example of these cities. Agesi- *in Europe.* laus invades Acarnania, and forces the Acarnanians to join the Lacedaemonian league; his colleague Agesipolis carries out one of those invasions of Argolis which lead to nothing. Then the Spartans use Aegina as a base for harassing Attica, and a warfare of surprises is carried on between the harmosts of Aegina and Athenian admirals. The harmost Gorgopas captured four ships of an Athenian squadron; the Athenian Chabrias then landed in Aegina, laid an ambush, and killed Gorgopas. Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, was sent to Aegina soon afterwards. He made an attack on the Piraeus at daybreak, and towed away some of the galleys lying in the harbour. In old Greece the war was on the whole advantageous to Sparta, though no decisive success was gained.

But the most important event was the recovery of Athenian dominion on the Propontis. At this moment Athens *Taxation at Athens:* was in great financial straits, for she had ceased to receive (1) Persian subsidies. When an indirect impost of $\frac{1}{40}$ th had been *Euripides' tax of $\frac{1}{40}$ th:* tried and found insufficient, a direct war-tax was levied. For (2) *war tax, 390, 389 B.C.* the Athenians had determined to operate both in the south and in the north; in the south to assist their friend Evagoras who was revolting from the Great King, in the north to recover

389 B.C.

*Death of
Thrasy-
bulus*
(388 B.C.).

control of the road to the Euxine Sea. Thrasybulus, the restorer of the democracy, sailed with a fleet of forty ships to the Hellespont, and gained over to the Athenian alliance the islands of Thasos and Samothrace, the Chersonesus, and the two cities which commanded the Bosphorus, Byzantium and Chalcedon. Proceeding to Lesbos, he defeated and slew the Spartan harmost, and established Athenian supremacy over most of the island. He also won Clazomenae. The original object for which he had been sent out was to assist Rhodes in maintaining her independence against the efforts of Sparta to regain the mastery of the island. But to act with effect it was necessary to raise money, and the Athenian fleet coasted round Asia Minor, levying contributions. These exactions appear to have been a renewal of the tax of 5 per cent which Athens imposed on the commerce of her allies after the Sicilian expedition. It seemed like the beginning of a new empire. Aspendus in Pamphylia was one of the places visited, and the visit was fatal to Thrasybulus. The violent methods of his soldiers enraged the inhabitants; they surprised him at night in his tent and slew him. Athens had now lost the two men of action to whom, since the death of Pericles, she owed most, Conon and Thrasybulus. Conon, who soon after his imprisonment by Tiribazus died in Cyprus, had broken down the maritime dominion of the Lacedaemonian oppressor and had given Athens the means of recovering her independence and her sea-power. Thrasybulus had given to the Athenian democracy a new life and breathed into it a new spirit of conciliation and moderation. He strikes us—we know too little of him—as an eminently reasonable citizen, one of those men who command general confidence, and are not biassed by prejudice or ambition. The virtues of Thrasybulus were moral rather than intellectual. After his death insinuations were made against his integrity; and one of his friends named Ergocles was found guilty of embezzlement of money collected on the expedition of Thrasybulus and was put to death. But the statements of an advocate—and we have no other evidence—carry no weight.

The success of Thrasybulus in re-establishing a toll for the advantage of Athens on commerce passing through the Bosphorus was almost immediately merchandise by Anaxibius,

whom Sparta promptly sent out to act against Athens and Pharnabazus. He deprived Athens of her tolls by seizing the 388 *B.C.* merchant vessels. Iphicrates was dispatched to oppose him with 1200 peltasts, and the Hellespont became the scene of the same kind of warfare of raids and surprises which we saw carried on at Aegina. At last Iphicrates saw a favourable opportunity for a decisive blow. Anaxibius had gone to place a garrison in Antandrus, which he had just gained over. Iphicrates crossed by night from the Chersonese and laid an ambush on the return route, near the gold mines of Cremaste. The troops of Anaxibius marched in careless order, traversing the narrow mountain passes in extended single file, without the slightest suspicion that an enemy lay in the way. Suddenly, as they were coming down from the mountains into the plain of Cremaste, the peltasts of Iphicrates leaped out. Anaxibius saw at a glance that the case was desperate. The scattered hoplites had no chance against the peltasts. "I must die here," he said to his men, "my honour demands it; but do you save yourselves." The youth whom he loved and who always accompanied him fell fighting by his side. The exploit of Iphicrates ensured the command of the Hellespont and Bosphorus to Athens.

Unfortunately for Athens, the political situation changed and other great powers intervened. At the beginning of the fourth century there were three great powers which aimed at supremacy over portions of the Greek world—Persia, Sparta, and the tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius. At first, however, it was not a case of these three great powers uniting in a sacred alliance for the suppression of liberty. Dionysius did not intervene in the east; and Persia and Sparta contested the supremacy over the Asiatic Greeks. Thus Persia, in the cause of her own supremacy in Asia, made common cause with liberty elsewhere. The general military failure of Sparta forced her to seek a reconciliation with Persia on the basis of abandoning Asia. One of the obstacles to the accomplishment of this object was the influence of the satrap Pharnabazus who cherished bitter hostility to the country of Dercyllidas and Agesilaus. On the other hand, Athens had taken an ambiguous step which could not fail to create distrust and resentment at the Persian court. If Athens was indebted

*Athens
votes to
assist
Evagoras,
390 B.C.*

to Persia for the restoration of her walls, she had also been befriended and supported by Evagoras, prince of Salamis, the friend of Conon, and she had bestowed upon him her citizenship in recognition of his services. Thus, when he revolted from Persia, Athens was in an embarrassing position. The support of Persia against Sparta was all-important to her. Artaxerxes was her ally; but Evagoras was her citizen, and a Greek. Against her own apparent interests, Athens sent ten ships to assist her Cypriote friend; and, though they were captured by a Lacedaemonian admiral and never actually served against the Persians, the incident was calculated to dispose the Great King to entertain the overtures of Sparta. The diplomatist Antalcidas went up to Susa and renewed his proposals. Backed by the influence of Tiribazus he overcame the reluctance of Artaxerxes, who was personally prepossessed against Sparta, and induced him to agree to enforce a general pacification, on the same conditions which had been proposed before. Opposition on the part of Pharnabazus was removed by summoning him to court to marry a daughter of Artaxerxes.

*Sparta
supported
by
Syracuse.*

The diplomacy of Sparta was successful not only at Susa; it was successful also at Syracuse, and obtained an auxiliary force of twenty triremes from the tyrant Dionysius.

387 B.C.

With the support of the west and the east, Sparta was able to force the peace upon Hellas. When Antalcidas and Tiribazus returned to the coast, they found Iphicrates blockading the Spartan fleet at Abydus. Antalcidas dexterously rescued the fleet from this predicament, and was able, when the Syracusan vessels joined him, as well as Persian reinforcements, to blockade the Athenians in the Hellespont and prevent corn vessels from reaching Athens. The coasting trade of Attica was at the same time suffering grievously through the raids from Aegina, which have already been mentioned. Hence peace was expedient for Athens; and the allies could not think of continuing the war without her. The representatives of the belligerents were summoned to Sardis, and Tiribazus read aloud the edict of his master, showing them the royal seal. It was to this effect:—

*The peace
which the
King sent
down,
387-6 B.C.*

“King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia, and the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus, shall belong to him. Further, that all the other Greek cities, small and

great, shall be autonomous; except Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which shall belong to Athens, as aforetime. If any refuse to accept this peace I shall make war on them, along with those who are of the same purpose, both by land and sea, with both ships and money."

The representatives were to report to the cities the terms of the peace, and then meet at Sparta to declare their acceptance. All accepted; but the Thebans raised a difficulty by (386 B.C.) claiming to take the oath on behalf of all the Boeotian cities as well as of themselves. Such a proposal would clearly place the Boeotian cities in a different class from the other cities of Greece, which took the oath each for itself. It was an attempt to assert the dependence of the Boeotian communities on Thebes, whereas one of the chief objects of the peace was to assert their autonomy. Agesilaus was secretly pleased with the opposition of Thebes: he hoped that the Thebans would persist in it and give him the opportunity of attacking and subduing their detested city. But they submitted in time and disappointed his vengeance.

The King's Peace was inscribed on stone tablets, which were set up in the chief sanctuaries of the Greek states. There was a feeling among many that Greece had suffered a humiliation in having to submit to the arbitration of Persia. Both Spartans and Athenians had alike used Persian help, when they could get it, but never before had the domestic conflicts of Hellas been settled by barbarian dictation and under a barbarian sanction. It was Sparta's doing. She constituted herself the minister of the Great King's will in order to save her own position; and the Greeks of Asia were left to endure oriental methods of government. Athens, though she had lost what Thrasybulus had won for her, was allowed to retain her old insular dependencies in the North Aegean; a concession which shows that it was thought necessary to bribe her into accepting the peace, and that Sparta was more eagerly bent on weakening the other confederates. In truth, the main objects were to break up the Boeotian league and to separate the Argives from Corinth.

But it was an age of federal experiments, and the King's *Federal* Peace, while it dissolved the leagues of Argos and Thebes, led *movements*. to a federal movement in another quarter. Ephesus, Samos,

Coinage.

Cnidus, and Iasus, flung back into the power of Persia, formed an alliance with Rhodes, and in token thereof these cities issued alliance coins of the Rhodian standard, engraved with a picture of the infant Heracles strangling the snakes. It was an alliance for mutual protection of their liberties. These were days in which, from one end of the Greek world to the other, smaller states, seeing their freedom threatened by Persia, Sparta, or Syracuse, were inclined to draw together into small federations. And from one end of the Greek world to the other there seems to have spread a fellow-feeling among these smaller states, a consciousness that their cause was the same. In the west, Croton and Zacynthus, viewing with alarm the extension of the Syracusan empire, seem to have had a secret understanding, and it is most curious that they too engraved on their money the same symbolic scene. Again on the Propontis, at Cyzicus and Lampsacus, this properly Theban token reappears. It is hazardous to draw conclusions from coins as to definite political relations without some further evidence; but Heracles strangling the snakes seems to have been adopted at this period by tacit unanimity, if nothing more, as an emblem of liberty.

CHAPTER III

THE REVIVAL OF ATHENS AND HER SECOND LEAGUE

SECT. 1. HIGH-HANDED POLICY OF SPARTA

THE gates of the Peloponnesus were again open to Sparta without dispute; she was supported by Persia, and she had no complications in Asia to divide her energy. Accordingly she was able to renew the despotic policy which had been inaugurated for her by Lysander. Arcadian Mantinea was the first to suffer. The Mantineans were accused of various acts of disobedience and disloyalty to Sparta, and commanded to pull down their walls. When they refused, king Agesipolis—son of the exiled Pausanias—marched out against them. The city of Mantinea stood in a high plain, without any natural defences, depending entirely on its walls of unburnt brick. The river Ophis flowed through the town; and, a blockade proving tedious, Agesipolis dammed the stream at the point of issue. The water rose and undermined the walls; and when one of the towers threatened to fall, the people surrendered. Their punishment was severe. Mantinea ceased to be a city, and was broken up into its five constituent villages. Those who originally belonged to the *village* of Mantinea remained on the site of the city; the rest had to pull down their houses and move each to the village where his property was. The loss of civic life meant to a Greek the loss of all his higher interests.

The dissolution of the city of Mantinea (386-5 B.C.).

Agesilaus, who had once gone forth to destroy the Persian power, zealously supported the King's Peace. When some one suggested that it was at least curious to find the Spartans medizing, he rejoined, "Rather say that the Persians are

*The
Panegyric
of Isocrates
(composed
381), 380.*

*(See above,
p. 52;
and below,
p. 123.)*

*Evagoras
of Cyprus.*

411-10 B.C.

laconizing." Each way of putting it expressed a measure of the truth. But some of the Lacedaemonians, including king Agesipolis, were opposed to the recent policy of their government, and thought it ill-done to abandon the Greeks of Asia. Some years after the Peace, there seems to have been floating in the air a vague idea, which might or might not take shape, of organising another Asiatic expedition. It was to animate this idea that the Athenian orator Isocrates published a festal speech when the Greek nation was assembled at the Olympian festival. He advocated a grand Panhellenic union against Persia, under the common headship of Sparta and Athens—Sparta taking the command by land, Athens by sea. It was the third occasion on which a renowned master of style had broached the same idea at the same gathering-place. Nearly thirty years ago, it had been recommended by the florid eloquence of Gorgias; more recently it had been advocated with gracious simplicity by Lysias; and now the rich periods of Isocrates urged it once more upon Greece. The project—in the ideal form in which Isocrates imagined it—was at this moment chimerical. A hundred years before, it had been hard enough to compass a practical co-operation between Greek powers of equal strength and pretensions, in a war of defence; it was hopeless to think of such co-operation now for a war of aggression. Sparta and Athens were quarrelling, as the orator complains, over the tribute of the Cyclad islands; and neither was likely to yield to the other without a clear award of war. And other troubles were brewing in another quarter.

The contest of east and west had been going on meanwhile in Cyprus, an island whose geographical situation has marked it out, like Sicily, to be a meeting-place of races. We have already met a man who played an eminent part in that struggle, Evagoras the prince of Salamis. He belonged to the Teucrid family which had reigned there in the days of Darius and Xerxes, but had been supplanted by a Phoenician dynasty about the middle of the fifth century. Evagoras, crossing over from the Cilician Soli, won back the sceptre of his race by a daring surprise. He governed with conspicuous moderation, discretion, and success; setting himself to the work of reviving the cause of Hellenism, which had lost much ground during the past half-century; and pursuing this task

by entirely peaceful means. After Aegospotami, the city of Evagoras became the refuge for large numbers of Athenians who had settled down in various parts of the Athenian empire and could no longer remain securely in their homes. For the first sixteen years of his reign Evagoras was a faithful tributary of the Great King, and we have seen how his influence at Susa assisted Conon. But soon after the battle of Cnidus he became involved in war, both with Persia and with some of the Phoenician cities in the island. The Peace expressly ^{336 B.C.} recognised the sovereignty of Artaxerxes over Cyprus, and as soon as it was concluded, Persia began to concentrate her forces against Evagoras and a recalcitrant king of Egypt, with ^(Acoris.) whom Evagoras was leagued. A severe defeat at sea shut ^{336-4 B.C.} Evagoras up in Salamis; but he held out so dauntlessly, and the war had already cost Persia so much, that Tiribazus agreed to leave him his principality, on condition that he should pay tribute "as a slave to his lord." Evagoras refused; he would only pay it as one king to another. The negotiations were ^{381 B.C.} ruptured for a moment on this point of honour, but a dispute between the satrap and his subordinate general resulted in the removal of Tiribazus, and his successor permitted Evagoras to have his way.

The Salaminian despot had thus gained a moral triumph. ^{His death.} He did not survive it many years, and the story of his death is curious. A certain man named Nicocreon formed a plot against his life, and being detected was forced to fly. He left a daughter behind him in Salamis under the care of a faithful eunuch. This servant privily acquainted both Evagoras and his son Pnytagoras with the existence of this young lady and her uncommon beauty, and undertook to conduct them to her bedchamber, each without the knowledge of the other. Both ^{374 B.C.} kept the assignation and were slain by the eunuch, who thus avenged his master's exile. Another son of Evagoras, named Nicocles, succeeded him, and pursued the same hellenizing policy. One of the great objects of these enlightened princes was to keep their country in touch with the intellectual and artistic movements of Greece. Nicocles was a student of Greek philosophy, and a generous friend of the essayist, Isocrates, to whose pen we are indebted for much of what we know of the career of Evagoras.

Macedonia.
335 B.C.

Towards the close of the almost single-handed struggle of Salamis against Persia, the eyes of Greece were directed to a different quarter of the world. Events were passing in the north of the Aegean, which riveted the attention of Sparta and Athens; their Greek brethren of Cyprus and the Asiatic coast seem to be quite forgotten; for a while the oriental question almost passes out of the pages of Greek history. Yet it was destined that from that very region on the north-west corner of the Aegean should issue the force which should not only reclaim for European influence Cyprus and all the Greek cities of Asia, but bear Greek light into lands of which Agesilaus had never dreamed. That force was being forged in the Macedonian uplands; and some who were children when Isocrates published his Panegyric against the Barbarian lived to see the Barbarian succumb to a Greek power.

385 B.C.

*The
Chalcidian
Confederacy.*

It was indeed only indirectly that the southern Greeks had now to concern themselves with their backward brethren of Macedonia. One of the chief obstacles to the development of this country was its constant exposure to the attacks of its Illyrian neighbours; and an Illyrian invasion, supported by domestic disloyalty, compelled king Amyntas—he was the nephew of Perdiccas—to flee from his kingdom. Amyntas, soon after his accession, had concluded a close defensive and commercial alliance for fifty years with the Chalcidian league, which had been formed by Olynthus and comprised the towns of the Sithonian promontory. It was, as we observed already, an age of small federations. At the moment of his retreat Amyntas handed over to the Chalcidians the lower districts of Macedonia and the cities lying round the Thermaic gulf. The Macedonian cities readily embraced an union which could protect them against the Illyrians, and the league spread from the maritime towns up the country and included even Pella. Perfect equality and brotherhood between the members was the basis of this Chalcidian confederacy. All the cities had common laws, common rights of citizenship, intermarriage and commerce; Olynthus did not assume a privileged position for herself. The neighbouring Greek cities were also asked to join, and some of them, Potidaea for instance, accepted the offer. But it was always a sacrifice for a Greek city to give up its hereditary laws and surrender any part of its sovereignty,

whatever compensating advantages might be purchased; and there was consequently more reluctance among the Chalcidians than among the less developed Macedonians to join the league. The Olynthians, as their work grew, conceived the idea of a confederate power which should embrace the whole Chalcidic peninsula and its neighbourhood. Once this ambition took form, it became necessary to impose by force their proposition upon those who declined to accept it freely. The strong cities of Acanthus and Apollonia resisted, and sent envoys to Sparta to obtain her help. Moreover Amyntas had recovered his throne, and when the Olynthians refused to abandon the cities which he had handed over to them, he too looked for aid to Sparta. These appeals directed the eyes of Greece upon the Chalcidian confederacy. It was the Lacedaemonian policy to oppose all combinations and keep Greece disunited—a policy which was popular, in so far as it appealed to that innate love of autonomy which made it so difficult to bring about abiding federal unions in Greece. The ambassadors had little difficulty in persuading the Lacedaemonians and their allies that the movement in Chalcidice was dangerous to the interests of Sparta, and should be crushed at the outset; and they argued that the very liberality of the principles on which it was founded made the league more attractive and therefore more dangerous. A vote of assistance to Acanthus and Apollonia was passed, and a small advance force was immediately sent under Eudamidas. Though unable to meet the confederate army in the field, this force was sufficient to protect the cities which had refused to join the league, and it even induced Potidaea to revolt.

The expedition against the Chalcidian Confederacy led unexpectedly to an important incident elsewhere. Phoebidas, the brother of Eudamidas, was to follow with larger forces, and, as the line of march lay through Boeotia, a party in Thebes favourable to Sparta thought to profit by the proximity of Spartan troops for the purpose of a revolution. Leontiadas, the most prominent member of this party, was then one of the polemarchs. He concerted with Phoebidas a plot to seize the Cadmea—the citadel of Thebes—on the day of the Thesmophoria; for on that day the citadel was given up to the use of the women who celebrated the feast. The plot

The citadel of Thebes seized by the Spartans, (383 or) 382 B.C.

succeeded perfectly ; the acropolis was occupied without striking a blow ; the oligarchical Council was intimidated by Leontiadas ; and his colleague, the other polemarch, Ismenias was arrested. The leading anti-Spartans fled from Thebes, and a government friendly to Sparta was established. This was a great triumph for Sparta, a great satisfaction to Agesilaus, although, as a violation of peace, it caused a moment's embarrassment. Was the government to recognise the action of Phoebidas and profit by it ? Spartan hypocrisy compromised the matter ; Phoebidas was fined 100,000 drachmae for his indiscretion, and the Cadmea was retained. Then Ismenias was tried by a body of judges representing Sparta and her allies, and was condemned on charges of medism and executed. That Sparta, after the King's Peace, should condemn a Theban for medism, was a travesty of justice.

Restoration of Plataea, 382-1 B.C.

With the fortress of Thebes in her hands, Sparta had a basis for extending her power in central Greece and might regard her supremacy as secured. She restored the city of Plataea, which she had herself destroyed well-nigh fifty years ago, and gathered all the Plataeans who could be found to their old home. But her immediate attention was fixed on the necessity of repressing the dangerous league in the north of Greece, and continuing the measures which had been interrupted by the enterprise of Phoebidas in Boeotia. The popular brother of Agesilaus, Teleutias, was sent to conduct the war ; but, although he was aided by Amyntas, and by Derdas, a prince of Upper Macedonia, who supplied good cavalry, it proved no easy matter to make head against the league. In front of the walls of Olynthus, Teleutias sustained a signal defeat and was himself slain. The war was fatal to a king as well as to a king's brother. Agesipolis, who was next

(381 B.C.)

(380 B.C.)

Suppression of the Chalcidian League, 379 B.C.

sent out at the head of a very large force, caught a fever in the intolerable summer heat. He was carried to the shady grove of the temple of Dionysus at Aphytis, but he died there ; and his body, stowed in honey, was brought home for burial. His successor, Polybiadas, was more successful. He forced the Olynthians to sue for peace and dissolve their league. They and all the Greek cities of the peninsula were constrained to join the Lacedaemonian alliance, and the maritime cities of Macedonia were restored to the sway of Amyntas. Thus Sparta put down an attempt to overcome that system of isola-

tion, which placed Greek cities at a great disadvantage, when they had barbarian neighbours. If Sparta had not happened to be so strong at this moment, the Chalcidian league might have grown into a power, which would have considerably modified the development of Macedonia. All that Sparta did, although for a moment it made her power paramount in northern Greece, fell out ultimately to the advancement and profit of Macedon.

About the same time, the Lacedaemonians were making their heavy hand felt in the Peloponnesus. Soon after the King's Peace they had forced the Phliasians to recall a number of banished aristocrats. Disputes arose about the restoration of confiscated property, and the exiles appealed to Sparta, where they had a zealous supporter in Agesilaus. War was declared; Agesilaus reduced the city of Phlius by blockade, and compelled it to receive a Lacedaemonian garrison for six months, until a commission of one hundred, which he nominated, should have drawn up a new constitution.

Thus the Lacedaemonians, in alliance with the tyrant Dionysius and the barbarian Artaxerxes, tyrannised over the Greeks for a space. Some demonstrations were made, some voices of protest were raised, in the name of the Panhellenic cause. At the Olympian festival which was held about two years after the King's Peace, the Athenian orator Lysias warned the assembled Greeks of the dangers which loomed in the east and in the west, from Persia and from Sicily, and uttered his amazement at the policy of Lacedaemon. A magnificent deputation had been sent by Dionysius to this festival, and the inflammatory words, perhaps the direct instigation, of the speaker incited some enthusiastic spectators to attack the gorgeous pavilion of the Syracusan envoys. The outrage was prevented; but the occurrence shows the beginning of that tide of feeling to which Isocrates appealed, four years later, when in his festal oration he denounced the Lacedaemonians, as sacrificing the freedom of Greece to their own interests and treacherously aiding foreigners and tyrants.

Even Xenophon, the friend of Sparta's king, the admirer of Sparta's institutions, is roused to regretful indignation at Sparta's conduct, and recognises her fall as a just retribution. "The Lacedaemonians, who swore to leave the cities

Sparta
tyrannises
over
Phlius;
blockade,
381-79 B.C.

(384 B.C.)
Olympic
oration of
Lysias.

independent, seized the acropolis of Thebes, and they were punished by the very men, single-handed, whom they had wronged, though never before had they been vanquished by any single people. It is a proof that the gods observe men who do irreligious and unhallowed deeds." In this way the pious historian introduces the event which prepared the fall of Sparta and the rise of Thebes.

SECT. 2. ALLIANCE OF ATHENS AND THEBES

*The
deliverance
of Thebes.*

The government of Leontiadas and his party at Thebes, maintained by 1500 Lacedaemonians in the citadel, was despotic and cruel, like that of the Thirty at Athens. Fear made the rulers suspicious and oppressive; for they were afraid of the large number of exiles, who had found a refuge at Athens and were awaiting an opportunity to recover their city. Athens was now showing the same goodwill to the fugitives from Thebes which Thebes, when Athens was in a like plight, had shown to Thrasybulus and his fellows. One of the exiles, named Pelopidas, of more than common daring and devotion, resolved to take his life in his hands, and found six others to associate in his plans. No open attack was to be thought of; Thebes must be recovered by guile, even as by guile it had been won. There were many in Thebes who were bitter foes of the ruling party, such as Epaminondas, the beloved friend of Pelopidas, but most of them deemed the time unripe for any sudden stroke for freedom. Yet a few were found ready to run the risk; above all, Phyllidas, who was the secretary of the polemarchs and therefore the most useful of confederates, and Charon, a citizen of good estate, who offered his house as a place of hiding for the conspirators. The day on which the two polemarchs, Archias and Philippus, were to go out of office was fixed for the enterprise. On the day before, Pelopidas and his six comrades crossed Cithaeron in the guise of huntsmen, and, nearing Thebes at nightfall, mixed with the peasants who were returning from the fields, got them safely within the gates, and found safe hiding in the abode of Charon. The secretary Phyllidas had made ready a great banquet for the following night, to which he had bidden the outgoing polemarchs, tempting them by the promise of

379-8 B.C.
(winter).

introducing them to some high-born and beautiful women, whose love they desired. During the carouse a messenger came with a letter for Archias, and said that it concerned serious affairs. "Business to-morrow," said Archias, placing it under his pillow. On the morrow it was found that this letter disclosed the conspiracy. The polemarchs then called for the women, who were waiting in an adjoining room. Phyllidas said that they declined to appear till all the attendants were dismissed. When no one remained in the dining hall but the polemarchs and a few friends, all flushed with wine, the women entered and sat down beside the lords. They were covered with long veils; and even as they were bidden lift them and reveal their charms, they buried daggers in the bodies of the polemarchs. For they were none other than Pelopidas and his fellows in the guise of women. Then they went and slew in their houses Leontiadas and Hypatas, the two other chief leaders of the party, and set free the political prisoners. When all this was done, Epaminondas and the other patriots, who were unwilling to initiate such deeds themselves, accepted the revolution with joy. When day dawned, an assembly of the people was held in the Agora, and the conspirators were crowned with wreaths. Three of them, including Pelopidas, were appointed polemarchs, and a democratic constitution was established.

The rest of the exiles and a body of Athenian volunteers presently arrived, on the news of the success. The Spartan commander of the Cadmea had sent hastily, on the first alarm, for reinforcements to Thespieae and Plataea, but those that came were charged and repelled, outside the gate. Then in the first flush of success the patriots resolved to storm the Cadmea, strong as the place was. But the labour and the danger were spared them. Amazing as it may seem, the Lacedaemonian harmosts decided to capitulate at once. Two of these commanders were put to death on their return to Sparta, and the third was banished. The chagrin of the ephors and Agesilaus was intense; king Cleombrotus was immediately sent with an army to Boeotia, but accomplished nothing.

*Cadmea
sur-
rendered.*

Athens was formally at peace with Sparta, and was not disposed to break with her, however great may have been the

*Athens
disowns the
action of
the
Athenian
volunteers,
and
punishes
the
generals.*

secret joy felt at the events in Boeotia. But the march of the Athenian volunteers to Thebes was an awkward incident, the more so as there were two strategi among them. Lacedaemonian envoys arrived to demand explanation and satisfaction: and their statements were reinforced by the neighbourhood of the army of king Cleombrotus. There was indeed nothing to be said for the conduct of the two strategi. They had abused their position and brought their city into danger and embarrassment. We can only approve the sentence of the Athenians, which executed one and banished the other.

*The raid of
Sphodrias.*

But if these Athenian generals were indiscreet, it was as nothing beside the indiscretion of a Lacedaemonian commander, which now precipitated the breach between the two states. A not ignoble sympathy might have been pleaded by the two Athenians; but no excuse could be urged for the rash enterprise of the Spartan harmost of Thespieae, who aspired to be a second Phoebeidas. His name was Sphodrias, and he conceived the plan of making a night march to Athens and surprising Piraeus on the land side. To seize Piraeus, the seat of Athenian merchandise, would be a compensation for the loss of Thebes. But the plan was, if not ill considered, at least ill carried out. Day dawned when he had hardly passed Eleusis; and there was nothing to do but to turn back. He retreated, laying waste the districts through which he passed.

Great wrath was kindled in Athens by this unprovoked deed of hostility. The envoys had not yet gone; they were immediately thrown into prison, but escaped by declaring that the Spartan government was not responsible for the raid, and would speedily prove its innocence by the condemnation of Sphodrias. The assurance was belied; Sphodrias was not condemned. His son and the son of Agesilaus were lovers, and the king's influence saved him. Agesilaus is reported to have said: "Sphodrias is guilty, of course; but it is a hard thing to put to death a man who, as child, stripling, and man, lived a life of perfect honour; for Sparta needeth such soldiers." This miscarriage of justice was a grave mistake of policy; and the high-handed insolence of the Spartan oligarchs was set in a more glaring light by contrast with the fair-mindedness which the Athenian people had displayed in promptly punishing its own generals for a similar though

certainly less heinous act. The Athenian generals had at least not invaded Lacedaemonian territory. It was debated at the time, and has been debated since, whether Sphodrias acted wholly of his own accord; some thought that the suggestion came from king Cleombrotus, and the theory was started that the Thebans were the prime instigators—an unlikely theory, which was evidently based on the fact that Thebes was the only gainer by the raid. It seems most probable that the private ambition of Sphodrias, who thought he had a chance of emulating Phoebeidas, was alone responsible.

The raid and acquittal of Sphodrias drove Athens, against her will, into war with Sparta and alliance with Thebes; it stirred her for a while to leave her rôle of neutral spectator and assume that of an active belligerent. For the next six years, Athens and Sparta are at war, though such a war was contrary to the interests of both states, but especially to the interests of Sparta.

*Alliance of
Athens
with
Thebes,
378 B.C.*

SECT. 3. THE SECOND ATHENIAN LEAGUE AND THE THEBAN REFORMS

The raid of Sphodrias was the direct occasion of the Second Athenian Confederacy. For many years back, ever since the battle of Cnidus, Athens had been gradually forming bonds of alliance with various states in Thrace, the Aegean, and the coasts of Asia Minor. The breach with Sparta induced her now to gather together these separate connexions into a common league, with the express object of protecting the independence of the Greek states against the oppression of Sparta. When men thought of the old Confederacy of Delos, they might fear that the second Athenian league would be soon converted into a second Athenian empire. But Athens anticipated such alarms by establishing the confederacy on a different system, which provided safeguards against the dangers of Athenian preponderance and Athenian encroachment. In the archonship of Nausinicus, Aristoteles of the deme of Marathon proposed in the Assembly a decree which embodied the principles of the league. The sway of Persia over the Greeks of Asia was explicitly recognised, so that the field of operations was to be European Greece and the Islands. The

*Second
Athenian
Con-
federacy.*

378-7 B.C.

league, which was purely defensive, was constituted in two parts, Athens on one side, her allies on the other. The allies had their own synedrion or congress which met in Athens, but in which Athens had no part. Both the synedrion of the Confederates and the Athenian Assembly had the right of initiating measures, but no measure passed by either body was valid until it had been approved by the other body also. While this system gave Athens a weight and dignity equal to that of all her allies together, it secured for the allies an independence which they had not possessed under the old league, and they had the right of absolute veto on any Athenian proposal which they disliked. It was necessary for the members of the league to form a federal fund; their payments were called *syntaxeis* ("contributions"), and the word *phoros* ("tribute"), which had odious memories connected with the confederacy of Delos, was avoided. It was especially enacted that the practice of Athenian outsettling in the lands of the allies, which had formerly helped and supported the Athenian empire, was not to be permitted. No Athenian was to acquire home or farm, "by purchase or mortgage, or any other means whatever," in the territory of any of the confederates. But the administration of the federal fund and the leadership of the federal army were in the hands of Athens.

Callistratus.

Good fortune has preserved to us the original stone, shattered in about twenty pieces, with the decree which founded the confederacy, and we find the purpose of the league definitely declared: "To force the Lacedaemonians to allow the Greeks to enjoy peace in freedom and independence, with their lands unviolated." It was no doubt Callistratus, the ablest statesman and orator of the day, who did most to make the new scheme a success; but, though he may be called the Aristides of the Second Confederacy, Callistratus certainly did not mean the combination against Sparta as seriously as Aristides meant the combination against Persia. The policy which Callistratus generally pursued was based on harmony with Sparta and antagonism to Thebes. It is sometimes said that at this period there were two parties contending for the guidance of the foreign policy of Athens, one friendly and the other obstinately hostile to Boeotia. But, though Thebes had some friends at Athens, we have no good grounds for speaking

of a Theban or Boeotian party. It might be truer to say that there was an anti-Spartan faction, which might often seek a Theban alliance as a means to an end. At this juncture Callistratus was astute enough to see not only that it would be useless to oppose the feeling against Sparta, but also that an opportunity was offered, which might never recur, for increasing the power of Athens. He therefore abandoned for the time his permanent policy, and threw himself heartily into a scheme of which the most remarkable feature was union with Thebes.

The chief cities which first joined the new league were Chios, Byzantium, Mytilene, Methymna, and Rhodes; then most of the towns of Euboea joined, and, what was most important and wonderful, Thebes enrolled her name in the list of the confederates. The Thracian cities, and several other states, including Corcyra, Jason the despot of Pherae in Thessaly, and Alcetas a prince of Epirus, presently brought up the whole tale of members to about seventy. But though the league, drawn on such liberal lines, evoked some enthusiasm at first, and the adhesion of Thebes gave its inauguration a certain *éclat*, it had no vital elements of growth or permanence, and never attained high political importance. The fact is, that the true interest of Athens, as Callistratus knew, was peace with Sparta, and was consequently repugnant to the avowed object of the confederacy. Hence the confederacy was doomed either to fall asunder, or to become the tool of other designs of Athens as soon as Sparta had been taught a lesson and the more abiding interest of Athens could safely assert itself again over the temporary expedient of an unnatural alliance with Thebes.

It was a moment at which the chief Greek states were setting their houses in order. Thebes was making herself ready and dight for a new career; Sparta was remodelling her league,¹ and Athens her finances. A property tax, such as *Eisphora* or property-tax at Athens. *ἐὶς τοῦτο* of capital. had first been introduced in the third year of the Peloponnesian war, was revived, and a new assessment of property was made. One-fifth of the actual capital of each citizen was inscribed in the register, and the tax (probably about one per cent) was

¹ In nine divisions:—1, 2, Arcadia; 3, Elis; 4, 5, Achæa; 5, Corinth and Megara; 6, Sicyon, Phlius, the Acte of Argolis; 7, Acarnania; 8, Phocis, Locris; 9, Olynthus and other Thracian cities.

£14,400.

imposed on this fraction, not on the whole capital. The revenue from this impost seems to have amounted annually to about sixty talents. For the purpose of levying the tax the whole body of burghers was divided into 100 symmories, and the richest citizens in each symmory were responsible to the treasury for the total sum due on the properties of all the citizens who belonged to it. By this means the State relieved itself from the friction which is generally caused by the collection of direct imposts, and the revenue accruing from the tax was realised more promptly and easily than if the government had to deal immediately with the individual burghers. Thus Athens tried the novel experiment of a system of joint responsibility, such as in later days was to be introduced and established in an empire of which Athens was only an insignificant town.

(Roman
Empire.)

*Sacred
Locks.*

*Epami-
nondas.*

At Thebes the attention of the government was chiefly bestowed on military affairs. A ditch was dug and a rampart raised round part of the Theban territory as a defence against the inevitable Lacedaemonian invasions. But this precaution was of small moment in comparison with the creation of a new troop of 300 hoplites, all chosen young men of the noblest families, who had proved their eminent strength and endurance in a long training in the wrestling school. Each man had his best friend beside him; so that the Sacred Band, as it was called, consisted of 150 pairs of lovers, prepared to fight and fall together. In battle, it was to stand in front of the other hoplites. At the same time, we may be sure, much was done to improve the army in other points. Oppor-
tunely for Thebes there had arisen, to guide her to success when her chance came, a man of rare ability, in whom nature seemed to have united the best features of Greek character and discarded the defects. This was Epaminondas, the friend of Pelopidas. He was a modest, unambitious man, who in other circumstances would probably have remained in obscurity, unobtrusively fulfilling the duties of a citizen and soldier. But the revolution stimulated his patriotism and lured him into the field of public affairs, where his eminent capacity, gradually revealing itself, made him, before eight years had passed, the most influential man in his city. He had devoted as much time to musical as to gymnastic training; unlike

most of his countrymen, he could play the lyre as well as the Theban flute; and he had a genuine interest in philosophical speculation. A Tarentine friend, who had been much in his company, assevered that he never met a man who knew more and talked less than Epaminondas. But the Theban statesman could speak when he chose, or when the need demanded; and his eloquence was extremely impressive. Exceptional in his indifference to the prizes of ambition, he was also exceptional in his indifference to money, and he died poor. Not less remarkable was his lack of that party spirit, which led to so many crimes in Greece. He could not share in strong political hatred or lust for revenge; and we have already seen that his repugnance to domestic bloodshed kept him from taking a part in the fortunate conspiracy of Pelopidas.

SECT. 4. THE BATTLE OF NAXOS AND THE PEACE OF CALLIAS

The following eight years are marked by a successful defensive war of Thebes against Spartan invasions; by a decrease of Spartan prestige; by the extension of the Theban supremacy over the rest of Boeotia. At the same time, Athens prosecutes a naval war against the Lacedaemonian Confederacy, and gains considerable successes; but the strain on her resources which this war entails, and a growing jealousy of Thebes, combine to induce her to come to terms with Sparta.

Two invasions of Boeotia conducted by Agesilaus himself in successive summers achieved nothing; and the Thebans had the satisfaction of slaying Phoebidas, who had won his fame by the capture of their acropolis. The other king, Cleombrotus, did even less than Agesilaus, for he found the passes of Cithaeron held by the foes, and could not enter Boeotia. After this, the Thebans had time to attack the Boeotian cities and drive out the Spartan garrisons; so that by the end of four years the Boeotian confederacy once more extended over all Boeotia, the local governments being overthrown and the foreign harmosts expelled. Only in the extreme west, in Orchomenus and Chaeronea, were the Lacedaemonians able to hold their ground. In the course of this resuscitation of the

*Boeotia
invaded by
Agesilaus,
378, 377
B.C.
Defeat and
death of
Phoebidas,
377 B.C.
Cleom-
brotus
marches to
Cithaeron,
373 B.C.*

Boeotian league one notable exploit was wrought by Pelopidas and the Sacred Band. At Tegyra, on the road from Orchomenus to Locris, in a narrow pass, the Thebans routed twice as many Lacedaemonian troops, and slew both the Spartan generals. As in the case of all Spartan defeats, the moral effect was of far greater import than the actual loss in the field. Perhaps it was about this time that Athens won back Oropus, which had been lost to her in the year of the Four Hundred.

*Battle of
Naxos,
376 (September).*

In the meantime there had been war too on the seas. When the invasions of Boeotia fell out so badly, Sparta had bethought herself of equipping a naval armament to cut off the corn-ships which bore grain to Attica from the Euxine. The ships reached Geraestus, the south point of Euboea; but a fleet of sixty galleys under the Spartan Pollis hindered them from rounding the Cape of Sunium, and Athens was menaced with famine. Eighty triremes were speedily fitted out and sent forth from the Piraeus, under the command of Chabrias, to recover the mastery of the sea. Chabrias sailed to Naxos, which had seized this moment to desert the Athenian Confederacy, and beleaguered the city. Pollis hurried to the rescue, and a battle was fought in the sound between Paros and Naxos. The Athenians gained a complete victory, and only eleven of the Lacedaemonian vessels escaped. Even these would have been disabled, had not Chabrias desisted from the action, for the purpose of saving some of his own men who were overboard or in disabled ships. The lesson which the Athenian people taught its generals after the battle of Arginusae had not been forgotten. Though the battle of Naxos had not the important consequences of the battle of Cnidus, it was more gratifying to Athens. The Cnidian victory had been won indeed under the command of an Athenian, but by Persian men and ships; the victory gained by Chabrias was entirely Athenian. It led immediately to an enlargement of the Confederacy. The triumphant fleet sailed round the Aegean, enrolled seventeen new cities, and collected a large sum of money. Athens had also to reassert her authority at Delos. For the inhabitants of the island who chafed at the administration of their temple by the Athenian *amphictiones*, as the sacred overseers were entitled, had attempted, doubtless with

*Insurrectionary
movement
at Delos,
376 B.C.*

Lacedaemonian help, to recover control of the sanctuary. An interesting entry in the Delian accounts of these years, preserved on a stone, tells how seven ringleaders of the movement were punished by fines and perpetual banishment "for having led the amphictiones forth from the temple and beaten them."

Next year, the fleet was sent to sail round the Peloponnesus under the command of Timotheus, son of Conon. This circumnavigation of the Peloponnesus was an assertion by Athens that her naval power was once more dominant; it was intended to frighten Sparta, to extend Athenian influence in western Greece, and to act in the Corinthian Gulf, in case the Spartans tried to throw an army into Boeotia by the port of Creusis. The islands of Corcyra and Cephallenia, the king of the Molossi, some of the Acarnanians, were won over to the Athenian alliance by the discreet policy of Timotheus, who also gained a trifling victory over some hostile ships. But there was a darker side to this triumphant expedition. The cost of the war was proving to be greater than Athens could well bear, and Timotheus failed to obtain from home the money requisite to pay his seamen. In this strait, he was obliged to ask each trierarch to advance seven minae for the payment of his crew; (£28.) and Athens herself sent a request to Thebes for some contribution towards the expense of the naval operations, on the ground that the enterprise of Timotheus had been undertaken partly at Theban instigation. The refusal of this demand, along with a growing jealousy of Theban success, and the somewhat grave financial difficulties of the moment, combined to dispose Athens towards peace with Sparta; and this was in fact her wisest policy. Negotiations were opened and carried to a successful issue; but the peace was no sooner made than it was broken. For Timotheus, who was ordered to return home from Corcyra and reluctantly obeyed, halted at Zacynthus on his way, landed some Zacynthian exiles who were with him, and fortified a post for them on the island.¹ The Zacynthians straightway complained to Sparta; Sparta demanded satisfaction from Athens; and when this was

376 B.C.
*Expedition
of Timo-
theus.*

Peace, 374.

¹ The settlement of democratic exiles was enrolled in the Athenian Confederacy; and "the people of the Zacynthians at Néllon" appears as the last of the additions to the list of members on the Confederacy stone.

refused, the incident was treated as a breach of contract and the war was resumed.

*Lacedaemonians
attack on
Corcyra,
374-3 B.C.*

The first object of Sparta was to regain her power in the west, and undo the work of Timotheus. The best of the winnings of that general had been Corcyra, and Corcyra once more became the scene of a "Peloponnesian" war. With the help of their confederates, including Corinth, the Lacedaemonians launched an armament of sixty ships, conveying 1500 mercenary hoplites, to gain possession of the island; and at the same time a message was dispatched to Dionysius of Syracuse requesting his aid, on the ground that Sicily had her interests in Corcyraean politics. The armament was commanded by the Spartan Mnasippus. He drove the Corcyraean fleet into the harbour, which he blocked with his own ships, and he invested the city by land, so that the supplies of the inhabitants were cut off. The island was a rich prize for the soldiers to whose depredations it was now given over. The tillage was goodly, the crofts and farmhouses exceeding fair: and so plentiful was the wine that the troopers would drink none that was not of the finest sort. Urgent messages were sent to Athens by the Corcyraeans, who soon began to feel the pinch of famine. So great was the misery that slaves were cast out of the gates; even some citizens deserted, but were whipped back to the walls by the Lacedaemonian commander. But he, deeming that he had the city in his hands, grew careless in his confidence; and from the watch-towers on their walls the besieged could observe that the watch was sometimes relaxed. An opportune moment was seized for a sally, which resulted in a completer success than they looked for. The professional soldiers, who had not been paid and detested their general, showed no zeal in withstanding the hot onslaught of the desperate men who poured forth from the gates. Mnasippus was slain, and the besiegers fell back to their camp. The beleaguement was thus broken up, and the Corcyraeans were safe until the coming of the expected help from Athens. But they were delivered from all constraint even before that tardy help came; for the Lacedaemonians evacuated the island almost immediately after the defeat. Then at last the Athenian fleet sailed into the roads of Corcyra.

It was from no want of goodwill on the part of the Athenian people that the help had not come in time to save Corcyra much of the misery which she had suffered. A tale hangs by the delay of the fleet. On the first appeal, it was resolved to send sixty ships at once, and 600 peltasts were sent in advance and successfully introduced into the city. It was be- *Difficulties and delays of Timotheus;* fitting that Timotheus should return to the scene of his former achievements, and the command of the fleet was entrusted to him. He found himself in an awkward position, owing to one of the gravest defects in the machinery of Athenian administration. The people had voted a certain measure, appointing him to carry it out; but had omitted to vote or consider the necessary ways and means. It consequently devolved upon Timotheus to find the men and the money. For this purpose he cruised with some of his ships in the Northern Aegean, visiting Thessaly, Macedonia, and Thrace, while the main part of the fleet awaited his return at the island of Calauria. But meanwhile the need of Corcyra was sore, and more pressing messengers were arriving in Athens. The long tarrying of *he is deposed.* the general excited public indignation; his appointment was annulled; and Iphicrates, in conjunction with Chabrias and Callistratus, was charged to sail at once to Corcyra.

Callistratus was the most eloquent orator of the day. *Iphicrates in Thrace.* Chabrias, a tried soldier who had served under Cypriote and Egyptian kings, we have already met as the victor of Naxos. Iphicrates, who had come to the front by his boldness and success in the Corinthian war, had for the last fifteen years served as a captain of peltasts under the princes of Thrace, and had married a daughter of king Cotys. A comic poet (*c. 378 B.C.*) gives a picturesque description of his barbaric wedding. In the market-place a plentiful feast is set out for a throng of wild-haired Thracians. There are immense brazen cauldrons of broth, and the king, girding himself up, serves it with his own hands in a golden basin. Then the wine and water are tempered in the mixing-bowls, and the king goes around tasting each bowl, until he is the first drunk. But an adventurous life among the "butter-eating" barbarians does not seem to have wholly satisfied Iphicrates. He served the king of Persia in Egypt and then returned to Athens, and this expedition (*375-4 B.C.*) to Corcyra seems to have been his first service after his return.

*Return of
Timotheus.*

It was well and capably performed. The people in their excitement gave him a freer hand than they had given to Timotheus. He was able to put hard pressure on the trierarchs; he was allowed to impress seamen, and to make use of the galleys which guarded the Attic coast, and even the two sacred vessels, the *Salaminia* and *Paralus*. By these unusual efforts a fleet of seventy triremes was put together, but before it was quite ready to sail Timotheus returned. His cruise had been successful in raising money and men, and adding new members to the Confederacy; but it was thought that neither necessity nor success could excuse the singular inopportuneness of the delay. Ill-luck seemed to wait upon Timotheus. The funds which he brought back proved insufficient to meet the obligations which they ought to have defrayed, and a fraud was suspected. Iphicrates and Callistratus, his political rivals, lodged an indictment against him, but as they had to sail immediately to the west, the trial was postponed till the autumn.

372 B.C.
*Capture
of the
reinforce-
ments from
Syracuse.*

On his way out Iphicrates learned the news of the deliverance of Corcyra, so that he was able to send back those ships whose true duty was the defence of Attica. But there was still work to be done. The appeal which the Lacedaemonians sent to the tyrant Dionysius had not been in vain, and ten Syracusan triremes were even then approaching Corcyra. They stopped at a point in the north of the island, that the crews might rest after the long voyage; and there Iphicrates, whose scouts had watched for their approach, captured them, all but one vessel. This prize raised the welcome sum of sixty talents, but it was not long before Iphicrates, even as Timotheus, found himself embarrassed through want of money. Callistratus went back to Athens, promising to persuade the people either to keep the fleet regularly paid or to make peace. Meanwhile the crews of Iphicrates obtained subsistence by labour on the Corcyraean farms.

*Trial of
Timotheus,
373 (Nov.).*

If Corcyra had fallen, there can be little question that Timotheus would have been sacrificed to the displeasure of the Athenian people. But the good tidings from the west restored the public good-humour, and this was fortunate for the discredited general. His trial came on towards the end of the year. His military treasurer was tried at the same

time, found guilty of malversation, and condemned to death. But Timotheus himself was acquitted. He had indeed unusually powerful support. Two foreign monarchs had condescended to come to Athens to bear testimony in his favour, the Epirot king Alcetas, and Jason the despot of Thessalian Pherae. It was through Timotheus that these potentates had joined the Athenian league; and it was through them that he had been able to transport across Thessaly and Epirus the 600 peltasts who had been sent in advance to Corcyra. The interest of Jason—of whom more will have to be said presently—was particularly effective. Timotheus entertained these distinguished guests in his house in Piraeus, but he was obliged to borrow bedding, two silver bowls, and other things from his rich neighbour, the banker Pasion, in order to lodge them suitably. Though acquitted, Timotheus was discredited in public opinion, and he soon left Athens to take service in Egypt under the Great King.

Sparta had lost heart at the decisive check which she had received in Corcyra, and the discouragement was increased by a series of terrible earthquakes, in which Poseidon seemed to declare his wrath. She was therefore disposed to peace, and she thought to bring peace about, as before, through the mediation of Persia. Antalcidas was once more sent up to the Persian court. But this intervention from without was not really needed. Athens, uneasy under the burdens of the war and feeling rather jealousy of Thebes than bitterness against Sparta, was also well inclined to peace, and the influential orator Callistratus made it the object of his policy. The recent aggressions of Thebes against the Phocians, who were old allies of Athens, tended to estrange the two cities; and to this was added the treatment of that unfortunate little mountain burg, Plataea, by her Theban enemies. Restored Plataea had perforce been enrolled in the Boeotian confederacy, but she was secretly scheming for annexation to Attica. Suspecting these plots, Thebes determined to forestall them, and a small Theban force, surprising the town one day when the men were in the fields, took possession of it and drove all the Plataeans forth from Plataean soil. Many of the people, thus bereft of land and city, found a refuge at Athens; where the publicist Isocrates took up their cause and

*Plataea
seized by
Thebes.*

wrote his *Plataic Discourse*, a denunciation of Thebes. This incident definitely, though not formally, loosened the bonds between the two northern powers.

371 B.C.
Peace of
Callias.

The overtures came from Athens and her Confederacy. When the Lacedaemonian allies met at Sparta in spring, three Athenian envoys appeared at the congress. Of these the chief spokesman was Callistratus, and one of his associates was Callias, Torchbearer of the Eleusinian Mysteries, who had also worked to bring about the abortive peace three years before. Thebes likewise sent ambassadors, one of whom was Epaminondas. The basis of the peace which was now concluded was the principle which had been affirmed by the King's Peace, the principle of the autonomy of every Hellenic city. The Athenian and Lacedaemonian Confederacies were thus both rendered invalid. No compulsion could be exercised on any city to fulfil engagements as member of a league. Cities might co-operate with each other freely so far as they chose, but no obligation could be contracted or enforced. Yet while Athens and Sparta resigned empire, they mutually agreed to recognise each other's predominance, that of Athens by sea, that of Sparta on land—a predominance which must never be asserted by aggression and must always be consistent with the universal autonomy.

The
Boeotian
question.

The question immediately arose whether the Boeotian League was condemned by this doctrine of universal autonomy. Sparta and Athens, of course, intended to condemn it. But it might be pleaded that the Confederacy of Boeotian cities under the presidency of Thebes was not on the same footing as the Confederacies which had been formed, for temporary political purposes, without any historical or geographical basis of union, under the presidencies of Athens and Sparta. It might be contended that Boeotia was a geographical unity, like Attica and Laconia, and had a title to political unity too, especially as the League was an ancient institution. The question came to the issue when it was the turn of Thebes to take the oath. Her representative Epaminondas claimed to take it on behalf of the Boeotian cities; and Thebes, represented by him, was not so easily cowed as when she made the same claim at the conclusion of the King's Peace. He seems to have developed the view that Boeotia was to be

compared to Laconia, not to the Lacedaemonian Confederacy; and when Agesilaus asked him, curtly and angrily: "Will you leave each of the Boeotian towns independent?" he retorted: "Will *you* leave each of the Laconian towns independent?" The name of Thebes was thereupon struck out of the treaty. *Thebes excluded.*

There was an argument as well as a sting in this retort of Epaminondas. The argument was: Sparta has no more right to interfere in the internal affairs of Boeotia than we have to interfere in the domestic administration of Laconia; Laconia, Boeotia, Attica, each represents a distinct kind of constitution, and each constitution is justified; the union of Boeotia in a federation is as natural as the union of Attica in a single city, as legitimate as the union of Laconia in its subjection to the Spartan oligarchy. The union of Boeotia, like the union of Laconia, could not have been realised and could not be maintained without the perpetration of outrages upon the freewill of some communities. Yet it is hardly legitimate for one state to say to another: "We have committed certain acts of violence, but you must not interfere; for at a remote period of history which none of us remember, your ancestors used even more high-handed methods for similar purposes, and you now maintain what they established." But the tyrannical method by which Laconia was governed was certainly a weak point in the Spartan armour; and the reply of Epaminondas may have well set Greece thinking over a question of political science. Setting aside the arguments of diplomacy, the point of the situation was this: Thebes could never become a strong power, the rival of Sparta or of Athens, except at the head of an united Boeotia, and it was the interest of Athens and Sparta to hinder her from becoming such a power.

So far as the two chief contracting parties were concerned, this bargain—which is often called the "Peace of Callias"—put an end to a war which was contrary to the best interests of both. They were both partly to blame, but Sparta was far more to blame than her old rival. Her witless policy in overlooking the raid of Sphodrias had caused the war; for it left to Athens no alternative but hostility. At the end of four years, they seemed to have come to their senses; they made peace, but they were stupid enough to allow the incident of Zacynthus to annul the bargain. Three more years of *Positions of Athens and Sparta.*

fighting were required to restore their wits. But, although Athens was financially exhausted by her military efforts, the war had brought her its compensations. The victory of Naxos, the circumnavigation of the Peloponnesus and revival of her influence in Western Greece, were achievements which indisputably proved that Athens was once more a first-rate Hellenic power, the peer of Sparta; and this fact was fully acknowledged in the Peace of Callias. But the true policy of Athens—from which the raid of Sphodrias had forced her—was that of a watchful spectator; and this policy she now resumes, though only for a brief space, leaving Sparta and Thebes in the arena. As for Sparta, she had lost as much as Athens had gained; the defeat of Naxos, the defeat of Tegyra, the failure at Corcyra, had dimmed her prestige. After the King's Peace, she had begun her second attempt to dominate Greece; her failure is confessed by the Peace of Callias. If a third attempt was to be successful, it was obvious that it must begin by the subjugation of Thebes.

SECT 5. ATHENS UNDER THE RESTORED DEMOCRACY

When Pericles declared that Athens was the school of Greece, this was rather his ideal of what she should be than a statement of a reality. It would have surprised him to learn that, when imperial Athens fell from her throne, his ideal would be fulfilled. This was what actually happened. It was not until Athens lost her empire that she began to exert a great decisive influence on Greek thought and civilisation. This influence was partly exerted by the establishment of schools in the strict sense—the literary school of Isocrates and the philosophical school of Plato—which attracted to Athens men from all quarters of the Hellenic world. But the increase in the intellectual influence of Athens was largely owing to the fact that she was becoming herself more receptive of influence from without. She was becoming Hellenic as well as Athenian; she was beginning to become even something more than Hellenic. This tendency towards cosmopolitanism had been promoted by philosophical speculation, which rises above national distinctions; and it is manifested variously in the pan-Hellenism of Isocrates, in the attitude of

*Influence
of Athens
on Greece.*

such different men as Plato and Xenophon towards Athens, in the increasing number of foreign religious worships established at Athens or Piræus, in a general decline of local patriotism, and in many other ways. There was perhaps no institution which had a wider influence in educating Greek thought in the fourth century than the theatre; its importance in city life was recognised by practical statesmen. It was therefore a matter of the utmost moment that the old Athenian comedy, turning mainly on local politics, ceased to be written, and a new school of comic poets arose who dealt with subjects of general human interest. Here Athens had a most effectual instrument for spreading ideas. And the tragedies of the fourth century, though as literature they were of less note and consequence than the comedies, were not less significant of the spirit of the time. They were all dominated by the influence of Euripides, the great teacher of rationalism, the daring critic of all established institutions and beliefs. And the comic poets were also under his spell.

It can easily be seen that the cultivation of these wider sympathies was connected with the growth of what is commonly called "individualism." By this it is meant that the individual citizen no longer looks at the outside world through the medium of his city, but regards it directly, as it were, with his own eyes and in its bearings on him individually. He is no longer content to express his religious feelings, simply as one member of the state, in the common usages of the state religion, but seeks to enter into an immediate personal relation with the supernatural world. And since his own life has thus become for him something independent of the city, his attitude to the city itself is transformed. The citizen of Athens has become a citizen of the world. His duty to his country may conflict with his duty to himself as a man; and thus patriotism ceases to be unconditionally the highest virtue. Again, men begin to put to themselves, more or less explicitly, the question, whether the state is not made for the individual and not the individual for the state,—a complete reversal of the old unquestioning submission to the authority of the social organism. It followed that greater demands were made upon the state by the citizen for his own private welfare; and that the citizen,

*Growth
of indi-
vidualism.*

feeling himself tied by no indissoluble bond to his country, was readier than formerly to seek his fortune elsewhere. Thus we find, in the single field of military service, Athenian officers acting independently of their country, in the pay of foreign powers, whenever it suited them—Conon, Xenophon, Iphicrates, Chabrias, and others.

A vivid exaggerated description of this spirit has been drawn by Plato in one of his famous contributions to political science, the *Republic*. "The horses and asses," he says, "have a way of marching along with all the rights and dignities of freemen; and they will run at anybody whom they meet in the street if he does not leave the road clear for them: and all things are just ready to burst with liberty."¹ When he describes the excessive freedom of democracy, he is dealing with the growth of individualism, as a result of freedom in its constitutional sense; but his argument that individualism is the fatal fruit of a democratic constitution rests largely on the double sense of the word "freedom." The notable thing is that no man did more to promote the tendencies which are here deplored by Plato than Plato himself and his fellow philosophers. If any single man could be held responsible for the inevitable growth of individualism, it would be perhaps Euripides;² but assuredly, next to Euripides, it would be Plato's revered master, Socrates, the son of Sophroniscus.

*Socrates,
the
sculptor
son of
Sophron-
iscus.
(born c.
469 B.C.).*

When the history of Greece was being directed by Pericles and Cleon, Nicias and Lysander, men little dreamed either at Athens or elsewhere that the interests of the world were far more deeply concerned in the doings of one eccentric Athenian who held aloof from public affairs. The work of Pericles and Lysander affected a few generations in a small portion of the globe; but the spirit of that eccentric Athenian was to lay an impress, indelible for ever, upon the thought of mankind. The ideas which we owe to Socrates are now so organically a part of the mind of civilised men, so familiar and commonplace, that it is hard to appreciate the intellectual power *His spirit.* which was required to originate them. Socrates was the first

¹ Transl. Jowett.

² Euripides first; for, though he did not exert nearly as great influence on the world as Socrates, he reached a larger public in his own and the two next generations.

champion of the supremacy of the intellect as a court from which there is no appeal; he was the first to insist, without modification or compromise, that a man must order his life by the guidance of his own intellect, without any regard for mandates of external authority or for the impulses of emotion, unless his intellect approves. Socrates was thus a rebel against authority as such; and he shrank from no consequences. He did not hesitate to show his companions that an old man has no title to respect because he is old, unless he is also wise; or that an ignorant parent has no claim to obedience on the mere account of the parental relation. Knowledge and veracity, the absolute sovereignty of the understanding, regardless of consequences, regardless of all prejudices connected with family or city—this was the ideal of Socrates, consistently and uncompromisingly followed.

But men using their intellects often come to different conclusions. The command issued by an authority which Socrates may reject has been, directly or ultimately, the result of some mental process. It is manifest that we require a standard of truth and an explanation of the causes of error. The solution of Socrates is, briefly, this. When we make a judgment, we compare two ideas; and in order to do so correctly it is obvious that these ideas must be clear and distinct; error arises from comparing ideas that are undefined and vague. Definition was thus the essential point—and it was an essential novelty—in the Socratic method for arriving at truth. Its necessity is a commonplace now; and we have rather to guard against its dangers.

The application of this method to ethics was the chief occupation of Socrates, for the interests of human life and its perplexities entirely absorbed him. In the history of ethics his position is supreme; he was the founder of utilitarianism. He arrived at the doctrine by analysing the notion of "good"; the result of his analysis was that "the good is the useful." Closely connected was the principle that virtue is happiness, and this was the basis of the famous Socratic paradox that no man willingly does wrong, but only through ignorance, for there is no man who would not will his own happiness. It is easy to point out the errors of this startling statement; it is perhaps easier to forget how much wrong-doing is due to the

confused thinking of clouded brains and the ignorance of untrained minds.

*Attitude to
theology.*

The man who had no respect for authority was not likely to except the gods from the range of his criticism; and the popular religion could not sustain examination. Socrates was as little orthodox as Anaxagoras and other "impious" philosophers; but he made no new departure in the field of theology. He doubtless believed in the existence of a God; but as to the nature of the divine principle he was probably what we call an "agnostic," as he certainly was in regard to the immortality of the soul.

*His
scepticism
and irony.*

Socrates then was the originator of a new logical method, the founder of utilitarianism, and, above all, the unsparing critic of all things in heaven and earth—or rather on earth only, for he disdained things in heaven as uninteresting and irrelevant,—a fearless critic, undeterred by any feeling of piety or prejudice. He never wrote anything, he only conversed. But he conversed with the ablest young men of the day who were destined afterwards to become immortal themselves as thinkers; he communicated to them—to Plato, to Aristippus, to Euclides—his own spirit of scepticism and criticism; he imbued them with intellectual courage and intellectual freedom. He never preached, he only discussed; that was the Socratic method—dialectic or the conversational method. He did not teach, for he professed to have no knowledge; he would only confess that he was exceptional in knowing that he knew nothing: this was the Socratic irony. He went about showing that most popular notions, as soon as they are tested, prove to be inconsistent and untenable; he wished to convince every man he met that his convictions would not stand examination. We can easily conceive how stimulating this was to the young men, and how extremely irritating to the old. Haunting the market-places and the gymnasia Socrates was always ready to entrap men of all ages and ranks into argument, and many a grudge was owed him by reverend and conceited seniors, whose foggy minds he exposed to ridicule by means of his prudent interrogations. Though no man ever taught more effectually than Socrates, he was not a teacher, he had no course of lectures to give, and therefore he took no fee. Herein lay his distinction from the

sophists, to whom by his speculation, his scepticism, his mastery of argument, his influence over young men, he naturally belongs, and with whom he was generally classed. He soon became a notorious figure in the streets of Athens; nature had marked him out among other men by his grotesque satyr-like face.

Though he was the child of democracy, born to a heritage of freedom in a city where the right of free discussion was unrestrained, the sacred name of democracy was not more sheltered than anything else from the criticism of Socrates. He railed, for instance, at the system of choosing magistrates by lot, one of the protections of democracy at Athens. He was unpopular with the mass, for he was an enemy of shams and ignorance and superstition. Honest democrats of the type of Thrasybulus and Anytus, who did their duty but had no desire to probe its foundations, regarded him as a dangerous freethinker who spent his life in diffusing ideas subversive of the social order. They might point to the ablest of the young men who had kept company with him, and say: "Behold the fruits of his conversation! Look at Alcibiades, his favourite companion, who has done more than any other man to ruin his country. Look at Critias, who, next to Alcibiades, has wrought the deepest harm to Athens; who, brought up in the Socratic circle, first wrote a book against democracy, then visited Thessaly and stirred up the serfs against their masters, and finally, returning here, inaugurated the reign of terror. Look, on the other hand, at Plato, an able young man, whom the taste for idle speculation, infused by Socrates, has seduced from the service of his country. Or look at Xenophon, who, instead of serving Athens, has gone to serve her enemies. Truly Socrates and his propaganda have done little good to the Athenian state." However unjust any particular instance might seem, it is easy to understand how considerations of this kind would lead many practical un-speculative men to look upon Socrates and his ways with little favour. And from their point of view, they were perfectly right. His spirit, and the ideas that he made current, were an insidious menace to the cohesion of the social fabric, in which there was not a stone or a joint that he did not question. In other words, he was the active apostle

*Criticism
of demo-
cracy.*

*His
teaching
suspected
and un-
popular.*

of individualism, which led in its further development to the subversion of that local patriotism which had inspired the cities of Greece in her days of greatness.

*He receives
the
approval
of Delphi.*

And this thinker, whose talk was shaking the Greek world in its foundations, though none guessed it, was singled out by the Delphic priesthood for a distinguished mark of approbation. In the truest oracle that was ever uttered from the Pythian tripod, it was declared that no one in the world was wiser than Socrates. We know not at what period of the philosopher's career this answer was given, but, if it was seriously meant, it showed a strange insight which we should hardly have looked for at the shrine of Delphi. The Delphic priesthood were skilful enough in adjusting their policy to the changing course of events; but they cannot be suspected of brooding over the mysteries of things to come, or feeling the deeper pulsations of the thoughts of men. The motive of the oracle concerning the wisdom of Socrates is an unsolved problem. If it were an attempt to enlist his support, in days when religion was threatened by such men as Anaxagoras, it shows an unexpected perception of his importance, united with a blindness, by no means surprising, to the significance of his work.

*Trial of
Socrates,
399 B.C.*

Socrates died five years after the fall of the Athenian empire, and the manner of his death set a seal upon his life. Anytus, the honest democratic politician who had been prominent in the restoration of the democracy, came forward, with some others, as a champion of the state religion, and accused Socrates of impiety. The accusation ran: "Socrates is guilty of crime, because he does not believe in the gods recognised by the city, but introduces strange supernatural beings; he is also guilty, because he corrupts the youth." The penalty proposed was death; but the accusers had no desire to inflict it; they expected that, when the charge was lodged in the archon's office, Socrates would leave Attica, and no one would have hindered him from doing so. But Socrates was full of days—he had reached the age of seventy—and life spent otherwise than in conversing in the streets of Athens would have been worthless to him. He surprised the city by remaining to answer the charge. The trial was heard in a court of 501 judges, the king-archon presiding, and the old

philosopher was found guilty by a majority of sixty. It was a small majority, considering that the general truth of the accusation was undeniable. According to the practice of Athenian law, it was open to a defendant, when he was condemned, to propose a lighter punishment than that fixed by the accuser, and the judges were required to choose one of the two sentences. Socrates might have saved his life if he had proposed an adequate penalty, but he offered only a small fine, and was consequently condemned, by a much larger majority, to death. He drank the cup of doom a month later, discours- *His death.* ing with his disciples as eagerly as ever till his last hour.

The actual reply of Socrates at his trial has not been preserved, but we know its tone and spirit and much of its tenor. For it supplied his companion Plato, who was present, *Plato's Apology.* with the material of a work which stands alone in literature. In the *Apology of Socrates*, Plato has succeeded in catching the personality of the master and conveying its stimulus to his readers. There can be no question that this work reproduces the general outline of the actual defence, which is here wrought into an artistic form. And we see how utterly impossible it was for Socrates to answer the accusation. He enters into an explanation of his life and motives, and has no difficulty in showing that many things popularly alleged against him are false. But with the actual charge of holding *Socrates justly con-* and diffusing heterodox views he deals briefly and unsatisfac- *demned.* torily. He was not condemned unjustly—according to the law. And that is the intensity of the tragedy. There have been no better men than Socrates; and yet his accusers were perfectly right. It is not clear why their manifesto for orthodoxy was made at that particular time; but it is probable that twenty years later such an action would have been a failure. Perhaps the facts of the trial justify us in the rough conclusion that two out of every five Athenian citizens then were religiously indifferent. In any case the event had a wider than a merely religious significance. The execution of Socrates was the protest of the spirit of the old order against the growth of individualism.

Seldom in the course of history have violent blows of this kind failed to recoil upon the striker and serve the cause they were meant to harm. Socrates was remembered at Athens

with pride and regret. His spirit began to exercise an influence which the tragedy of his death enhanced. His companions never forgave the democracy for putting their master to death; he lived and grew in the study of their imaginations; and they spent their lives in carrying on his work.

They carried forward his work, but they knew not what they were doing. They had no suspicion that in pursuing those speculations to which they were stimulated by the Socratic method they were sapping the roots of Greek city life as it was known to the men who fought at Marathon. Plato was a true child of Socrates, and yet he was vehement in condemning that individualism which it had been the lifework of Socrates to foster. Few sights are stranger than Plato and Xenophon turning their eyes away from their own free country to regard with admiration the constitution of Sparta, where their beloved master would not have been suffered so much as to open his mouth. It was a triumph for the Lacedaemonians when their constitution, which the Athenians of the age of Pericles regarded as old-fashioned machinery, was selected by the greatest thinker of Athens as the nearest existing approach to the ideal. Indeed the Spartan organisation, at the very time when Sparta was making herself detested throughout Greece, seems to have attracted general admiration from political thinkers. It attracted them because the old order survived there,—the citizen absolutely submissive to the authority of the state, and not looking beyond it. Elsewhere they were troubled by the problem of reconciling the authority of the state with the liberty of the individual citizen; at Sparta there was no such trouble, for the state was absolute. Accordingly they saw in Sparta the image of what a state should be; just because it was relatively free from that individualism which they were themselves actively promoting by their speculations in political philosophy. How freely such speculations ranged at this time is illustrated by the fact that the fundamental institution of ancient society, slavery, was called in question. It had indeed been called in question by Euripides, and the heterodox "modern" views of Euripides were coming into fashion. One thinker expounded the doctrine that slavery was unnatural. Speculation even went so far as

*Lycophron's
view on
slavery.*

to stir the question of the political subjection of women. The *Parliament of Women*, a comedy of Aristophanes, ridicules women's rights; and in Plato's ideal *Republic* women are on a political equality with men. Socialistic theories were also rife, and were a mark for the mockery of Aristophanes in the same play. Plato seized upon the notion of communism and made it one of the principles of his ideal state. But his object was not that of the ordinary "collectivist," to promote the material well-being of all; but rather to make his citizens better, by defending them against poverty and ambition. Before he died, Plato had come to the conviction that communism was impracticable, and in the state which he adumbrated in his old age he recognised private property—though he vested the ownership not in the individual but in the family.

Aristophanes' Ecclesiastusae, (392 or) 389 B.C.

Communism in Plato's Republic.

Private property in the Laws.

In this period—during the fifty years after the battle of Aegospotami—the art of writing prose was brought to perfection at Athens; and this is closely connected with the characteristic tendency which has engaged our attention. While Socrates and others had been bringing about a revolution in thought, the Sicilian Gorgias and other professors of rhetoric or style had been preparing an efficient vehicle for diffusing ideas. Prose is the natural instrument of criticism and argument; it is a necessary weapon for intellectual persuasion; and therefore the fourth century is an age of prose. The circumstance that the great Athenian poets of the fifth century had no successors in the fourth does not prove any decline in brains or in imagination. If Plato had been born half a century earlier he would have been a rival of Aeschylus and Sophocles. If Aeschylus and Sophocles had been born two or three generations later they would have expressed their genius in prose. Euripides, who has come under the influence of the critical spirit, seems sometimes like a man belated; he uses the old vehicle to convey thoughts for which it was hardly suited. It must always be remembered that the great dramatic poems of the fifth century bore an inalienable religious character; and, as soon as the day came when the men of the highest literary faculty were no longer in touch with the received religion, drama of the old kind ceased to be written. That is why the fourth century is an

Development of prose.

age of prose; tragic poetry owes its death to Euripides and the Socratic spirit. The eager individualism of the age found its natural expression in prose, whose rhythmical periods demanded almost as much care and art as poetry; and the plastic nature of the Greek language rendered it a most facile instrument for the purposes of free thought and criticism.

Thus Athens became really a school for Greece, as soon as that individualism prevailed which Pericles had unwittingly foreshadowed in the very same breath: "I say that Athens is the school of Hellas, and that the individual Athenian in his own person seems to have the power of adapting himself to the most varied forms of action with the utmost versatility and grace."¹

*Higher
education
at Athens:
Plato and
Isocrates.*

It must never be forgotten that it is to the democratic Athenian law-courts that the perfecting of Attic prose was mainly due. This institution had, as we saw, called into being a class of professional speech-writers. But there were many who were not content with learning off, and reciting in court, speeches which a speech-writer like Lysias wrote for them, but wished to learn themselves the art of speaking. For those who aspired to make their mark in debates in the Assembly, this was a necessity. The most illustrious instructor in oratory at this period was Isocrates. But the school of Isocrates had a far wider scope and higher aim than to teach the construction of sentences or the arrangement of topics in a speech. It was a general school of culture, a discipline intended to fit men for public life. Questions of political science were studied, and Isocrates likes to describe his course of studies as "philosophy." But it was to Plato's school in the Academy that the youths of the day went to study "philosophy" in the stricter sense. The discipline of these two rival schools—for there was rivalry between them, though their aims were different—was what corresponded at Athens to our university education. And the pupils of Isocrates, as well as those of Plato, had to work hard. For thoroughness of method was one of the distinctive characteristics of Isocrates. His school attained a pan-Hellenic reputation; pupils came to him from all quarters of the world. "Our city," he says, "is regarded as the established teacher of all who speak or teach

¹ Jowett's translation.

others to speak. And naturally so, since men see that our city offers the greatest prizes to those who possess this faculty—provides the most numerous and various schools for those who having resolved to enter the real contests desire a preparatory discipline—and further affords to all men that experience which is the main secret of success in speaking.”¹ The tone of the teaching of Isocrates harmonised with the national position which he held. He took a large view of all things; there was nothing narrow or local in his opinions. And not less important than the width of his horizon was the high moral tone in which his thoughts were consistently pitched. Isocrates discharged not only the duties which are in modern times discharged by university teachers, but also the functions of a journalist of the best kind. Naturally nervous and endowed with a poor voice, he did not speak in the Assembly, but when any great question moved him he would issue a pamphlet, in the form of a speech, for the purpose of influencing public opinion. We may suspect that the Athenians appreciated these publications more for their inimitable excellence of style than for their political wisdom.

Isocrates as a pamphleteer.

A highly remarkable passage of Isocrates expresses and applauds the wide-minded cosmopolitanism which was beginning to prevail in Greece. He says that “Athens has so distanced the rest of the world in power of thought and speech that her disciples have become the teachers of all other men. She has brought it to pass that the name of Greek should be thought no longer a matter of race but a matter of intelligence; and should be given to the participators in our culture rather than to the sharers of our common origin.”² Thirty or forty years earlier, no one perhaps, except Euripides, would have been bold enough to speak like that. But Isocrates did not see that this enlightenment which he admires was closely connected with the decay of public spirit which he elsewhere deplures. It is curious to find the man who approves of citizenship of the world looking back with regret to the days of Solon and proposing to revive the old powers of censorship which the court of the Areopagus possessed over the lives of Athenian citizens.

Cosmopolitanism in the Panegyric Speech of Isocrates, 381 B.C.

Idealisation of 6th century, Athens.

(Areopagitikos, 355-4 B.C.)

The form and features of an age are wont to be mirrored in its art; and one effective means of winning a concrete

¹ Translated by Jebb.

² *Ibid.*

*Individualistic
character
of the art
of 4th
century.*

notion of the spirit of the fourth century is to study the works of Praxiteles and compare them with the sculptures which issued from the workshop of Phidias. Just as the citizen was beginning to assert his own individuality as more than a mere item in the state, so the plastic artist was emancipating his art from its intimate connexion with the temples of the gods, and its subordination to architecture. For in the fifth century, apart from a few colossal statues like those which Phidias wrought for Athens and Olympia, the finest works of the sculptor's chisel were to decorate frieze or pediment. In the fourth century the architect indeed still required the sculptor's service; Scopas, for instance, was called upon in his youth to decorate the temple of Athena Alea at Tegea, in his later years to make a frieze for the tomb of a Carian prince; but, in general, the sculptor developed his art more independently of architecture, and all the great works of Praxiteles were complete in themselves and independent. And, as sculpture was emancipating itself from the old subordination to architecture, so it also emancipated itself from the religious ideal. In the age of Phidias, the artist who fashioned a god sought to express in human shape the majesty and immutability of a divine being; and this ideal had been perfectly achieved. In the fourth century the deities lose their majesty and changelessness; they are conceived as physically perfect men and women, with human feelings though without human sorrows; they are invested with human personalities. The contrast may be seen by looking at the group of gods in the frieze of the Parthenon, and then at some of the works of Praxiteles: the Hermes, which was set up in the temple of Hera at Olympia, and is preserved there; the Aphrodite of Cnidus—a woman shrinking from revealing her beauty as she enters the bath; or the Satyr, with the shape of a man and the mind of a beast. Thus sculpture is marked by "individualism" in a double sense. Each artist is freer to work out an individual path of his own; and the tendency of all artists is to portray the individual man or woman rather than the type, and even the individual phase of emotion rather than the character.

The general spirit of the Athenians in their political life corresponds to this change. Men came more and more to regard the state as a means for administering to the needs of

the individual. We might almost say that they conceived it as a co-operative society for making profits to be divided among the members; this at least was the tendency of public opinion. They were consequently more disinclined to enter upon foreign undertakings which were not either necessary for the protection and promotion of their commerce or likely to fill their purses. The fourth century was therefore for Athens an age of less ambition and glory, but of greater happiness and freedom, than the fifth.

The decisive circumstance for Athens was that, while she *Athenian commerce.* lost her empire, she did not lose her commerce. This was a cruel blow to Corinth, since it was to destroy Athenian trade that Corinth had brought about the war. The fact shows on how firm foundations Athenian commerce rested. The only rival Athens had to fear was Rhodes, which was becoming a centre of traffic in the south-eastern Mediterranean, but was not destined to interfere seriously with Athenian trade for a long time yet. The population of Attica had declined; plague and war reduced the number of adult male citizens from at least 35,000 to 21,000. But that was not unfortunate, for there were no longer outsettlements to receive the surplus of the population; and even with the diminished numbers there was a surplus which sought employment in foreign mercenary service. The mercantile development of Athens is shown by the increase of the Piræus at the expense of the city, in which many plots of ground now became deserted, and by the growth of private banks. It had long been a practice to deposit *Banks.* money in temples, and the priesthoods used to lend money on interest. This suggested to money-changers the idea of doing likewise; and Pasion founded a famous house at Athens, which operated with a capital of fifty talents, and had credit at all Greek centres of commerce. Thus business could be transacted by exchanging letters of credit instead of paying in coin; and the introduction of this system, even on such a small scale, shows the growth of mercantile activity. Money was now much more plentiful, and prices far higher, than before. This was due to the large amount of the precious metals, chiefly gold, which had been brought into circulation in the Greek world in the last quarter of the fifth century. The continuous war led to the coining of the treasures which had

*Rate of
interest.*

been accumulating for many years in temples; and the banking system circulated the money which would otherwise have been hoarded in private houses. But, although the precious metals became plentiful, the rate of interest did not fall; men could still get 12 per cent for a loan of their money. This fact is highly significant; it shows clearly that industries were more thriving and trade more active, and consequently capital in greater demand. The high rate of interest must always be remembered when we read of a Greek described as wealthy with a capital which would nowadays seem small. Thus a fortune of 50 talents, little more than 10,000 English pounds, would yield an income of nearly £1500; and that sum had an enormously greater purchasing power than the equivalent weight of gold to-day. Such incomes were extremely rare.

Socialism.

Communitistic ideas were a consequence, perhaps inevitable, of the growth of individualism and the growth of capital. The poorer burghers became more and more acutely alive to the inconsistency between the political equality of all citizens and the social and economical advantages enjoyed by the rich. Political equality seemed to point to social equality as its logical sequel; in fact, full and equal political equality could not be secured without social equality also, since the advantages of wealth necessarily involve superiorities in political influence. Thus, just as in modern Europe, so in ancient Greece, capital and democracy produced socialists, who pleaded for a levelling of classes by means of a distribution of property by the state. Aristophanes mocked these speculations in his *Parliament of Women* and his *Wealth*. The idea of Communism which Plato develops on lines of his own in the *Republic* was not an original notion of the philosopher's brain, but was suggested by the current communitistic theories of the day. It is well worthy of consideration that the Athenians did not take the step from political to social democracy; and this discretion may have been partly due to the policy of those statesmen who, doubtless conscious of the danger, regarded the theoric fund as an indispensable institution.

*Ecclesi-
azusae,
389 B.C.;
Plutus,
388 B.C.*

*Ecclesiastic
pay
(introduced
before 389
B.C.).*

The changed attitude of the individual to the state is shown by the introduction of a fixed remuneration of half a drachma to Athenian citizens for attending the meetings of the Assembly; and the rise in prices is illustrated by the sub-

sequent increase of this remuneration. For the regular sessions, in which the proceedings were unattractive, the pay was raised to a drachma and a half; for the other meetings, which were more exciting, it was fixed at a drachma. The remuneration for serving in the law-courts was not increased; it was found that half a drachma was sufficient to draw applicants for the judge's ticket. Payment for the discharge of political duties was part of the necessary machinery of the democracy, but the distribution of "spectacle-money" to the poor citizens was a luxury which involved an entirely different principle. It is uncertain when the practice of giving the price of his theatre ticket to the poor Athenian was first introduced; it has been attributed to Pericles, but it is possible that it was not introduced till Athens began to recover after the fall of her empire. In any case, the principle became established in the fourth century of distributing "theoric" moneys, which were supposed to be spent on religious festivals; the citizens came to look forward to frequent and large distributions; the surplus revenue of the state, instead of being saved for emergencies, was placed in the theoric fund; and this theoric fund became so important that it ultimately required a special minister of finance to manage it. Those statesmen under whose guidance the theoric doles were most liberal had naturally the greatest influence with the mass of the citizens; and consequently finance acquired a new importance, and financial ability was developed in a very high degree. The state thus assumed the character of a commercial society; dividends were a political necessity, and in order to meet it heavier taxation was demanded. We have seen how, when war broke out with Sparta, in the year in which the Second Athenian Confederacy was formed, a property-tax was imposed, and the properties of the citizens were assessed anew for this purpose.

Thus the state provided for the comfort of its poorer burghers at the expense of their wealthier fellows. It is, as it were, publicly recognised as a principle of political science that the end of the state is the comfort and pleasure of its individual members; and everything has to be made subordinate to this principle which is outwardly embodied in the theoric fund. This principle affected the foreign policy of Athens, as we have already observed. When she took the

ὁ ἐπὶ τὸ
θεωρικόν.

step of sending outsettlers to Samos and elsewhere, in defiance of the public opinion of Greece, her chief motive was doubtless pecuniary profit.

The constitution in the 4th century.

Constitutionally, the restored Athenian democracy was a remarkable success. The difficulties which the democratic statesmen encountered after the overthrow of the Thirty had been treated with a wisdom and moderation which are in striking contrast with the violence and vengeance shown in other Greek states at similar crises. Most democratic men of means had been robbed of property under the tyranny of the oligarchs, and the property had been sold. Were the purchasers to be compelled to restore it without compensation? Were all the acts of the Thirty to be declared illegal? Such a measure would have created a bitter and discontented party in the state. Some of the chief democratic leaders voluntarily resigned all claim to compensation for the property they had lost, and this example promoted a general inclination on both sides to concession and compromise. The wisdom and tact displayed in this matter were not the least of the services which Thrasybulus and his fellows rendered to their country. No oligarchical conspiracy endangered the domestic peace of Athens again; no citizen, if it were not a philosophical speculator, called the democracy in question.

Change in the presidency of the Assembly: probably in 403-2 B.C.

At this epoch the laws were revised, and the register of burghers was revised, but the constitution was left practically unaltered. A change, indeed, was made in the presidency of the Assembly, which had hitherto belonged to the *prytaneis* or board of Ten, selected every seven days from the presiding tribe in the Council. The close organic relation between the Council and Assembly rendered it needful that members of the Council should preside in the Assembly; but the presidency of the Assembly was now divorced from the presidency of the Council and invested in a body of nine, selected one from each of the nine tribes which were not presiding. This change was obviously designed to form a check on the administration. The presiding tribe in the Council could no longer deal directly with the Assembly, but was obliged to present its measures to the people through an intermediate body, which belonged indeed to the Council but not to its own part of the Council. The year in which these

*The nine *proedroi*.*

reforms were probably made witnessed also the introduction of a new alphabet as the official script of the state. The old Attic alphabet, with its hard-worked vowels doing duty for more than one sound, was discontinued; and henceforward the stones which record the public acts of the Athenian people are inscribed in the Ionic alphabet, with separate signs for the long and short *e* and *o*, and distinct symbols for the double consonants.

Introduction of the Ionic alphabet in the archonship of Euclides, 403-2 B.C.

It is plain that Athens needed, at this period, not men of genius or enthusiasm, but simply men of ability, for the conduct of her affairs. She had no great aims to achieve, no grave dangers to escape, which demanded a Pericles or a Themistocles; a man of genius would have found no scope in the politics of Athens for two generations after the fall of her empire. Men of great ability she had, men who were thoroughly adequate to the comparatively unambitious rôle which she had wisely imposed upon herself—Agyrrhius, Callistratus, and afterwards Eubulus. To us they are all shadowy figures. Agyrrhius inaugurated the profit-system which afterwards resulted in the institution of the theoric fund; and it was he who opposed and discredited the extreme anti-Spartan policy of the heroes of Phyle. His nephew Callistratus enjoyed a longer career and played a greater part in the affairs of Greece, conspicuous as the founder of the Second Confederacy, as the negotiator of the Peace of Callias, and then as the opponent of Epaminondas. His policy throughout was consistent and reasonable. He aimed at rendering Athens powerful enough to be independent of Sparta; he desired that Sparta and Athens should stand side by side as the two leading states in Greece; and he recognised that the neighbourhood of Attica to Boeotia necessarily laid upon Athens the policy of opposing the aggrandisement of Thebes.

Agyrrhius.

Callistratus.

Agyrrhius and Callistratus might once and again fill the office of strategos; but, like Cleon and Hyperbolus, they exercised their influence as recognised—practically, official—advisers of the Assembly. The art of war became every year more and more an art, and little could be accomplished except by generals who devoted their life to the military profession. Such were Timotheus, the hero of Leucas; Chabrias, the victor

Military men.

of Naxos; and above all Iphicrates, whom we have met in so many places and in so many guises. Timotheus was a rich man; his father Conon had left him a fortune, and he could afford to serve his country and his country only. But Chabrias and Iphicrates enriched themselves by taking temporary service under foreign masters; Iphicrates even went so far as to support the Thracian king, whose daughter he had wedded, against Athens. All these military men preferred to dwell elsewhere than at Athens. Abroad they could live in luxury and ostentation; while at Athens men lived simply and moderately, and public opinion was unfavourable to sumptuous establishments. The attitude of the generals to the city became much more independent when the citizens themselves ceased to serve abroad regularly, and hired mercenaries instead. The hiring of the troops and their organisation devolved upon the general, and he was often expected to provide the means for paying them too. Here we touch on a vice in the constitutional machine, which was the cause of frequent failures in the foreign enterprises of Athens during this period. No systematic provision was made that, when the people voted that a certain thing should be done, the adequate moneys should be voted at the same time. Any one might propose a decree, without responsibility for its execution; and at the next meeting of the Assembly the people might refuse to allow the necessary supplies, or no one might be ready to move the grant. In the same way, supplies might be cut off in the middle of a campaign. This defect had not made itself seriously felt in the fifth century, when the leading generals were always statesmen too, with influence in the Assembly; but it became serious when the generals were professional soldiers whom the statesmen employed. During the ten years after the Peace of Callias, Athens was actively engaged in a multitude of enterprises of foreign aggrandisement; but she achieved little, and the reason is that her armaments were hardly ever adequate. The difficulties of her financiers, who had always to keep a theoric reserve, must be taken into consideration.

CHAPTER IV

THE HEGEMONY OF THEBES

SECT. 1. JASON OF PHERAE; AND THE BATTLE OF LEUCTRA

THE balance of power in Greece had been swayed for a hundred years by the two rivals Sparta and Athens; and now the Peace of Callias had formally adjusted an equilibrium between them. But this dual system was threatened from the very outset by formidable dangers. It was clear that new forces had arisen within the last few years, which would dispute the leadership of Hellas with the two older states. There had been a development of military power in the north, and two cities had come into dangerous prominence, Thebes and Pherae.

Of the rise of Pherae we know less than of the rise of Thebes. At the time of the Peace of Callias we make the sudden discovery that the Thessalian cities which were usually in a state of feud have been united, and that Thessaly has consequently become one of the great powers of Greece. This was the doing of one man. There had arisen at Pherae a *Jason of Pherae.* despot, who was not merely vigorous and warlike, but whose ambition ranged beyond the domestic politics of Thessaly and sought to play a great part on the wider stage of Hellas. Jason had established his dominion by means of a well-trained body of 6000 mercenaries, and also doubtless by able diplomacy. The most influential citizen of Pharsalus exposed at Sparta the *371 B.C.* ambitious and menacing views of Jason, and urged the importance of checking his career before he became too powerful; but Sparta, pressed by other more importunate claims, declined to interfere. Then Pharsalus yielded to the

solicitations of Jason, and helped to install him as *Tugus* of an united Thessaly. The power of the despot extended on one side into Epirus, where Alcetas, prince of the Molossi, became his vassal; and on the other side to Macedonia.

A monarch, endowed with uncommon political and military ability, at the head of all Thessaly, with the best cavalry in Greece at his command, seemed likely to change the whole course of Hellenic affairs. That he aimed at becoming the first power in Hellas—at attaining the *hegemony* or leadership, as it was called—there can be no question; nor, considering the weakness and jealousies of the southern Grecian states, would this object, with his resources, be difficult of achievement. But, if his ambition was not bounded by Thessaly, neither was it confined to Hellas. His dream was to lead Hellas against Persia, and overthrow the power of the Great King. How serious he was in his great projects is shown by the fact that he set about building a navy. Thessaly was again to become a sea-power, as in the days of legendary story, when the *Argo* ventured forth from the land-locked bay of Iolcus.

The power of Sparta had evidently declined, but she was still regarded as holding the highest position in Greece; and it was the first object of Jason to weaken her still further and dethrone her from that place. His second immediate object was to gain control of the key of southern Greece—the pass of Thermopylae; and as this was commanded by the Spartan fortress of Heraclea, these two objects were intimately connected. His obvious policy was to ally himself with Sparta's enemy, Thebes; and Thebes, in her isolated position, leapt at his alliance. The treaty between the Boeotian and Thessalian federations was probably concluded not long before the Peace of Callias. According to the terms of that Peace, all parties were to recall their armaments from foreign countries and their garrisons from foreign towns. Athens promptly recalled Iphicrates from Corcyra, but Sparta on her side failed to fulfil the contract. King Cleombrotus had, shortly before, led an army to Phocis, and now, instead of disbanding it, he was ordered to march against Thebes and compel that state to set free the Boeotian cities. One voice, perhaps, in the Spartan assembly was raised against this violation of the recent oaths, a violation which was also unfair

*Sparta
(contrary
to treaty)
orders
Cleom-
brotus to
march
against
Thebes.
371 B.C.*

*Protest of
Prothous.*

to the allies who served in the Lacedaemonian army. But in this hour Sparta was led on, as one of her admirers said, by a fatal impulse inspired by the gods; the feeling of hatred against Thebes, diligently fostered by Agesilaus, swept away all thoughts of policy or justice; and the voice which was raised for justice and policy was scornfully cried down. The duel between Thebes and Sparta was inevitable; and all Greece, confident in Spartan superiority, looked to see Thebes broken up into villages or wiped out from among the cities of Hellas. Even Thebes herself hardly hoped for success. But Sparta would have done well to disband the army of Cleombrotus, and organise a new force with the help of those allies who were willing to support her.

The object of Cleombrotus, who was posted near Chaeronea, in the gate between Phocis and Boeotia, was to reach Thebes; and, as we have seen in the case of former military operations in this country, his direct road lay along the western and southern banks of Lake Copais, by Coronea and Haliartus. The aim of the Thebans was to prevent him from reaching his objective; and they posted their forces nigh to Coronea, where, nearly a quarter of a century before, a confederate army had waylaid Agesilaus. But Cleombrotus disappointed his enemy; he marched southward by a difficult road round Mount Helicon to Thisbe, and thence pounced on the port of Creusis, which he captured along with twelve Theban ships in the harbour; and, by this swift stroke having secured his rear, he advanced northward along the road to Thebes.

When he reached the height of Leuctra, he found that the way was barred by the Theban army. Leuctra lies on the hills which form the south limit of a small plain, somewhat more than half a mile broad, traversed by the brook of the upper Asopus. The road from the coast to Thebes crosses it and ascends the hills on the northern side, where the Boeotarchs and their army were now drawn up. The round top of one of these low hills, just east of the road, was levelled and enlarged to form a smooth platform. Here the Theban hoplites of the left wing were posted, and the artificial mound marks their place to this day. The numbers of the two hosts are uncertain; the Lacedaemonians, in any case considerably superior, may have been about eleven, the Theban about six,

*Position of
the armies
at Leuctra.*

*Tactics of
Epami-
nondas.*

thousand strong. But the military genius of one of the Boeotarchs, now for the first time fully revealed, made up for the deficiency in strength. Instead of drawing out the usual long and shallow line, Epaminondas made his left wing deep. This wedge, fifty shields deep, of irresistible weight, with the Sacred Band, under the captaincy of Pelopidas, in front, was opposed to the Spartans who, with Cleombrotus himself, were drawn up on the right of the hostile army. It was on his left wing that Epaminondas relied for victory; the shock between the Spartans and Thebans would decide the battle; it mattered little about the Boeotians on the centre and left, whom he could not entirely trust. The Thespians, who were present by constraint, were at the last moment permitted to depart; but their retreat was cut off and they were driven back to the camp by the Phocians and other of the Lacedaemonian allies, who, by detaching themselves for this purpose, weakened their own army without effecting an useful result.

*Battle of
Leuctra,
July 371
B.C.*

The battle began with an engagement of the cavalry. In this arm the Lacedaemonians were notoriously weak; and now their horsemen, easily driven back, carried disorder into the line of foot. Cleombrotus, who was confident of victory, then led his right wing down the slopes—the centre and left being probably impeded in their advance by the cavalry; and on his side Epaminondas with the Theban left moved down from their hill, deliberately keeping back the rest of the line. The novel tactics of Epaminondas decided the battle. The Spartans, twelve deep, though they fought ever so bravely, could not resist the impact of the Theban wedge led by Pelopidas. King Cleombrotus fell, and after a great carnage on both sides the Thebans drove their enemies up the slopes back to their camp. In other parts of the field there seems to have been little fighting or slaughter; the Lacedaemonian allies, when they saw the right wing worsted, retired without more ado.

A thousand Lacedaemonians had fallen, including four hundred Spartans; and the survivors acknowledged their defeat by demanding the customary truce to take up the dead. It might be thought that they would have immediately retreated to Creusis, the place of safety which the dead king had prudently provided in their rear. It is not likely that

the enemy, whom they still considerably outnumbered, would have attempted to stop their way, or even to harass them seriously from behind. The Thebans could hardly realise the victory which they had never expected; it was more than




FIG. 2.

enough to have defeated the Lacedaemonians in the open field, to have slain their king, and to have compelled them to evacuate Boeotia. But the Lacedaemonian army remained in its entrenchments on the hill of Leuctra, in the expectation of being reinforced by a new army from Sparta and retrieving the misfortune. A messenger was sent home with the

*Position at
Leuctra
after the
battle.*

*Army of
relief
under
Archidamus.*

inglorious tidings, and the shock was borne there with that studied self-repression which only the discipline of Sparta could inculcate in her citizens. The remaining forces of the city were hastily got together, and placed under the command of Archidamus, son of Agesilaus. Some of the allied states sent aid, and the troops were transported by ship from Corinth to Creusis.

*Reception
of the news
at Athens.*

But all this took time, and meanwhile Thebes had not been idle. Two messengers were sent with the good news, to Athens and to Thessaly. At Athens the wreathed messenger was received with an ominous silence. The Theban victory was distinctly unwelcome there; it opened up an indefinite prospect of warfare and seemed likely to undo the recent pacification; while the Athenians were far less jealous of Sparta than of Thebes. At Pherae the tidings had a very

*Jason of
Pherae
marches to
Leuctra.*

different reception. Jason marched forthwith to the scene of action, at the head of his cavalry and mercenaries, flying so rapidly through Phocis that the Phocians, his irreconcilable enemies, did not realise his presence until he had passed. He cannot have reached Leuctra until the sixth or seventh day after the battle. The Thebans thought that with the help of his forces they might storm the Lacedaemonian entrenchments, dangerous though the task would be. But for the policy of Jason the humiliation already inflicted on Sparta was enough; the annihilation of the enemy or any further enhancement of the Theban success would have been too much. He dissuaded the Thebans from the enterprise, and induced them to grant a truce to the Lacedaemonians, with leave to retire unharmed. This the Lacedaemonians were now forced to accept, notwithstanding the approach of reinforcements. For their position was totally altered through the presence of the seasoned troops of Jason, and it was clear that the foe would not wait to attack them till the expected reinforcements arrived. The retreat was carried out at night, for the leaders suspected the good faith of their opponents. On the coast the defeated troops met the army of Archidamus, which had come in vain, and all the forces were disbanded.

Truce.

*The
Lacedaemonians
evacuate
Boeotia.*

*Another
view of the
evacuation
of Boeotia.*

Such were the circumstances of the Lacedaemonian evacuation of Boeotia after the battle of Leuctra, according to the historian whose authority we are naturally inclined to

prefer. But the memory of Xenophon might have misled him in regard to some of the details, and there was another account from which it might be inferred that events moved more rapidly. There is something to be said for the view that the army of Archidamus was not dispatched as a relief force after the battle of Leuctra, but was already on its way before the battle was fought; that Cleombrotus had the alternative of waiting for Archidamus before he ventured on an action, and that his visit to Creusis was, in fact, connected with the expected arrival of reinforcements; that Jason too was hastening to support the Thebans, and that the messenger who bore the news of victory met him on his southward march. On this view the truce might have been concluded on the morrow of the battle, and we avoid the difficulty of supposing that the defeated army decided to remain for a week on the hill of Leuctra, when the road to Creusis was open behind them.

The question is of little moment save in so far as it concerns the movements of the Tagus of Thessaly. The significance of the sequel of the battle lies in the prominent part which he played as a mediator; and we should like well to know whether his original purpose was to fight side by side with his Theban allies. We also hear darkly of his avowed intention to bring help by sea; and we are tempted to speculate at what point the new Thessalian navy would have acted at this crisis.

Jason returned to his northern home, but on his way he dealt another blow at Sparta on his own account, by dismantling Heraclea, the fort which controlled the pass of Thermopylae. He thus compassed an object of great importance for his further designs. These designs he soon began to unfold. He fixed on the next celebration of the Pythian festival as a time to display his greatness and his power to the eyes of assembled Hellas. He sent mandates around to the Thessalian cities to prepare oxen, sheep, and goats for the sacrifice at Delphi, offering a gold crown as a prize for the fairest ox. And he issued commands that the armed host of the Thessalians should be ready to march with him to keep the feast. He proposed to usurp the rights of the Amphictyonic board, and preside himself over the games. A rumour was set afloat that he intended to seize the treasures of

*Jason's
Fleet.*

*Jason at
Thermo-
pylae.*

*His
schemes.*

the temple; but it is hard to believe that an aspirant to the hegemony of Greece would have perpetrated an act so manifestly impolitic. Apollo told the Delphians, who were fluttered by the report, that he would himself guard his treasure.

*Assassina-
tion of
Jason.
370 B.C.*

But the priests were soon to breathe freely; the Phocians were to be spared the mortification of seeing the hated Thessalian in their land. One day Jason held a review of his cavalry, and afterwards sat to hear petitions. Seven young men, to all appearance wrangling hotly, drew near to lay their dispute before him, and slew him where he sat. The death of Jason was the knell of all his plans. The unity of Thessaly, the high position which it had attained among the Grecian powers, depended entirely on him. The brothers who succeeded to his place were slight insignificant men, without the ability, even if they had possessed the will, to carry out his far-reaching designs. It is the bare truth to say that the blades of the seven young men changed the course of history. Jason was well on his way to attain in eastern Greece the supreme position which his great fellow-despot Dionysius held in the west. Nor is it extravagant to suppose that under him Thessaly might have accomplished part of the work which was reserved for Macedonia. Politically, indeed, his work is to be condemned. He had not laid the foundations of a national unity in Thessaly; the unity which he had compassed was held by military force only and his own genius. We cannot congratulate a statesman on a result of which the stability hangs on the chances of his own life. In this respect Jason stands in the same rank with Epaminondas.

*Historical
signifi-
cance of
this crime;*

*its con-
sequences
for Thebes.*

The death of the Thessalian potentate decided that, of the two northern states which had recently risen into prominence, Boeotia, not Thessaly, should take the torch from Sparta.

*Results of
Leuctra
and rôle of
Thebes.*

The significance of the battle of Leuctra is perhaps most clearly revealed in the fact that, during the wars between Sparta and Thebes which followed it, the parts hitherto played by the two states are reversed. Thebes now becomes the invader of the Peloponnese, as Sparta before had been the invader of Boeotia. Thebes is now the aggressor; it is as much as Sparta can do to defend her own land. The significance of Leuctra is also displayed in the effect which it

produced upon the policy of Athens, and in its stimulating influence on the lesser Peloponnesian states, especially Arcadia, which was wakened up into new life.

The supremacy of Thebes was the result of no overmastering imperial instinct and was inspired by no large idea, but it brought about some beneficial results. Sparta had grievously abused the dominion which had fallen into her hands; and the period of Theban greatness represents the reaction against the period of Lacedaemonian oppression. The two objects of Theban policy are to hinder Sparta from regaining her old position in the Peloponnesus, and to prevent the revival of Jason's power in Thessaly.

Although no express record has been handed down as to constitutional changes, there is some evidence which has suggested the belief that the Thebans drew tighter the bond which united the Boeotian communities by transforming the federation into a national state. Thebes, seemingly, became in Boeotia what Athens was in Attica; the other cities, Coronea, Thespieae, Haliartus, and the rest, were uncitied and became as Marathon and Eleusis; their citizens exercised their political rights in an Assembly at Thebes. If this be so, we may suspect that Epaminondas played the part of legendary Theseus; but the new constitution had no elements of stability, and it endured but for a few years.

SECT. 2. POLICY OF THEBES IN SOUTHERN GREECE, ARCADIA, AND MESSENIA

The defeat of a Lacedaemonian army in the open field by an enemy inferior in numbers was a thrilling shock to the Greeks, who deemed it part of the order of nature that the Spartan hoplites should be invincible except in front of an overwhelmingly larger force. The event was made more impressive by the death of king Cleombrotus; a Spartan king had never fallen in battle since Leonidas laid down his life at the gates of Greece. The news agitated every state in the Peloponnesus. The harmosts, whom Sparta had undertaken to withdraw three weeks before, when she signed the Peace, were now expelled from the cities; there was an universal reaction against the local oligarchies which had been supported by

*Democratic
movements
throughout
the Peloponnesus.*

*Soytalism,
or cudgel-
ling, at
Argos.*

*Pan-
Arcadian
League.*

Sparta and had excited universal discontent; and these democratic revolutions flooded the land with troops of dangerous exiles. The contagion spread even to Argos, though Sparta had no influence there, and broke out with such violence that many citizens were cudgelled to death by the infuriated people.

But it was in Arcadia that the most weighty political results followed. A general feeling, which had perhaps been growing for some years back, now took definite shape, that the cities of Arcadia must combine together to oppose an united front to Lacedaemonian pretensions. The only way in which each city could hope to preserve her independence against the power of Sparta was by voluntarily surrendering a portion of that independence to a federal union of her sister cities. The most zealous advocate of the Pan-Arcadian idea was the Mantinean Lycomedes, a native of the district which had been more cruelly used than all others by the high-handed policy of Lacedaemon. The fall of Sparta was the signal for the Mantineans to rebuild their walls, desert their villages, and resume the dignity and pleasures of city life. The old king Agesilaus had the insolence to remonstrate; he requested them at least to ask the gracious permission of Sparta, but he had no power to enforce his request.

*Rebuild-
ing of
Mantineia,
370 B.C.,
spring.*

The Mantineans resolved that their city should not again be captured, as king Agesipolis had captured it, by means of its own river. They dug a new bed, so that the Ophis when it approached the south-eastern wall parted into two channels and, having described a great loop, reunited its waters on the north-western side. In this loop the city of Mantinea rose again, and by this means the river, which had proved itself a danger, was forced to become a fortification, entirely encompassing the walls. The stone foundations of the wall enable us to trace the circuit of the city; but they were only the base for a superstructure which, like the buildings of the town, was of brick. The ten gates were curiously constructed, no two alike, yet all elaborations of a principle which was adopted by the builders of the fortress of Tiryns—the principle of exposing the undefended right side of an approaching enemy to the defenders who manned the walls and flanking towers. The general design may be best grasped by conceiving the wall not as a continuous circle but as composed of ten

separate pieces, which did not join but overlapped, while the gates connected the overlapping ends.

Mantineia, arisen from her ruins, and the other towns of Arcadia—with the important exceptions of Tegea, Orchomenus, and Heraea—now agreed to form a Pan-Arcadian union and constitute a federal state. Several reasons made it expedient to establish a new seat as the federal capital of the country. The Arcadian cities were too small for the purpose. The selection of one of them would have excited the jealousies of the other, and it was intended that there should be no Thebes in the Arcadian state. The site chosen for the new city was in the western of the two large plains which define the geographical character of central Arcadia. It lay, in a long narrow irregular shape, on both sides of the river Helisson. Not far off rose Lycæon, the mountain to which the Arcadian folk attached their most sacred associations; and in the centre of the market-place was built a shrine of Zeus of that holy hill. The town was entitled to its name of Megalopolis, or Great City, by the large circuit of its double wall, a circuit of five miles and a half—a somewhat rough piece of work, built of stone in the lower courses and brick above, and furnished with towers at intervals.

*Founda-
tion of
Megalopolis (date
uncertain;
371-369
B.C.).*

It must be kept in view that Megalopolis had a double character. It was to be the federal capital, but it was also to be one of the federal cities. Apart from its relation to all Arcadia, it had a special relation to its own plain. The change which had come to pass in the eastern plain, so long ago that no man could tell when, by the founding of Tegea and Mantineia, was now brought to pass in the western plain. The village communities of the surrounding districts were induced to exchange their separate existence for joint life in a city. Lying close to the north-western frontier of Laconia, Megalopolis would be a bulwark against Sparta on this side, corresponding to Tegea on the north. It is natural to compare it with Mantineia, which arose in its new shape at the same time. Both cities seem to have had a similar system of fortification—double walls of stone and brick, strengthened by towers; but Megalopolis, which was the larger, was also the stronger by nature. For Mantineia lay on a dead level, all its strength was due to art; Megalopolis lay on sloping irregular

ground, offering hills of which the architect could take advantage. The difference is illustrated by the fact that the little theatre in Mantinea rested on a stone substructure, while the huge theatre in Megalopolis is cut out of a hill.

*Assembly
of the
Myrioi.*

The Federal Constitution was modelled on the ordinary type of democratic constitutions. There was an Assembly, which met at stated periods to consider all important questions. Every citizen of the federal communities was a member of this Assembly, of which the official title was the *Ten Thousand*. The name indicates an approximate, not an exact, number, like the Five Thousand in the constitution of Theramenes at Athens. We have no information as to the working of this body, but from the analogy of other ancient federations it is probable that the votes were taken by cities, the vote of each city being determined by the majority of the votes of those of its citizens who were present. The Ten Thousand made war and peace, concluded alliances, and sat in

*Council of
Damiorgoi.*

judgment on offenders against the League. There was also a *Council*, composed of fifty members from the various cities, and this body had doubtless the usual executive and deliberative functions which belonged to the Greek conception of a Council.

On the south side of the river stood the Thersilion, the federal building in which meetings of the Arcadian league were held. The foundations of this spacious covered hall have recently been laid bare, and display an ingenious arrangement of the internal pillars, converging in lines whereby as few as possible of a crowded audience might be hindered from seeing and hearing. It is an attempt to apply the principle of the theatre to a covered building. The Thersilion stood close in front of the hill from which the theatre was hewn, and the place of political deliberation seemed part of the same structure as the place of dramatic spectacles. For the Doric portico, which adorned the southern side of the federal house, faced the audience; the orchestra in which the chorus danced and the actors sometimes played stretched from the circle of seats up to the steps of the portico. Such was the original arrangement, changed in later years; and it illustrates the fact that the stone theatres which began to spring up throughout Greece in the fourth century were intended as much for political assemblies as for theatrical representations.

The river Helisson divides Megalopolis into two nearly equal parts; and it would seem that this division corresponded to the double character of the place. The city of Megalopolis, in the strict sense, was on the northern side; there was the market-place on the bank of the river, there was the hall in which the Council of the Megalopolitan state met together. *Buleuterion.* But the southern half of Megalopolis was federal ground; here was the federal Hall of Assembly, here was the theatre, which was in fact an open-air hall for federal meetings. Here, we may suppose, were the dwellings of the permanent armed force, 5000 strong, which was maintained by the Federation; here were lodgings for the "Ten Thousand" when they assembled to vote on the affairs of the Arcadian state. *Eparittoi (federal army).*

Tegea had hitherto been a sort of Laconian outpost, and a revolution was necessary to bring about its adhesion to the new federation. With the help of a Mantinean band, the philo-Laconian party was overthrown, and 800 exiles sought refuge at Sparta. This blow stung Sparta to action. She might brook the resuscitation of Mantinea, she might look on patiently at the measures taken by the presumptuous Arcadians for managing their own affairs; but it was too much to see Tegea, her steadfast ally, the strong warder of her northern frontier, pass over to the camp of the rebels. Agesilaus led an army into Arcadia, and displayed the resentment of Sparta by ravaging the fields of Mantinea; neither he nor the federal forces risked a conflict. *Tegea joins the League, 370 B.C.*

In view of this Spartan invasion, which came to so little, the Arcadians had sought the help of foreign powers. To Athens their first appeal was made. The tidings of Leuctra had excited in that city mixed feelings of pleasure and jealousy. The humiliation of Sparta opened up a prospect of regaining empire, notwithstanding the undertakings of the recent peace; but the triumph of Thebes was unwelcome and dangerous. These hopes and fears spurred Athens to new activity. Shortly after the battle of Leuctra she showed her appreciation of the changed condition of Hellas by inviting delegates from the Peloponnesian cities to pledge themselves anew to the King's Peace (which, it must always be remembered, was the basis of the Peace of Callias) and to *Close of 371 B.C.*

pledge themselves to one another for mutual help in case of hostile attack. Elis, refusing to recognise the autonomy of some of her subjects, was forced to hold aloof; but most of the other states swore to the alliance. It was a contract between Athens and her allies on one side, and the former allies of Sparta on the other. By virtue of this act of alliance, Athens was bound to help Mantinea and the Arcadian cities whenever they were threatened by an invasion. But it appeared that, though ready to usurp the place of Sparta, she was not ready to renew the war with her old rival. Perhaps a change of feeling had been wrought in the course of the nine or ten months which had run since the congress at Athens; the violence of the democratic movements in the Peloponnese may have caused disgust; certain it is that Athens refused the Arcadian appeal; she seems to have contemplated a policy of neutrality.

The rebuff at Athens drove Arcadia into the arms of Thebes. The battle which had been fought to secure the unity of Boeotia had been the means of promoting the unity of Arcadia; and there was a certain fitness in the northern state coming to the aid of its younger fellow. But it was not mere sympathy with federal institutions that induced Thebes to send a Boeotian army into the Peloponnese. To keep Sparta down and prevent her from recovering her influence was the concern of Thebes, and an united Arcadia was the best instrument that could be devised for the purpose. At this juncture, the situation in northern Greece permitted Thebes to comply with the Arcadian request. The Phocians and Ozolian Locrians, the Locrians of Opus, the Malians, had sought her alliance after Leuctra, and even the Euboeans had deserted to her; so that all central Greece, as far as Cithaeron, was under the Boeotian influence. But if the request had come some months sooner, it would have been impossible to grant it; for Jason of Pherae was then alive, preparing to march to Delphi, and the Boeotian forces could not have left Boeotia.

*Boeotians
invade
Laconia.*

It was already winter when the Theban army, led by Epaminondas, accompanied by his fellow Boeotarchs, arrived in Arcadia to find that Agesilaus had withdrawn from the field. But, though the purpose of the expedition was thus

accomplished, the Arcadians persuaded Epaminondas not to return home without striking a blow at the enemy. To invade Laconia and attack Sparta herself was the daring proposal—daring in idea at least; for within the memory of history no foeman had ever violated Laconian soil, the unwalled city had never repelled an assault. There was little danger, with an army of such size as that which was now assembled; and a march to the gates of Sparta would drive home the lesson of Leuctra. The invaders advanced in four divisions by four roads, converging on Sellasia, and met no serious attempt to block their way; some neodamodes and Tegeate exiles were annihilated by the Arcadians. Sellasia was burnt, and the united army descended into the plain on the left bank of the Eurotas. The river, which separated them from Sparta, was swollen with winter rains, and this probably saved the city; for the bridge was too strongly guarded to be safely attacked. Epaminondas marched southward a few miles further, as far as Amyclae, where he crossed the stream by a ford. But Sparta was now saved. On the first alarm of the coming invasion, messages had flown to the Peloponnesian cities which were still friendly; and these—Corinth, Sicyon, Phlius, Pellene, and the towns of the Argolic coast—had promptly sent auxiliary forces. The northern roads being barred by the enemy, these forces were obliged to land on the eastern shore of Laconia and make their way across Mount Parnon. They reached the Eurotas bridge, after the invaders had moved to Amyclae; and their coming added such strength to the defence of Sparta that Epaminondas did not attack it, but contented himself with marching up defiantly to its outskirts. It was indeed a sufficient revenge even for Theban hatred to have wounded Sparta as none had wounded her before, to have violated the precinct of the Laconian land. The consternation of the Spartans at a calamity which, owing to the immunity of ages, they had never even conceived as possible, can hardly be imagined. The women, disciplined though they were in repressing their feelings when sons or husbands perished in battle, now fell into fits of distress and despair: for, unlike the women of so many other Greek cities, they had never looked upon the face of an enemy before. Old Agesilaus, who loathed the Theban above all other names, was charged with

the defence; and his task was the harder since he had to watch not only the foe, but the disaffected. Freedom had been promised to 6000 helots who came forward to serve; but this aid was a new danger.

Depopulation of Sparta.

It is needless to say that the loss of a few hundred soldiers on the field of Leuctra had nothing to do with the impotence displayed by Sparta at this crisis. And if Leuctra had been won by superior generalship, it was not inferior generalship that exposed Laconia. The disease lay far deeper. The vigour of Sparta was decaying from the mere want of men; it has been calculated that at this time there were not more than 1500 with full citizenship. Not merely constant warfare, but, far more, economical conditions, brought about this depopling. Since money had begun to flow into Laconia, and since a new law permitted citizens to alienate their holdings, the inevitable result ensued; the small lots which meagrely supported each Spartan were gathered into large estates; and with the lots the citizens disappeared. This disease which was sapping the energies of his enemy cannot have escaped the view of Epaminondas, and his next step is significant.

Foundation of Messene, winter, 370-69 B.C.

Having ravaged southern Laconia, from the banks of the Eurotas to the foot of Taygetus, as far as Gytheion—where they failed, we know not why, to take the arsenal—the allies returned to Arcadia. But, though it was midwinter, their work was not over yet; a far greater blow was still to be inflicted on Sparta. Epaminondas led them now into another part of the Spartan territory, the ancient Messenia. The serfs, who belonged to the old Messenian race, arose at their coming; and on the slopes of Mount Ithome the foundations of a new Messene were laid by Epaminondas. The ancient heroes and heroines of the race were invited to return to the restored nation; the ample circuit of the town was marked out, and the first stones placed, to the sound of flutes. Ithome was the citadel, and formed one side of the town, whose walls of well-wrought masonry descended the slopes and met in the plain below. The Messenian exiles who had been wandering over the Greek world had now a home once more.

Messene, like Megalopolis, was founded by "synoecizing" the districts round about. But its political position was

entirely different from that of Megalopolis. Messene was not a federal capital; it was the Messenian state—a city with the whole country for its territory. Corone and Methone were not cities like Mantinea and Clitor; they were places like Brauron and Marathon; their inhabitants possessed the citizenship of Messene, but it was only under Mount Ithome that they could exercise their burgher-rights. The relation of Messene to Messenia was that of Athens to Attica, not that of Megalopolis to Arcadia.

Thus not only a new stronghold but a new enemy was erected against Sparta in Sparta's own domain. All western Laconia, all the land between Ithome and the sea (except Asine and Cyparissia), were subtracted from the Spartan dominion; all the perioeci and helots became the freemen of a hostile state. Under the auspices of Thebes an old act of injustice was undone, and the principle of autonomy was strikingly affirmed. But, besides the glory which Thebes won by so popular an act, besides the direct injury inflicted on Sparta and the establishment of a hostile fort, the policy of Epaminondas was calculated to produce a result of greater importance. The loss of Messenia would accelerate that process of decline in the Spartan state, which had already advanced so far. The fewer the lots, the fewer the citizens, according to the indissoluble connexion between land and burgher-rights on the Lyncurgen system. It was high time for Sparta to reform her constitution.

The Arcadians celebrated this memorable invasion of Laconia by dedicating with part of the spoil a group of statues to the Delphian god. The verses of dedication signify that the indigenous people from sacred Arcadia, having laid Lacedaemon waste, set up the monument as a witness to future generations. The statues are gone, but the verses on their stone have come to light in our own day.

The stone which bears witness to the invasion of Laconia.

In the meantime Sparta had begged aid from Athens, and Athens had decided to depart from her position of neutrality. A vote was passed, strongly supported by the orator Callistratus, to send the entire force of the city under Iphicrates to assist Sparta. This was evidently the most politic course for Athens to adopt. Sparta was a necessary makeweight against Thebes. Nor is it doubtful that, notwithstanding all

*Athens
sends an
army to
rescue
Sparta.*

*Theban
army
returns
home,
spring,
369 B.C.*

*Alliance of
Athens
and
Sparta,
spring,
369 B.C.*

*Second
expedition
of Epami-
nondas
into the
Pelopon-
nesus.*

their rivalries, no such antipathy parted Athens from Sparta as that which existed between the two states and Thebes. Iphicrates marched to the Isthmus and occupied Corinth and Cenchreae, thus commanding the line of Mount Oneion. His object, it must be clearly understood, was not to prevent the enemy from leaving the Peloponnesus, but to protect the rear of his own army marching into a hostile country. He advanced into Arcadia, but found that the Thebans and their allies had left Laconia, and Sparta was no longer in danger. He therefore drew back to Corinth, and harassed the Boeotian army on its return march, without attempting to bar its passage. For the object of the Athenian expedition was simply to rescue Sparta, not, except so far as Sparta's peril might demand, to fight with the Thebans.

But the hasty vote to march to the rescue was soon followed by a deliberate treaty of alliance; and Athens definitely ranged herself with Sparta against Boeotia and Arcadia. She was already meditating schemes of extending her empire; she was nourishing the hope of recovering the most precious of all her former imperial possessions, the Thracian Amphipolis. With such designs it was impossible to remain neutral; and, as we shall see, there was some danger of a collision with Thebes in Macedonia.

Fighting went on in the Peloponnese between the Arcadians and the allies of Sparta; and a few months later Epaminondas (who had been re-elected Boeotarch in his absence at the beginning of the year) appeared again at the head of the Boeotian army. The Spartans and Athenians had occupied the line of Mount Oneion; this time the object was to keep out the Thebans. But Epaminondas broke through their lines, joined his allies, won over Sicyon and Pellene, and failed to win Phlius. A new succour for Sparta arrived at this moment from over-seas. Twenty ships bearing 2000 Celtic and Iberian mercenaries came from her old ally, the tyrant of Syracuse, to whom she had once sent aid in an hour of peril, and who had more than once sent succour to her. Their coming seems to have decided Epaminondas to return home, though he had accomplished but little, and his political opponent Meneclidas took advantage of the general disappointment to indict him for treason. The result was that

Epaminondas was not re-elected Boeotarch for the following year.

To establish her supremacy, Thebes was adopting the same policy as Sparta. She placed a harmost in Sicyon; as the Boeotian cities had formerly been garrisoned by Sparta, the Peloponnesian cities were now to be garrisoned by Thebes. Messenia and Arcadia were to be autonomous, but the Thebans desired to be regarded as both the authors and preservers of that autonomy. As a mistress, distant Thebes might be more tolerable than neighbouring Lacedaemon; but the free federation of Arcadia determined to be free in very deed. Sparta was now sunk so low that the Arcadians—with friendly Messene on one side, and friendly Argos on the other—could hope to maintain their liberty with their own swords, without foreign aid. Their leading spirit Lycomedes animated them to this resolve of independence and self-reliance. "You are the only indigenous natives of the Peloponnesus, and you are the most numerous and hardiest nation in Greece. Your valour is proved by the fact that you have been always in the greatest request as allies. Give up following the lead of others. You made Sparta by following her lead; and now if you follow the lead of Thebes, without yourselves leading in turn, she will prove perhaps a second Sparta." In this mood the Arcadians displayed a surprising activity and achieved a series of successes. The two important cities, Heraea in the west, and Orchomenus in the north, which had hitherto stood aloof, were forced to join the league, which now became in the fullest sense Pan-Arcadian. Some of the northern villages of Laconia were annexed, and the Triphylian towns sought in the league a support against the hated domination of Elis. The federal forces were active in the opposite quarters of Argolis and Messenia. Against all this activity Sparta felt herself helpless. But a second armament of auxiliaries arrived from her friend, the tyrant of Syracuse, and thus reinforced she ventured to take the field, and marched into the plain of Megalopolis. But the expedition was suddenly interrupted; time had been wasted, and the Syracusan force, in accordance with its orders, was obliged to return to Sicily. Its way lay through Laconia, in order to take ship at Gytheion; and the enemy tried to cut it off in the mountain defiles.

Spring
368 B.C.

Sparta
receives
help from
Dionysius.
The tear-
less battle,
368 (late
summer?).

The Spartan commander Archidamus, who was in the rear, hastened to the rescue, and dispersed the Arcadians with great loss. Not a single Lacedaemonian was killed, and the victory was called the "tearless battle." The joy displayed in Sparta over this slight success showed how low Sparta had fallen.

*Congress
of Delphi,
368 B.C.
(summer).*

It may be thought that Dionysius might have kept his troops at home, if they were charged to return before they had well time to begin to fight. But the truth is, that these troops were for some months inactive in Greece, while an attempt was being made to bring about a general peace. The initiative came from Ariobarzanes, the Persian satrap of Phrygia, who sent to Greece an agent well furnished with money; and this move on the part of Persia was probably suggested by Athens. The Syracusan sovereign also intervened in the interests of peace, and the stone remains on which the Athenians thanked Dionysius and his sons for being "good men in regard to the people of the Athenians and their allies, and helping the King's Peace." Thus the King's Peace was the basis of the negotiations of the congress which met at Delphi. Both Athens, which was doubtless the prime mover, and Sparta were most anxious for peace; but each had an ultimate condition from which she would not retreat. Sparta's very life seemed to demand the recovery of Messenia, and Athens had set her heart on Amphipolis. But neither condition would be admitted by Thebes, and consequently the negotiations fell through. They led, however, to independent negotiations of various states with Persia, each seeking to win from the king a recognition of its own claims. Pelopidas went up to Susa on behalf of Thebes to obtain a royal confirmation of the independence of Messenia. The Athenians sent envoys to convince the king of their rights to Amphipolis. Arcadia, Elis, and Argos were also represented. Pelopidas was entirely successful. The king issued an order to Greece, embodying the wishes of Thebes: Messenia and Amphipolis to be independent, the Athenians to recall their warships. The question of Triphylia—whether it was to be dependent on Elis or a part of Arcadia—was decided in favour of Elis; this decision in a matter of absolute indifference to Persia was clearly due to Pelopidas, and indicates strained relations between Thebes and Arcadia. Pelopidas returned with the

*Greek
envoys
at Susa,
367 B.C.*

*Persian
rescript.*

royal letter, but it found no acceptance in Greece, either at the congress of allies which was convoked at Thebes, or when the document was afterwards sent round to the cities. Arcadia would not abandon Triphylia, and Lycomedes formally protested against the headship of Thebes.

The answer of Thebes to this defiance of her will was an invasion of the Peloponnesus. The line of Mount Oneion was still defended, but negligently; and Epaminondas passed it with Argive help. His object was not to depress Sparta further, for Sparta was now too feeble to be formidable, but to check the pretensions of Arcadia. And this could only be done through strengthening Theban influence in the Peloponnesus by winning new allies. Accordingly, Epaminondas advanced to Achaea, and easily gained the adhesion of the Achæan cities.

But the gain of Achaea was soon followed by its loss. Counter to the moderate policy of Epaminondas, the Thebans had insisted on overthrowing the oligarchical constitutions and banishing the oligarchical leaders; these exiles from the various cities banded together, and recovered each city successively, overthrowing the democracies and expelling the harmosts. Henceforward Achaea was an ardent partisan of Sparta.

The unsettled state of the Peloponnesus was conspicuously shown by the events which happened at Sicyon. When the Theban harmost was installed in the acropolis, the oligarchy had been spared; but soon afterwards one of the chief citizens, named Euphron, brought about the establishment of a democracy, and then, procuring his own election as general, organising a mercenary force, and surrounding himself with a bodyguard,—the usual and notorious steps of a despot's progress,—made himself master of the city and harbour. The Arcadians had helped Euphron in his first designs, but the intrigues of his opponents were so skilful, that Arcadia again intervened and restored to Sicyon the exiles whom the tyrant had driven out. Euphron fled from the city to the harbour, which he surrendered to the Lacedæmonians; but the Lacedæmonians failed to hold it. Sicyon, however, was not yet delivered from her tyrant. He was restored by the help of Athenian mercenaries. Afterwards, seeing that he could not

Third expedition of Epaminondas into the Peloponnesus, 366 B.C.

Achæa won and lost, 366 B.C.

Sicyon: Euphron becomes tyrant, 368 B.C.

Expelled,

restored. 366-5 B.C.

maintain himself without the support of Boeotia, he visited Thebes, and was slain on the Cadmea in front of the Hall of Council, by two Sicyonian exiles who had dogged him. His assassins were tried and acquitted at Thebes, but at Sicyon his memory was cherished and he was worshipped as a second founder of the city. The fact shows that under the rule of Euphron the masses of the people were happier than under the political opponents whom he had so mercilessly treated. His son succeeded to his power.

*Thebans
seize
Oropus,
366 B.C.*

The expedition of Epaminondas was attended with results which were in the end injurious to Thebes. The relations with Arcadia became more and more strained. But in the same year Oropus was wrested from Athens and occupied by a Theban force. The Athenians were unable to cope alone with Thebes; they called on their allies, but none moved to

*Alliance of
Arcadia
with
Athens,
366 B.C.*

their aid. The moment was seized by Arcadia. Lycomedes visited Athens and induced the Athenians, smarting with resentment against their allies, to conclude an alliance with the league. Thus Athens was now in the position of being an ally of both Arcadia and Sparta, which were at war with each other; and Arcadia was the ally of Athens and Thebes, which were also at war with each other. The visit of Lycomedes incidentally led to a disaster for Arcadia which outweighed the benefit of the alliance. The ambassador, on his way back, was slain by some exiles into whose hands he fell; and the league lost its ablest statesman.

*Murder of
Lycomedes.*

This change in the mutual relations among the Greek states, brought about by the seizure of Oropus, was followed by another change, brought about by an Athenian plot to seize Corinth. The object was to secure permanent control over the passage into the Peloponnesus. But the plot was discovered and foiled by the Corinthians, who then politely dismissed the Athenian soldiers stationed at various posts in the Corinthian territory. But by herself Corinth would have been unable to resist the combined pressure of Thebes on one side and Argos on the other; and, as Sparta could not help her, she was driven to make peace with Thebes. She was joined by her neighbour Phlius and by the cities of the Argolic coast; all these states formally recognised the independence of Messene, but did not enter into any alliance with

*Partial
peace of
366-5 B.C.*

Thebes, or give any pledge to obey her headship. They became, in fact, neutral.

It was a blow to Sparta, who still refused to accept a peace on any terms save the restoration of Messenia. The Messenian question gave political speculators at Athens a subject for meditation. Was the demand of Sparta just? The publicist Isocrates argued the case for Sparta in a speech which he put in the mouth of king Archidamus. Another orator, Alcidas, vindicated in reply the liberty of the Messenians and declared a principle which was far in advance of his time, "God has left all men free; nature has made no man a slave."

If we survey the political relations of southern Hellas at this epoch, we see Thebes, supported by Argos, still at war with Sparta, who is supported by Athens; Achaea actively siding with Sparta; Elis hostile to Arcadia; the Arcadian league at war with Sparta, in alliance with Athens, in alliance with, but cool towards, Thebes, and already—having lost its leader Lycomedes—beginning to fall into disunion with itself.

The peace with Corinth and others of the belligerent states marks the time at which Peloponnesian affairs cease to occupy the chief place in the counsels of Thebes, and her most anxious attention turns to a different quarter. For Sparta is disabled, and the mistress of Boeotia recognises that it is with Athens that the strife for headship will now be. While events were progressing in the Peloponnesus, as we have seen, Athens was busily engaged in other parts of the world with a view to restoring her maritime empire; and we have now to see how she succeeded, and how Thebes likewise was pushing her own supremacy in the north.

SECT. 3. POLICY AND ACTION OF THEBES IN NORTHERN GREECE

The same year which saw the death of Jason of Pherae saw the death of another potentate in the north, his neighbour and ally Amyntas of Macedonia. We have seen how Amyntas had to fight for his kingdom with the Chalcidian league; how he was driven out of his land and restored; and how the league was crushed by the power of Sparta. Both Jason and

*Summary
of the
situation.*

*Death of
Amyntas.*

Amyntas were succeeded by an Alexander. At Pherae, the power first passed to Jason's brothers, of whom one murdered the other and was in turn murdered by his victim's son,—Alexander, whose reign was worthy of its sanguinary inauguration. The Thessalian cities refused to bow down to the supremacy of Pherae, now that Pherae had no man who was worthy to be obeyed; and to resist Alexander of Pherae they invoked the aid of Alexander of Macedonia. The aid was given, and Larissa, Crannon, and other cities passed under Macedonian sway. But this was not the purpose of the Thessalians, to exchange a native for a foreign ruler; and accordingly they invoked the help of Thebes against both Alexanders alike. It was sound policy on the part of Thebes to accede to the request. It was impossible to discern yet what manner of man the successor of Jason might prove to be; and it was important, from the Boeotian point of view, to hinder the reunion of Thessaly under a monarch. The conduct of an expedition was entrusted to Pelopidas, who brought Larissa and other towns in the northern part of Thessaly under a Theban protectorate.

First expedition of Pelopidas to Thessaly, 369 B.C.

Thessalian league.

Tetrads.

Archon.

At the same time, the Thessalians sought to strengthen their position by a federal union,—a political experiment which had been tried in Thessaly before. The little we know of the league which was established about this time suggests rather the revival of an old system than a new creation. The country was divided into four political divisions corresponding to the old geographical districts; at the head of each was a polemarch, who had officers of horse and foot under him; and at the head of the league was an archon, elected if not for life at least for longer than a year. Thus the organisation was military; but there are indications that it grew out of an old amphictionic association. There is no reason to think that Pelopidas had more to do with the establishment of the Thessalian federation than Epaminondas with that of the Pan-Arcadian league; the part of Thebes in either case was simply to support and confirm.

Macedonia offered no obstacles to the operations of Pelopidas in Thessaly, for it was involved in a domestic struggle. One of the nobles, Ptolemy of Alorus, rebelled against the king, and was supported by the king's unnatural mother

Eurydice. The two parties called upon Pelopidas to adjudicate between them, and he patched up a temporary arrangement and concluded a Theban alliance with Macedonia. Hardly had he turned his back when Ptolemy murdered Alexander and married Eurydice. But it seemed as if the paramours would not be permitted to reap the profits of their crime. Another pretender to the throne had gathered an army of mercenaries and occupied all the land along the Chalcidian frontier. Help, however, was at hand. An Athenian fleet was cruising in the Thermaic gulf, under the command of Iphicrates. The queen visited the admiral on the coast, accompanied by her two sons, Perdiccas and Philip,—the brothers of Iphicrates, since he had been adopted as a son by Amyntas,—and persuaded him to help her in her need. By his exertions the pretender was expelled, and the succession of Perdiccas was secured under the regency of Ptolemy.

Murder of Alexander of Macedon, 369-8 B.C. Revolt of Pausanias.

Intervention of Iphicrates.

The interests of Athens on the Chalcidian and the adjacent coasts had forced that state to keep an ever-watchful eye on political events in Macedonia and to seek influence at the court of Aegae. The intervention of Iphicrates was not the first case in which Athenian power had settled a dynastic question. His settlement was more abiding than that of Pelopidas; we may conjecture that the opportune appearance of the Athenian fleet was due to the circumstance that Thebes had interfered. But Thebes was resolved to continue her interference, and oust the Athenian influence. Pelopidas, again dispatched to the north, compelled the regent Ptolemy to enter into alliance with Thebes and assure his fidelity by furnishing a number of hostages. Amongst the young Macedonian nobles who were sent as pledges to Thebes was the boy Philip, who was destined to be the maker of Macedonia, and was now to be trained for the work in the military school of Boeotia, under the eye of Epaminondas himself.

Second expedition of Pelopidas to Macedonia and Thessaly, 368 B.C.

Having thus brought Macedonia within the circle of the Theban supremacy, Pelopidas on his way home visited the camp of the despot of Pherae. But he did not know that Alexander had become the ally of Athens—an inevitable combination, since it was the interest of both to oppose Theban

Pelopidas detained by the despot of Pherae.

*Theban
invasion
of Thessaly
to rescue
Pelopidas,
368 B.C.
(autumn),
unsuccess-
ful.*

*Second
invasion
of Thessaly
to rescue
Pelopidas,
367 B.C.
(first
months),
successful.*

expansion in the north. Supported by Athens, the despot could defy Thebes, and he detained his visitor Pelopidas as a hostage. A Boeotian army marched to rescue the captive; but an armament of 1000 men arrived by sea from Athens, and the invaders, who were commanded by incompetent generals, were out-manceuvred and forced to retreat. Epaminondas was serving as a common hoplite in the ranks, and but for his presence the army would have been lost. The soldiers unanimously invited him to take the command, and he skilfully extricated them from a dangerous position and managed their safe retreat. This exploit secured the re-election of Epaminondas as Boeotarch, and he immediately returned to Thessaly at the head of another army to deliver his friend. It was necessary to apply a compulsion severe enough to frighten the tyrant, but not so violent as to transport him with fury, which might be fatal to his prisoner. This was achieved by dexterous military operations, and Pelopidas was released in return for a month's truce. It seems probable that at the same time Epaminondas freed Pharsalus from the rule of Pherae. But it was not the interest of Thebes to overthrow the tyrant or even limit his authority to his own city. It was well that he should be there, as a threat to the rest of Thessaly; it was well that Thessaly should be unable to dispense with Theban protection. The power of Alexander extended over Phthiotis and Magnesia, and along the shores of the Pagasaeon Bay, and to neighbouring towns like Scotussa. His tyranny and brutality seem to have been extreme, though the anecdotes of his cruelty cannot be implicitly trusted. We read that he buried men alive, or sewed them up in the hides of wild beasts for his hounds to tear. We read that he massacred the inhabitants of two friendly cities. We read that he worshipped as a divine being the dagger with which he had slain his uncle, and gave it the name of "Sir Luck"—an anecdote indicating a strain of madness which often attends the taste for cruelty. Excellently invented, if not true, is the story that, having seen with dry eyes a performance of the *Troades* of Euripides, a drama unutterably sad, the tyrant sent an apology to the actor, explaining that his apparent want of emotion was due to no defect in the acting, but to a feeling of shame that tears

Tychon.

*"What's
Hecuba to
him?"*

for the sorrows of Hecuba should fall from the eyes of one who had shown no pity for so many victims.

It has been said that the chief desire of Athens at this time was to regain the finest jewel of her first empire, Amphipolis. The fleet, under Iphicrates, was cruising and watching, with this purpose in view; but the hopes of success—which depended much on the good-will of Macedonia—were lessened by the ties which Ptolemy had contracted with Thebes. And, besides losing Macedonian support, Athens was impeded by the cities of the Chalcidian league, who now broke away from the Athenian alliance and made a treaty with Amphipolis.

Meanwhile Athens began to act in the Eastern Aegean. 366 B.C. The opportunity was furnished by the revolt of her friend (367 B.C.) Ariobarzanes, the satrap of Phrygia. It was the policy of Athens to help the satrap without breaking with the Great King, from whom she still hoped to obtain a recognition of her claim to Amphipolis. A fleet of thirty galleys and 8000 troops was sent under her other experienced general Timotheus, and he accomplished more in the east than Iphicrates had accomplished in the north. He laid siege to Samos, on which Persia had laid hands, contrary to the King's Peace; and took it at the end of ten months. At the same time he lent assistance to Ariobarzanes, who had to maintain himself against the satraps of Lydia and Caria; and as a reward for these services Athens obtained the cession of two cities in the Thracian Chersonese—Sestos and Crithote.

Of these acquisitions Sestos was of special value, from its position on the Hellespont, securing to Athens control at this point over the ships which supplied her with corn from the Euxine coasts. But more than this, she now regained a foothold in the peninsula which Miltiades had won for her, and she hoped to make it entirely her own up to a line drawn across the isthmus north of Cardia, marked at one point by an altar of "Zeus of Boundaries." Timotheus himself began the work of expansion by annexing Elaeus near the southern extremity. Thus Athens began to revive her old empire, but in Samos she revealed her designs even more clearly. This island was not treated as a subject ally, but was appropriated as Athenian territory. Outsettlers were sent

*Timotheus
sent to Asia
Minor,
366 B.C.*

*He captures
Samos,
365 B.C.*

*Athens gets
Sestos.*

from Athens to occupy Samos, and thus the system of cleruchies, which had been the most unpopular feature of the first Confederacy, and had been expressly guarded against at the formation of the second Confederacy, was renewed. It did not indeed violate the letter of the constitution of the league, which only bound Athens not to force outsettlers upon members of the league; but it was distinctly a violation in spirit. The treatment of Samos showed Greece that Athens was bent on rising again to her old Imperial position; while the second Confederacy was based on the principle that she had renounced such pretensions for ever.

*Murder of
the regent
Ptolemy;
Perdiccas
in power,
365 B.C.*

Delighted with the achievements of Timotheus, the Athenians appointed him to command the fleet which had been operating for years on the Macedonian coast under Iphicrates, whose failure was strikingly contrasted with the success of Timotheus. It must be remembered that while Iphicrates was hindered by the hostility of the regent of Macedon, Timotheus was helped by the friendship of the satrap of Phrygia; but Timotheus possessed a diplomatic dexterity which Iphicrates never displayed. And now fortune favoured the diplomatist. Shortly before his new appointment, the regent Ptolemy was assassinated by the young king Perdiccas, who thus avenged his brother Alexander. The change in the holders of power led to a change in policy. Macedonia freed itself from the influence of Thebes, and the young king sought the support of Athens. And so Timotheus, not only untrammelled by Macedonian opposition, but even aided by Macedonian auxiliaries, set about the reduction of towns around the Thermaic gulf. He compelled Methone and Pydna to join the Athenian confederacy; and in the Chalcidic peninsula he made himself master of Potidaea and Torone. The acquisition of these Chalcidic towns was valuable in itself and Potidaea was occupied by Athenian outsettlers; but the main purpose of the general was to weaken the resources of Olynthus, which, at the head of the Chalcidian states, gave powerful support to its ally Amphipolis, the supreme object coveted by Athens, whose rights to it had recently been recognised by the Persian king. A famous mercenary captain named Charidemus, who had previously served under Iphicrates, was now secured again by Timotheus; but two

*Successes of
Timotheus
in the
Chalcidic
region
(364-2
B.C.).*

efforts to capture Amphipolis were repelled. The work of Brasidas was not destined to be undone.

It was high time for Thebes to interfere. If the successes of Timotheus were allowed to continue, Athens would soon recover Euboea, and the adhesion of that island was, from its geographical position, of the highest importance to Boeotia. But in order to check the advance of her neighbour it would be necessary for Thebes to grapple with her on her own element. By the advice of Epaminondas, in spite of the advice of Meneclidas, it was resolved to create a navy and enter upon the career of a sea-power. This was a momentous decision, which demanded a careful consideration of ways and means. Given the problem, to break the power of Athens, there can be no question that Epaminondas advised the only possible method of solving it. But it might be well to consider whether its solution was a necessity for Thebes. The history of Boeotia had marked it out as a continental power; and it would have been wiser to consolidate its sway on the mainland. The maintenance of a navy involved financial efforts which could not be sustained by any but a great commercial state; and the cities of Boeotia had no trade. It was the natural antipathy of the two neighbours far more than any mature consideration of her own interests that drove Boeotia to take this indiscreet step. Yet the step had immediate success. A hundred triremes were built and manned and sent to the Propontis under the Boeotarch, Epaminondas.

The sailing of this fleet was a blow to Athens, not from any victory that it gained—there was no battle—but from the support and encouragement which it gave to those members of the Confederacy which were eager to break their bonds. The establishment of the cleruchies of Samos had created great discontent and apprehension among the Athenian allies, and they wanted only the support of a power like Thebes to throw off the federal yoke. Byzantium openly rebelled; Rhodes and Chios negotiated with Epaminondas; and even Ceos, close to Attica itself, defied Athens. When the Theban fleet returned home, Chabrias recalled Ceos to its allegiance, and a new act of treaty was drawn up; but a second rebellion had to be put down at Iulis before the island acquiesced in

*Boeotian
navy.*

364 B.C.

*Revolts of
Athenian
allies,
364 B.C.
Revolts of
Ceos,
364 and
363 B.C.*

Athenian sway. The expedition of Epaminondas also served to support the enemies of Athens who opposed her advance in the Chersonese; namely, the free city of Cardia, and the Thracian king Cotys, who was aided by his son-in-law Iphicrates. This general, superseded by Timotheus, had not ventured to return to Athens, and now sided with her enemies.

Third expedition of Pelopidas to Thessaly 364 B.C.

While the young Theban navy went forth to oppose Athens in the Propontis, a Theban army had marched against the ally of Athens, Alexander of Pherae, whose hand, strengthened by a mercenary force, had been heavy against the Thessalians. Once more, but for the last time, Pelopidas entered Thessaly at the head of an army to assist the Federation. Before he left Thebes, the sun suffered an eclipse, and this celestial event, interpreted by the prophets as a sign of coming evil, cast a gloom over his departure.

Eclipse of the sun, July 13.

Battle of Cynoscephalæ.

At Pharsalus he was joined by forces of the Thessalian league, and immediately advanced against Pherae itself. Alexander came forth to meet him with a large force, and it was a matter of great importance, for the purpose of barring the Theban advance, to occupy the heights known as the Dog's Heads, on the road from Pharsalus to Pherae. The armies reached the critical spot nearly at the same time, and there was a rush for the crests. The Theban cavalry beat off the cavalry of the foe, but lost time in pursuing it, and in the meantime the infantry of Alexander seized the hills. In the battle which followed the object of the Thebans was to drive the enemy from this position. Having been repeatedly repelled, Pelopidas, by a combined assault of horse and foot, at length won the summit and forced the enemy to give way.

Death of Pelopidas.

But in the moment of victory the impetuous general espied the hated despot in whose dungeon he had languished, and yielding to an irresistible fit of passion, aggravated by the excitement of battle, he forgot the duties of a general and rushed against his enemy. Alexander withdrew into the midst of his guards, and Pelopidas, plunging desperately after him, was overwhelmed by numbers. It was even so that Cyrus threw away his victory at Cunaxa. The death of Pelopidas was not fatal to his followers, who routed the enemy with heavy loss; but it was a sore blow both to his own Thebes, of which he had been the deliverer and strong pillar,

and to Thessaly, of which he had been the protector. In the following year an army was sent against Pherae, and avenged his death. Alexander was obliged to relinquish all his possessions except his own city and submit to the headship of Thebes. *Thessaly becomes a Boeotian dependency, 363 B.C.*

It was about this time that Thebes shocked the Hellenic world by the destruction of her venerable rival, the Minyan Orchomenus. Some Theban exiles induced the horsemen of Orchomenus to join them in a plot to subvert the constitution. But the hearts of the principal conspirators failing them before the day of action came, they informed the Boeotarchs; the horsemen were promptly seized and condemned to death; and the Assembly passed a resolution to rase Orchomenus and enslave its people. The Thebans rejoiced at a fair pretext to wreak the hatred of ages upon their unhappy neighbour. They marched forth and executed the doom; the men were slain because they resisted, the rest of the folk were enslaved. It was a deed on which Greece cried shame; and, if the moderate and humane Boeotarch, who was then in the Hellespontine regions, had been present to control the counsels of his country, it would possibly never have been committed. *The destruction of Orchomenus, 364 B.C.*

SECT. 4. THE BATTLE OF MANTINEA

While Thebes was intent on opposing Athens, now her only serious rival, she had kept aloof from the Peloponnesus. But the course of affairs there was soon to demand a new intervention. The interest now centres on the relations of Elis with Arcadia; and the decisive element in the situation is the rift in the Arcadian league, perceptibly widening every month.

Her rights over Triphylia were the chief question of political importance for Elis. They had been recognised in the Persian rescript, but Arcadia refused to admit them and Thebes did not interfere. Thus Elis found herself in the same plight as Sparta in regard to the Arcadian league. It had always been a principle of Lacedaemonian policy to preserve against Elis the independence of her two southern neighbours, the Pisatans and the Triphylians. But now Sparta was only too ready to renounce this policy and recognise the Elean *The Triphylian question.*

claim, for the sake of winning an ally. It was in the nature of things that the two states should combine to recover Messenia and Triphylia. Thus there came to pass a change for the better in the prospect of Sparta: enemies had risen up against Arcadia on the north and on the west, and Thebes held aloof. The Spartans had recently gained a welcome success in the recovery of Sellasia, with the help of a force which had been sent to their aid by the second Dionysius of Syracuse.

*Outbreak
of war
between
Elis and
Arcadia,
365 B.C.
First
Arcadian
invasion of
Elis,
365 B.C.*

Besides Triphylia there were certain places on the mountainous frontier between Elis and Arcadia to which Elis professed to have claims. One of these was Lasion, in the high plateau of Pholoe, north-east of Olympia. The Eleans occupied the district, but were speedily driven out by the Pan-Arcadian *eparitoi*, who were always ready for such emergencies. The plains of Elis were far more assailable than the highlands of Arcadia, and the Arcadians were able to carry the war to the very heart of their foe. The Olympian festival would fall next year, and they were resolved that it should not be celebrated under the time-honoured presidency of Elis. They marched to Olympia, and occupied and fortified the Hill of Cronus, which looks down upon the Altis. Then they made an attack on the unwalled city of Elis, in concert with the democratic faction. But the attempt at a revolution failed and the Arcadians were repulsed. In the following year a second invasion reduced the Eleans to such distress that they implored Sparta to make a diversion and draw off the Arcadian forces. In answer to this prayer Archidamus occupied Cromnon, a fort which commands the road from Megalopolis to Messenia, with a garrison of 200 men. The importance of this step is shown by the fact that not only did the Arcadians promptly leave Elis, but they were also joined by allies, Argives as well as Messenians, to besiege Cromnon. A Spartan post there cut off the communication between the Arcadian and the Messenian capitals and was a threat to both. Archidamus at first tried to create a second diversion by ravaging northern Laconia, which was now politically part of Arcadia. When this failed, he made an attempt to relieve Cromnon, but was driven back with some loss. A second attempt at rescue would have been successful

*Second
Arcadian
invasion
364 B.C.*

if it had been better concerted, but it led to the capture of almost the whole garrison,—an event which ten years before would have sent a shock through the Hellenic world, but now seemed an ordinary occurrence.

The Arcadians were again free to continue their designs in Elis. The time of the Olympian games was approaching, and the people of Pisa, the ancient possessors of the sanctuary, who had by no means forgotten the rights which Elis had usurped in days long gone by, were installed as presidents of the festival. It was fully expected that the feast would not pass without battle and bloodshed. The Hill of Cronus had been occupied for a year by the Arcadian garrison, but now the whole army of the Federation, as well as 2000 spearmen from Argos and 400 cavalry from Athens, arrived to protect the solemn celebration. The day came round and the games began. The horse race was run and won. The next contest was the pentathlon, which demanded excellence in five different kinds of athletic prowess—in running, wrestling, hurling the javelin, throwing the disc, and leaping. The first event, the race, was over when the company became aware that the men of Elis were marching up to the bank of the Cladeus, which bounded the western side of the Altis. The soldiers took up their position on the opposite bank, but the games went on. Those competitors who had not failed in the race proceeded to the wrestling; but as the spectators, when the alarm was given, moved from the race-course into the Altis, to be nearer the scene of action, the wrestling match was held in the open space between the race-course and the Great Altar, under the terrace of the Treasure-houses. The Eleans, who were supported by an Achæan force, performed a sacrifice, and then, charging across the stream with unexpected boldness, drove back the Arcadian and Argive line into the Altis. A battle ensued in the southern part of the holy precinct, between the Hall of Council and the great Temple of Zeus. But the colonnades of these and other adjacent buildings gave shelter and points of vantage to the defenders; and the Eleans, when their captain fell, retired across the stream to their camp. The Arcadians improvised a fortification on the western side of the Altis, using for this purpose the tents of the spectators; and the men of Elis, seeing that it would be

*The
Olympian
games,
364 B.C.,
July,
celebrated
by the
Pisatians
(Ol. 104).*

*Battle in
the Altis.*

useless to repeat their attack, returned home, obliged to content themselves with declaring the festival to be null and void, and marking the year in their register as an "An-Olympiad." The religious sentiment of Greece was outraged by these violent scenes at a sanctuary which belonged to all Greece rather than to any single state; and there can be no question that the general sympathy—independently of all political considerations—was on the side of Elis, whose presidency was regarded in Hellas as part of the order of nature, and was strongly adverse to the Arcadian intruders supporting with arms the antiquated rights of Pisa. But it was far worse when the Arcadians began to make free use of the sacred treasures of Olympia, for the purpose of paying the federal army. This was an act of sacrilegious spoliation which could not be defended, and it was disastrous to the Arcadian Federation.

*Spoliation
of the
Olympian
treasures.*

*Divisions
in the
Arcadian
League.*

It was inevitable that, when the first impulse of enthusiasm which drove the Arcadian cities to unite together had spent itself, the old jealousies would emerge again and imperil the Pan-Arcadian idea. So it was that the two neighbours, Mantinea and Tegea, whose common action had been the chief cause of the federal union, began to resume something of their traditional enmity. The scandal of Olympia gave Mantinea, who was jealous of Megalopolis also, a fair opportunity to secede from the League, which had put itself so signally in the wrong. This step necessarily involved the consequence that Mantinea would definitely range herself with the other camp in the Peloponnesus—with Sparta, Elis, and Achaea. And thus the traditional policies of Mantinea and Tegea were reversed. Tegea, the support of Sparta, had become the life and soul of the anti-Spartan movement; Mantinea, the state which Sparta had uncited, was now Sparta's support. Though the Arcadian Assembly resented and tried to punish the protest of Mantinea, the pressure of public opinion induced it to forbid any further plundering of the Olympian sanctuaries.

When this resolution was taken, the weakness of the Arcadian League was exhibited. There was no money in the federal treasury to pay the standing army, and without this army it would be impossible for Arcadia to maintain herself

against enemies on three sides—not to speak of disaffected Mantinea—without the protection of Thebes. But there was a strong feeling throughout the country against a Theban protectorate, and a large number of wealthy Arcadians, who shared this feeling, proposed to solve the difficulty by enrolling themselves in the corps of *Eparittoi* and serving without pay. Occupying this position they would be able to dictate the policy of the League. There was little doubt that the predominance of this party would soon bring Arcadia into alliance with Sparta, which was no longer dangerous to Arcadian liberty. But such a political revolution would be fatal to Theban influence, which rested on the antagonism between Arcadia and Sparta; it might even imperil the independence of Messenia.

To meet this danger of an alliance between Sparta and Arcadia, Thebes was constrained to send a fourth expedition into the Peloponnese. It was imperative to support the Theban party in Arcadia. Both parties alike were probably satisfied with the resolution of the Assembly to make peace with Elis and acknowledge her rights at Olympia. Each city swore to the peace. At Tegea the solemnity of the oath led to an incident. Arcadians from other places had gathered together for the occasion, which they celebrated by feasting and merriment. The commander of the Boeotian garrison ordered the gates to be shut and arrested the leaders of the anti-Theban party. Most of the Mantineans present had left the town at an early hour, but there were a few among the prisoners; and the energetic protests of Mantinea frightened the faint-hearted harmost into releasing all his prisoners and excusing his act by a false explanation. The *coup* had doubtless been planned long beforehand, and consent obtained from the highest quarter. Epaminondas, when complaint was made at Thebes, approved the act of arrest, and condemned the act of release. At the same time he declared to the Arcadian League that it had no right to make peace with Elis without consulting Thebes. "We will march into Arcadia," he said, "and assist our friends."

The threat was seriously meant, and the friends and enemies of Thebes prepared for war. Athens, the ally of both Sparta and Arcadia, could now fulfil without difficulty the

*Fourth
Theban
invasion of
the Peloponnese,
362 B.C.*

*The
quintuple
alliance,
summer,
362 B.C.*

double obligation, by supporting those Arcadians who were on Sparta's side. The common dread of Thebes was reflected in the quintuple alliance which Athens (with her allies), Mantinea, Elis, Achaia, and Phlius formed for the sake of mutual protection.¹ Part of the text of this treaty is preserved to us on fragments of one of the original marble copies. It is worthy of remark that the Mantineans, who seem to have been the only Arcadian community that entirely dissociated itself from the government at Megalopolis, appear in the treaty as "the Arcadians"—thus claiming to be the true representatives of their country.

The Boeotian force in its full strength, accompanied by all the allies of central Greece who were pledged to follow Thebes into the field, went forth under Epaminondas to bring back the unruly Peloponnesians under Boeotian control. The Phocians alone refused to go; the terms of the alliance which bound them to Boeotia obliged them to bear aid only if Boeotia were itself attacked. When he reached Nemea, Epaminondas halted his army, with the hope of intercepting the forces which Athens prepared to send to her allies. But the Athenian forces came not and he advanced to Tegea, the chief centre of Theban influence in the peninsula, which he had appointed as the meeting-place for all his allies—Arcadian, Argive, and Messenian. His enemies were also gathering to the rival city of Mantinea, and a Spartan army under old Agesilaus was expected there. Epaminondas marched to attack them before the Spartans and Athenians arrived, but found their position too strong and retired to his camp in Tegea. Learning that Agesilaus had already set out, he determined to strike a second blow at Sparta. He would have found the place as unprotected as "a nest of young birds," if his plan had not been thwarted by a Cretan runner who carried the news to Agesilaus. The king immediately returned on his steps; and when Epaminondas after a night's march reached Sparta, he found it prepared and defended. Baffled in this project by an incalculable chance, Epaminondas promptly resolved to attempt another surprise. He foresaw that the army at Mantinea would immediately march to the

*March of
Epami-
nondas
to Sparta.*

¹ The preliminaries must have been arranged in the early summer, but the date of the final treaty was later than the battle of Mantinea.

rescue of Sparta, and that Mantinea would consequently be inadequately guarded. His camp at Tegea commanded the direct road from Mantinea to Sparta, so that the enemy would be obliged to march by the longer western road. Moving rapidly he reached Tegea, where he rested his hoplites, but he sent on his cavalry to surprise Mantinea. The army had departed, as he calculated, and the people were out in the fields, busy with the harvest. But in the same hour in which the Theban horse approached from the south, a body of Athenian cavalry had reached the city. They had not yet eaten or drunk, but they rode forth and drove the assailants back. The conflict between the two weary troops of horsemen was sharp, and was marked by the death of Gryllus, the son of Xenophon the historian.

*He returns
to Tegea.*

*Cavalry
battle at
Mantinea.*

The allied army, learning that Sparta was no longer in danger, soon returned from its fruitless excursion to its former post, now reinforced by both the Spartan and the Athenian contingents. Foiled in his two projects of surprise, Epaminondas was obliged to attack the united enemy at Mantinea; the difficulty of supplying his army with provisions, and the anxiety of his allies to return home as soon as possible, rendered it imperative to bring the campaign to a swift decision. The enemy occupied the narrow part of the plain, south of Mantinea, where ridges of the opposite mountains approach each other; the object of Epaminondas was to sweep them out of his way and take the city. But instead of marching straight for the gap, he adopted a strategical movement which puzzled his antagonists. He led his army north-westwards to a point in the hills near the modern Tripolitza, and then moved a short distance along the skirts of the mountain so as to approach the right wing of the foe. He then halted and formed in battle array. The enemy were deceived by the indirect advance. Seeing him march obliquely towards the hills, they concluded that he would not attack that day, and even when he changed his direction and advanced towards them, persisted in their false opinion.

Epaminondas adopted the same tactics by which he had won at Leuctra. On the left he placed the Boeotian hoplites, under his own immediate command, in a deep column, destined to break through the right wing of the enemy before

*Disposi-
tions of
Epami-
nondas.*

the rest of the armies could come to blows. The oblique advance, besides its chief purpose of deceiving the foe, had the further advantage of assisting the peculiar tactics of the general; for, when he formed his line, there was obviously a far greater distance between his right and the hostile left than that which divided his left from the hostile right. The Mantineans (since it was their territory) had the place of honour on the extremity of the enemy's right wing, and the Lacedaemonians were next them; the Athenians were on the farthest left; and both wings were protected by squadrons of horse. Epaminondas placed his own cavalry in deep column in front of the deep column of infantry. But there was one danger against which he had to guard. When the Boeotian column charged, the Athenian left might wheel round and attack it on the unshielded side—a movement which could be executed owing to the distance dividing them from his own right. To meet this danger, he sent a body of horse and foot to occupy a rising ground, out in the plain, considerably in advance of his line; this body could attack the Athenians in the rear if they tried such a movement.

With an extraordinary lack of perception, the Lacedaemonians and their allies witnessed these manœuvres without understanding their drift; and it was not until Epaminondas began to advance in full march against them, that they realised his meaning and rushed tumultuously to arms. All fell out as he designed. His cavalry routed their cavalry, and the force of his wedge of hoplites, led by himself, broke through the opposing array and put the Lacedaemonians to flight. It is remarkable indeed how the tactical lesson of Leuctra seems to have been lost on the Spartans. The men of Achaea and Elis and the rest, when they saw the flight of the right wing, wavered before they came into collision with their own opponents. It is not quite clear what happened, but here again Mantinea seems to repeat Leuctra: the charge of the Theban left decided the battle; with the exception of cavalry engagements, there was but little and desultory fighting along the rest of the line.

It was a great Theban victory, and yet a chance determined that this victory should be the deathblow to the supremacy of Thebes. As he pursued the retreating foe, at

the head of his Thebans, Epaminondas received a mortal thrust from a spear. When the news spread through the field, the pursuit was stayed and the effect of the victory was undone; the troops fell back like beaten men. "So striking a proof has hardly ever been rendered, on the part of soldiers towards their general, of devoted and absorbing sentiment. All the hopes of this army, composed of such diverse elements, were centred in Epaminondas; all their confidence of success, all their security against defeat, were derived from the idea of acting under his orders; all their power, even of striking down a defeated enemy, appeared to vanish when those orders were withdrawn."¹ And there was no one to take his place. In his dying moments, before the point of the fatal spear was extracted, Epaminondas asked for Iolaidas and Daiphantus, whom he destined as his successors. He was told that they were slain. "Then," he said, "make peace with the enemy." Peace was made on condition that things should remain as they were; Megalopolis and Messenia were recognised—the abiding results of Theban policy. In this peace Sparta would not acquiesce; she still persisted in refusing to recognise the independence of Messenia, but her allies would not listen to her protests.

*Death of
Epami-
nondas.*

The military genius of Epaminondas, the qualities of mind and character which distinguished him among his countrymen, and the actual work which he accomplished in the deliverance of Messenia and the support of Arcadia, must not be suffered to obscure the fact that his political faculty was mediocre. What could be done by the energy and ability of a general, or by the discretion of a magistrate, that he did; but he failed to solve the fundamental problems which demanded solution at the hands of a statesman who aimed at making his country great. It was necessary to create an efficient machinery, acting on definite principles, for conducting the foreign affairs of Boeotia—like the machinery which existed at Sparta. This was the only possible substitute for brains, which were not plentiful in Boeotia; Epaminondas could not hope to communicate any part of his own virtue to his successors. It was necessary to decide whether it was possible or desirable for Boeotia to enter into competition with Athens as a maritime

*The work
of Epami-
nondas.*

¹ Grote.

power. If the decision were affirmative, it was of capital importance to organise the navy on a sound financial foundation. There is no sign that Epaminondas grappled with the problems of government and finance; his voyage to the Propontis was an experiment which had no results. Nor does he seem to have taken steps to secure Boeotia on the side of her dangerous Phocian neighbours, though he had the insight to organise anew the Amphictionic League and make it an instrument of Theban policy. Above all, he did not succeed in accomplishing the first thing needful, the welding together of Boeotia into a real national unity. He aspired to expand Boeotia into an empire; the worst of it was that no one had come before him to make it into a nation. That which mythical Lycurgus and Theseus had done for Sparta and Athens had never been done for Thebes by any of her numerous heroes. Epaminondas seems to have attempted to unify Boeotia; if he had known how to build such an unity on solid foundations, he might have bestowed on Thebes a future of glory which he would not have lived to see. But his ambition—for his country, not for himself—was too impatient and imaginative. The ardour of his patriotism impelled him to enter upon paths of policy which his countrymen felt no resistless impulse to pursue; the successes of Thebes were achieved by his brains, not by her force. He bore his country aloft on the wings of his genius, but did not impart to her frame the principle of that soaring motion; so that when the shaft pierced the heart of her sustainer, she sank to the earth, never to rise again. Epaminondas was a great general; he was not a great statesman.

SECT. 6. THE LAST EXPEDITION OF AGESILAUS

To no one in Greece can the supremacy of Thebes have come as a sorer trial than to the Spartan king Agesilaus. He who had once dreamed of conquering Persia had lived to see his own inviolable land twice trodden by an invader, his own city quake twice before an enemy at her doors. But he had at least the consolation of outliving the triumph of the Theban, and seeing the brief supremacy pass away. The death of

Epaminondas, of which he could not mistake the significance, did not restore Messenia or give Sparta any immediate power; but, Epaminondas dead and Arcadia spent, Sparta had now a prospect of regaining something of her old influence. With her own diminished population she could do little; it would be necessary to follow the general example and take mercenary forces into her pay; but to do this a well-filled treasury was needful. Accordingly we find Sparta, as well as Athens, busy beyond the sea, taking part in the troubles which in these years agitated the western portion of the Persian kingdom, and lending help to the satraps and dynasts who were rebelling against the Great King. The object of Athens was territory, the object of Sparta was money. While Timotheus had been engaged in winning Samos, 365 B.C. Agesilaus had visited Asia Minor and done his utmost in support of Ariobarzanes—for the sake of gold. And after the battle of Mantinea, he again went forth in a guise which differed little from that of a mercenary in foreign service.

The borders of Western Asia, from the Hellespont to the Nile, were in revolt against the Great King. The expedition of Cyrus was only the first of a series of rebellions which troubled the reign of Artaxerxes. We have seen how Cyprus rebelled and was subjugated, but Egypt still defied the Persian power, and its success set a bad example to the satraps of the adjoining countries. The Athenian general Chabrias had helped the Egyptians to strengthen their country by a scientific system of defences, but he was recalled to Athens after the King's Peace; and the Athenian whom we next find in Egypt is fighting on the other side—the free-lance Iphicrates, giving sound military advice to the Persian commander, which the Persian commander does not follow. Soon after this the satraps of Asia began to rebel—first in Cappadocia, then in Phrygia, then successively in Ionia, Caria, and Lydia—and the insurrection extended to Phoenicia and Syria. A scheme of co-operation was formed between the satraps and the Egyptian king Tachos, who had recently come to the throne, and Sparta decided to support this coalition. Athens held aloof, but Chabrias went once more to Egypt as a volunteer.

*Agésilas
in Egypt,
361 B.C.*

At the head of a thousand men, and accompanied by thirty Spartans as advisers, Agésilas set sail for the Nile. It is said that the small figure, the lame leg, and the plain dress of the experienced old soldier made a bad impression in Egypt; in any case he was not given the supreme command of the army as he expected. When a sufficient force was gathered, Tachos, accompanied by Agésilas and Chabrias, made an expedition to Phœnicia, to act there against the Persian troops; but they were obliged to return almost immediately in consequence of a revolt against Tachos, headed by his cousin Nektanebos. The Spartan king, who considered that he had been slighted by Tachos, supported the rival; and Tachos fled to Susa and made his peace with the Persian monarch. Another competitor then arose, but was defeated by the effective support which Agésilas gave to Nektanebos. In consequence of these struggles for the Egyptian throne nothing was done against Persia, and the great coalition signally failed. Ariobarzanes of Phrygia, the friend of Timotheus, was betrayed and crucified; another satrap was murdered; the rest made their submission to their king. Within a year Western Asia was entirely subject to Artaxerxes.

*Death of
Agésilas,
winter,
361-0
B.C. (?).*

But Sparta had won from the futile project what she really wanted. She might shelter her dignity under the pretext that she had gone forth to punish the Persian king for recognising the independence of Messenia, but every one knew that her motive was to replenish her treasury. Nektanebos presented her with 230 talents, in return for the support of Agésilas. It was the last service the old king was destined to perform for his country. Death carried him off—he was eighty-four years old—at the Harbour of Menelaus on the way to Cyrene, and his embalmed body was sent home to Sparta.

Though not in any sense a great man, though not in the same rank as Lysander, Agésilas had been for forty years a prominent figure in Greece. There is something melancholy about his career. He could remember the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War; he had seen the triumph of Sparta, and had conducted her policy during a great part of thirty years of supremacy; and then, as an old man, he shared

in her humiliation. He had begun by dreaming of the conquest of Persia; he had been forced to abandon such dreams; and he had translated his ardour into a bitter hatred against an Hellenic city. It is tragic to see him, at the age of eighty-three, going forth against Persia once more, not now for conquest or glory, but to earn by any and every means the money needed by his indigent country.

CHAPTER V

THE SYRACUSAN EMPIRE AND THE STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE

*Parallel
between
struggle of
western
Greeks
with
Carthage
and
eastern
Greeks
with
Persia.*

WE have seen how the war in Greece, in its last stage, after the collapse of the Sicilian expedition, ceased to be a mere domestic struggle among Greek states and became part of the greater struggle between Greek and barbarian. We have now to see how the strife of Greek and barbarian was renewed at the same moment in the west. It is indeed remarkable how these two episodes in the great conflict between Asia and Europe run parallel though separate courses in the fifth century. The victory of Himera, which beat back the Carthaginian invader from the shores of Sicily, was won in the same year which saw the repulsion of the Persian invader from the shores of Attica. After these triumphs of Hellas, both Persia and Carthage had long lain quiescent, and left the Greek cities of east and west to live undisturbed at war or in peace among themselves. It was not till the mightiest city of eastern and the mightiest city of western Hellas came to blows and wore one another out in the conflict, that the barbarian foes, discerning the propitious hour, once more made their voices heard in the Grecian world. Sicily with an exhausted Syracuse, the Aegean with an exhausted Athens, invited Carthage and Persia alike to make an attempt to enlarge their borders at the expense of the Greek.

SECT. 1. CARTHAGINIAN DESTRUCTION OF SELINUS AND HIMERA

*Results of
the Syra-
cusan
victory.*

After she had achieved the repulse and utter confusion of Athens, it might have seemed likely that Syracuse would

succeed in founding a Sicilian empire. Her first task would be to reduce Catane and Naxos; and, when this was done, the other cities, including luxurious Acragas, would hardly be able to resist. This prospect was disappointed by the intervention of a foreign enemy. But, though the victory of Syracuse over Athens did not lead to a Syracusan empire, as the victory of Athens over Persia had led to an Athenian empire, it was followed, as in the case of Athens, by a further advance in the development of democracy. Had Hermocrates remained at Syracuse, in possession of his old influence, a change in this direction would hardly have come to pass. But he was appointed to command the auxiliary fleet which Syracuse sent to Sparta's help in the Aegean; and, when he had gone, the democratic mood of the citizens, excited by their recent efforts, vented itself in a decree pronouncing the deposition and banishment of Hermocrates. This was the work of his political opponent Diocles, who was a thorough-going democrat. Diocles bore the same name as a far earlier lawgiver—belonging to the same class and age as Charondas and Zaleucus—who had drawn up the laws on which the Syracusan constitution rested. The accidental identity of name led in subsequent ages to a confusion, and we find later writers ascribing to the democratic reformer, who rose into prominence now, the legislation of his ancient namesake. In his popular innovations Diocles borrowed ideas from the enemy whom his country had just overthrown. The Athenian use of lot in the appointment of magistrates was adopted. Hitherto the generals were also the presidents of the sovereign assembly and had the unrestricted power of dismissing it at discretion. Diocles seems to have taken away this political function from the generals, and assigned the presidency of the assembly to the new magistrates, but with much smaller powers. The presidents, as we shall presently see, were able only to fine a speaker who was out of order; they could not silence him or break up the assembly.

Such was the position of the greatest Sicilian city—a full-blown democracy, but without her chief citizen to whom above all others she owed the deliverance from her danger—when the island was exposed for the second time to a Carthaginian invasion. The occasion of the war was the same which had

*Advance in
democracy.*

Diocles :

his reforms.

*Pretext
and cause
of the war
with
Carthage.*

brought about the Athenian invasion—the feud between Selinus and Segesta concerning some fields on their common frontier. In both cases, the dispute of these towns was a pretext, not the deeper cause. As Athens thought that the time had come for extending her commerce in the west, so Carthage deemed that the day had dawned for asserting anew her power in Sicily; and there were those who had not let fade the memory of the humiliation endured at Himera seventy years before and longed to take a late revenge.

410 B.C.

Segesta, with no Athens to protect her now, ceded the disputed lands; but Selinus went on to exact further cessions, and the Elymian city appealed to Carthage. One of the two shophets or judges in that republic was Hannibal, the grandson of Hamilcar, who had been slain at Himera. The desire of vengeance, long deferred, dominated Hannibal, now almost an old man; and his influence persuaded the Senate to accept Segesta's offer to become a Carthaginian dependency in return for Carthaginian help. A grand expedition was fitted out, and Hannibal was named commander. Sixty warships were got ready, 1500 transports, 100,000 foot, 4000 horse. The fleet was not intended to take a part in the offensive warfare; it was stationed at Motya to be a protection for Phoenician Sicily and a security in case of discomfiture. The army landed at Lilybaeum and marched straight to Selinus. This city had never been besieged before within the memory of its folk; immunity had made it secure; the fortifications had been neglected. The Selinuntines were engaged in building a temple of vast proportions to Apollo, or perhaps Olympian Zeus, when they were brought face to face with the sudden danger from Carthage. The house of the god was never completed; of the "pillars of the giants" which were to support the massive roof some stand in their places on the eastern hill, but the great drums and the capitals of others must be looked for, some miles away, in the quarries from which they were hewn, left there when the Carthaginian destroyer came. There was no time to repair adequately the walls of the acropolis, on the central hill. Hannibal surrounded it and a breach was soon made; but the place was not in the foe's hands for nine days, owing to the stubborn resistance which the inhabitants were able to offer in the

*Second
Cartha-
ginian
invasion,
409 B.C.
Siege of
Selinus.*

narrow streets. The Siceliot sister cities were not prompt in aid; Syracuse promised to come to the rescue, and sent a force under Diocles, which arrived too late. Selinus was the first Siceliot city which was stormed and sacked by the barbarian; she was not to be the last. The people were slaughtered without mercy; only some women and children who took refuge in the temples were spared (not from any respect of the holy places) and carried into bondage. Those who escaped from the sack fled to Acragas. Thus Selinus fell, after a brief life of two centuries and a half.

Destruction of Selinus.

Hannibal had now done the work which Carthage had given him to do; but he had still to do the work which he had imposed upon himself. His real motive, in undertaking the public duty of the Selinuntine war, was to carry out the private duty of ancestral vengeance. Against Selinus he had no personal grudge, and there he did not carry the work of destruction further than military considerations required. The buildings on the western hill, where he had pitched his camp, suffered much; but the injuries sustained by the temples on the acropolis and on the eastern hill are due, not to Hannibal's army, but to the earthquakes of later ages. It was to be different in the case of the city which he now turned to attack. At Selinus, Hannibal was merely the general of Carthage; at Himera, he was the grandson of Hamilcar.

Hannibal as avenger.

Hannibal designed to capture Himera by his land forces alone; and in this absence of a Carthaginian fleet Hannibal's siege of Himera differs from Hamilcar's. The Greeks of Sicily were now bestirring themselves; the terrible fate of one of their chief cities had aroused them to a sense of their peril. The naval power which was supporting Sparta in the Aegean had been long ago recalled; and a force of 5000, including 3000 Syracusans, under Diocles, came to the relief of Himera. This city had time to prepare for the danger which she must have foreseen. But the besiegers, by means of mines, opened a breach in the wall; and, although they were repelled and the defenders made a successful sally, the prospects of Himera looked black, when the fleet of 25 ships, which had returned from the Aegean, appeared in front of the city. Hannibal saved the situation by a stratagem. He spread abroad a report that he intended to march on Syracuse and take it

Siege of Himera.

unprepared. Diocles, thoroughly deceived, decided to return home and carry off the citizens of Himera, leaving the empty town to its fate. He induced half the population to embark in the ships, which, as soon as they had set the passengers in safety at Messana, were to return for the rest. Diocles and his army departed in haste, not even waiting to ask Hannibal for the dead bodies of those who had fallen in fight outside the walls; and for this neglect he was greatly blamed. When Hannibal saw that half his prey had escaped him, he pressed the siege more vehemently, determined to force an entry before the ships returned. The fate of thousands, the vengeance of Hannibal, might turn on the event of a few minutes.

*Third day
of the siege.*

On the third day, the vessels of safety hove in sight of the straining eyes of the Himeraeans. It seemed that Hannibal was to be balked of his revenge. But the gods of Canaan prevailed in that hour of suspense. Before the ships of rescue could reach the harbour, the Spanish troops of Hannibal burst through the breach, and the town was in the hands of the avenger. On the spot where Hamilcar, according to the story, had offered up his life to the gods of his country, a solemn rite was held; 3000 men, who had survived the first indiscriminate slaughter, were sacrificed with torture to appease his shade. Himera, the offending city, was swept utterly out of the world and its place knew it no more.

Having thus accomplished his duty to his country and his gods, Hannibal returned triumphant to Africa. The position which Carthage won in Sicily by this year's work, and her new policy of activity there, are reflected in the coinage of Segesta and Panormus. The transformation of Segesta into a Carthaginian dependency was displayed by the fact that she ceased to coin her own money. But Carthage also showed that she intended to keep a firmer hand on her Phoenician dependencies. These cities had hitherto paid homage to Hellenic influences by adopting a coinage of Hellenic character, with Hellenic inscriptions. This coinage now comes to an end at Panormus, and is replaced by a coinage, of Greek type indeed, but with a Phoenician legend—the word *Ziz*. The change seems to have been made just before the invasion, and it was significant of an anti-Greek movement. But the curious thing is that Himera—the city which was to be one of the

*New
coinage at
Panormus
with
mysterious
legend—
Ziz.*

first victims of the new policy heralded in this numismatic reform—abandoned her old coinage with the cock, and struck a new coinage with a sea-horse, on the Punic model of Panormus. Are we to suppose that Himera, aware of the peril which menaced her, thought to avert it by a timely approach of friendship to her Phoenician neighbour, and that this coinage was part of a policy of Punicism, intended to be only temporary?

*Change in
Himera's
coinage.*

Syracuse, although she had sought to do something for Selinus and had done something for Himera, felt no call to come forward as a champion against the new aggressive policy of Carthage. It was reserved for one of her citizens to attempt on his private responsibility the warfare which she declined to undertake against the Phoenician foe. The exile Hermocrates returned to Sicily, enriched by the gifts of the satrap Pharnabazus. His own city refused to withdraw the sentence of banishment, for a man of his views and abilities seemed dangerous to the democratic constitution. Hermocrates then resolved to earn his recall by performing conspicuous services to the Hellenic cause in Sicily,—by winning back the Greek territory which the Phoenician had taken, by carrying Greek arms into Phoenician territory itself. He had built five triremes, he had hired 1000 mercenaries, and he was joined by 1000 Himeræan fugitives. With these he marched to the spot where Selinus had once been, and made the place a centre for a "crusade" against the Phoenician. He repaired the fortifications of the acropolis on the central hill; and the remains of the well-built wall betray, by the capitals of columns used in the building, the circumstances of its erection. The adventure prospered; the band of Hermocrates soon increased to 6000, and he was able to devastate the lands of Motya and Panormus, and to drive back the forces which came out to meet him. In the same way he ravaged the territory of Solus and the now Carthaginian Segesta. These successes of Hermocrates were of greater significance than the actual injury dealt to the enemy. He had done what had not been done before (since the days of Dorieus¹); he had broken into the precincts of Phoenician Sicily, and set an example to many subsequent leaders.

*Return of
Hermo-
crates,
408 B.C.*

*His
warfare
against the
Phoenician
cities.
Selinus
reoccupied.*

¹ See above, vol. i. p. 220.

Hermocrates at Himera, 407 B.C.:

he sends the bones of the dead to Syracuse;

he breaks into Syracuse and is slain.

(Dionysius.)

Hermocrates was bent, above all things, on regaining his own country. Diocles and his political opponents were still powerful in the city, and able to hinder the revulsion of feeling which his successes caused from having any practical effect. Accordingly he made another attempt to soften the hearts of his fellow-citizens. It was a well-calculated move. He marched to the ruins of Himera, collected the unburied bones of the soldiers of Diocles which Diocles had neglected, and sent them on waggons to Syracuse, himself remaining as an exile outside the Syracusan borders. He hoped to awaken the religious sentiment of the citizens in his own favour and at the same time to turn it against his rival. The bones were received and Diocles was banished; but Hermocrates was not recalled. Having failed to compass his restoration by persuasion, the exile resolved to compass it by force; and he was encouraged by his numerous partisans in Syracuse. He was admitted with a small band at the gate of Achradina, and posted himself in the adjacent agora waiting for the rest of his forces to arrive. But they tarried too long; the people, learning that Hermocrates was in the city, rushed to the market-place; the small band was soon overcome and Hermocrates was slain. The Syracusans in these days were inspired with an instinctive rather than well-founded dread of tyranny; and this dread was stronger than admiration for Hermocrates. Their instinct was right; tyranny was approaching, but *he* was not the man. They little guessed that their future master was an obscure follower of Hermocrates, who was wounded that day in the agora and left for dead.

SECT. 2. CARTHAGINIAN CONQUEST OF ACRAGAS

The private warfare of Hermocrates in western Sicily had naturally provoked the wrath of the Carthaginians. Embassies passed between Carthage and Syracuse, Carthage regarding Syracuse as answerable for the acts of a Syracusan. But diplomacy was merely a matter of form; the African republic had resolved to make all Greek Sicily subject to her sway. She made ready another great expedition—as great as if not a greater armament than that which had been sent against Selinus; and at the same time she took the novel step of

founding a colony on Sicilian soil. If Hermocrates had lived, Himera might have been partially restored like Selinus; but the destroyers of Himera now founded a city in the neighbourhood which was to take Himera's place. On the hill above the "hot baths of the Nymphs," whereof Pindar sings, the Carthaginian colonists built their town. But it was not

Foundation of Carthaginian colony at Thermae, 407 B.C. (Termini.)




FIG. 3.

destined to retain its Phoenician character. The Greek strangers who were admitted to dwell in it transformed it before long into a Greek city; the *Thermae* of Himera preserved the memories of Himera, and the people were known as Thermites or Himeraeans indifferently.

Acragas, the city which faces Carthage, was the first object of attack to the invaders who now came to conquer and enslave all Greek Sicily. Since the days of Theron, Acragas had held aloof from all struggles in the island and was now at

the height of her prosperity. But she was enervated by peace and luxury, and, when the day of trial came, she was found wanting. How far her citizens were prepared to endure the hardships of military life may be inferred from the law—passed with a view to the present peril—that none of the men in the watch-towers should have more than a mattress, two pillows, and a quilt. Such were the austerities of the men of Acragas. But at least they paid homage to the different discipline of Sparta. They invited Dexippus, a Spartan who was then at Gela, to undertake the conduct of the defence. A body of Campanian mercenaries was hired; and they could rely on the assistance of their old rivals the Syracusans, as well as of the other Greek cities, who were fully conscious that the peril of Acragas was their own. And Acragas herself behaved well. Notwithstanding her habits of ease, and her old practice of holding aloof, she refused the tempting offer of the invader that she should now purchase immunity by remaining neutral. She was true to her own race; she might remain indifferent when it was a struggle between Dorian and Ionian, but it was another case when the whole of Sicilian Hellas was threatened by the Phœnician.

406 B.C.

*Siege of
Acragas.*

The army of Carthage was again under the command of Hannibal, who felt that he was too old for the work, and was assisted by his cousin Himilco. They pitched their main camp on the right bank of the river Hypsas, south-west of the city, and stationed some forces in another small camp on the eastern hill, beyond the river Acragas, to act against Greek aids coming from the east. The point of attack was the part of the western wall close to the chief western gate. But the ground, though lower here, was still difficult for a besieger, and Hannibal determined to raise an immense causeway from which the wall could be more effectively attacked. The tombs of the neighbouring necropolis supplied stones for the work; but, as the tomb of Theron was being broken down, it was shaken by a thunderbolt, and the seers advised that it must be spared. Then a pestilence broke out in the Carthaginian camp, and carried off Hannibal himself. It seemed that the gods were wroth and demanded a victim; Himilco lit the fires of Moloch and sacrificed a boy. The causeway was then completed, but no further injury was done to the sepulchres.

*The
causeway.**Plague.
Death of
Hannibal.*

An army was already on its way to the relief of Acragas — 30,000 foot and 5000 horse from Syracuse, Gela, and Camarina. When they approached the city they were met by the forces which had been placed for this purpose on the eastern hill; a battle was fought, a victory gained, and the Greek army took possession of the lesser Carthaginian camp. Meanwhile the routed barbarians fled for refuge to the main camp, and their flight lay along the road beneath the southern wall of the city. There was a general cry to sally forth and cut them off; but the generals refused. The moment was lost; but presently the people, yielding to an impulse which the generals could not resist, went forth from the eastern gates to meet their victorious allies. A strange scene followed. A tumultuous assembly was held outside the walls; the Acragantine commanders were accused of failing in their duty; and, when they essayed to defend themselves, the fury of the people burst out and four generals were stoned to death. The direction of the defence seems now to have been shared by Dexippus within the city and Daphnaeus, the commander of the Syracusan troops, without. Though the hostile camp was too strong to be attacked, the prospect looked favourable for Acragas. The Punic army, diminished though it had been by the plague, was sore bestead for lack of supplies, and it seemed certain that hunger and mutinous soldiers would soon force Himilco to raise the siege. But he learned that provision-ships were coming from Syracuse to Acragas; he sent in haste for the Carthaginian vessels at Panormus and Motya, put out to sea with forty triremes, and intercepted the supplies. This not only saved his leaguer, but even reversed the situation. The besieged city now began to suffer from scarcity of food. And as soon as supplies began to fail, the weak point in the position of the Acragantines was displayed. They had found it needful to rely on mercenaries, and hirelings were not likely to serve long when rations ran short. The Campanians were easily induced to transfer their services from Acragas to Carthage. But this was not all. It was commonly believed that Dexippus—like most Spartans abroad, incapable of resisting a bribe—received fifteen talents from Himilco and induced the Italiot and Siceliot allies to desert Acragas as a sinking ship. But, whatever the conduct of Dexippus may

*Relief
army
arrives.*

*Acragan-
tines
murder
their
generals.*

*Mercen-
aries and
allies desert
Acragas.*

have been, the discredit of this desertion cannot rest entirely with him.

*Flight of
the Acra-
gantines.*

406-5 B.C.

The defence, which had been maintained for eight months with foreign aid, was now left to the men of Acragas alone. They showed at once that they were shaped of different stuff from the men of Selinus. Overcome with despair, they resolved to save their lives and abandon their city and their gods. Such a resolution, taken by the people of a great city, is unique in Greek history. It did not befit the men who had rejected the overtures of Hannibal, but it was what we might expect from the men who murdered their generals. They marched forth at night, men, women, and children, without let or hindrance from the foe; "they were compelled to leave, for the barbarians to pillage, those things which made their lives happy."¹ The old and sick could not set out on the long journey to Gela, the place of refuge, and were left behind; some too remained who chose to perish at Acragas rather than live in another place. The army of Himilco entered the city in the morning and sacked it, slaying all whom they found, and despoiling and burning the temples. The great house of Olympian Zeus—the largest Greek temple in Europe—was still unfinished, and the sack of Himilco decided that it should never be completed. But Acragas was not to be destroyed like Selinus; it was intended to be a Carthaginian city in a Carthaginian Sicily. Himilco made the place his winter-quarters; Gela would be the next object of his attack, when the spring came round.

SECT. 3. RISE OF DIONYSIUS

For the catastrophe of Acragas the chief blame was laid upon the Syracusan generals, who deserted her in the critical hour. The Acragantines were not slow to make them responsible for their own unheroic flight. At Syracuse itself there was a feeling that these generals were hardly the men to meet the great jeopardy in which Sicily now stood; and there was one man who saw in this jeopardy the opportunity of his own ambition. It was Dionysius, a man of obscure birth, who had been a clerk in a public office. He had been a partisan

¹ Diodorus, from Philistus.

of Hermocrates, by whose side he had stood in the last fatal fray, and had been wounded and left for dead. Recently he had marked himself out by his energy and bravery before the walls of Acragas. He saw the incompetence of the democratic government of his city; he saw that in the present peril it might be overthrown, and he determined to overthrow it. An assembly was held to consider the situation. Dionysius arose and in a violent harangue accused the generals of treachery. His language was intended to stir up the hearers to fury; he called upon the people to rise up themselves and destroy the traitors without trial. His violence transgressed the constitutional rules of the assembly, but the presidents had no power to bridle him; they imposed a fine—the only resource they had; but a wealthy friend, Philistus the historian, came forward and paid the fine, bidding the speaker go on, for as often as a fine was imposed he would pay it. Dionysius carried his point. The generals were deposed, and a new board was appointed, of which Dionysius was one. This was only the first step on the road which was to lead to the *tyrannis*. His next success was to procure the recall of the partisans of Hermocrates who had been condemned to exile; these old comrades might be useful to him in his designs. At the same time he sought to discredit his colleagues; he kept entirely apart from them and spread reports that they were disloyal to Syracuse. Presently he openly accused them, and the people elected him sole general with sovereign powers to meet the instant danger. This office, held before, as we have reason to think, by Gelon and Hiero, did not set him above the laws; nor was the office illegal, though extraordinary; it may be compared to the Roman dictatorship. But it was the second step to the tyranny. The next step, as history taught him—the story of Pisistratus, for instance—was to procure a bodyguard. The Assembly at Syracuse, which had perhaps begun to repent already of having placed so much power in the hands of one man, would certainly not have granted such an instrument of tyranny. But Dionysius was ingenious; he saw that the thing might be done elsewhere. He ordered the Syracusan army to march to Leontini, which, it will be remembered, was now a Syracusan dependency. He encamped near the town, and during the night a rumour

comes forward for the first time; his violent speech.

Philistus the historian.

The despot's progress; (1) Dionysius general;

(2) Dionysius στρατηγός αὐτοκράτωρ;

(3) gets a
bodyguard. and was spread abroad that the general's life had been attempted and he had been compelled to seek refuge in the acropolis. An assembly was held next day, nominally an assembly of Syracusan citizens, which, when Dionysius laid bare the designs of his enemies, voted him a bodyguard of 600; this he soon increased to 1000; and he had won over the mercenaries to his cause.

These were the three steps in the "despot's progress" which rendered Dionysius lord and master of Syracuse. His intrigues had won him first a generalship, then sole generalship with unlimited military powers, and finally a bodyguard. Syracuse, unwilling and embarrassed, submitted with evident chagrin, but was dominated by the double dread of the mercenaries and the Carthaginians. The democracy of course was not formally overthrown; Dionysius held no office that upset the constitution. Things went on as at Athens under Pisistratus; the Assembly met and passed decrees and elected magistrates.

*Siege of
Gela,
405 B.C.*

The justification of the power of Dionysius lay in the need of an able champion to oppose Carthage, and his partisans represented him as a second Gelon. But, though Dionysius was in later years to prove himself among the chief champions of Hellenic Sicily against the Punic power, his conduct at this crisis did not fulfil the hopes of those who thought to compare him with the hero of Himera. The Carthaginians were already encamped at Gela. Their first act was to remove a colossal brazen statue of Apollo which stood, looking over the sea, on the hill to the west of the city. The Geloans defended their walls with courage and zeal, and when Dionysius arrived with an army of Italiots and Siceliots, and a fleet of fifty ironclad ships to co-operate, it seemed as if Gela would escape the doom of Acragas. An excellent plan was arranged for a combined attack on the Carthaginian camp, which lay on the west side of the town. The plan failed, because the concert was not accurately carried out. The Siceliots who were to assault the eastern side of the camp arrived late on the spot, and found the enemy, who had already repelled the attack of the Italiots and the fleet on the southern and western sides, free to meet them in full force. This hitch in the execution of the plan was hardly a mere blunder. Dionysius with his

*Plan of
concerted
attack;
its failure.*

mercenaries had undertaken to issue from the western gate of Gela and drive away the besiegers, while the rest of his army were attacking the camp. It seems, however, that Dionysius took no part in the fighting, and alleged that he was retarded by difficulties in crossing the town from the eastern to the western gate. We shall probably do no injustice to Dionysius if we conclude that it was through his dispositions that the Siceliots failed to act in concert with the Italiots. The action which he took after the defeat shows that he was half-hearted in the work. He decided in a private council, as Diocles had decided at Himera, that the defence must be abandoned and the whole people of Gela removed. At the first watch of the night he sent the multitude forth from the city, and followed himself at midnight. His way to Syracuse led by Camarina, and here too Dionysius ruled that the whole people must forsake their home. The road to Syracuse was full of the crowds of helpless fugitives from the two cities.

*Strange
conduct of
Dionysius.*

*Gela and
Camarina
dispeopled.*

It was generally thought that these strange proceedings of Dionysius were carried out in collusion with the barbarians; that he had deliberately betrayed to them Gela, which might have been defended, Camarina, which had not yet been attacked. The Italiot allies showed not their disgust only, but their apprehension that the war was practically over, by marching immediately home. The horsemen of Syracuse seized the occasion for a desperate attempt to subvert the new tyrant. They rode rapidly to the city, plundered the house of Dionysius, and maltreated his wife although she was the daughter of Hermocrates. When Dionysius heard the news, he hastened to Syracuse with a small force. He reached the gate of Achradina by night and, being refused admittance, burned it down with a fire of reeds supplied by the neighbouring marsh. In the market-place he easily overmastered a handful of opponents; the remnant fled to Aetna, which now became, "in a better cause, what Eleusis was to Athens after the overthrow of the Thirty."¹

*Revolt of
the horse-
men,*

*put down
by
Dionysius.
Aetna.*

In what concerns the charge that the Syracusan tyrant had a secret understanding with Carthage, there is a strong case against him; the events are scarcely intelligible on any other view. But it was no more than a temporary dis-

*Policy of
Dionysius.*

¹ Freeman.

loyalty to the cause of Hellas and Europe, for which he was hereafter to do great feats. His first motive was the selfish motive of a tyrant. He wanted time to lay stable foundations for his still precarious power at Syracuse; and he judged that it would be a strong support to obtain a recognition of his power from the Carthaginian republic. The Punicism of the lord of Syracuse was not more unscrupulous than the Medism of the ephors of Sparta, to which it is the western parallel.

*The treaty
between
Carthage
and
Dionysius,
405 B.C.
Cartha-
ginian
Sicily:*

The treaty, which was now agreed upon between Himilco and Dionysius, was drawn up on the basis of *uti possidetis*. Each party retained what it actually held at the time. Syracuse acknowledged Carthage as mistress of all the Greek states on the northern and southern coasts, and also of the Sican communities. Acragas, what was left of Selinus, Gela, and Camarina, were all to be henceforward under Punic sway; and, on the north coast, Carthage had advanced her frontier to include the territory of Himera in which she had planted her first colony.¹ But all these cities were not to hold the same relation to their mistress. Acragas and Selinus, like Thermae, were subjects in the full sense of the word; but Gela and Camarina were to be only tributary and unwall'd cities. The Elymian towns are not mentioned; but we have seen how Segesta became a subject of Carthage by her own act, and we can hardly doubt that Eryx was forced into the same condition.

*subjects
and tribu-
taries.*

*Independ-
ent states:
position of
Leontini.*

The terms of the treaty provided for the independence of the Sicel communities and of the city of Messina. But it provided also for the independence of Leontini, and this was a point in which it departed from the basis *uti possidetis*, Leontini being a dependency of Syracuse. It was clearly a provision extorted from Dionysius, and intended by Himilco to be a source of embarrassment to Syracuse. On the other hand, as a counter-concession, nothing was said about the dependence of Naxos or Catane, so that Syracuse might have a free hand to deal with her old enemies, without fear of violating the treaty. Such was the new arrangement of the map of Sicily at the end of the second Carthaginian invasion. An accidental consequence of that invasion had been to establish Dionysius as tyrant of Syracuse. This consequence enabled

¹ In the treaty, the old Phoenician colonies, sisters of Carthage, seem to have been spoken of as if they were her own daughter colonies.

Himilco to bring his work to a conclusion more easily and quickly than he had hoped; he could not foresee that the undoing of his work would be the ultimate result. The Carthaginians guaranteed to maintain the rule of Dionysius, *Clause of guaranty.* who was soon to prove one of their most powerful foes. For Dionysius this guaranty, "the Syracusans shall be subject to Dionysius," was the most important clause in the treaty,—some suppose that it was a secret clause. It was for the sake of this recognition and the implied promise of support that he stooped to betray Sicilian Hellas. We shall see how he redeemed this unscrupulous act of expediency by creating the most powerful Hellenic state in the Europe of his day.

SECT. 4. FIRST YEARS OF DIONYSIUS

For half a century after the fall of Athens it seemed likely that the destinies of Europe would be decided by a Greek city in the western Mediterranean. Under her new lord Dionysius, Syracuse had become a great power, a greater power than any that had yet arisen in Europe. In strength and dominion, in influence and promise, she outstripped all the cities of the mother-country; and, in a general survey of the Mediterranean coasts, she stands out clearly as the leading European power. *Great position of Syracuse.* The Greek states to which the Persian king sent down his Peace were now flanked on either side by two great powers, and a political prophet might have been tempted to foretell that the communities of old Greece were doomed to perish between the monarchies of Susa and Syracuse, which threatened their freedom on the east and on the west. Those who were tempted to spy into the future might have conjectured that the ultimate conflict with Persia was reserved for a Sicilian conqueror, who should one day extend his dominion over eastern Greece and the Aegean and, as autocrat of Europe, oppose the autocrat of Asia. Though this was not to be, though the expansion of Sicily was arrested, and the power which was to subdue Asia arose on the borders of Old Greece, yet we shall see that in many ways the monarchy of Dionysius foreshadowed the monarchy of Philip and Alexander. It is in Sicily, not in Old Greece, that we see the first signs of a

new epoch, in which large states are to take the place of small, and monarchy is to supersede free institutions.

The state-craft of Dionysius, and the secret of his long reign.

The tyranny of Dionysius lasted for thirty-eight years, till the end of his life. All that time it was maintained by force; all that time it was recognised as a violation of the constitution and an outrage on the freedom of the people. The forms of the constitution were still maintained; the folk still met and voted in the Assembly; and Dionysius was either annually re-elected, or permanently appointed, general with absolute powers. But all this was pure form; his position was a fact, which had no constitutional name, and which made the constitution of none effect. And it was by compulsion and not of their freewill that the mass of the citizens continued to obey him; his bodyguard of foreign mercenaries was the support of his power. More than one attempt was made to throw off the yoke, but his craft and energy defeated the most determined efforts of his adversaries. Yet the unusual ability of Dionysius would not have availed, more than the spearmen who were ever within call, to extend his unlawful reign to a length which a tyrant's reign seldom reached, if he had not discovered and laid to heart what may be called a secret of tyranny. While he did cruel and oppressive deeds for political purposes, he never committed outrages to gratify personal desires of his own. He scrupulously avoided all those acts of private insolence which have brought the reigns of Greek tyrants into such ill repute. Many a despot had fallen by the hand of fathers or lovers, whom the dishonour of their nearest and dearest had spurred to the pursuit of vengeance at the risk of their own lives. Dionysius eschewed this mistake; his crimes and his enemies were political. When his son seduced a married woman, the discreet tyrant rebuked him. "It is well for you to chide me," said the young man, "but you had not a tyrant for your father." "And if you go on doing this sort of thing," retorted Dionysius, "you will not have a tyrant for your son." This notable moderation of Dionysius in private life was perhaps the chief cause of the duration of his tyranny; beyond the common motive of patriotism, men had no burning personal wrongs to spur them to encounter the danger of driving a dagger to the despot's heart. But, besides this discretion which made his govern-

ment tolerable, his successes abroad counted for something, and it was more than once borne in on Syracuse that his rule was necessary to protect her against her enemies. And we shall see that Dionysius was fully conscious that it conduced to his own safety that there should be enemies against whom she needed a protector.

The first concern of the new tyrant was to establish himself in a stronghold. As we have seen, the acropolis of Syracuse was not, as in other cities, the hill, but the Island; and it was the Island which Dionysius made his fortress. He built a turreted wall on the north side of the isthmus so as to bar the Island off from the mainland, and he built two castles, one close to, if not on, the isthmus, the other at the southern point of the island. Whoever entered the Island from Achradina had to pass under five successive gates; and no one was allowed to dwell within the island fortress except those whom Dionysius regarded as his own friends and supporters. The scheme of fortifications took in the Lesser Harbour, which, with its new docks, became under Dionysius the chief arsenal of the Syracusan naval power. The mouth of this port was entirely closed by a mole, the galleys passing in and out through a gate which was only wide enough to allow one to pass at a time.

Besides these defences of stone, Dionysius strengthened his position by dealing rich rewards to confirm in their allegiance his friends and hirelings, and by forming a class of New Citizens out of enfranchised slaves. The forfeited estates of his enemies supplied him with the means of carrying out both these acts of policy.

It was not long before he had an unwelcome occasion of putting to the test both the walls of his fortress and the hearts of his followers. The most favourable opportunity for any attempt to overthrow the tyrant was when the Syracusan army was in the field. When the citizens had arms in their hands and were formed in military ranks, the word of a patriot could more easily kindle them to action than when they were engaged in their peaceable occupations at home. Dionysius led out the army against Herbessus, one of the cities of the Sicels. Mutinous talk passed from mouth to mouth, and the disaffected citizens slew one of the tyrant's officers who rebuked them. Then the mutiny broke out loud and free. Dionysius hastened to Syracuse and shut himself up in

Fortification of the Island.

Revolt against Dionysius.

*Siege of
Syracuse,
403 B.C.*

*Revolt
suppressed
by Cam-
panian
help.*

*Entella ;
first
Italian
settlement
in Sicily.*

his fastness; the revolted citizens followed and laid siege to their own city. They sent messages to Messana and Rhegium, asking these cities to help them to win back their freedom; and a succour of eighty triremes came in answer to their help. By sea and land they pressed Dionysius so hard in his island fortress that his case seemed desperate, and some of his mercenary troops went over to the enemy. Dionysius called a council of his most trusted friends. Some bade him flee on a swift horse; others counselled him to stay till he was driven out. Heloris used a phrase which became famous: "Sovereign power is a fair winding-sheet." Dionysius followed the counsel of those who bade him stay, but he resorted to a piece of craft which was more successful than he could well have hoped. He entered into negotiation with his besiegers and asked for permission to quit Syracuse with his own goods. They willingly agreed to the proposal and allowed him five triremes, and they were so convinced of his good faith that they dismissed a company of cavalry which had come to their aid from Aetna. But, meanwhile, Dionysius had sent a secret message to the Campanian mercenaries of Carthage, who had been left by Himilco in some part of Sicily. Twelve hundred in number, they were permitted to come to the help of the tyrant, whose lordship had been recognised and guaranteed by Carthage in the recent treaty. The besiegers, thinking that the struggle was over, had half broken up their leaguer, and were in complete disorder; the Campanians occupied the hills of Epipolæ without resistance; Dionysius sallied forth, and decisively, though without much shedding of blood, defeated the rebels in the neighbourhood of the theatre—a quarter of the city which we now find for the first time called *Neapolis*. Dionysius used his victory mildly. Many of the rebels fled to Aetna and refused to return to Syracuse, but those who returned were received kindly and not punished. As for the Campanians, to whom Dionysius owed his rescue, they did not return to the service of Carthage, but made a new home in the west of Sicily, in the Sican town of Entella. They induced the inhabitants to admit them as new citizens, and one night they arose and slew all the men and married the women. Thus was formed the first Italian settlement on Sicilian soil.

When the revolt broke out, we saw Dionysius aiming an attack at a Sicel city. The first step in the expansion of Syracusan power, which was the object of the tyrant's ambition, was the reduction of the Greek cities of the eastern coast and the neighbouring Sicel towns. The Sicel towns were putting on more and more of an Hellenic character, and the reign of Dionysius marks a stage of progress in their Hellenization. We get a glimpse of political parties striving in Sicel just as in Greek cities; and we find Henna ruled by a tyrant of Greek name. To attack the Sicels was indeed a breach of the treaty with Carthage; but for the present Dionysius gained no success which obliged Carthage to intervene. He entered Henna indeed, but only to overthrow the local tyrant and leave the inhabitants to enjoy their freedom; he attacked Herbita, but his attack was fruitless. With the Greek cities which stood in his way he was more successful. First of all he captured Aetna, the refuge of Syracusan exiles and malcontents, and these dangerous enemies dispersed we know not whither. Then he turned against the two Ionian cities, Catane and Naxos. In fear of such an attack Catane had taken the precaution of allying herself with Syracuse's former vassal, Leontini. The sole record we have of this alliance is a beautiful little silver coin, with a laurelled head of Apollo and the names of the two cities—one of an issue which was struck in token of the treaty. But the support of Leontini did not avail. Both Catane and Naxos were won by gold, not by the sword; traitors opened the gates to the Dorian tyrant.

*Designs of
Dionysius
on the
Sicels.*

*Aetna
taken.*

*Alliance of
Catane and
Leontini,
404 B.C.*

*Catane and
Naxos
taken by
treachery.*

In his treatment of these cities Dionysius showed himself in his worst light. All the inhabitants of Naxos and Catane alike were sold as slaves in the Syracusan slave-market. Catane was given over to Campanian mercenaries as a dwelling-place, and thus became the second Italian town in Sicily. But the city of Naxos, the most ancient of all the Siceliot cities, was not even given to a stranger to dwell in; the walls and the houses were destroyed; the territory was bestowed upon the Sicels, the descendants of the original possessors; and a small settlement near the old site barely maintained the memory of the name. Dionysius was one of the ablest champions of Greek Sicily against the Phoenician; yet here he appears in the character of a destroyer, dealing to

*Fate of
Catane and
Naxos.*

*(The
Naxian
Neapolis.)*

*Recovery
of Leontini.*

Greek civilisation blows such as we should expect only from the Phœnician foe. It is certain indeed that the severity of the doom which he meted out to these cities was meant to serve a purpose, for wanton severity was never practised by Dionysius. We may suspect what that purpose was. The conquest of Naxos and Catane was of far less consequence to the lord of Syracuse than the recovery of Leontini. To win back this lost Syracusan possession was the first object of all in the eyes of a Syracusan ruler. Dionysius had already called upon the Leontines to surrender, but in vain; and perhaps he thought that the siege of the place would be long and tedious. When he pronounced the doom of Naxos and Catane, he was in truth besieging Leontini with most effectual engines; and when he approached with his army and summoned the Leontines to migrate to Syracuse and become his subjects under the name of Syracusan citizens, they did not hesitate to prefer that unwelcome change to the risk of faring still worse than the folks of Catane and Naxos.

If we glance over Sicily at this moment, it comes upon us as a shock to discover that of all the cities of Greek Sicily which enjoyed sovereign powers at the time of the Athenian invasion, there remained now not a single independent community, outside Syracuse herself, with the exception of Messana, who still kept watch upon her strait. The Carthaginians and Dionysius between them had swept all away.

*Fortifica-
tion of
Epipolæ.*

The recovery of the Leontine territory was a success which probably gratified the Syracusans as well as their master. It was indeed a direct defiance of Carthage, for the treaty had guaranteed the independence of Leontini. But Dionysius knew that a struggle with Carthage must come, and was not unwilling that it should come soon. He determined to equip Syracuse against all enemies who should come against her, and we next find him engaged in fortifying the city on an enormous scale. The fortification of the Island had been intended mainly for his own safety against domestic enemies; but the works which he now undertook were for the city and not for the tyrant. The Athenian siege of Syracuse taught him lessons which he had taken to heart. It taught him that the commanding heights of Epipolæ must not be left for an enemy to seize, and therefore that it must become part of the

Syracusan city, enclosed within the circuit of the Syracusan wall. It taught too the decisive importance of the western corner at Euryalos, and the necessity of constructing a strong fortress at that point, which has been called "the key of Epipolae and of all Syracuse." The walls were built in an incredibly short space of time by 60,000 freemen, under the supervision of Dionysius himself. He seems to have inspired the citizens with the ambition of making their city the most strongly fortified place in the whole Greek world. The northern wall, from Tycha to Euryalos, a distance of more than three miles, was completed in twenty days. The striking ruins of the massive castle of Euryalos, with its curious underground chambers, are a memorial indeed of a tyrant's rule; but they are more than that; they are a monument of Greek Syracuse at the period of her greatest might—when she became for a moment the greatest power in Europe.

It was no small thing to have carried out this enormous system of fortifications which made Syracuse the vastest of all Greek cities; but Dionysius showed his surpassing energy and resource in preparing for offensive as well as for defensive warfare. In military innovations he is the forerunner of the great Macedonians and the originator of the methods which they employed. He first thought out and taught how the heterogeneous parts of a military armament—the army and the navy, the cavalry and the infantry, the heavy and the light troops—might be closely and systematically co-ordinated so as to act as if they were a single organic body. He first introduced, his engineers first invented, the catapult, which, if it did not revolutionise warfare in general like the discovery of gunpowder, certainly revolutionised siege-warfare, and introduced a new element into military operations. An engine which hurled a stone of two or three hundredweight for a distance of two or three hundred yards was extremely formidable in close quarters. In naval warfare he was also an innovator; he constructed ships of huger size than had ever been built before, with five banks of oars. He largely increased the fleet, which, counting vessels of both the larger and the smaller kind, seems to have numbered about 300 galleys.

*Improvements of
Dionysius
in warfare.*

SECT. 5. FIRST PUNIC WAR OF DIONYSIUS

*First
Punic
War,
398-7 B.C.*

When his preparations were complete, Dionysius went forth to do what no Greek leader in Sicily had ever done before. He went forth not merely to deliver Greek cities from Phoenician rule, but to conquer Phoenician Sicily itself. Marching along the south coast he was hailed as a deliverer by the Greek dependencies of Carthage, both by the tributary towns Gela and Camarina, and the subject town of Acragas. Thermae on the northern coast likewise joined him, and of the two Elymian towns, Eryx received his overtures, while Segesta remained faithful to her Punic mistress. At the head of a host, which for a Greek army seems immense—80,000 foot, it is said, and more than 3000 horse—Dionysius advanced to test his new siege engines on the walls of Motya. This city, which now for the first and for the last time becomes the centre of a memorable episode in history, was, like the original Syracuse, an island town; but, though joined to the mainland by a causeway, the town did not like Syracuse spread to the mainland. It was surrounded entirely by a wall, of which traces still remain; and the bay in which it lay was protected on the sea-side by a long spit of land. The men of Motya were determined to withstand the invader to the uttermost, and the first measure they took was to insulate themselves completely by breaking down the causeway which bound them to the mainland. Thus they hoped that Dionysius would have to trust entirely to his ships to conduct the siege, and that he would be unable to make use of his artillery.


*Siege of
Motya.*

The mole.

But they knew not the enterprise of Dionysius nor the excellence of his engineer department. The tyrant was determined to assault the city from solid ground, and to bring his terrible engines close to the walls. He set the crews of his ships to the work of building a mole far greater than the causeway which the Motyans had destroyed; the ships themselves, which he did not destine to play any part in the business of the siege, he drew up on the northern coast of the bay. The mole of Dionysius at Motya forestalls a more famous mole which we shall hereafter see erected by a greater than

*(Compare
the mole of
Alexander
the Great
at Tyre.)*





Dionysius at another Phoenician island town, older and more illustrious than Motya.

While the mole was being built, Dionysius made expeditions in the neighbourhood. He won over the Sicans from their Carthaginian allegiance, and he laid siege to Elymian Segesta and Campanian Entella. Both these cities repelled his attacks, and leaving them under blockade he returned to Motya when the solid bridge was completed. In the meantime, Carthage was preparing an effort to rescue the menaced city. She tried to cause a diversion by sending a few galleys to Syracuse, and some damage was caused to ships that were lying in the Great Harbour. But Dionysius was not to be diverted from his enterprise; he had doubtless foreseen such an attempt to lure him away, and knew that there was no real danger. Himilco, the Carthaginian admiral, seeing that Dionysius was immovable, sailed with a large force to Motya and entered the bay, with the purpose of destroying the Syracusan fleet, which was drawn up on the shore. Dionysius seems to have been taken by surprise. For whatever reason, he made no attempt to launch his galleys; he merely placed archers and slingers on those ships which would be first attacked. But he brought his army round to the peninsula which forms the western side of the bay, and on the shores of this strip of land he placed his new engines. The catapults hurled deadly volleys of stones, upon Himilco's ships, and the novelty of these crushing missiles, which they were quite unprepared to meet, utterly disconcerted the Punic sailors, and the Carthaginians retreated. Then Dionysius, who was no less ready to treat earth as water than to turn sea into land, laid wooden rollers across the neck of land which formed the northern side of the bay, and hauled his whole fleet into the open sea. But Himilco did not tarry to give him battle there; he went back to Carthage, and the men of Motya were left unaided to abide their fate.

As the site of the island city required a special road of approach, so its architecture demanded a special device of assault. Since the space in the city was limited, its wealthy inhabitants had to seek dwelling-room by raising high towers into the air; and to attack these towers Dionysius constructed (The sieg towers of corresponding height, with six storeys, which he moved up near the walls on wheels. These wooden *belfries*, ^{helepoleis.})

as they were called in the Middle Ages, were not a new invention, but they had never perhaps been built to such a height before, and it is not till the Macedonian age, which Dionysius in so many ways foreshadows, that they came into common use. It was a strange sight to see the battle waged in mid-air. The defenders of the stone towers had one advantage: they were able to damage some of the wooden towers of the enemy by lighted brands and pitch. But the arrangements of Dionysius were so well ordered that this device wrought little effect; and the Phoenicians could not stand on the wall which was swept by his catapults, while the rams battered it below. Presently a breach was made, and the struggle began in earnest. The Motyans had no thought of surrender; dauntless to the end they defended their streets and houses inch by inch. Missiles rained on the heads of the Greeks who thronged through, and each of the lofty houses had to be besieged like a miniature town. The wooden towers were wheeled within the walls; from their topmost storeys bridges were flung across to the upper storeys of the houses, and in the face of the desperate inhabitants the Greek soldiers rushed across these dizzy ways, often to be flung down into the street below. At night the combat ceased; both besiegers and besieged rested. The issue was indeed certain; for however bravely the Motyans might fight, they were far outnumbered. But day after day the fighting went on in the same way, and Motya was not taken. The losses on the Greek side were great, and Dionysius became impatient. Accordingly he planned a night assault, for which the Motyans did not look, and this was successful. By means of ladders a small band entered the part of the town which was still defended, and then admitted the rest of the army through a gate. There was a short and sharp struggle, which soon became a massacre. The Greeks had no thought of plunder, they thought only of vengeance. Now for the first time a Phoenician town had fallen into their hands, and they resolved to do to it as the Phoenicians had done to Greek cities. They remembered how Hannibal had dealt with Himera. At length Dionysius stayed the slaughter, which was not to his mind, since every corpse was a captive less to be sold. Then the victors turned to spoil the city, and its wealth was abandoned

*Capture of
Motya, and
massacre,
398 B.C.*

to them without any reserve. All the prisoners were sold into slavery, except some Greek mercenaries, whose treachery to the Hellenic cause was expiated by the death of crucifixion. A Sicel garrison was left in the captured city.

After this achievement, the like of which had not been wrought before in Sicilian history, Dionysius retired for the winter to Syracuse. Next spring he marched forth again to press the siege of Segesta, which was still under blockade. In the meantime the fall of Motya had awakened Carthage into action; she saw that she must bestir herself, if she was not to let her whole Sicilian dominion slip out of her hands.

*Second
campaign
of Diony-
sius, 397
B.C.*

Himilco was appointed shophet and entrusted with the work of saving Punic Sicily. He collected a force, which seems to have been at least as large as that which Dionysius had brought into the field, and set sail with sealed orders for Panormus. A small portion of the armament was sunk by Leptines, brother of Dionysius, who was in command of the Syracusan fleet; but the main part disembarked in safety. And then events happened in rapid succession, which are hard to explain.

*Cartha-
ginian
expedition
to Sicily,
397 B.C.*

Himilco first gains possession of Eryx by treason; then he marches to Motya and captures it; and when Motya is lost, Dionysius raises the siege of Segesta and returns to Syracuse.

*Himilco
takes Eryx
and Motya.*

The loss of Eryx could not be provided against; but it is hard to discern why Dionysius should have made no attempt to relieve Motya, whose capture had cost him so much the year before, or why he should have allowed the Carthaginian army to march from Panormus to Eryx and Motya without attempting to intercept it. He could not have pressed the siege of Segesta more effectually than by dealing a decided check to Himilco. Not knowing the exact circumstances, not knowing even the number of the two armies, we can hardly judge his action; but it may be suspected that Dionysius was by nature a man who did not care to risk a pitched battle unless the advantage were distinctly on his own side. It is to be remembered that he won nearly all his successes by sieges and surprises, by diplomacy and craft, and that the name of this great military innovator is not associated with a single famous battle in the open field. When he had once allowed Motya to be taken, his retreat is not surprising; for he had no base in the western part of the island, and we are told that his supplies

*End of
Motya.
Founda-
tion of
Lilybaeum
(Marsala).*

were failing. He had now lost all that he had won in the first campaign. Motya, however, was wiped out as a Phoenician city, though it was not to be a Greek or a Sicel stronghold. Himilco, instead of restoring the old colony, founded a new city hard by to take its place. On the promontory of the mainland which forms the south side of the Motyan bay arose the city of Lilybaeum, which was henceforward to be the great stronghold of Carthaginian power in the west of the island. The sea washed two sides of the town, and the walls of the other two sides were protected by enormous ditches cut in the rock. The history of Lilybaeum is the continuation of the history of Motya; but it was not destined to be taken either by a Greek or a Roman besieger.

*Himilco
takes and
destroys
Messana.*

Having driven the invader from Phoenician Sicily, and having laid the foundations of a new city, Himilco resolved to carry his arms into the lands of the enemy and to attack Syracuse itself. But he did not go directly against Syracuse. Before he attempted that mighty fortress, he would try the easier task of capturing Messana. The fall of this city would be a grievous blow to Hellas, and it would be no mean vengeance for the fall of Motya. The walls of Messana had been allowed to fall into decay, and the place was an easy prey for the Carthaginians; but the greater part of the inhabitants escaped into fortresses in the neighbouring hills. The Carthaginian general had to wreak his vengeance on the stones. He rased the walls and the edifices, and the work was done so well that no man, we are told, would have recognised the site.

*Founda-
tion of
Tauro-
menium.*

If the triumphant demolition of the Sicilian city which watched the strait was a sore blow to the Hellenic cause, Himilco sought at the same moment to deal another blow to that cause by the foundation of a new Sicilian city in another place. It was his policy to cultivate the friendship of the Sicels and to foment the dislike which they felt towards the lord of Syracuse. Dionysius too had sought to win influence over the native race, and we saw how he gave them the territory of Naxos. The Carthaginian general grasped at the idea of erecting a new town for these very Sicels of Naxos, on the heights of Taurus which rise above the old site. Such was the strange origin of the strong city of Tauromenion, with its two rock citadels, one of the fairest sites in Sicily. It was the

second foundation of Himilco in the same year; and both his foundations were destined signally to prosper. Lilybaeum became more famous than Motya, and Tauromenion has had a greater place in history than Naxos. As a founder of cities Himilco has a high title to fame; he was, like Dionysius, a creator as well as a destroyer. The creation of new cities and the destruction of old, by Greeks and Phoenicians alike, was a characteristic feature of this epoch.

Dionysius was preparing in the meantime to protect Syracuse. He committed the command of the fleet, which appears to have been now about 200 strong, to his brother Leptines; and fleet and army together moved northward to Catane. In the waters near the shore of Catane a naval battle was fought, and the Greek armament was defeated with great loss. It was indeed far outnumbered by the fleet of the Phoenicians, who also used their transport vessels as warships; but the cause of the disaster was the bad generalship of Leptines, who did not keep his ships together. The rout was witnessed by Dionysius from the shore, and it might have been retrieved by a victory on the land. Himilco and his army had not yet arrived on the scene, for an eruption of Aetna had made the direct road impassable and forced them to make a long detour. Dionysius again shrank from risking a battle, though the men of Sicily were eager to fight; he retreated to the walls of Syracuse. This city was the last bulwark of Greek Sicily, and with it the cause of Greek civilisation was in jeopardy. It was a moment at which the Siceliots might well sue for help from their fellow-Greeks beyond the sea. Dionysius dispatched messages to Italy, to Corinth, and to Sparta, imploring urgently for succour.

*Sea-fight at
Catane.*

*Retreat of
Dionysius.*

It was not long before the victorious Carthaginian fleet sailed into the Great Harbour, and the Carthaginian army encamped hard by, along the banks of the Anapus. The mass of the host encamped as well as it could in the swamp, but the general pitched his tent on the high ground of Polichna, within the precinct of the Olympian Zeus. This insult to the religion of Hellas was followed up by a more awful sacrilege, when Himilco pillaged the temple of Demeter and Kore on the southern slope of Epipolae. When the barbarians began to perish in the plague-stricken marsh, the pestilence was

*Punic
siege of
Syracuse.*

imputed to the divine vengeance for these acts of outrage. The besiegers must have sat for no brief space before the walls of Syracuse. The messengers of Dionysius had time to reach the Peloponnesus and return with succour—thirty ships under a Lacedaemonian admiral. Himilco had time to build three forts to protect his army and his fleet—one near his own quarters at Polichna, one at Dascon, on the western shore of the harbour, and one at Plemmyrion. After the arrival of the auxiliaries, the capture of a Punic corn-ship was the occasion of a small naval combat in the harbour; only a few of the Carthaginian ships were engaged, and the Syracusans were victorious.

*Feeling in
Syracuse
against the
tyrant.*

Within the town there was deep dissatisfaction with Dionysius and his conduct of the war, and the citizens thought that they might reckon on the sympathy of their Peloponnesian allies with an attempt to cast off the tyrant's yoke. At an assembly which the tyrant convened the feeling of dissatisfaction broke openly forth, and the lord of Syracuse could not only read in the faces but hear in the words of the citizens the depth of their hatred. But the movement of revolution was checked by the Peloponnesians, who said that their business was to help Dionysius against the Carthaginians, not to help the Syracusans against Dionysius. So the danger passed over, but the tyrant had a warning, and he put on winning manners and courted popularity.

*Plague in
Cartha-
ginian
camp.*

The deadly airs of the swamp, in the burning heat of summer, were doing their work. The army of Himilco was ravaged by pestilence; soon the soldiers fell so fast that they could not be buried. The hour had now come for the men of the city to complete the destruction which their fens had begun. It was just such a case as called forth the energy and craft of the ruler of Syracuse and showed him at his best. He devised his attack with great skill. Eighty galleys, under Leptines and the Spartan captain, were to attack the Carthaginian fleet, which was anchored off the shore of Dascon. He himself led the land forces, marching by a roundabout road on a moonless night, and suddenly appeared at dawn on the west side of the Punic camp. He ordered his horsemen and a thousand mercenaries to attack the camp here; but the horsemen had secret commands to abandon the hired

*Dionysius
attacks the
Cartha-
ginians.*

soldiers once they were in the thick of the fight, and ride rapidly round to the east of the camp, where the true attack was to be made. The attack on the west was only a feint, to distract the attention of the enemy from the other side; and for this purpose Dionysius sacrificed the lives of the hirelings whom he did not trust. The real attack on the east was made on the forts of Dascon and Polichna. Dascon was assailed by the horsemen along with a special force of triremes which had been sent across the bay; Dionysius himself went round to lead the attack on Polichna. The plan was carried out with perfect success. The thousand hirelings were cut to pieces, the forts were captured, and the victory on the land was crowned by the destruction of the Carthaginian fleet. The Syracusan galleys bore down upon the enemy, before they had time fully to man their vessels, much less to row well out to sea, and the beaks of the triremes crashed into defenceless timber. There was slaughter, but hardly a fight; and then the land troops, fresh from *their* victory, rushed down to the beach and set fire to the transports and all vessels which had not left the shore. A wild scene followed. A high wind propagated the flames; the cables were burnt asunder; and the bay of Dascon was filled with drifting fireships, while amid the waters despairing swimmers were making for the shore.

*Defeat of
Cartha-
ginians.*

Fate had indeed delivered the barbarians into the hands of the Greeks; and the Greeks were determined to wreak their vengeance to the uttermost and extirpate the destroyers of Messana. Dionysius had approved himself the successor of Gelon; the double victory of Dascon was worthy to be set beside the victory of Himera. But Dionysius was not capable of absolute sincerity in the part he played as the champion of Hellas; he could not act to the end as a Syracusan patriot with singleness of heart. This was the fatality of his position as a tyrant, conscious that his autocracy rested on unstable foundations. He fought against Carthage, but it was always with the resolve that the power of the Carthaginians should not be annihilated in Sicily. The Punic peril was a security for his tyranny, by making him necessary to Syracuse. The Syracusans must look to him as their protector against the ever-present barbarian foe. This was another secret of tyranny

*Double-
dealing of
Dionysius.*

*His policy
in regard
to Car-
thage.*

*Escape of
Himilco by
collusion of
Dionysius.*

discovered by Dionysius. The Punic subtlety of Himilco, enlightened by passages in the tyrant's past career, formed no doubt a shrewd idea of this side of his policy; the Carthaginian saw that his hope of safety lay in bargaining with Dionysius. Secret messages passed; and Dionysius agreed to allow Himilco along with all those who were Carthaginian citizens to sail away at night. In payment for this collusion he received three hundred talents. Dionysius recalled his reluctant army from their assaults on the camp, and left it in peace for three days. On the fourth night Himilco set sail with forty triremes, leaving his allies and his mercenaries to their fate. It was an act of desertion which was likely to repel mercenary soldiers from the Carthaginian service in the future; and this was doubtless foreseen by the crafty tyrant. But the squadron of fugitive triremes did not escape untouched. The noise of the oars as they sailed out of the Harbour was detected by the Corinthian allies, and they gave the alarm to Dionysius. But Dionysius was purposely slow in his preparations to pursue, and the impatient Corinthians sailed out without his orders and sank some of the hindmost of the Punic vessels. Having connived at the escape of Himilco, the tyrant was energetic in dealing with the remnant of Himilco's host. The Sicel allies had escaped to their own homes, and only the mercenaries were left. These were slain or made slaves, with the exception of a band of strong and valiant Iberians who were taken into the service of the tyrant.

Thus ended the first struggle of Dionysius with Carthage, and it ended in a complete triumph for the Greek cause. The dominion of the African city was now circumscribed within its old western corner; and the greater part of the rest of Sicily was subject, directly or indirectly, to the rule of the lord of Syracuse. Both from Greek and from barbarian Sicily, a famous city had been blotted out; but Motya had been revived in Lilybaeum, and Messana was soon to rise again upon her ruins.

SECT. 6. SECOND PUNIC WAR, AND SICEL CONQUESTS OF DIONYSIUS

The equivocal policy of Dionysius in his hostilities to Carthage was manifested clearly enough in the course which

he pursued after his great victory. It was the most favourable moment that had yet come in the struggle of centuries, for driving the barbarians out and making Sicily a Greek island from the eastern to the western shore. Carthage could not readily gather together such another armament as that which had been destroyed. No patriot leader who was devoted to the Greek cause heart and soul, with singleness of aim, would have failed to follow up the great success by an invasion of western Sicily. But the preservation of his own precarious despotism was the guiding principle of Dionysius; and he saw in the barbarian corner of the island a palladium of his power.

The next Punic War broke out five years later, and part of the meantime had been occupied by Dionysius in extending his power over the Sicels. He annexed to his dominion Morgantina, Cephaloedion, and Henna itself; he made treaties with the tyrants of Agyrion and Centuripa, and with other places. But among all the Sicel towns, that which it was most important for him to win was the new foundation of the Carthaginian on the heights of Taurus. He laid siege to Tauromenium in the depth of winter. Operations of war in the winter season are one of the features of the reign of Dionysius which separate it from the habits of older Greece and link it to the age of the Macedonian monarchy. The tyrant himself led his men on a wild and moonless night up the steep ascent to the town. One of the citadels was taken, and the assailants entered the place. But the Syracusan band was outnumbered and surrounded, six hundred were killed, and the rest were driven down the cliffs. Of these Dionysius was one; he reached the bottom barely alive, after that precipitous descent.

Sicel conquests of Dionysius (between 396 and 393 B.C.)

Unsuccessful assault on Tauromenium.

In the course of the extension of his power on the northern coast, Dionysius had advanced to the limits of the Phoenician corner, and had won possession, through domestic treachery, of Solus, the most easterly of the three Phoenician cities. Of the circumstances we know nothing, but the conquest would seem to have been rather a piece of luck than part of any deliberate plan of aggression on the part of the Greek tyrant. No treaty appears to have been concluded between Carthage and Syracuse after the defeat of Himilco, so that the capture of Solus was not a violation of peace, but only an occasion for

Conquest of Solus.

the reawakening of hostilities which had been permitted to sleep by tacit consent. At all events it must have had something to do with the renewal of the war,—a renewal for which our records assign no causes.

*Second
Punic
War,
392 B.C.*

At the opening of the second war we find a Carthaginian general commanding the Phœnician forces of the island, but without any troops, so far as we know, from Africa. The general was Mago, who in the previous war had been commander of the fleet. His army was doubtless considerably inferior to the forces which Dionysius could muster; certain it is that on this occasion Dionysius did not hesitate to give him battle and did not fail to defeat him. Carthage saw that she must make a more vigorous effort, and she gave Mago a large army—80,000 men, it is said,—to retrieve his ill-success.

*Victory of
Dionysius.*

*League of
Dionysius
with
Agyris.*

To meet the invader, Dionysius entered into a close league with the strongest Sicel power in the land, his fellow-tyrant Agyris of Agrium. This is the special feature of the second Punic War: the cause of Europe is upheld by a federation of the two European powers of the island, Sicel and Greek. The Carthaginian army advanced into Sicel territory, seeking to win the Sicel towns. But Agyris and his men waged a most effectual manner of warfare, cutting off all the foraging parties of the enemy and thus starving them by degrees. This they were able to do from their knowledge of their native hills. But it seems that the Syracusans were dissatisfied with this slow method, which was thoroughly to the taste of Dionysius. What happened is not clear; but we learn that the Syracusans marched away from the camp, and that Dionysius replaced them by arming the slaves. Then the Greeks and the Sicels must have won some unrecorded success, or the Carthaginian host must have already been terribly depleted by the want of food; for we next find Mago suing for peace.

*Terms of
the Peace.*

This peace, although it is said to have been based on the treaty which Dionysius had made twelve years before, was in truth altogether different; for the parts of the two powers were reversed. All the Greek communities of Sicily were now placed under the direct or indirect power of Syracuse. The Carthaginian power was confined to the western corner. Nothing is said of Solus; it must have been now handed over to Carthage, if Mago had not already recovered it by arms.

But the most striking provision of the treaty is that which placed "the Sicels" under the rule of Dionysius. Nothing is said of Agyrum, and we are almost driven to wonder whether there was here any treachery to Agyris, of whom we hear nothing further. But there was a special clause touching Tauromenium; and acting on this clause Dionysius immediately took possession of the town, expelled the Sicels, and established in the fortress one of those mercenary settlements which were characteristic of his age. Such was the end of the two Punic wars, which were in truth rather but a single war broken by an interval of quiescence.

*Dionysius
wins
Tauromenium.*

SECT. 7. THE EMPIRE OF DIONYSIUS

Having made himself master of all Greek Sicily, the lord of Syracuse began to extend the compass of his ambition beyond the bounds of the island. He began to plan the conquest of Greek Italy. Hitherto the Sicilian cities, though they had constant dealings with the colonies of the Italian mainland, had never sought there, or anywhere out of their own island, a field for conquest or aggression. The restriction of Siceliot ambition to Sicilian territory was the other side of the doctrine preached by Hermocrates that the Siceliots should not allow Greeks from beyond the sea to interfere in the affairs of Sicily. We are reminded of the policy which has been followed on a greater scale by the United States on the American continent. Here, as in other things, Dionysius was an innovator; he set the example of enterprises of conquest beyond the sea. Into the enterprise of Italian conquest he was naturally led on by his dealings with the fellow-cities of the strait, Messina and Rhegium.

For Messina was a city once more; it had been rebuilt by Dionysius himself. He settled in it colonists from Locri and Medma in Italy, and 600 Messenians from old Greece, who had been wandering about homeless since Sparta had driven them from Naupactus. But this favour to the Messenians displeased the Spartans, and as Dionysius clave to the friendship of Sparta he yielded to their protests. He removed the exiles from Messina, but he made for them a secure though less illustrious home. He founded the city of Tyndaris on a

*Messina
restored
396 B.C.
(Messen-
ians driven
from Nau-
pactus,
400-1 B.C.)
Founda-
tion of
Tyndaris
by
Dionysius,
395 B.C.*

high hill to the west of Mylae, and fortified it strongly; the walls and towers, which still remain, are a good specimen of the fortifications of Dionysius.

*Founda-
tion of
Mylae,
394 B.C.*

The restoration of Messana and the foundation of Tyndaris were no pleasant sight to the Ionian city across the strait; these new cities seemed to Rhegium a Syracusan menace. The men of Rhegium sought to make a counter-move by founding a city themselves between Tyndaris and Messana. They gathered together the exiles from Catane and Naxos and settled them on the peninsula of Mylae; but the settlement lasted only for a moment; almost immediately the town of Mylae was captured by its neighbours of Messana, and the exiles were driven out to resume their wanderings.

*Rhegium
besieged,
391 B.C.*

Apart from his political hostility to Rhegium, Dionysius is said to have borne it a private grudge. He had asked the men of Rhegium to give him one of their maidens to wife, and they had answered that they would give him none but the hangman's daughter. Locri, Rhegium's neighbour, then granted him the request which Rhegium refused; Locri was his faithful ally; and now, when the conclusion of peace with Carthage left him free to pursue his Italian designs, it was Locri that he made his base of operations. The first object was to capture Rhegium; its position on the strait dictated this, apart from all motives of revenge or hatred. Accordingly starting from Locri with army and fleet, he laid siege to Rhegium by land and sea. But the confederate cities of the Italian coast came to the assistance of a member of their league; the Italiot armament worsted the fleet of Dionysius in or near the strait, and Dionysius escaped with difficulty to the opposite coast.

*Naval
defeat of
Dionysius.*

*Alliance of
Dionysius
with the
Lucan-
ians: joint
operations,
390 B.C.*

Rhegium was thus relieved, and Dionysius now directed his hostilities against the Italiot federation. He made an alliance with the Lucanians, to the intent that they and he should carry on war in common against the Italiot cities, they by land and he by sea. In accordance with this treaty, the Lucanians invaded the land of Thurii. The men of Thurii retorted by invading Lucania in considerable force; but they sustained a crushing defeat at the hands of the barbarians.

*Thurians
defeated by
Lucan-
ians.*

Most of the Thurians were slain, but some escaped to the shore and swam out to ships which they descried coasting along. By a curious chance, the ships were the fleet of

Syracuse, and Leptines, the tyrant's brother, was once more the commander. He received the fugitives, and did more; he landed and ransomed them from the Lucanians. He did even more than this; he arranged an armistice between the Lucanians and the Italiots. In acting thus, he clearly went beyond his powers; he had been sent to co-operate with the Lucanians against the Italiots, and he had no right to conclude an armistice in such circumstances, without consulting his brother. It is not surprising that Dionysius deposed him from the command.

Leptines concludes an armistice and is deposed.

In the following year Dionysius took the field himself. He opened the campaign by laying siege to Caulonia, the northern neighbour of Locri. The Italiots, under the active lead of Croton, collected an army of 15,000 foot and 2000 horse, and entrusted the command to Helōris, a brave exile of Syracuse, who burned with hatred against the tyrant who had banished him. The federal army marched forth from Croton to relieve Caulonia, and when Dionysius learned of its approach, he decided to go forth to meet it; for his own forces, 20,000 foot and 3000 horse, were considerably superior. Luck favoured him. Near the river Elleporus which flows into the sea between Caulonia and Croton, the tyrant heard that the enemy were encamped within a distance of five miles, and he drew up his men in battle array. Helōris, less well informed, rode forward in front of his main army, with a company of 500 men, and suddenly found himself in the presence of the Syracusan host. He did not quail or flee. Sending back a message to hasten the rest of his army, he and his little band stood firm against the onset of the invaders. Helōris fell himself, and the main army, coming up company by company, in haste and disorder, was easily routed by Dionysius. Ten thousand fugitives escaped to a high hill, but it was a poor hill of refuge, for there was no spring of water and they could not hold out. The next morning they besought Dionysius, who kept watch around the hill throughout the night, to set them free for a ransom. Dionysius refused; he would accept only unreserved surrender. But he was cruel only to grant them a greater mercy than they could themselves have dared to ask. When they came down the hill, Dionysius himself told their number with a wand as they filed past him, and

Dionysius besieges Caulonia, 389 B.C.

Battle of the Elleporus, 389 B.C.

Dionysius' politic act of mercy.

each man deemed that his doom would be bondage if not death. But Dionysius let them all depart, without even exacting a ransom. This act of mercy, which was notable as compared not only with other acts of the tyrant, but with the ordinary practice of the age, produced a great sensation. There is no reason for imputing it to a magnanimous impulse ;

*His treaties
with the
Italiot
cities.*

it was a deliberate act of policy. Dionysius did not wish to be generous, but he wished to be regarded as generous and win over the Italiot cities. For this purpose he made up his mind to sacrifice 10,000 ransoms. His wisdom was soon approved. The communities to which the captives belonged gratefully voted him golden crowns, and made separate treaties with him. In this way he accomplished his purpose ; with Rhegium, Caulonia, and Hipponion he still remained at war, but these states were now isolated and the league was broken up. Rhegium bought off his hostilities for the time by surrendering its fleet. Caulonia was captured and abolished,

*Sub-
mission of
Rhegium :
capture of
Caulonia,
389 B.C.*

*Capture of
Hippon-
ion, 388
B.C.*

and its territory given to Locri ; Hipponion was likewise taken and destroyed ; but the peoples of both these cities were transplanted to Syracuse and became Syracusan citizens.

*Capture of
Rhegium,
387 B.C.*

But Dionysius had not yet finished with Rhegium. He created a pretext for renewing hostilities and he laid siege to the city. The men of Rhegium had now no friends to help them, but, under their general Phyton, whom the tyrant vainly endeavoured to bribe, they held out for ten months, and were reduced to surrender in the end by starvation. Dionysius accepted ransoms for those who could find the money ; the rest of the inhabitants were sold. Phyton was selected for special vengeance. He was scourged through the army, and then drowned with all his kin. Thus Dionysius gained what hitherto had been one of his most pressing desires—possession of the city which had so long hated and defied him. He was now master of both sides of the strait, and held the fortress which was the bulwark of Greek Italy. Eight years later he captured Croton, and his power in Italy reached its greatest height.

*The
Hadriatic
schemes of
Dionysius.*

But in the meanwhile the unresting lord of Syracuse had turned his eyes to a region of enterprise further afield. The needs of his treasury, if nothing else, bent his attention to commerce. We touch here upon that side of ancient enter-

prise which has been persistently and provokingly withdrawn from our vision, because the writers of antiquity never thought of lingering on the ordinary business transactions which were happening every day before their eyes. Many things that are now dark would be cleared up if we had more knowledge of the operations of Greek trade. Dionysius saw an opening for Sicilian commerce along the eastern and western coasts of the Hadriatic sea, in whose waters the ships of Coreyra, Athens, and Taras hitherto had chiefly plied. He set about making the Hadriatic a Syracusan lake, by means of settlements and alliances. He founded settlements in Apulia, which he probably hoped ultimately to incorporate in his dominion. He settled a colony and fixed a naval station in the island of Issa, whose importance as a strategic post has been more than *Issa*. once illustrated in subsequent history. He took part with the Parians in colonising Pharos, on an island not far from *Pharos*. Issa. A Syracusan colony was planted at Ancon, and, even if *Ancona*. the colonists were, as they are said to have been, exiles and foes of Dionysius, we may be sure that the merchant ships of Syracuse were welcome at the wharfs of Ancon. The northern goal of these merchant ships was near the mouth of the Po, at a spot where there was already a mart for diffusing Greek merchandise in Cis-Alpine Gaul, and beyond the Alps into northern Europe. This was the Venetian Hadria, city of *Hadria*. marshes and canals, which was now colonised by Dionysius, to be in some sort—as has been aptly observed—a forerunner of Venice itself. It was in one of these outlying posts of the *Philistus* Hellenic world that the historian, to whom we owe our best *the* knowledge of the Sicilian history of this time, probably wrote *historian*. his works. Philistus had held posts of high trust under Dionysius, and had even been the commandant of the Syracusan citadel; but in later years he incurred his master's displeasure or suspicion, and chose as his place of banishment some city on the Hadriatic, possibly Hadria. In connexion with these Hadriatic designs, touching which we have only the most fragmentary records, Dionysius formed an alliance with Alcetas of Molossia, whose unstable position in his own *Molossia*. kingdom made him willing to be a dependent on the strong ruler of Syracuse. Thus Dionysius made his influence pre-dominant at the gates of the Hadriatic.

Greatest extent of Syracusan Empire. Its character. I. Immediate dominion. (a) Territory of Syracuse. (b) Military Colonies.

The Syracusan empire—we may survey it, when it reached its widest extent—consisted, like most other empires, partly of immediate dominion and partly of dependent communities. The immediate dominion was both insular and continental; it included the greater portion of Sicily and the southern peninsula of Italy, perhaps as far north as the river Crathis. But this dominion was not homogeneous, in the relations of its various parts to the government at Syracuse. There was first of all the old territory of the Syracusan republic. There were secondly, a number of military settlements; an institution of Dionysius which has been compared to the military colonies of Rome. Such, for example, was Croton on the mainland; such in Sicily were Henna and Messana; such was Issa in the Hadriatic. Outside these direct subjects was the third class of the allied cities, which, though absolutely subject to the power of Dionysius, had still the management of their less important affairs in their own hands. To this class belonged the old Greek cities of Sicily—like Gela and Camarina; new colonies, like Tyndaris; some Sicel states like Agryium and Herbita.

(c) Allied cities.


II. Dependencies.


Beyond the sphere of direct dominion stretched the sphere of dependencies—the allies, whose bond of dependence was rather implied than formally expressed. Here belonged the cities of the Italiot league, Thurii and the rest, north of the Crathis river; here belonged some of the Iapygian communities in the heel of Italy; and here the kingdom of Molossia beyond the Ionian sea, and some Illyrian places on the Hadriatic coast. The Crathis may be regarded as the line between the two, the outer and the inner, divisions of the empire of Dionysius. But it is remarkable that at one time he planned a wall and ditch, which should run across the isthmus from Scylletion to the nearest point on the other sea—a distance of about twenty miles—and thus sever, as it were, the toe of Italy from the mainland and make it a sort of second Sicily.

Scheme of fencing off the extremity of Italy.

The finances of Dionysius.

The acquisition and maintenance of this empire, the building of ships and ship-sheds, the payment of mercenary soldiers, the vast fortifications of Syracuse, both of the island and of the hill—all this, along with the ordinary expenses of government and the state of a despot's court, demanded an enormous





outlay. To meet this outlay Dionysius was forced to resort to extraordinary expedients. In the first place, he oppressed the Syracusans by a burdensome taxation. He imposed special taxes for war, special taxes for building ships; and he introduced an onerous tax on cattle. It is said that the citizens paid yearly into the treasury at the rate of twenty per cent of their capital. In the second place, he had recourse to various expedients affecting the coinage. Thus he issued debased four-drachm pieces of tin instead of silver; and in one case of financial need he paid a debt by placing on each coin an official mark which rendered it worth the double of its true value. But such expedients were not enough. Dionysius was an unscrupulous rifler of temples. Thus, when he took Croton, he carried off the treasures of a temple of Hera. In an earlier year he sailed like a pirate to Etruria, swooped down on a rich temple at the port of Agylla, and bore off booty which amounted to the value of 1500 talents. The plunder of a sanctuary on distant barbarian shores might seem a small thing, but no awe of divine displeasure restrained Dionysius from planning a raid upon the holiest place of Hellenic worship. He formed the design of robbing the treasury of Delphi itself, with Illyrian and Molossian help; but the plan miscarried. It is little wonder that the tyrant had an evil repute in the mother-country.

SECT. 8. DEATH OF DIONYSIUS. ESTIMATE OF HIS WORK

It was only for a moment that the dominion of the Syracusan despot reached its extreme limits. He had hardly won the city and lands of Croton, when his borders fell back in the west of his own island. A new war with Carthage had broken out, and this time if Dionysius was not the first to draw the sword, he at least provoked hostilities. He entered into alliances with some of the cities dependent on Carthage—possibly Segesta or Eryx. Of the campaigns we know almost nothing, except their result. First we find Carthage helping the Italiots with whom the tyrant was at war. Next we find a Carthaginian force in Sicily commanded by Mago. In a battle fought at Cabala—a place unknown—

*Outbreak
of Third
Punic
War,
383 B.C.*

*Battle of
Cabala.*

*Battle of
Cronion,
379 B.C.*

*Peace,
378 B.C.*

*Ras
Melkart.*

*Fourth
Punic
War,
368 B.C.*

*Death of
Dionysius,
367 B.C.*

*Dionysius
as a tragic
poet.*

the Syracusans won a great victory and Mago was killed. While negotiations for peace were proceeding, another battle was fought at Cronion near Panormus, and fate reversed her award. Dionysius was defeated with terrible loss, and compelled to make a disadvantageous peace. The boundary of Greek against Punic Sicily was withdrawn from the river Mazarus to the river Halycus. This meant that the deliverer of Selinus and Thermae gave back those cities to the mercies of the barbarian. At the mouth of the Halycus, the old Greek foundation of Heraclea Minoa now became, under the corresponding Punic name Ras Melkart, one of the chief strongholds of Punic power.

Just ten years later, ten years in which the history of Sicily is a blank, Dionysius essayed to retrieve the losses which the disastrous battle of Cronion had brought upon him. He made war once more upon Carthage, and for the second time he invaded Punic Sicily. He delivered Greek Selinus; he won Campanian Entella; and captured Elymian Eryx along with its haven Drepanon. He then attempted, we may almost say, to repeat the great exploit of his first war. There was no more a Motya to capture, but he laid siege to Lilybaeum, which had taken Motya's place. But he was compelled to abandon the attempt; the fortress was too strong; and his ill-success was soon crowned by the loss of a large part of his fleet, which was carried out of the harbour of Drepanon by an enterprising Carthaginian admiral.

It was the last undertaking of the great "ruler of Sicily." He did not live to conclude the peace which probably confirmed the Halycus as the boundary between Greek and barbarian. His death was connected with a side of his character which has not yet come before us. The tyrant of Syracuse has a place, though it is a small place, in literary history. He was a dramatic poet, and he frequently competed with his tragedies in the Athenian theatre. He won third, he won even second, prizes; but his dearest ambition was to be awarded a first place. That desire was at length fulfilled; his failure at Lilybaeum and the loss of his ships at Drepanon were compensated by the tidings that the first prize had been assigned to his *Ransom of Hector* at the Lenaeon festival. He celebrated his joy by an unwonted carouse; his intemperance was followed

by a fever; and a soporific draught was administered to him which induced the sleep of death.

Dionysius did not stand wholly aloof from the politics of elder Greece. His alliance with Sparta, and the help which he received from her at the siege of Syracuse, involved him in obligations to her which he fulfilled on more than one occasion; and in the regions of Coreyra his empire came into direct contact with the spheres of some of the states of the mother-country. But these political relations are an unimportant part of his reign. His reign, as a whole, lies apart from the contemporary politics of elder Greece. Yet, from some points of view, it possesses more significance in Grecian, and in European, history than the contemporary history of Sparta and Athens.

In the first place, Dionysius stands out as one of the most prominent champions of Europe in the long struggle between the Asiatic and the European for the possession of Sicily. He did what no champion had done before: he carried the war into the enemy's precinct. He well-nigh achieved what it was reserved for an Italian commonwealth to achieve actually, the reclaiming of the whole island for Europe, the complete expulsion of the Semitic intruder. In the second place, he stands out as the man who raised his own city not only to dominion over all Greek Sicily but to a transmarine dominion, which made her the most powerful city in the Greek world, the most potent state in Europe. The purely Sicilian policy is flung aside, and Syracuse becomes a continental power, laying one hand on that peninsula to which her own island geographically belongs, and stretching out the other to the lands beyond the Hadriatic. And, thirdly, this empire, though it is thinly disguised like the later empire of Rome under constitutional forms, is really a monarchical realm, which is a foreshadowing of the Macedonian monarchies and an anticipation of a new period in European history. Again in the art of war Dionysius inaugurated methods which did not come into general use till more than half a century later; some of his military operations seem to transport us to the age of Alexander the Great and his successors. In another way too Dionysius anticipated the age of those monarchs; statues were set up representing him in the guise of Dionysus, the god by

Relations of Sicily to Eastern Greece in time of Dionysius.

Significance of Dionysius in history. Champion of Europe against the Semite.

Extra-Sicilian Empire.

Anticipation of the Macedonian monarchies.

Military improvements.

Deification.

whose name he was called. Here indeed he did not stand alone among his contemporaries; the Spartan Lysander also had been invested with attributes of divinity.

*Dionysius
not a
Hellen-
izer:*

*First signs
of the ex-
pansion of
the Italian
race.*

But in one respect Dionysius was far from being a fore-runner of the Macedonian monarchs: he was not an active or deliberate diffuser of Hellenic civilisation. On the contrary he appears rather as an undoer of Hellenic civilisation. He destroys Hellenic towns, and he replaces Hellenic by Italian communities; he cultivates the friendship of Gauls and Lucanians, to use them against Greeks, not to make them Greeks. This side of the policy of Dionysius, the establishment of Italian settlements in Sicily, points in a different direction; it points—unintentionally, indeed, so far as he was concerned—to the expansion of Italy, it points to the Italian conquest of Sicily which was to be accomplished more than a century after his death.

*Why
Dionysius
did not do
more.*

Dionysius then has the significance of a pioneer. But there is something else to be said. Original and successful as he was, great things as he did, we cannot help feeling that he ought to have done greater things still. A master of political wisdom, an originator of daring ideas, a man of endless energy, remarkably temperate in the habits of his life, he was hampered throughout by his unconstitutional position. The nature of tyranny imposed limitations on his work. He had always to consider first the security of his own unchartered rule; he could never forget the fact that he was a hated master. He could therefore never devote himself to the accomplishment of any object or the solution of any problem with the undivided zeal which may animate a constitutional prince who need never turn aside to examine the sure foundations of his power. We saw how the tyrant's warfare against Carthage was affected by these personal calculations. The Syracusan tyranny accomplished indeed far more than could have been accomplished by the Syracusan democracy; Dionysius as a tyrant wrought what he could never have wrought as a mere statesman governing by legitimate influence the counsels of a free assembly. But he illustrates—and all the more strikingly, as the pioneer of the great monarchies of the future—the truth to which attention has been called before, that the tyrannies and democracies of Greek cities were

in their nature not adapted to create and maintain large empires.

SECT. 9. DIONYSIUS THE YOUNGER

The empire of Dionysius, which he had made fast, to use *Dionysius* his own expression, "by chains of adamant"—a strong army, *II., 367* a strong navy, and strong walls—descended to his son, Diony- *B.C.* sius, a youth of feeble character, not without amiable qualities, but of the nature that is easily swayed to good or evil and is always dependent on advisers. At first he was under the influence of Dion, who had been the most trusted minister of the elder Dionysius in the latter part of his reign, holding the office of admiral, and allied by a double marriage with the tyrant's family. The tyrant had espoused Dion's sister Aris- *Dion, brother-in-law and son-in-law of Dionysius the elder.* tomache; and Dion married one of the daughters of this marriage, Arete, his own niece. The other daughter was given to Dionysius, her half-brother. Another man, possessing the pride, wealth, and ability of Dion, might have sought to fling aside Dionysius, and if he did not seize the tyranny himself, at all events to secure it for the sons of his sister, the brothers of his wife, Hipparinus and Nysaeus. But Dion was *His political aspirations.* not like other men; his aspirations were loftier and less selfish. His object was not to secure tyranny for any man, but to get rid of tyranny altogether. But this was not to be done by a revolution; the democracy which would have risen on the ruins of the despotism would have been in Dion's eyes as evil a thing for Syracuse as the despotism itself. For Dion *Plato's influence on Dion.* had imbibed, and thoroughly believed in, the political teaching of his friend, Plato the philosopher. His darling project was to establish at Syracuse a constitution which would, so far as possible, conform to the theoretical views of Plato, and which would probably have taken the shape of a limited kingship, with some resemblance to the constitution of Sparta. And this could never have been brought about by a pure vote of the Syracusan people; the ideal constitution must be imposed upon them for their own good. The sole chance lay in persuading a tyrant to impose limitations on his own absolute power and introduce the required constitution. "Give me," says Plato himself, "a city governed by a tyranny, and let

the tyrant be young, with good brains, brave, and generous, and let fortune bring in his way a good lawgiver"—then a state has a chance of being well governed. Dion saw in young Dionysius a nature which might be moulded as he wished,—a nature, perhaps, which he missed in his own nephews, Hipparinus and Nysaeus. He devoted himself loyally to Dionysius, who looked up to his virtue and experience, and he set himself to interest the young ruler in philosophy and make him take a serious view of his duties. But his chief hope lay in bringing the tyrant under the attraction of the same powerful personality which had exercised a decisive and abiding influence over himself. Plato must come to Syracuse and make the tyrant a philosopher.

c. 388 B.C.

*Plato's
second visit
to Sicily.*

The treatment which Plato had experienced on the occasion of a previous visit to Sicily, at the hands of the elder Dionysius, was not indeed such as to encourage him to return. But he yielded, reluctantly, to the pressing invitation of the young ruler and the urgent solicitations of Dion, who represented that now at last the moment had come to call an ideal state into actual existence.

*Serious
intention to
form an
ideal state.*

It was the vision of a "dreamer dreaming greatly"; and that a statesman of Dion's practical experience and knowledge of human nature should have allowed himself to be guided by such a dream may seem strange to us; to us to whom the history of hundreds of societies throughout a period of more than two thousand years has brought disillusion. It has indeed seemed so curious that some have concluded that Dion was throughout plotting to dethrone Dionysius, that the philosophical scheme was part of the plot, and Plato an unconscious tool of the conspiracy. But the good faith of Dion seems assured. We must remember that a state founded on philosophical principles was a new idea, which was not at all likely to seem foredoomed to failure to any one who was enamoured of philosophy; for such a state had never been tried, and consequently there was no example of a previous failure. On the contrary, there was the example of Sparta as a success. The political speculators of those days always turned with special predilection to Sparta, as a well-balanced state, and it was believed that her constitution and discipline had been called into being and established for all time by the will

and fiat of a single extraordinarily wise lawgiver. Why then should not Dionysius and Dion, under the direction of Plato, do for Syracuse what Lycurgus had done for Lacedaemon? And Dion doubtless thought that his own experience would enable him to adjust the demands of speculation to the rude realities of existence.

No welcome could have been more honourable and flattering than that which Plato received. He engaged the respect and admiration of Dionysius, and the young tyrant was easily brought to regard tyranny as a vile thing and to cherish the plan of building up a new constitution. The experiment would probably have been tried, if Plato, in dealing with his pupil, had acted otherwise than he did. The nature of Dionysius was one of those natures which are susceptible of impressions and capable of enthusiasm, but incapable of persevering application. If Plato had contented himself with inculcating the general principles which he has expounded with such charm in his *Republic*, Dionysius would in all likelihood have attempted to create at Syracuse a dim adumbration of the ideal state. It is hardly likely that it would have been long maintained: still, it would at least have been essayed. But Plato insisted on imparting to his pupil a systematic course of philosophical training, and began with the science of geometry. The tyrant took up the study with eagerness; his court was absorbed in geometry; but he presently wearied of it. And then influences which were opposed to the scheme of Dion and Plato began to tell.

One of the first acts of the new reign had been to recall from exile the historian Philistus. He was entirely adverse to the proposed reforms, and wished that the tyranny should continue on its old lines. He and his friends insinuated that the true object of Dion was to secure the tyranny for one of his own nephews, as soon as Dionysius had laid it down. They did everything to turn Dionysius against Dion, and at last an indiscreet letter of Dion gave them the means of success. Syracuse and Carthage were negotiating peace, and Dion wrote to the Carthaginian Judges not to act without first consulting him. The letter was intercepted, and though its motive was doubtless perfectly honest, it was interpreted as treason. Dion was banished from Sicily, but was allowed to

*Plato's
course of
instruc-
tion.*

*Philistus
recalled:
opposed to
Dion's
scheme.*

*Banish-
ment of
Dion.*

*Plato
returns to
Athens.*

retain his property ; and the party of Philistus won the upper hand. Plato remained for a while in the island ; Dionysius was jealous of the esteem which he felt for Dion, and desired above all things to win the same esteem for himself. But the philosopher's visit had been a failure ; he yearned to get back to Athens, and at length Dionysius let him go.

So ended the notable scheme of founding an ideal state, the realisation of which would have involved the disbandment of the mercenary troops and thereby the collapse of the Syracusan empire. It is easy to ridicule Plato for want of tact in his treatment of the young tyrant ; it is easy to flout him as a pedant for not distinguishing between an Academy and a Court. But Plato was perfectly right. The only motive which had brought him to Sicily was to prepare the way for founding a state fashioned more or less according to his own ideal. Now the first condition of the life of such a state was that a king should be a philosopher. Therefore, as Dionysius—not Plato—was to be king in the new state, it was indispensable that Dionysius should become a philosopher. Plato had not the smallest interest in imparting to the tyrant a superficial smattering of philosophy, enough to beguile him into framing a Platonic state. For that state would have been still-born, since it lacked the first condition of life, a true philosopher at its head. If Dionysius had not the stuff of a true, but only of a sham, philosopher, it was useless to make the experiment. Plato adopted the only reasonable course ; he was true to his own ideal.

SECT. 10. DION

*Third visit
of Plato to
Syracuse.*

Strange as it may appear, after such experiences, Plato seems to have returned once more to Sicily, at the urgent invitation of Dionysius. He can have had no more expectations of making a philosopher out of the tyrant, and his chief motive must have been to bring about the recall of Dion and reconcile him to Dionysius, who appears to have lured the philosopher by the hope that this might be accomplished. Plato was received and entertained with as great honour as before, but his visit was fruitless. Probably the tyrant ascertained that Dion was in the meantime using his wealth to make silent

preparations for winning his way back to Syracuse and overthrowing the tyranny. Dionysius therefore took the precaution of confiscating Dion's property; and then Plato returned to Athens as soon as he could. Dion also betook himself to Old Greece and made Athens his headquarters. Presently the tyrant committed a needless act of tyranny; he compelled Dion's wife Arete to marry another man. At length Dion deemed that the time for action had come. With a very small force, packed into not more than five merchant ships, he set sail from Zacynthus, to encounter the mighty armaments of Dionysius. His coming was expected, and the admiral Philistus had a fleet in Italian waters to waylay him. But Dion sailed across the open sea to Pachynus. His plan was to land in Western Sicily, collect what reinforcements he could, and march on Syracuse. It was a bold enterprise, but Dion knew that the character of the tyrant was feeble, and that the Syracusans pined to be delivered from his tyranny. Driven by a storm to the Libyan coast, the ships of the deliverer finally reached Heraclea Minoa, now a Carthaginian port, in south-western Sicily. Here they learned that Dionysius had departed for Italy with eighty ships, and they lost no time in marching to Syracuse, picking up reinforcements, both Greek and Sicel, on their way. The Campanian mercenaries who were guarding Epipolae were lured away by a trick; and, making a night march from Acrae, Dion and his party entered Syracuse amid general rejoicings. The Assembly placed the government in the hands of twenty generals, Dion among them. The fortress of Epipolae was secured; no part of Syracuse remained in possession of Dionysius except the Island, and against this Dion built a wall of defence from the Greater to the Lesser Harbour. Seven days later Dionysius returned.

Dion at Athens.

*357 B.C.
Dion sails for Sicily, August.*

Enters Syracuse.

Dionysius holds the Island.

While Syracuse was rocking with the first enthusiasm at her deliverance, the deliverer was the popular hero. But Dion was not a man who could hold the affections of the people, for he repelled men by his exceeding haughtiness. And it was seen too that he was determined masterfully to direct the Syracusans how they were to use their freedom. Dionysius, shut up in the Island, resorted to artifices to raise suspicion against him in the minds of the citizens. And a rival

Heraclides. appeared on the scene who possessed more popular manners than Dion. This was a certain Heraclides, whom the tyrant had banished, and who now returned with an armament of ships and soldiers. The Assembly elected him admiral. Dion undid this act on the ground that his own consent was necessary; and then came forward himself to propose Heraclides. This behaviour alienated the sympathies of the citizens; they did not want another autocrat. Soon afterwards Heraclides won an important sea-fight, defeating Philistus, who had returned from Italy with his squadron. The old historian himself was taken and put to death with cruelty. *Death of Philistus.* Dionysius thus lost his best support, and presently he escaped from the Island, taking his triremes with him, but leaving a garrison of mercenaries and his young son Apollocrates in command.

Soon after this the influence of Dion waned so much that the Syracusans deposed him from the post of general, and appointed twenty-five new generals, among them Heraclides. They also refused to grant any pay to the Peloponnesian deliverers who had come with Dion. The Peloponnesians would gladly have turned against the Syracusans if Dion had given the signal; but Dion, though self-willed, was too genuine a patriot to attack his own city, and he retired to Leontini with 3000 devoted men. *Dion withdraws to Leontini, 356 B.C.*

The Syracusans then went on with the siege of the island fortress, and so hard pressed was the garrison that it determined to surrender. Heralds had been already sent to announce the decision to the Syracusans, when in the early morning reinforcements arrived—soldiers and provisions, brought by a Campanian of Naples, by name Nysius, who, eluding the notice of the enemy's ships, sailed into the Great Harbour. The situation was changed, and negotiations were immediately broken off. At first fortune favoured the Syracusans. Heraclides put out to sea, and won a second sea-fight, sinking or capturing whatever warships had been left behind by Dionysius or were brought by Nysius. At this success the city went wild with joy and spent the night in carousing. Before the dawn of day, when soldiers and generals were alike sunk in a drunken sleep, Nysius and his troops issued from the gates of the island, and surmounting the cross wall of *Arrival of Nysius (Nysius).*

Dion by scaling-ladders, slew the guards and took possession of Lower Achradina and the Agora. All this part of the city was sacked; full leave was given to the mercenaries to do as they listed; they carried off women and children and all the property they could lay hands on. Next day all the citizens who had taken refuge in Epipolæ and the Upper Achradina, looking helplessly at what had been done, and seeing that the barbarians were beginning their horrible work again, voted to call Dion to the rescue. Messengers riding as swiftly as they could reached Leontini towards evening. Dion led them to the theatre, and there before the gathered folk the envoys told their tale and implored Dion and the Peloponnesians to forget the ingratitude of Syracuse and come to her help. Dion made a moving speech; he would in any case go, and, if he could not save his city, he would bury himself in her ruins; but the Peloponnesians might well refuse to stir for a people which had entreated them so ill. A shout went up that Syracuse must be rescued; and for the second time Dion led the Peloponnesians to her deliverance. They set out at once, and a night march brought them to Megara, five or six miles from Syracuse, at the dawn of day. There dreadful tidings reached them. Nysius, knowing that the rescue was on its way and deeming that no time was to be lost, had let loose his barbarians again into the city at midnight. They no longer thought of plunder, but only of slaying and burning. At this news the army of rescue hurried on to save what might still be saved. Entering by the Hexapylon on the north, Dion cleared his way before him through Achradina, and reached the cross-wall which he had himself built as a defence against the Island. It was now broken down, but behind its ruins Nysius had posted a body of his mercenaries, and this was the scene of the decisive struggle. Dion's men carried the wall, and the foe was driven back into the fortress of Ortygia.

The opponents of Dion, who had not fled, were humbled. Heraclides besought his pardon, and Dion was blamed for not putting him to death. It was at all events foolish magnanimity which consented to the arrangement that Dion should be general with full power on land, and Heraclides by sea. The old dissensions soon broke out, and presently we find a

Spartan named Gaesylus reconciling the rivals and constraining Heraclides to swear solemnly to do nothing against Dion.

*Surrender
of the
Island.*

Nypsius seems to have disappeared from the scene, and it was not long before the son of Dionysius, weary of the long siege, made up his mind to surrender the Island to Dion. During all these dreadful events Dion's sister Aristomache and his wife Arete had been kept in the Island. Dion now took back his wife.

*Dion's
political
aim :*

The time at last came for Dion to show what his political aims really were. He professed to have come to give Syracuse freedom ; but the freedom which he would have given her was not such as she herself desired. The Syracusan citizens wanted the restoration of their democracy ; but to Dion democracy seemed as bad a form of government as tyranny. If, taught by experience, he no longer dreamed of a

*a modified
aristo-
cracy.*

Platonic state, he desired to establish an aristocracy, with some democratic limitations, and with a king, or kings, as in Sparta. With this purpose in view he sent to Corinth for helpers and advisers ; and he expressed his leanings to the Corinthian oligarchy by an issue of coins, with a flying horse, modelled on the Pegasi of Corinth. But though Dion hoped to establish a state in which the few should govern the many, he made a grave mistake in not immediately placing himself above the suspicion of being a selfish power-seeker—a possible tyrant. The Syracusans longed to see the fortress of the tyrant demolished, and if Dion had complied with their wish he might have secured for himself abiding influence. But though he did not live in the fortress he allowed it to remain, and its existence seemed a standing invitation to tyranny. Dion had no intention of allowing the Syracusans to manage their own affairs, and the enjoyment of power corrupted him. His authority was only limited by the joint command of Heraclides, and at last he was brought to consent that his rival should be secretly assassinated. After this he was to all purposes tyrant, though he might repudiate tyranny with his lips.

*Dion
becomes a
tyrant.*

*Plot of
Callippus :*

Among those who had come with him from elder Greece to liberate Syracuse was a pupil of Plato named Callippus ; and this man plotted to overthrow Dion, who trusted him implicitly. Aristomache and Arete suspected him and taxed him with treachery ; nor were they assured until he had taken the most

solemn oath that a mortal could take. He went to the precinct of the great goddesses Demeter and Persephone; the priest wrapped him in the purple robe of the queen of the underworld and gave him a lighted torch; in this guise he swore that he plotted no evil design against Dion. But so little regard had Callippus for religion that he chose the festival of the Maiden by whom he had sworn for the execution of his plot. He employed some men of Zacynthus to murder Dion, and then seized the power himself.

The tyranny of Callippus lasted for about a year. Then, while he was engaged in an attack on Catane, the two sons of the elder Dionysius by his second wife, Hipparinus and Nysaeus, came to Syracuse and won the possession of Ortygia. These brothers were a worthless pair, drunken and dissolute. Hipparinus held the island for about two years; then he was murdered in a fit of drunkenness, and was succeeded by Nysaeus, who ruled Ortygia five years longer. It is not certain how far these tyrants were able to assert their authority over Syracuse outside the precincts of the Island.

During all these changes Dionysius was living at Locri, the native city of his mother, and ruling it with a tyrant's rod. His cruelty and the outrages which he committed on the freeborn maidens of the city provoked universal hatred. At length he saw the chance of recovering Syracuse. Leaving his wife and daughters at Locri with a small garrison, he sailed to Ortygia and drove out Nysaeus. As soon as he had gone the Locrians arose and easily overcame his mercenaries. The enormities of which the tyrant had been guilty may best be measured by the brutal thirst of vengeance which now consumed the citizens of Locri. No supplications, no intervention, no offers of ransom could turn them away from wreaking their pent-up hatred on the wife and daughters of Dionysius. The women were submitted to the most horrible tortures and insults before they were strangled; the sea was sown with their ashes.

SECT. 11. TIMOLEON

At this moment tyrannies flourished in Sicily. Besides Syracuse, the cities of Messana, Leontini, and Catane, and

Hicetas.

*Sicilian
appeal to
Corinth.*

*Corinth's
response.*

Timoleon.

*The
sailing of
Timoleon,
344 B.C.*

many Sicel towns were under the yoke of tyrants. Syracuse was at least half free; Dionysius held only the Island. But the Syracusans, for lack of another leader, looked for help and guidance, in their struggle against their own tyrant, to the man who had made himself lord of Leontini. This was a certain Hicetas, a man ill to deal with, who was a follower of Dion, but after Dion's death caused his wife and sister to be drowned while they were sailing to the Peloponnesus. This Hicetas was aiming at becoming himself lord of Syracuse, and he hoped to accomplish his purpose with the help of Carthage. But he veiled his designs, and he supported an appeal which the Sicilian Greeks now addressed to Corinth. It was an appeal for help both against the plague of tyranny which was rampant in Sicily and against the Carthaginians, who were preparing a great armament to descend upon the troubled island. The Syracusans selected Hicetas as their general.

Corinth, ever a solicitous mother to her colonies, was ready to respond to the appeal; and the only difficulty was to find a suitable commander. Some one in the assembly, by a sudden inspiration, arose and named Timoleon, the son of Timodemus. Belonging to a noble family, and notable by his personal qualities, Timoleon was living under a strange cloud, through a deed which some highly praised and others severely blamed. He had saved his brother's life in battle at the risk of his own; but, when that brother afterwards plotted to make himself tyrant, Timoleon and some friends put him to death. His mother and many others abhorred him as guilty of a brother's blood; while others admired him as the slayer of a tyrant. In the light of his later deeds, we know that Timoleon was actuated by the highest motives of duty when he consented to his brother's death. Ever since that terrible day he had lived in retirement, but when his name was mentioned in the Assembly all approved, and Teleclides, a man of influence, expressed the general thought by saying, "We shall decide that he slew a tyrant, if he is successful; that he slew his brother, if he fails." The enterprise was to be Timoleon's ordeal.

With ten ships of war, a few fellow-citizens, and about 1000 mercenaries, Timoleon crossed the Ionian sea, guided, it was said, by the track of a flaming torch, the emblem of the

Sicilian goddesses Demeter and Persephone. At Rhegium, now free from the rule of tyrants, he met with a warm welcome. But he found a Carthaginian fleet awaiting him there, and likewise ambassadors from Hicetas, who demanded that the ships and soldiers should be sent back to Corinth, since the Carthaginians would not permit them to cruise in Sicilian waters. As for Timoleon himself, Hicetas would be pleased to have his help and counsel. Timoleon had no thought of heeding such a message. It was not to set up the rule of Hicetas at Syracuse that he had come, or to submit to the dictation of the foes of Hellas. But the difficulty was to leave the roadstead of Rhegium in face of the Punic fleet. Here Timoleon showed caution and craft. He pretended to agree to the proposals, but he asked that the whole matter and the intentions of Hicetas should be clearly stated in the presence of the Rhegine people. With the connivance of the Rhegines, time was wasted, and the Carthaginians and the ambassadors of Hicetas were detained in the Assembly, until the Corinthian ships had put out to sea, Timoleon himself slipping away just in time to embark in the last of them. He made straight for Tauromenium.

It will be remembered that Tauromenium, planted by Himilco to be a Sikel city, had been taken by Dionysius to be an abode for his mercenaries. Amid the troubles after the tyrant's death it had gained its independence, and a citizen named Andromachus had become the foremost man in its public affairs. Andromachus induced his fellow-citizens to offer a home to the homeless Naxians whose parents Dionysius had so cruelly dispossessed. The Naxians came back to the hill which looked down on the place of their old city; Naxos revived in Tauromenium. And the Naxians were the first Sicilians to welcome the deliverer of Sicily to her shores. Timoleon's first success was at Hadranum, the Sikel town where the great Sicilian fire-god Hadranus had his chief abode. The men of Hadranum were at discord among themselves; some would summon Hicetas, others invited Timoleon; and both Hicetas and Timoleon came. It was a race between them to get to Hadranum first. Timoleon, the later to arrive, surprised the enemy as they were resting outside the town, and defeated them, although in numbers they were five to one.

Timoleon comes to Tauromenium.

Settlement of Naxians there by Andromachus.

Battle of Hadranum.

The gates of the city were then thrown open and Hadranum became the headquarters of Timoleon's army. Soon afterwards Hicetas suborned two men to assassinate the Corinthian leader, but the plot was frustrated at the last moment; and henceforth the belief gained ground that Timoleon was hedged about by some divine protection. The fire-god of Hadranum too had shown by miraculous signs that he approved of the stranger's enterprise. Other cities now allied themselves with Timoleon; and presently Dionysius sent a message to him, proposing to surrender the Island, and asking only to be allowed to retire in safety to Corinth, with his private property. The offer was at once accepted; the fortress, and the mercenaries who guarded it, and all the war-gear were transferred to Timoleon. Dionysius lived the rest of his life at Corinth in harmless obscurity. Many anecdotes were told of the trivial doings of the fallen lord of Sicily and his smart sayings. When some one contrasted his fortune with that of his father, he remarked, "My father came into power when democracy was hated, but I when tyranny was envied."

*The end of
Dionysius.*

*Cartha-
ginians at
Syracuse
supporting
Hicetas.*

Having won Ortygia sooner and more easily than could have been hoped, it remained for Timoleon to liberate the rest of Syracuse, which was in the hands of Hicetas. But Hicetas had powerful allies. A hundred and fifty Carthaginian ships, under the command of Mago, sailed into the Great Harbour, and a Carthaginian force was admitted into Syracuse. The Corinthian commander in the Island—Timoleon himself still abode at Hadranum—was hard pressed; but presently Mago and Hicetas went off to besiege Catane, and Neon making a successful sally occupied Achradina. At the same time reinforcements from Corinth, which had been for some time delayed in Italy by the Carthaginian fleet, arrived in Sicily. It was now time for Timoleon himself to appear at Syracuse. He pitched his camp on the south side, on the banks of the Anapus. Then another piece of luck befell him. The Greek mercenaries, both his own and those of Hicetas, used to amuse their idle hours by fishing for eels at the mouth of the river; and as they had no cause of quarrel, though they were ready to kill each other for pay, they used to converse amicably on such occasions. One of Timoleon's soldiers observed that the Greeks ought to combine

against the barbarians, and the words coming to the ears of Mago caused him to conceive suspicions of Hicetas; he suddenly sailed off with all his fleet; but when he reached Carthage he slew himself and his countrymen crucified his corpse. This story, however, can hardly be the whole explanation of Mago's strange behaviour.

Thus freed from his most formidable foe, Timoleon soon drove Hicetas from Epipolae, and Syracuse was at length completely free. The Syracusans had found a deliverer who did not, like Dion, seek to be their master; and the fortress of Dionysius was pulled down. This act of demolition seemed the seal and assurance of their deliverance. But the city was dispeopled and desolate, grass grew in the marketplace; and the first task of the deliverer was to repopulate *Syracuse* it with new citizens. The Corinthians made proclamations *repeopled*. at the festivals of elder Greece, inviting emigrants to resettle Syracuse; men whom the tyrants had banished flocked back; and 60,000 men in all gathered both from west and east, with women and children, and restored the strength of the city. The laws of Diocles were issued anew, and the democratic constitution was revived and in some respects remodelled. The most important innovation was the invest- *Democracy*. ing of the *amphipolos* or priest of Olympian Zeus with the chief magistracy. The priest was annually elected and gave his name to the year; but, as he was chosen by lot out of three clans, his promotion to be the first magistrate of the republic was a limitation of the democracy. Such was the renovation of Syracuse; and her new freedom was expressed, on some coins which were now issued, by the symbol of an unbridled *Coinage*. steed.

Timoleon then went on to do for other towns in Sicily *Tyrants* what he had done for Syracuse. Many tyrants submitted; *suppressed* even Hicetas, who had withdrawn to Leontini. There was *in Sicily*. also work to be done against the Carthaginians, who were intent upon recovering lost ground and were preparing for another great effort to drive the Greeks out of Sicily. Five *Cartha-* years after Timoleon had landed in the island, a large *ginian* armament sailed from Carthage and put in at Lilybaeum. It *expedition* consisted of 200 galleys and 1000 transports; there were *against* 10,000 horses—some for war-chariots; and the total number *Sicily,* *339 B.C.*

of the infantry was said to be 70,000. The flower of the host was the "Sacred Band" of 2500 Carthaginian citizens, men of birth and wealth. Hamilcar and Hasdrubal, the commanders, decided to march right across Sicily against Syracuse. But Timoleon did not await them there; he would try to encounter them west of the Halycus, in Punic not in Grecian territory. Collecting such an army as he could—it amounted to no more than 10,000—he set out. On the march he was deserted by 1000 mercenaries who clamoured for arrears of pay and murmured at being led against such overwhelming odds; and with difficulty could he persuade the rest to go on. The Carthaginians were encamped on the west bank of the Crimissus, a branch of the river Hypsas, not that which washes Acragas, but that which flows through the territory of Selinus. The city of Entella, now held by Campanians, was situated on the Crimissus, and it may be that the Punic army had halted with the hope of taking it.

*Battle of
the Crimi-
sus (June).*

(σελευνον.)

The field of the battle which was now fought between the Greeks and Phoenicians on the banks of the Crimissus is unknown. In the morning the Greeks ascended a hill which divided them from the river, and on their way they met mules laden with wild celery, a herb which was used to wreath sepulchral slabs. The soldiers were depressed by an incident which seemed ominous of evil; but of the same herb were wrought the crowns of victors in the Isthmian games, and Timoleon hastened to interpret the chance as an augury of victory. He wreathed his head with the celery, and the whole host followed his example. Then two eagles appeared in the sky, one bearing a serpent—another fortunate omen. The Greeks halted on the hilltop, striving to pierce the mist which enveloped the ground below them; and when it melted away, they saw the enemy crossing the stream. The war-chariots crossed first, and behind came the Sacred Band. Timoleon saw that his chance lay in attacking before the whole army had crossed. He sent down his cavalry to lead the attack and himself followed with the foot. The war-chariots prevented the horses from approaching the Sacred Band; so Timoleon ordered the cavalry to move aside and assail the flank of the foe, leaving the way clear for the infantry. It is not recorded how the infantry swept away the war-chariots,

but they succeeded in reaching the Sacred Band. The Carthaginians, firm and immovable, withstood the onset of the spears; and the Greeks, finding that all their thrusting could not drive back or pierce the shield wall, flung down their spears and drew their swords. In the sword fight it was no longer a matter of weight and courage; skill and lithesome movements told; and the Greeks, superior in these qualities, utterly smote the Sacred Band. Meanwhile the rest of the Punic army had crossed the river, and although the flower of it was destroyed, there were still enormous numbers to deal with. But fortune followed Timoleon. Clouds had gathered and were hanging over the hills, and suddenly there burst forth a tempest of lightning and wind-driven rain and hail. The Greeks had their backs to the wind; the rain and hail drove into the faces of the enemy, who in the noise could not hear the commands of their officers. When the ground became muddy, the lighter armour of the Greeks gave them a great advantage over their foes, who floundered about, weighed down by their heavy mail. At length the Carthaginians could no longer stand their ground, and when they turned to flee, they found death in the Crimissus. Rapidly swollen by the rain, the river was now rushing along in a furious torrent, which swept men and horses to destruction. It is said that 15,000 prisoners were secured; that 10,000 men had been killed in the fight, not counting those who perished in the river; rich spoils of gold and silver were taken in the camp. The choicest of the arms were sent to the Isthmus to be dedicated in the temple of Poseidon.

The battle had fallen out clean contrary to what was like to have been. Timoleon had gained a victory which may be set beside Gelon's victory at Himera. But he did not follow it up; he made no attempt to cut short the Phoenician dominion in Sicily. Perhaps his inaction was due less to unwillingness than to embarrassments which threatened Syracuse. The tyrant of Catane, who had gone over to Timoleon, declared against him. Hicetas seems to have seized again the tyranny at Leontini; and Timoleon found himself engaged in a war with these two tyrants, Mamercus and Hicetas, who were aided by Carthaginian mercenaries. At last both the tyrants were captured. The Syracusans put them both to death, and slew the wife and daughter of Hicetas, in retaliation for the

*Tyranny
reviving is
suppressed.*

*Peace with
Carthage.*

murder of the wife and sister of Dion. The Messanians also put to death their oppressor, Hippon, with torture, and the school-boys were taken to the theatre to witness a tyrant's death. Other cities under the yoke of tyranny were likewise liberated, and some dispeopled towns, like Acragas and Gela, were colonised. After twenty years of troubles Sicily was to have a respite now. Carthage made peace, the Halycus being again fixed as the frontier, and she undertook to do nothing to uphold tyrants in Greek cities.

The Timoleonteion.

Timoleon had now delivered Sicily both from domestic despots and from foreign foes, and having achieved his task he laid down the powers which had been granted to him for its performance. Among the great men in Greek history he holds a unique place; for the work which he accomplished was inspired neither by selfish ambition nor by patriotism. He sought no power for himself; he laboured in a strange land for cities which might adopt him but were not his own. Patriotism, indeed, in the widest sense, might stimulate his ardour, when he fought for Hellas against the Phoenician. But of Greek leaders who achieved as much as he, there is none whose conduct was, like Timoleon's, wholly guided by simple devotion to duty. The Syracusans gave him a property near Syracuse, and there he dwelt till his death, two years after his crowning victory. Occasionally he visited the city when the folk wished to ask for his counsel, but he had become blind and these visits were rare. He was lamented by all Greek Sicily, and at Syracuse his memory was preserved by a group of public buildings called after him.

The land had rest for twenty years after Timoleon's death; the direct results of his work did not amount to more than that. A tyrant arose then of a worse type than the elder Dionysius, and his hand was heavy upon Sicily. But the career of Agathocles lies outside the limits of this history.

SECT. 12. EVENTS IN GREAT GREECE

In these days, troubles and dangers beset the Greeks of Italy no less than their brethren of Sicily. On the mainland, as in the island, the Hellenic name seemed like to have been blotted out,—there by the Phoenicians and the Italian

mercenaries, here by the native races. The power of the elder Dionysius had kept at bay the Lucanians, the Messapians, the Iapygians, and other neighbours who pressed on Great Greece; but when his son was attacked by Dion, the Syracusan empire dissolved of itself, and the barbarians of Italy, having no great power to fear, began anew to descend from the mountains on the Greek settlements of the coast. A number of tribes in the toe of the peninsula banded themselves together in a league with their federal capital at Consentia; and this Bre-^{*The Bret-*} tian league, as it was called, aimed at subduing all the Greek cities of the promontory. Terina, Hipponion, New Sybaris on the Traeis, and other places were captured. Men were not blind to the danger which menaced Western Hellas, of being sunk under a tide of barbarism; one of the objects of Plato and Dion had been to drive all the barbarian mercenaries out of Greek Sicily. But in Italy the peril was greatest, and there was sore need of help from without. The appeal of Syracuse to her mother Corinth and the coming of Timoleon put it into the mind of Taras, hard bestead by the neighbouring peoples, to ask succour of her mother Sparta. The appeal came at a favourable moment. Sparta was not in a position to undertake any political scheme at home, and king Archida-^{*King Archida-*} mus eagerly embraced the chance of going forth to fight for^{*mus sails to Italy,*} Hellas against the barbarians of the West, even as his father^{*343 B.C.*} Agesilaus, sixty years ago, had fought against the barbarians of the East. He got together a band of mercenaries, chiefly from the Phocian survivors of the Sacred War,¹ and sailed to Italy. For four or five years seemingly he strove against the barbarians, but without winning any decisive success, and was finally killed at Mandonia in a battle with the Lucanians. The ineffectual expedition of Archidamus was a striking^{*Battle of Mandonia,*} contrast to the brilliant achievements of Timoleon. But Taras was not ungrateful for his efforts. She had commemorated her appeal to Sparta by minting beautiful gold pieces, on which the infant Taras was shown supplicating Poseidon of Cape Taenarus. The tragic issue of that appeal suggested a motive for another series of coins, and called forth one of those pathetic allusions which Greek art could achieve with matchless grace. Taras is represented riding on his

¹ See below, p. 298.

dolphin and sadly contemplating a helmet; it is the helmet of the Spartan king who had fallen in his service.

*Expedi-
tion of
Alexander
of Epirus,
334 B.C.*

Taris was soon forced to seek a new champion. She invited Alexander of Molossia, the uncle of Alexander the Great, and this king saw and seized the chance of founding an empire in the West—of doing there on a small scale what his nephew was accomplishing on a mighty scale in Asia. He was an able man and success attended his arms. On the east coast of Italy he subdued the Messapians, and pushed as far north as Sipontum, which he captured. In the west he smote the Brettian league, seizing Consentia and liberating Terina. His power was so great in the south that Rome made a treaty with him; and it is possible that his designs reached to Sicily. The welcome given to this ally and deliverer was also reflected in the money of Taras; coins were struck with the seated eagle of Dodona and the thunderbolt of Zeus beside it. But Taras presently felt her own freedom menaced by the conqueror, and she renounced her alliance. War ensued, Thurii upholding Alexander. The barbarians profited by these struggles to rise against their conqueror, and a battle was fought at Pandosia. During the engagement, a Lucanian exile in the Tarentine army stabbed the king in the back, and the design of an Epirote empire bestriding the Hadriatic perished with him. This befell not long after the overthrow of the Persian monarchy on the field of Gaugamela. But Alexander's work had not been futile; henceforward Taras was able to keep the upper hand over her Italian neighbours.

*Battle of
Pandosia,
331-30 B.C.
Alex-
ander's
death.*

CHAPTER VI

THE RISE OF MACEDONIA

AFTER the battle of Mantinea, when Thebes retired from her aggressive policy, Athens stood forth the most important state in Old Greece. She would have been free to devote all her energies to re-establishing her power on the coasts of the northern Aegean and by the gates of the Pontic waters, and would doubtless have achieved successfully this main object of her policy, if two outlying powers had not suddenly stepped upon the scene to thwart her and cut short her empire. These powers, Caria and Macedon, lay in opposite quarters of the Greek world. Both were monarchies, both were semi-Hellenic. Macedon was a land-power; Caria was both a land-power and a sea-power, but it was as a sea-power that she was formidable to Athens. Of the two, it was Caria which seemed to Greece the country with a future and to Athens the dangerous rival. Of Macedonia little account was taken by the civilised world, and Athens expected that she could always manage it. No prophet in his happiest hour of clairvoyance could have predicted that within thirty years Caria would have sunk back into insignificance, leaving nothing to posterity save the sepulchre of her prince, while Macedon would bear the arts and wisdom of Hellas to the ends of the earth. *

SECT. 1. ATHENS REGAINS THE CHERSONESE AND EUBOEÆ

The death of Epaminondas delivered Athens from her most dangerous and active enemy; but the intrigues which he had

*Thessalian
alliance of
Athens.*

spun against her in the north bore results after his death. Alexander of Pherae, who had become the ally of the Thebans, seized the island of Peparethus with his pirate ships and defeated an Athenian armament under Leosthenes. He then repeated the daring enterprise of the Spartan Teleutias, sailing rapidly into the Piræus, plundering the shops, and disappearing as rapidly with ample spoil. The Athenians replied by making a close defensive and offensive alliance with the federal state of the Thessalians. The stone of the treaty is preserved. The allies of both parties are included. The Thessalians bind themselves not to conclude the war against Alexander without the Athenians, and the Athenians in like wise "without the president (archon) and league of the Thessalians"; and the treasurers of Athens are directed to pull down the stêlê on which the former alliance with Alexander had been inscribed.

*Condemna-
tion and
exile of
Calli-
stratus.*

But the Athenians vented their indignation within their own walls. Since the capture of Oropus there had been signs of smouldering discontent at the conduct of affairs. Callistratus had been indicted and acquitted in the matter of Oropus; but his credit had been roughly shaken, and Alexander's insult to the city at her very doors excited the popular wrath to such a pitch that the statesman as well as the defeated admiral was condemned to death, and escaped only by a timely flight. Thus the ablest Athenian statesman of the fourth century passed from the stage, and no sympathy followed him. Some years later he ventured to return from his Macedonian exile, hoping that the wrath of his countrymen would have passed away. Their wrath had passed, but it had not been replaced by regret. On reaching Athens he sought the refuge of suppliants at the altar of the Twelve Gods; but no voice was raised to save him, and the executioner carried out the doom of the people. The Athenians were always austere masters of their statesmen, and it sometimes appears to us—though in truth we seldom have sufficient knowledge of the circumstances to justify a confident judgment—that they unreasonably expected an ingathering where no seed had been sown.

*The
Thracian
Chersonese.*

The public indignation which had been aroused by the daring stroke of the tyrant of Pherae was enhanced by the bad tidings which came from Thrace. King Cotys, the reviver

of the Odrysian power, had succeeded in laying hold of Sestos and almost the whole peninsula which guards the entrance to the Propontis, in spite of the Athenian fleet. Soon afterwards the old king was murdered and his realm was divided among his three sons. This change was advantageous to Athens, as she could play off one Thracian prince against another. The territory on the Propontis fell to Cersobleptes, who was supported by the Euboean Charidemus, a mercenary captain who had frequently been employed in the service of Athens, and had married, like Iphicrates, a daughter of the Thracian king. Cersobleptes engaged to hand over to Athens the entire Chersonese, except Cardia, "the enemy of Athens," which was to remain independent. But there was no fleet on the spot to enforce the immediate fulfilment of the promise; and, when an admiral was presently sent out, he was defeated by Charidemus. At length a capable man was sent, Chares, a daring, dissolute, and experienced son of Ares, who speedily captured Sestos and punished the inhabitants for their unfaithfulness by an unmerciful slaughter. Cersobleptes was forced to change his attitude, and the peninsula was recovered. The Athenians, adopting the same policy which they had followed in Samos, sent outsettlers to the Chersonese. In the same year Euboea was won back to the Athenian league, and there even seemed a fair prospect of accomplishing what of all things would have rejoiced them most, the recovery of long-lost Amphipolis. But their new scheme against Amphipolis may be said to open, in a certain way, a new chapter in the history of Greece.

*Death of
King Cotys,
360-59.*

*Cerso-
bleptes
and his
brothers
succeed
Cotys.*

*357 B.C.
Recovery of
the Chersu-
nesus and
settlement
of cleru-
ches.*

*Recovery of
Euboea,
357 B.C.*

SECT. 2. PHILIP II. OF MACEDONIA

The man for whom Macedonia had waited long came at last. We have met once and again in the course of our history kings of that ambiguous country—Hellenic, and yet not Hellenic: Alexander playing a double part at Plataea; Perdiccas playing, with consummate skill, a double part in the war of Sparta and Athens. But now the hour of Macedonia has come, and we must look more closely at the cradle of the power which was destined to change the face not only of the Greek but of the oriental world.

Macedonia.

In their fortress of Aegae the Macedonian kings had ruled for ages with absolute sway over the lands on the northern and north-western coasts of the Thermaic Gulf, which formed Macedonia in the strictest sense. The Macedonian people and their kings were of Greek stock, as their traditions and the scanty remains of their language combine to testify. They were a military people, and they extended their power westward and northward over the peoples of the hills, so that Macedonia in a wider sense reached to the borders of the Illyrians in the west and of the Paeonians in the north. These hill tribes, the Orestians, Lyncestians, and others, belonged to the Illyrian race, and they were ever seeking to cast off the bond of subjection which attached them to the kings of Aegae. In Illyria and Paeonia they had allies who were generally ready to support them in rebellion; and the dangers which Macedonia had constantly to encounter and always to dread from half-subjugated vassals and warlike enemies had effectually hindered her hitherto from playing any conspicuous part in the Greek world.

King Archelaus.

Thus the Macedonian kingdom consisted of two heterogeneous parts, and the Macedonian kings had two different characters. Over the Greek Macedonians of the coast the king ruled immediately; they were his own people, his own "Companions." Over the Illyric folks of the hills he was only overlord; they were each subject to its own chieftain, and the chieftains were his unruly vassals. It is clear that Macedonia could never become a great power until these vassal peoples had been completely tamed and brought under the direct rule of the kings, and until the Illyrian and Paeonian neighbours had been taught a severe lesson. These were the tasks which awaited the man who should make Macedonia. The kings had made some efforts to introduce Greek civilisation into their land. Archelaus, who succeeded Perdiccas, had been a builder and a roadmaker, and, following the example of Greek tyrants, he had succeeded in making his court at Pella a centre for famous artists and poets. Euripides the tragic poet, Timotheus the most eminent leader of a new school of music, Zeuxis the painter, and many another, may have found pleasure and relief in a change from the highly civilised cities of the south to a new and fresher

atmosphere, where there were no politicians. It is sometimes said that Macedonia was still in the Homeric stage of development. There is truth in this; but the position of the monarch was different from that of the Homeric king. No law bound the Macedonian monarch; his will was binding on his subjects; and against him they had perhaps only one solitary right. In the case of a capital charge, the king could not put a Macedonian to death without the authority of a general Assembly. This was the charter of Macedonian liberty. Fighting and hunting were the chief occupations of this vigorous people. A Macedonian who had not killed his man wore a cord round his waist; and until he had slain a wild boar he could not sit at table with the men. Like the Thracians, they drank deep; Bacchic mysteries had been introduced; it was in Macedonian air, on the banks of Lake Ludias, that Euripides drew inspiration for his *Bacchæ*.

We have seen how Perdiccas slew his guardian and step-father Ptolemy and reigned alone. Six years later the Illyrians swooped down upon Macedonia, and the king was slain in battle. It was a critical moment for the kingdom; the land was surrounded by enemies, for the Paeonians at the same time menaced it in the north, and from the east a Thracian army was advancing to set a pretender on the throne. The rightful heir, Amyntas, the son of the slain king, was a child. But there was one man in the land who was equal to the situation—this child's uncle, Philip; and he took the government and the guardianship of the boy into his own hands. We have already met Philip as one of the hostages who were carried off to Thebes. He had lived there for a few years, and drunk in the military and political wisdom of Epaminondas and Pelopidas. We know not why he was allowed to return to his home soon after the death of Ptolemy; perhaps it was thought that his affections had been firmly won by Thebes and that he would be more useful to her in Macedonia.

Philip was twenty-four years old when he was called upon to rescue his country and the dynasty of his own house. The danger consisted in the number of his enemies,—foreign invaders, and domestic pretenders, and pretenders supported by foreign powers. Philip's first step was to buy off the

Perdiccas
sole king,
365 B.C.;

slain
359 B.C.

Philip,
guardian
of
Amyntas,
359 B.C.

Philip
returns to
Macedonia,
364 B.C.

Philip dis-
poses of the
pretenders,
359 B.C.;

Paeonians by a large sum of money, his next to get rid of the pretenders. One of these, Argaeus, was assisted by Athens with a strong fleet. Philip defeated him, and did all in his power to come to terms with Athens. He released without ransom the Athenians whom he had made prisoners in the battle; and he renounced all claim to the possession of Amphipolis, which his brother king Perdiccas had occupied with a garrison. Gold easily induced the Thracians to desert the pretender whom they had come forth to support.

But the Paeonians were quieted only for the moment, and the Illyrians were still in the land, besetting Macedonian towns. It was necessary to deal with these enemies once for all, and to assert decisively the military power of Macedon. Philip had new ideas on the art of war, and he spent the winter in remodelling and training his army. When the springtide came round, he had 10,000 foot-soldiers and 600 horsemen, thoroughly disciplined and of great physical strength. With this force he marched against the Paeonians and quelled them in a single battle. He then turned against the Illyrians, who refused to evacuate the towns they held in the Lyncestian territory. A great battle was fought, in which Philip tested his new military ideas; the Illyrians left 7000 on the field; and the vassals of the highlands, who had supported the invaders, were reduced to abject submission.

*defeats the
Paeonians,
358 B.C.
(spring);
the
Illyrians,
358 B.C.*

When he had thus established his power over his dependencies and cleared the land of foes, Philip lost little time in pushing eastward, on the side of Thrace. The motive for this rapid advance was the imperative necessity of obtaining gold. Without gold Philip could not develop his country or carry out his military schemes; the Macedonians were not a commercial folk; and therefore his prospects depended on possessing land which produced the precious ore. In Mount Pangaeus on his eastern frontier there were rich sources of gold; and, incited by him, a number of people from the opposite island of Thasos, where the art of mining was well understood, had crossed over to Crenides on that mountain and formed a settlement. But in order to control the new mines it was indispensable to become master of the great fortress on the Strymon, the much-coveted Amphipolis. The interests of Philip thus came into direct collision with the

*Thasian
settlement
at
Crenides,
359 B.C.*

interests of Athens. Here Philip revealed his skill in diplomacy. When he released the Athenian prisoners, he professed to resign all claim to Amphipolis; and on this basis he negotiated a peace with Athens. When the treaty was concluded, a secret article was agreed upon, by which Philip undertook to conquer Amphipolis for Athens, and Athens undertook to surrender to him the free town of Pydna. It is probable that this secret engagement was not made until Philip had actually attacked Amphipolis, and the Amphipolitans—preferring Athens to Macedon—had sent a request for Athenian succour. The moment was inconvenient, as the forces of Athens could not be spared from the Chersonese; and the Athenians, failing to grasp the situation, trusted the promises of Philip. Of course Philip deceived them, and they deserve no sympathy; for their own part of the agreement was a shameful act of treachery to Pydna, their ally. Their orators might cry out against the perfidy of the Macedonian; but the truth is that they thought to make Philip a tool of their own designs and he showed them that in diplomacy he was not their dupe but their master.

*Philip's
treaty with
Athens,
and secret
agreement.*

*Philip
attacks
Amphi-
polis.
357 B.C.*

When Philip had taken Amphipolis, he converted the Thasian settlement of Crenides into a great fortress, which he called after his own name, Philippi. He had thus two strong stations to secure Mount Pangaeus; and the yield of the gold mines, which were soon actively worked, amounted at least to 1000 talents a year. No Greek state was so rich. The old capital, Aegae or Edessa, was now definitely abandoned, and the seat of government was established at Pella, the favourite residence of Archelaus. This coming down from Aegae to Pella is significant of the opening of a new epoch in Macedonian history.

Not long afterwards Philip captured Pydna. If the seizure of Amphipolis was an injury to Athens, the capture of Pydna was an insult. He then took Potidaea, but instead of keeping it for himself, handed it over to the Olynthians, to whom he also ceded Anthemus. The Olynthians, alarmed by his operations on the Strymon, had made proposals to Athens for common action against Macedon. The Athenians, trusting Philip, had rejected the overtures. But when they found that they had been duped, they would have been ready and glad to co-operate with Olynthus; and it was to prevent

*Philip
takes
Pydna and
Potidaea,
c. B.C. 356;
his alliance
with
Olynthus.*

such a combination that Philip dexterously propitiated the Olynthians—intending to devour them on some future day. With the exception of Methone, the Athenians had no foothold now on the coasts of the Thermaic Gulf.

*Defeat of
Illyrians,
356 B.C.,
autumn.*

They formed alliances¹ with the Thracians of the west, who were indignant at the Macedonian occupation of Crenides, and with the Paeonian and Illyrian kings, who were smarting under their recent discomfitures. But Philip prevented the common action of the allies. He forced the Paeonians to become his vassals; his ablest general—his only general, he used to say himself—Parmenio inflicted another overwhelming defeat on the Illyrians; and the Thracians, again bought off, renounced their rights to Mount Pangaeus.

*The making
of
Macedonia.*

But the successes cost Philip little. Having established his mining town, he assumed the royal title, setting his nephew aside, and devoted himself during the next few years to the consolidation of his kingdom, and the creation of a national army. It was in these years that he made Macedonia. His task, as has been already indicated, was to unite the hill tribes, along with his own Macedonians of the coast, into one nation. The means by which he accomplished this was military organisation. He made the highlanders into professional soldiers and kept them always under arms. Caught by the infection of the military spirit, seduced by the motives of emulation and ambition, they were to forget that they were Orestians or Lyncestians, and blend into a single homogeneous Macedonian people. To complete this consummation would be a work of years, but Philip conceived the project clearly and set about it at once. "A professional army with a national spirit—that was the new idea." Both infantry and cavalry were indeed organised in territorial regiments; perhaps Philip could not have ventured at first on any other system. But common pride and common desire of promotion, common hope of victory, tended to obliterate these distinctions, and they were done away with under Philip's son. The heavy cavalry were called "Companions" of the king and "Royal" soldiers, and they were more honourable than the infantry. Among the

Hetairoi.

¹ A treaty of alliance in summer 356, between Athens, the Thracian king Cetriporis and his brothers (these were the nephews of Cersobleptes and ruled in western Thrace), Lyppaeos the Paeonian, and Grabos the Illyrian, is extant.

infantry there was one body of "Royal" guards, the silver-shielded *Hypaspistae*. *Argyrosphides.*

The famous Macedonian phalanx, which Philip drilled, was merely a modified form of the usual battle-line of Greek spearmen. *The phalanx.* The men in the phalanx stood freer, in a more open array, and used a longer spear; so that the whole line, though still cumbrous enough, was more easily wielded, and the effect was produced not merely by the sheer pressure of a heavy mass of men but by the skilful manipulation of weapons. Nor was the phalanx intended to decide a battle, like the deep columns of Epaminondas; its function was to keep the front of the foe in play, while the cavalry, in wedge-like squadrons, rode into the flanks. It was by these tactics that Philip had won his victory over the Illyrians.

But Greece paid little heed to the things which Philip was doing. The Athenians might indeed encourage his Illyrian and Paeonian enemies, and urge the Thracians to drive him from Mount Pangaeus, but though he had outwitted them, they could not yet see that he was an enemy of a different stamp from a Cotys or a Cersobleptes; having managed Macedonia for a hundred years, they had little fear that as soon as they had the time to spare they would easily manage it again. When Philip married Olympias, the daughter of an Epirot prince, the event could cause no sensation; the birth of a son a year later stirred no man's heart in Greece; for who, in his wildest dreams, could have foreseen in the Macedonian infant the greatest conqueror who had yet been born into the world? *Birth of Alexander, c. Oct. 356 B.C.* If it had been revealed to men in that autumn that a power had started up which was to guide history into new paths, they would have turned their eyes not to Pella but to Halicarnassus.

SECT. 3. MAUSOLUS OF CARIA.

Caria, like Macedonia, was peopled by a double race, the native Carians and the Greek settlers on the coast. But the native Carians were further removed than the Illyrians from the Greeks: the Illyrians spoke a tongue of the same Indo-Germanic stock as the Greeks; the Carians belonged to an older race which held the region of the Aegean before Greeks and Illyrians came. Yet the Carians were in closer touch

Hecatomnus,
c. 395-90
to 377 B.C.

Extra-constitutional position of the Carian tyrants.

with Greece than the Greeks of Macedonia. The Greeks of Caria were always abreast of Greek civilisation, and they had assimilated and tutored the natives of the land. Tralles and Mylasa were to all appearance Greek towns; Greek was the dominant language of the country. A province of the Persian empire, Caria had yet a certain independent bond of union among her cities in an Amphictionic League which met in the temple of Zeus at Lagina. It was a religious union, though it might be used for purposes of common political action. But political unity was given to Caria not by federation but by monarchy. A citizen of Mylasa named Hecatomnus succeeded in establishing his rule over the whole land, soon after the death of Tissaphernes, and the Great King esteemed it his most prudent policy to acknowledge the "dynast of Caria" as his official satrap. Both Hecatomnus and his son Mausolus,¹ who succeeded to his power, never failed to pay their tribute to the treasury of Susa or to display the becoming submission to the Persian king; only once—as we have seen—when all the western satraps rebelled, did Mausolus fall short in his loyalty. The Carian Dynasts—they never assumed the royal title—thus secured for themselves a free hand. With the constitutions of the Carian cities their sovereignty did not interfere. Thus even in their own city, Mylasa, the popular Assembly still passes decrees, and these decrees are ratified not by Mausolus but by the "Three Tribes"—perhaps a sort of aristocratic council. In fact Hecatomnus and Mausolus held in relation to the Carian states an analogous position to that which Pisistratus and his sons held in the Athenian state; they were the actual rulers but officially they did not exist. The differences were that the Carian dynast held the official position of Persian satrap, and was "tyrant" of a number of states which were independent of each other.

These native satraps brought the Greek towns of the coast, Halicarnassus, Iasus, Cnidus, perhaps Miletus itself, gradually under their power; and Mausolus annexed the neighbouring land of Lycia. Thus at the time of Philip's accession to the throne of Macedonia, a rich and ambitious monarchy had arisen on the south-eastern shores of the Aegean. To develop

¹ The true form is Maussóllōs, but for literary purposes Mausolus is consecrated by *Mausoleum*.

his power, it was desirable for Mausolus to win the lordship of the islands adjacent to his coasts, and it was clearly necessary to form a strong navy. The change of the satrap's residence from inland Mylasa to Halicarnassus on the sea is thus politically significant; Caria was to become a sea-power. Mausolus built himself a strong castle on the little island of Zephyrion in front of the city, and constructed two harbours, one for ships of war, the other for ships of trade.

The great islands of Rhodes, Cos, and Chios, which Mausolus especially coveted, belonged to the Athenian alliance. But recently there was much discontent at the Athenian supremacy, and there were good grounds for this feeling. The reversion to the policy of cleruchies in neighbouring Samos, as well as in distant Potidaea, excited apprehensions for the future; and the exactions of the rapacious and irresponsible mercenaries whom Athens regularly employed, but did not regularly pay, caused many complaints. There were moreover strong oligarchical parties in these states which would be glad to sever connexion with Athens. The scheme of the Carian prince was first to induce these islands to detach themselves from Athens and then to bring them under his own sway. He fanned the flame of discontent, and the three islands jointly revolted from the Athenian alliance and were supported by Byzantium.

*Revolt of
Chios, Cos,
and
Rhodes,
357 B.C.*

Athens immediately sent naval forces to Chios under Chabrias and Chares, two of the generals of the year, and the town was attacked by land and sea. But in trying to enter the harbour, Chabrias, who led the way, was assailed on all sides and fell fighting. Thus the Athenians lost the most gallant of their soldiers—a commander of whom it was said that he never spared himself and always spared his men. The attack on Chios was abandoned, and the Chians, much elated, and commanding a fleet of 100 ships, proceeded to aggressive warfare against the outsettlers of Athens, and blockaded Samos. With only sixty ships Chares could do nothing; and as many more were hastily sent under the command of Timotheus and Iphicrates. Under three such generals much might be expected from such a fleet; but more would probably have been accomplished under any one of them alone. They relieved Samos and made an unsuccessful

*Athenian
attack on
Chios;
death of
Chabrias,
357 B.C.*

356 B.C.

*Battle of
Embata.*

diversion to the Propontis, hoping to take Byzantium. Then they sailed to Chios, and concerted a plan of attack in the strait between the island and the mainland. But the day proved stormy, and the two veteran admirals, Iphicrates and Timotheus, deemed that it would be rash to fight. Chares, however, against their judgment, attacked the enemy, and being unsupported was repulsed with loss.

*Trial of
Timotheus
and Iphi-
crates,*

355 B.C.(?).

The ineffectual operations of two such tried and famous generals were a cruel disappointment to the Athenians, who had given them an adequate fleet. Chares, furious at the behaviour of his colleagues, formally accused them of deliberate treachery, and was supported by the orator Aristophon. The charge was that they had received bribes from the Chians and the Rhodians. Counter-charges were brought against Chares by Timotheus and Iphicrates, but the sympathies of Athens were altogether given to the commander who erred on the side of boldness. Iphicrates, however, had less political influence and therefore fewer enemies than Timotheus, and he knew how to conciliate the people; he was accordingly acquitted.

*Condemna-
tion of
Timotheus*

(£27,000);

his death.

Timotheus, always haughty and unpopular, probably assumed a posture as haughty and unbending as ever, Aristophon probably pressed him hard, and he was fined 100 talents. Rich as he was, he was unable to pay this enormous sum, and he withdrew to Chalcis where he died soon afterwards. Thus within twelve months the Athenians lost the two men, Chabrias and Timotheus, who had built up their second empire. They afterwards recognised that the measure which they had dealt out to Timotheus was hard, and they permitted his son—who had himself been tried and acquitted on the same charge—to settle the fine by a payment of ten talents.

*Chares in
Asia
Minor,*

355 B.C.

Chares now went forth as sole commander to sustain the war against the recreant allies; but he went unfurnished with money to pay his troops. He found the means of supplying this deficiency in the disturbed state of Asia Minor. The satrap of Hellespontine Phrygia, Artabazus, had rebelled, but was not strong enough to hold his own against the king's troops. Chares came to his rescue, gained a brilliant victory over the satraps who were arrayed against him, and received from the grateful Artabazus money which enabled him to pay and maintain the army. The victory and the money pleased

the Athenians, but Artaxerxes was deeply incensed. The news presently reached Athens that the Great King was equipping a vast armament in Syria and Cilicia to avenge the audacity of Chares. How much truth there was in this report it is impossible to say; but it evoked an outburst of patriotism and supplied the Athenian orators with material for invectives and declamations. Men began to talk in earnest of realising the dream of Isocrates, of convoking a pan-Hellenic congress and arming Hellas against the barbarian. Demosthenes, who was now beginning to rise into public notice, delivered in these days a speech which was more to the point than many of his later more famous orations. He showed that the alarm was premature; and that the notion of sending round appeals to the cities of Greece was foolish; "your envoys will do nothing more than rhapsodise in their round of visits." The truth was that Athens could in no case think of embarking at this juncture in a big war; she had not the means. Isocrates himself raised his voice for peace in a remarkable pamphlet, distinguished by the nobility of tone and the width of view which always mark his writings. It was a scathing condemnation of Imperialism. Passing from the momentary state of affairs, he looked out into the future and boldly declared that the only salvation for Athens lay in giving up her naval empire. "It is that," he said, "which brought us to this pass; it is that which caused the fall of our democracy." He showed the calamities which the empires of Athens and Sparta had drawn upon themselves and Greece. But it is to be observed that, when a moment had come at which his favourite plan of a common attack on Persia seemed at length feasible, he was wise enough not to advise it. He looks to Thrace, not to Persia, to find lands for endowing those needy Greeks who were roving about for subsistence.

*Demosthenes' speech
On the Symmories.*

*Isocrates on the Peace,
355 B.C.*

(404 B.C.)

In the end prudent counsels prevailed; Chares was recalled; negotiations were opened with the revolted allies, and a peace was made.¹ Athens recognised the independence of the three islands, Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, and of the city of Byzantium. It was not long before Lesbos also severed itself

*Peace,
354 B.C.*

¹ The war which this peace brought to an end is generally called, by a misleading translation of *ὁ συμμαχικός πόλεμος*, the Social War. This Latinism might well disappear from histories.

from the Athenian alliance, which thus lost all its important members in the eastern Aegean; and in the west Coreyra fell away about the same time.

*Death of
Mausolus,
353 B.C.*

353 B.C.

All happened as Mausolus foresaw. He helped the oligarchies to overthrow the popular governments, and then gave them the protection of Carian garrisons. But the prince did not live to develop his empire. Soon after the success of his policy against Athens, he died, leaving his power to his widow Artemisia. The opportunity was seized by the democrats of Rhodes to regain their freedom, and they appealed to Athens. After what had passed they had little right to expect a hearing; and under the influence of the wise and pacific statesmen who now controlled the Assembly, their appeal was refused—in spite of the hot and somewhat sentimental pleadings of Demosthenes, who upheld the extraordinary doctrine that Athens was bound, whenever she was called upon, to intervene to support democracy against oligarchy. Artemisia soon recovered her grip on Rhodes.

*The statues
of Mau-
solus and
Artemisia
(in the
British
Museum).*

*The tomb
of Mau-
solus.*

*Sculptures
(in British
Museum).*

Caria remained for another twenty years under dynasts of the house of Hecatomnus, until it submitted to Alexander the Great. The expansion of the Carian power, which seemed probable under the active administration of Mausolus, was never fulfilled. Though we know nothing of his personal character, the outward appearance of Mausolus is familiar to us, the islanders of the north, who possess in our capital his genuine portrait, and the headless figure of his queen. The colossal statue, made, at latest, soon after his death, represents a man of a noble cast of face, of a type presumably Carian, certainly not Greek, and with the hair curiously brushed back from the brow. This statue stood, along with that of Artemisia, within the sepulchral tomb which he probably began and which she certainly completed. Such a royal tomb seems to take us back to the days of prehistoric Greece; it strikes one almost like a glorified resurrection of one of the old chamber sepulchres of the Leleges which are strewn about the Halicarnassian peninsula. It rose above the harbour at Halicarnassus, conspicuous from the sea, crowned with a chariot on its apex. The building was adorned with friezes, wrought by four of the most illustrious sculptors of the day, of whom Scopas himself was one. The precious fragments

of these works of art are the legacy which the Carian realm *Origin of*
 has bequeathed to mankind—these and a new word which the *“Mau-soleum.”*
 tomb of Mausolus added to the vocabularies of Europe.

SECT. 4. PHOCIS AND THE SACRED WAR

In the meantime, another of the states of northern Greece seemed likely to win the position of supremacy which Thessaly had seemed on the eve of winning, and which Boeotia had actually held for a few years. Phocis now came forward in her turn and enjoyed a brief moment of expansion and conquest—a flashlight which vanished almost as soon as it appeared. In succession to the national leaders, Jason of Pherae and Epaminondas of Thebes, we now meet Onomarchus of Elatea.

Into this career of aggrandisement Phocis was thrust by *Position of*
 the aggression of her neighbours rather than lured by the lust *Phocis.*
 of conquest. The Phocians had never been zealous adherents of the Boeotian alliance, which they were forced to join after the battle of Leuctra, and they cut themselves loose from it after the death of Epaminondas. But, though Thebes could no longer maintain her wider supremacy in Greece, an independent Phocis was a source of constant danger to her in her narrower supremacy in Boeotia, as the western cities of the land could always find in Phocis a stay and support for their own independence. It was therefore deemed necessary by the politicians of Thebes to strike a blow at their western neighbours. One of the instruments of which Epaminondas had made use to promote his city's influence in the north was the old Amphictionic League, which for a hundred years had never appeared on the scene of history. At an assembly of this body, soon after Leuctra, the Thebans accused the Spartans of having seized the Cadmea in time of peace. The Spartans were sentenced to pay a fine of 500 talents; *Sparta*
 the fine could not indeed be exacted, but they were doubtless *fined.*
 excluded from the temple of Delphi. The Thebans resolved to wield against Phocis the same engine which they had wielded against Sparta. The nature of the pretext is uncertain, but it was not difficult to find a misdemeanour which would seem grave enough to the Thessalians and Locrians, inveterate

*Phocians
fined.*

enemies of Phocis, to justify a sentence of condemnation. A number of rich and prominent Phocians were condemned to pay large fines for sacrilege, and when these sums were not paid within the prescribed time, the Amphictions decreed that the lands of the defaulters should be taken from them and consecrated to the Delphian god, and a tablet with the inscribed decree was set up at Delphi.

Philomelus.

The men who were implicated in the alleged sacrilege determined to resist, and they appealed to their fellow-countrymen, in whatever form of federal assembly the Phocian cities used to discuss their common interests, to protect themselves and their property against the threatened danger. The man who took the lead in organising the resistance was Philomelus, a wealthy citizen of Ledon. He discerned clearly that mercenaries would be required to defend Phocis against her enemies—Boeotians, Locrians, and Thessalians—and made the bold and practical proposal that Delphi should be seized, since the treasures of Delphi would supply at need the sinews of war. It is hardly likely that he openly avowed the true reason of the importance of seizing Delphi; it was enough to assert the old rights of the Phocians over rocky Pytho—rights for which he could appeal to the highest authority, the sacred text of Homer¹—and to point out that the Delphians were implicated in the unjust decrees of the Amphictions. The proposals of Philomelus were adopted, and he was appointed general of the Phocian forces, with full powers. His first step was to visit Sparta, not only as the enemy of Thebes, but as being in the same case as Phocis, lying under an Amphictionic sentence which had recently been renewed and confirmed. King Archidamus welcomed the proposals of the Phocian plenipotentiary, but Sparta stood in a rather awkward position. Hitherto she had always supported the Delphians in maintaining their independence against Phocian claims, as, for instance, when in the days of Pericles she restored them to their shrine after the Phocians with Athenian aid had dispossessed them. It would consequently have been a flagrant inconsistency in Spartan policy to turn against the Delphians now; so that Archidamus did not openly avow his

450 B.C.
sqq.

¹ In the Homeric Catalogue, Pytho is said to be possessed by two Phocian chiefs (*Iliad*, 2. 517-9).

sympathy with the Phocian cause, but privately he supported it by placing fifteen talents in the hands of Philomelus. With this sum and fifteen talents from his own purse, ^{Phocians seize Delphi, c. 356 B.C.} Philomelus was able to hire some mercenaries, and with their help to seize Delphi. The Locrians of neighbouring Amphissa, whom the Delphians had summoned to their aid, arrived too late and were repulsed. Philomelus did no hurt to the people of Delphi, excepting only the clan of the Thracidae, bitter anti-Phocians, whom he put to death.

The first object of Philomelus was to enlist Hellenic opinion in his favour. He had the secret sympathy of Sparta, and he might count on the friendship of Athens, who had always been an ally of Phocis and was now an enemy of Thebes. He sent envoys to Sparta, to Athens, to Thebes itself, to explain the Phocian position. These envoys were instructed to say that in seizing Delphi the Phocians were simply resuming their rights over the temple, which belonged to them and had been usurped by others, and to declare that they would act merely as administrators of the Panhellenic Sanctuary, and were ready to allow all the treasures to be weighed and numbered, and to be responsible to Greece for their safety. In consequence of these embassies Sparta came ^{Phocis supported by Sparta and others.} forward from her reserve and openly allied herself with Phocis, while Athens and some smaller states promised their support. The Thebans and their Amphictionic friends resolved to make war.

In the meantime, Philomelus had fortified the Delphic ^{Philomelus fortifies Delphi;} sanctuary by a wall, and had collected an army of 5000 men, with which he could easily hold the position. It was his wish that the oracular responses from the mystic tripod should continue to be given as usual to those who came to consult Apollo, and he was anxious above all to receive some voice of approval or encouragement from the god. But the Delphian priestess was stubborn to the Phocian intruder, and refused to prophesy. He tried to seat her by force upon the tripod, and in her alarm she bade him do as he would. He eagerly seized these words as an oracular sanction of his acts. It soon became necessary to raise more money for paying the mercenaries, and for this purpose Philomelus, refraining as long as he could from touching the treasures of the shrine,

*and defeats
the Loc-
rians.*

levied a contribution from the rich Delphians. At first he had to deal only with the Locrians, whom he finally defeated in a hot battle near the Phaedriad cliffs which rise sheer above Delphi. The loss of the Locrians was heavy; some of them, driven to the edge, hurled themselves down the cliffs.

*Thebes pre-
pares to act.*

This victory forced the Thebans to prepare actively to intervene. The Amphictionic assembly met at Thermopylae, and it was decided that an Amphictionic army should enforce the decree of the league against the Phocians, and rescue Delphi from their power. Philomelus, with the forces which he had, might hold his own against the Locrians, but not against the host which would now be arrayed against him. There were only two means of saving Phocis. One was the active support of Athens or Sparta, or both; the other was the organisation of a large army of mercenaries. As neither Athens nor Sparta showed willingness to give any immediate assistance, nothing remained but the other alternative. And that alternative, as Philomelus must have foreseen from the beginning, would not be possible without the control of far larger sums of money than could either be contributed by the Phocian cities or extorted from the Delphian proprietors. No resource remained but to make use of the treasures of the temple. At first Philomelus was scrupulous. He only *borrowed* from the god enough to meet the demand of the moment; but, as habitude blunted the first feelings of scrupulousness, and as needs grew more pressing, the Phocians dealt as freely with the sacred vessels and the precious dedications as if they were their own. By offering large pay Philomelus assembled an army of 10,000 men, who cared little whence the money came. An indecisive war with the Thebans and Locrians was waged for some time, till at length the Phocians underwent a severe defeat near Neon on the north side of Mount Parnassus. The general fought desperately, and, covered with wounds, he was driven to the verge of a precipice where he had to choose between capture and self-destruction. He hurled himself from the cliff and perished.

*Battle of
Neon,
354 B.C.;
death of
Philo-
melus.*

The Thebans imagined that the death of Philomelus meant the doom of the Phocian cause, and they retired after the

battle. But it was not so. In Onomarchus of Elatea, who had been associated with him in the command of the army, he had a successor as able as himself. The retreat of the enemy gave Onomarchus time to reorganise the troops and collect reinforcements; and he not only coined the gold and silver ornaments of the temple, but beat the bronze and iron donatives into arms for the soldiers. He then entered upon a short career of signal successes. Westward, he forced Locrian Amphissa to submit; to northward he reduced Doris, and crossing the passes of Mount Oeta he made himself master of Thermopylae, and captured the Locrian Thronion near the eastern gate of the pass. Eastward, he took possession of Orchomenus and restored those of the inhabitants who had escaped the sword of the Thebans ten years before.

The Thebans meanwhile were hampered by want of money, and, having neither mines like Philip nor a rich temple like Phocis, they decided to replenish their treasury by sending out a body of troops on foreign service. We have already seen Sparta and Athens raising money by the same means, and the Theban soldiers who now went forth under Pammenes hired themselves out to the same Persian satrap Artabazus, for whom the Athenian Chares had won a victory over the army of the king. Pammenes was equally successful, but it does not seem that his expedition profited the Boeotian treasury; for he presently became suspected by Artabazus, who threw him into prison.

Among the most important uses to which Onomarchus applied the gold of Delphi was the purchase of the alliance of the tyrants of Pherae. By this policy Thessaly was divided; and the Thessalian league, beset by the hostility of Pherae, was unable to co-operate with the Thebans against Phocis. But the Thessalians, being hard pressed, turned for help to their northern neighbour, Philip of Macedon, and his intervention south of Mount Olympus marks a new stage in the course of the Sacred War.

Philip had lately deprived Athens of her last ally on the Thermaic Gulf by the capture of Methone, the Athenian expedition of relief coming too late to save it. He readily acceded to the request of the Thessalians to act as their general; it was a convenient occasion to begin the push south-

Onomarchus succeeds Philomelus.

Philip's capture of Methone, 353 B.C. He enters Thessaly;

*defeats a
Phocian
army :*

*suffers two
defeats and
is expelled
from
Thessaly by
Onomarchus.*

*Height of
the
Phocian
supremacy,
353-2 B.C.*

Coronea.

*Philip
drives the
Phocians
from
Thessaly.*

ward, and lay the foundation of Macedonian supremacy in Greece, plans which were now coming within the range of practical effort. Against the forces which Philip led to the support of the Thessalian league, it was hopeless for Lycophron of Pherae to stand alone; the tyrant was lost unless he were succoured by the arm of those who had already furnished him with gold. Nor did the Phocians leave him unsupported. The strength of Onomarchus was now so great that he could spare a force of 7000 men for a campaign in the north. But his brother Phayllus, to whom he entrusted the command, was beaten out of Thessaly by Philip. Then Onomarchus went forth himself, at the head of the whole Phocian host (about 20,000), to rescue his ally. Far superior in numbers, he defeated the Macedonian army in two battles with serious loss; Philip was compelled to withdraw into Macedonia; and Onomarchus delivered Thessaly into the hands of Lycophron.

At this moment, the power of the Phocians was at its height. Their supremacy reached from the shores of the Corinthian Gulf to the slopes of Olympus. They were masters of the pass of Thermopylae, and they had two important posts in western Boeotia, for, in addition to Orchomenus, they won Coronea immediately after the Thessalian expedition. If all these things had befallen at some other epoch, the Phocian power might have endured for a time, and the name of their able leader might have been more familiar to posterity. But Onomarchus had fallen on evil days. He and his petty people were swept away in the onward course of a greater nation and a greater chief.

Philip of Macedon speedily retrieved the humiliation which he had suffered at the hands of his Phocian foes. In the following year he descended again into Thessaly, and Onomarchus went forth again to succour his ally or dependent. In the preceding campaign Philip had captured the port of Pagasae, and placed in it a Macedonian garrison. It was important not only for Pherae, but for Athens, that this post should not remain in his hands, and Chares was sent with an Athenian fleet to assist the Phocians in recovering it. The decisive battle was fought at a place unknown, near the Pagasaeon Gulf. The numbers of the infantry were nearly

equal, but Philip's cavalry and his tactics were far superior. More than a third of the Phocian army was slain or made prisoners, and Onomarchus was killed. Phœræ was then captured and Lycophron driven from the land; and Philip, having thus become master of Thessaly, prepared to march southward for the purpose of delivering the shrine of Apollo from the possession of the Phocians, whom he professed to regard as sacrilegious usurpers.

Phocis was now in great need, and her allies—Sparta, Achæa, and Athens—at length determined to give her active help. The Macedonian must not be permitted to pass Thermopylae. The statesman Eubulus, whose influence was now predominant at Athens, and was chiefly directed to the maintenance of peace, acted promptly on this occasion, and sent a large force under Nausicles to defend the pass. Philip at once recognised that it would be extremely hazardous to attempt to force the position, and he retired. He was a prince who knew when to wait and when to strike. Thus Phocis was rescued for the time; she was indebted to Sparta and Achæa who had sent her aid, but most of all to Athens.

In supporting Phocis, the Spartans had objects of their own in view. They had not abandoned their hopes of winning back Messenia and destroying Megalopolis. It was therefore their policy to sustain Phocis, in order that Phocis might keep Thebes so fully occupied that they would have a free hand in the Peloponnesus without fear of Theban interference. The successes of Onomarchus in his first Thessalian campaign encouraged Sparta to prepare for action, and Megalopolis, made aware of the danger, applied to Athens for help. It was a request which no practical statesman could have entertained, and it had no chance of being granted under the régime of as wise a head as Eubulus. Orators like Demosthenes, who constituted themselves the opponents of Eubulus, might invoke the old principle that it was the policy of Athens to keep Sparta weak. But this was an obsolete maxim, for there was now no serious prospect of Sparta becoming formidably strong. It was no concern of Athens to meddle in the Peloponnesus now. Her true policy was to keep on friendly terms with Sparta, and, in conjunction with her, to support the

*Eubulus
rescues
Phocis.*

*Megalopolis
applies to
Athens,
end of
353 B.C.*

*Demosthenes'
speech for
the Megalopolitans.*

Phocian state against Thebes, Thessaly, and Macedon. This was the policy which Eubulus followed.

*War in
the Peloponnesus,
352 B.C.*

The war broke out in the Peloponnesus soon after the check of Philip at Thermopylae. While Athens held aloof, Achaea and Elis, Phlius and Mantinea, supported Sparta, and the Phocians sent 3000 men to her help. But all these forces were outnumbered by the Messenians, Arcadians, and Argives, to whom the Thebans had sent a considerable aid. A series of engagements were fought; they were almost all indecisive; but they rescued Messenia and the Arcadian capital, and frustrated the plans of Lacedaemon.

Phayllus.

350 B.C.

The death of Onomarchus devolved the leadership of the Phocian league upon his brother Phayllus. At first the Phocians barely maintained their posts in western Boeotia; but presently—after the return of the auxiliaries whom they had sent to the Peloponnesus—they conquered Epicnemidian Locris and laid siege to Naryx, which they ultimately captured. Thus Phayllus maintained the power of Phocis for about two years; then he was carried off by disease, and was succeeded by his nephew,

Phalaecus.

Phalaecus, son of Onomarchus. Under Phalaecus the war dragged on for a few more years, without any notable achievement, the Thebans winning battles of no importance and ravaging Phocis, the Phocians retaining their grip on western Boeotia.

The rise of Phocis to its momentary position as one of the leading powers in Greece depended on two conditions—the possession of Delphi and the possibility of hiring mercenaries. It is therefore clear that Phocis could not easily have come to the front before the fourth century, when mercenary service had come widely into vogue. But these two essential features of the Phocian power, the occupation of Delphi and the employment of mercenary troops, gave it a bad name. Historians echo the invectives of the enemies of Phocis, and give the impression that during the Sacred War the sanctuary of Apollo was in the hands of sacrilegious and unscrupulous barbarians. Tales were told how the dedicatory offerings were bestowed upon the loose favourites of the generals—how Philomelus gave a golden wreath to a dancing girl, or Phayllus a silver beaker to a flute-player. It matters little whether such scandals are true or false; if true, they would only show that the generals were not above petty peculations.

*The position and
policy of
Phocis.*

But the Phocians were not alien desecrators of the shrine of Apollo. They could establish as good a claim to Delphi as many claims founded on remote events in the past; and they certainly desired to maintain the Panhellenic dignity and sanctity of the shrine and the oracle as high as ever under their own administration. But they regarded Delphi not only as a Panhellenic sanctuary, but as a national sanctuary of Phocis; and Phocis felt justified in employing the treasures of Apollo for the national interest. Throughout all, the Phocian statesmen would have maintained that they were only borrowing from the god loans which would be gradually paid back after the restoration of peace.

Recently there has come to light, among the original documents inscribed on the stones of Delphi, a striking disproof of the old view which conceived the Phocians of Onomarchus and Phayllus as a band of robbers holding their orgies in a holy place. The temple of the god which had been built by the Alcmaeonids was destroyed by an earthquake nearly twenty years before the Phocian usurpation. The work of rebuilding had been begun, perhaps soon after, but had advanced slowly, and when Philomelus seized Delphi the completion of the temple was still far off. The work was carried out under a commission of "Temple-builders," in which all the Amphictionic states were represented; and this body administered a fund set apart for the building. During the Phocian usurpation the council of Temple-builders still held their meetings; the work still went on; the skilful artisans in Corinth and elsewhere wrought the stone material and transferred it to Delphi, as if nothing had befallen; the payments were made, as usual, from the fund; and the accounts were kept—we have some of them still. Those Amphictionic states which were at war with Phocis, like Thebes and Thessaly, were naturally not represented at the meetings of the board of the Temple-builders, but Delphian members were always present; and after Locris had been conquered by Phayllus we find Locrians also attending the meetings.¹ Thus

The building of the temple of Apollo not interrupted during the Phocian occupation. Destruction of the Second Temple of Delphi, 373 B.C. Council of Naupolis.

¹ Thus in 351-50 B.C. the members present are a Delphian, a Sicyonian, a Corinthian, and two Argives; in 349-48 B.C., a Delphian, an Athenian, two Locrians, a Megarian, an Epidaurian, a Lacedaemonian, a Corinthian, two Phocians.

the completion of the temple of Apollo was not suspended while the Phocians held the sanctuary; and the Dorian and Ionian states continued to take their part in the Panhellenic work of supervising the structure, as if nothing had happened to alter the centre of the Greek world.

SECT. 5. THE ADVANCE OF MACEDONIA

The Macedonian monarch was now master not only of the Thermaic Gulf and the mouth of the Strymon, but of the basin of Pagasae, and he was beginning to create a fleet. His marauding vessels, let loose in the northern Aegean, captured the corn-ships of Athens, descended on her possessions and dependencies—Lemnos, Imbros, and Euboea—and once even insulted the coast of Attica itself. The most important interests of Athens centred round the Hellespont and Propontis; and it was obviously her policy to form a close combination with the Thracian king Cersobleptes, with a view to offering common resistance to the advance of the new northern power on the Thracian side. It was an effort in this direction when Aristocrates proposed a resolution in honour of Charidemus, the adventurer who had become the brother-in-law and the chief minister of the Thracian king. The resolution was impeached as illegal, and the accuser was supplied with a speech by the young politician Demosthenes. The legal objections were probably cogent, but the opponents of the proposal might wisely have confined themselves to this aspect of the question. They went on to impugn the expediency of the measure; and the speech of Demosthenes against Aristocrates was calculated, so far as a single speech could have a political effect, to alienate a power which it was distinctly the interest of Athens to conciliate.

Demosthenes' speech against Aristocrates, 352 B.C.

Philip in Thrace, 352 B.C., autumn.

Submission of Cersobleptes to Philip.

But it mattered little. No sooner had Philip returned from Thessaly than he moved against Thrace. Supported by a rival Thracian prince and by the cities of Byzantium and Perinthus, he advanced to the Propontis, besieged Heraeon-Teichos the capital of Cersobleptes, and forced that potentate to submit to the overlordship of Macedon. The movements of Philip had been so rapid that Athens had no time to come to the rescue of Thrace. When the news arrived there was a

panic, and an armament was voted to save the Chersonese. But a new message came that Philip had fallen ill; then he was reported dead; and the sending of the armament was postponed. Philip's illness was a fact; it compelled him to desist from further operations, and the Chersonesus was saved.

Eight years had not elapsed since Philip had mounted the throne of Macedon; and he had shifted the balance of power in Greece, and altered the whole prospect of the Greek world, for those who had eyes to see. He had created an army, and a thoroughly adequate revenue; he had made himself lord of almost the whole sea-board of the northern Aegean from the defile of Thermopylae to the shores of the Propontis. The only lands which were still excepted from his direct or indirect sway were the Chersonesus and the territory of the Chalcidian league. He was ambitious to secure a recognised hegemony in Greece; to hold such a position as had been held by Athens, by Sparta, and by Thebes in the days of their greatness; to form, in fact, a confederation of allies, which should hold some such dependent relation towards him as the confederates of Delos had held towards Athens. Rumours were already floating about that his ultimate design was to lead a Panhellenic expedition against the Persian king—the same design which was ascribed to Jason of Pherae. Though the Greek states regarded Philip as in a certain sense an outsider, both because Macedonia had hitherto lain aloof from their politics and because absolute monarchy was repugnant to their political ideas, it must never be forgotten that Philip desired to identify Macedonia with Greece, and to bring his own country up to the level of the kindred peoples which had so far outstripped it in civilisation. Throughout his whole career he regarded Athens with respect; he would have given much for her friendship, and he showed that he deemed it one of his misfortunes that she compelled him to be her foe. He was himself imbued with Greek culture; and if the robust Macedonian enjoyed the society of the somewhat rude boon companions of his own land with whom he could drink deep, he knew how to make himself agreeable to Attic philosophers or men of letters whom he always delighted to honour. He chose an accomplished man of letters, Aristotle of Stagira, who had been educated at Athens, to be the instructor of his son

*Position of
Philip at
the end of
352 B.C.*

*His
Hellenism.*

Alexander. This fact alone sets Philip in the true light, as a conscious and deliberate promoter of Greek civilisation.

Greece saw with alarm the increase of the Macedonian power, though men were yet far from apprehending what it really meant. No state had been directly hit except Athens —though the day of Chalcidice was at hand; and it was now too late for Athens to retrieve her lost position, either alone or with any combination she could form, against a state which possessed an ample revenue and a well-drilled national army, under the sovereign command of the greatest general and diplomatist of the day. The only event which could now have availed to stay the course of Macedon would have been the death of Philip. But the Athenians did not apprehend this; they still dreamed of recovering Amphipolis. Their best policy would have been peace and alliance with Macedonia. There can be little question that Philip would have gladly secured them the Chersonese and their corn-ships; for the possession of the Chersonese had not the same vital importance for him as Amphipolis, or as the towns around the Thermaic Gulf.

Eubulus, in charge of the Theoric Fund, 354-50 B.C., and probably, 350-346 B.C.

In these years, Athens was under the guidance of a cautious statesman, Eubulus, who was a marvellously able minister of finance. He was appointed chancellor of the Theoric Fund for four years, and this office, while it was specially concerned with the administration of the surplus of revenue which was devoted to theoric purposes, involved a general control over the finances of the state. He pursued a peace policy; yet it was he who struck the one effective blow that Athens ever struck at Philip, when she hindered him from passing Thermopylae. But Eubulus wisely refused to allow Athens to be misled into embarking on unnecessary wars in the Peloponnesus or Asia Minor; and frankly accepted the peace which had concluded the war of Athens with her allies. The mass of the Athenians were well contented to follow the counsel of a dexterous financier, who, while he met fully all the expenses of administration, distributed large dividends of festival-money. The news of Philip's campaign in Thrace may have temporarily weakened his influence; it was felt that there had been slackness in watching Athenian interests in the Hellespontine regions;

and his opponents had a fair opportunity to inveigh against an inactive policy.

The most prominent among these opponents was Demosthenes, who had recently made a reputation as a speaker in the Assembly. The father of Demosthenes was an Athenian manufacturer, who died when his son was still a child; his mother had Seythian blood in her veins. His guardians dealt fraudulently with the considerable fortune which his father had left him; and when he came of age he resolved to recover it. For this purpose he sat at the feet of the orator Isaeus, and was trained in law and rhetoric. Though he received but a small portion of his patrimony, the oratory of Demosthenes owed to this training with a practical purpose many qualities which it would never have acquired under the academic instruction of Isocrates. He used himself to tell how he struggled to overcome his natural defects of speech and manner, how he practised gesticulation before a mirror and declaimed verses with pebbles in his mouth. In the end he became as brilliant an orator as the Pnyx had ever cheered; perhaps his only fault was a too theatrical manner. His earlier political speeches are not monuments of wisdom. He came forward as an opponent of the policy of Eubulus, and so we have already met him supporting the appeals of Rhodes and Megalopolis. The advance of Philip to the Propontis gave him a more promising occasion to urge the Athenians to act, since their own interests were directly involved. And the effort of Demosthenes was more than adequate. The harangue, which is known as the First Philippic, one of his most brilliant and effective speeches, calls upon the Athenians to brace themselves vigorously to oppose Philip "our enemy." He draws a lively picture of the indifference of his countrymen and contrasts it with the energy of Philip "who is not the man to rest content with that he has subdued, but is always adding to his conquests, and casts his snare around us while we sit at home postponing." Again: "Is Philip dead? Nay, but he is ill. What does it matter to you? For, if this Philip die, you will soon raise up a second Philip by your apathy." Demosthenes proposed a scheme for increasing the military forces of the city; and the most essential part of the scheme was

*Demosthenes,
born
c. 384 B.C.*

*His first
Philippic.*

that a force should be sent to Thrace of which a quarter should consist of citizens, and the officers should be citizens. At present the numerous officers whom they elected were kept for services at home: "You choose your captains, not to fight but to be displayed like dolls in the market-place."

Demosthenes was applauded, but nothing was done. His ideal was the Athens of Pericles; but he lived in the Athens of Eubulus. In the fourth century the Athenians were quite capable of holding their own among their old friends and enemies, the Spartans and Thebans and the islanders of the Aegean; with paid soldiers and generals like Iphicrates and Chares they could maintain their position as a first-rate power. But against a large, vigorous land-power with a formidable army their chances were hopeless; for, since the fall of their empire, the whole spirit of the people had tended to peace and not to war; they were no longer animated by the idea of empire; and the memories of the past, which Demosthenes might invoke, were powerless to stir them to action. The orations of Demosthenes, however carefully studied, however imbued with passion, could not change the character of his countrymen; their spirit did not respond to his, and, not being under the imperious dominion of an idea, they saw no reason for great undertakings. Nor was the condition of Athens as ill as the opponent of Eubulus painted it. Under the administration of Eubulus the fleet was increased, the building of a new arsenal was begun, new ship-sheds were made, and the military establishment of Athens was in various ways improved. She was still the great sea-power of the Aegean, and strong enough to protect her commercial interests.

*Peace
of the
Chalcidian
league with
Athens,
352 B.C.*

The next stage in the development of Macedonia was the incorporation of Chalcidice, and as soon as Philip recovered from his illness he turned his attention to this quarter. If the Olynthians had treated Philip honourably, they would probably have been left a self-governing community, with their territory intact, dependent on Macedonia. But they treated both Athens and Philip badly. They first made a close alliance with Philip to rob Athens; and then, when they had received from Philip Anthemus and Potidaea, they turned round and made peace with Athens, a power with which

Philip was at war, and recognised the right of Athens to Amphipolis. At that time Philip was otherwise engaged; but three years later he sent a requisition to Olynthus, demanding the surrender of his half-brother, a pretender to the Macedonian throne, to whom they had given shelter. The demand was refused and Philip marched against Chalcidice. One after another the cities of the Olynthian confederacy opened their gates to him; or if they refused, like Stagira, they were captured.

Philip reduces Chalcidice, 349 B.C.

In her jeopardy Olynthus sought an alliance with Athens, and on this occasion both the leaders of the Athenian Assembly and the advocates of a war policy found themselves in harmony. It was during the debates on the question of alliance that Demosthenes pronounced his Olynthiac orations, which were animated by the same spirit as his Philippic, and were in fact Philippics. At this juncture the Athenians seem to have been awakened to the necessity of action sufficiently to embolden Demosthenes to throw out the unpopular suggestion that the Theoric Fund should be devoted to military purposes; and he repeats his old plea for citizen-soldiers. An alliance was concluded, and mercenaries were dispatched to the Chalcidian peninsula under Chares and Charidemus (who had left the service of Cersobleptes). More troops would certainly have followed, and Philip might have been placed in some embarrassment, especially as Cersobleptes had rebelled. But he diverted the concern of Athens in another direction, and so divided her forces. He had long been engaged in intrigues in Euboea, and now Eretria revolted and drove out Plutarch, the tyrant who held the city for Athens. Neighbouring Chalcis, and Oreos in the north, followed the example; Euboea was in a state of revolt. It is just possible that, if Athens had left Euboea alone, and concentrated all her military power in Chalcidice, she might have saved Olynthus for the time. The division of her forces was certainly fatal; and Demosthenes deserves great credit for opposing any interference in Euboea. But the Athenians would have been strong-minded indeed if they had done nothing to regain the neighbouring island, while they dispatched all their troops to succour an ally. The expedition to Euboea, which was now entrusted to the general Phocion, might better never have been sent; but beforehand

Alliance of Athens with the Olynthians.

Revolt of Euboea.

Expedition to Euboea, spring, 348 B.C.

*Euboea
declared
independ-
ent.*

there seemed no reason why it should not succeed. Phocion's only exploit was to extricate himself from a dangerous position at Tamynae, by winning a battle, but he returned to Athens without having recovered any of the rebellious cities. The enemy had taken a number of prisoners, for whose ransom Athens had to pay fifty talents; and it was decided that there was nothing for it but to acknowledge the independence of Euboea, with the exception of Carystus, which remained loyal.

*Fall of
Olynthus,
348 B.C.*

Meanwhile Philip was pressing Olynthus hard, and urgent appeals were sent to Athens. This time Demosthenes had his way, and 2000 citizen-soldiers sailed for the north. But it was too late. Olynthus was captured before they reached it: and Philip showed no mercy to the city which had played him false. The place was destroyed and the inhabitants scattered in various parts of Macedonia, some sent to work as slaves in the royal domains. The other cities of the confederacy were practically incorporated in Macedonia; but they still continued to exist as cities and manage their local affairs. There was no question of their extermination.

*Demosthenes
insulted
by Meidias,
348 B.C.*

Demosthenes had opposed the expedition to Euboea, and thereby hangs a story. He had a bitter foe in a rich man, named Meidias, who was a supporter of Eubulus. Their personal hostility was reawakened in the debates over the Euboean question, and Meidias seized the occasion of the great Dionysiac feast to put a public affront on his enemy. Demosthenes had undertaken the duty of supplying a chorus for his tribe, and on the day of the performance, when he appeared in the sacred robe of a choregus, Meidias struck him in the face. The outrage involved contempt of a religious festival, and Demosthenes instituted proceedings against his insulter. The speech which he composed for the occasion contains fine scathing invective. The description of Meidias vulgarly displaying his wealth may be quoted to illustrate contemporary manners. "Where," Demosthenes asks, "are his splendid outlays? For myself, I cannot see unless it be in this—that he has built a mansion at Eleusis large enough to darken all the neighbourhood—that he keeps a pair of white horses from Sicily, with which he conducts his wife to the mysteries or anywhere else he fancies—that he sweeps through the market-place with three or four lackeys all to

himself, and talks about his bowls and drinking-horns and saucers, loud enough to be heard by the passers-by."¹ But Demosthenes consented to compromise the matter for a small sum before it was brought to an issue, and there can be little question that his consent was given from political motives. On the capture of Olynthus the different parties drew together and agreed to co-operate; and this new political combination rendered it necessary for Demosthenes, however reluctant, to patch up the feud with Meidias.

SECT. 6. THE PEACE OF PHILOCRATES

Her recent military efforts had exhausted the revenue of Athens; there was not enough money in the treasury to pay the judges their daily wage. Peace was clearly a necessity, and this must have been fully recognised by Eubulus. But there was great indignation at the fall of Olynthus, and the feeling that a disaster had been sustained was augmented by the fact that there were a considerable number of Athenians among the captives. Accordingly the pressure of popular opinion, which was for the moment strongly aroused against Philip, induced Eubulus to countenance the dispatch of envoys to the cities of the Peloponnesus, for the purpose of organising a national resistance in Hellas against the man who had destroyed Olynthus. It is probable that this measure was advocated by Demosthenes; in later years, a national resistance to Philip was his favourite idea. It was an effort doomed to failure, as Eubulus knew perfectly well; yet it served his purpose, for it protected him against suspicions of being secretly friendly to Philip. On this occasion the orator Aeschines, famous as the antagonist of Demosthenes, first came prominently forward. He had begun life as an usher in a school kept by his father, he had then been a tragic actor, and finally a public clerk. He was now sent to rouse the Greeks of the Peloponnesus against Macedonia, and he used such strong language in disparagement of Philip, especially at Megalopolis, that no one could accuse him of "philippizing." The mere fact that envoys were sent to Megalopolis—whose application for help had so recently been rejected by Athens—is

*Aeschines
at Megalopolis, 347
B.C.*

¹ Translation by Professor Butcher.

enough to cast suspicion on the whole round of embassies as a farce, got up to satisfy public opinion at home. Demosthenes, like other politicians, saw the necessity of peace and worked towards it.

*Philip's
intercen-
tion sought
by Thebes.*

Philip desired two things, to conclude peace with Athens and to become a member of the Amphictionic Council. Towards this second end a path was prepared by the Thebans, who along with the Thessalians addressed an appeal to Philip that he would undertake the championship of the Amphictionic League and crush the Phocians. In Phocis itself there had recently been domestic strife; Phalaecus had been deposed from the generalship, but he had a party of his own and he held Thermopylae with the strong places in its neighbourhood. When it was noised abroad that Philip was about to march southward in answer to the Theban prayer, the Phocians invited Athens and Sparta to help them once again to hold the gates of Greece. Both Athens and Sparta again responded to the call; but the call had come from the political opponents of Phalaecus, and he refused to admit either Spartan or Athenian into the pass. Phalaecus seems to have previously assisted the enemies of Athens in Euboea; and statesmen at Athens might now feel some uneasiness, whether he would not turn traitor and surrender the pass to Philip. It was another reason for acquiescing in the necessity of making peace.

*The
ambiguous
position of
Phalaecus.*

*First
embassy
to Philip,
end of
347 B.C.*

The first overtures came from Athens. Ten Athenian envoys, and one representative of the Synedrion of Athenian allies, were sent to Pella to negotiate terms of peace with the Macedonian king. Among the envoys were Philocrates, who had proposed the embassy, Aeschines, and Demosthenes. The terms to which Philip agreed were that Athens and Macedon should each retain the territories of which they were actually in possession at the time the peace was concluded; the peace would be concluded when both sides had sworn to it. Both the allies of Macedonia and those of Athens were to be included, with two exceptions: Philip refused to treat with Halus in Thessaly—a place which he had recently attacked—or with the Phocians, whom he seemed determined to crush.

(Halonenus.)

By these terms, which were perfectly explicit, Athens would surrender her old claim to Amphipolis, and on the other hand Philip would recognise Athens as mistress of the

Chersonese. The two exceptions which Philip made were inevitable. Halus indeed was a trifle which no one heeded; but it was an essential part of the Macedonian policy to proceed against Phocis. To the envoys, whom the king charmed by his courteous hospitality at Pella, he privately intimated that he was far from being ill-disposed to the Phocians; and perhaps a few of them hoped that there was something in the assurance. But in truth the Athenian statesmen troubled themselves little about Phocis; some of them, like the Theban proxenos Demosthenes, were more disposed to lean towards Thebes. It would be necessary to keep up the appearance of protecting an ally,—though relations with that ally had recently grown somewhat strained; but neither Eubulus nor Demosthenes would for a moment have dreamed of foregoing the peace for the sake of supporting Phocis against her enemies.

There were a few Thracian forts, belonging to Cersobleptes, *Peace accepted and* which Philip was anxious to capture before the peace was made; and, when the envoys left Pella, he set out for Thrace, *signa to at Athens. March.* having given them an undertaking to respect the Chersonese. *346 B.C.* The envoys returned home bearing with them a friendly letter from Philip to the Athenian people, and they were followed in a few days by three Macedonian delegates, appointed to receive the oaths from the Athenians and their allies. How important this negotiation was for Philip is proved by the fact that two of these deputies were the two greatest of his subjects, Parmenio and Antipater. On the motion of Philocrates, the Peace was accepted by Athens on the terms which Philip offered, though there were dissentient voices against the exclusion of Phocis and Halus; but the murmurs of the opposition were silenced by the plain speaking of Eubulus, who showed that if the terms were rejected the war must be continued. And some of the ambassadors disseminated the unofficial utterances of Philip, that he would not ruin the Phocians and that he would help Athens to win back Euboea and Oropus. The upshot was that Phocis was not mentioned in the treaty; she was tacitly, not expressly, excluded.¹

¹ The express exclusion was not necessary, since Phocis did not belong to the Athenian symmarchy or confederacy in the strict sense, and had no voice in the Syndrion of the Athenian allies.

*Second
embassy
from
Athens to
Philip sets
out in
April,
346 B.C.*

The Peace was now concluded on one side, and it remained for the envoys of Athens to administer the oath to Philip and his allies. It was to the interest of Athens that this act should be accomplished as speedily as possible, for Philip was entitled to make new conquests until he swore to the Peace, and he was actually engaged in making new conquests in Thrace. The same ambassadors who had visited Macedonia to arrange the terms of a treaty now set forth a second time to administer the oaths.

Meanwhile Philip had taken the Thracian fortresses which he had gone to take, and had reduced Cersobleptes to be a vassal of Macedonia. When he returned to Pella, he found not only the embassy from Athens, but envoys from many other Greek states also, awaiting his arrival with various hopes and fears. He was beginning to be recognised as the arbiter of northern Hellas.

So far as the formal conclusion of the Peace went, there was no difficulty. But the Athenian ambassadors had received general powers to negotiate further with Philip, with a view to some common decision on the settlement of the Phocian question and northern Greece. The treaty was a treaty of "peace and alliance," and, if Philip could have had his way, the alliance would have become a bond of close friendship and co-operation. And it was in this direction that Eubulus and his party were inclined cautiously to move. Athens might have taken her position now as joint arbitrator with Philip in the settlement of the Amphictionic states. Both Philip and Athens had a common interest in reducing the power of Thebes; and, if it was the interest of Athens that Phocis should not be utterly destroyed, Philip had no special enmity against Phocis, whose strength was now exhausted; the Phocian "sacrilege" was a convenient pretext to interfere and step into the place of Phocis in the Delphian Amphictiony. A common programme was discussed, and might easily have been concerted between Philip and the ambassadors. To treat the Phocians with clemency and to force Thebes to acknowledge the independence of the Boeotian cities would have been the basis of common action; the restoration of Plataea was mentioned; and while Philip promised to secure the restitution to Athens of Euboea and

Oropus, Athens would have supported the admission of Macedonia into the Amphictionic Council. Aeschines was the chief mouthpiece of the counsels of Eubulus. But the project of an active alliance was opposed strenuously by Demosthenes, and, as Demosthenes had great and daily increasing influence with the Athenian Assembly, it would have been unsafe for Philip to conclude any definite agreement with the majority of the embassy. The policy of Demosthenes was to abandon the Phocians to their fate and to draw closer to Thebes; so that, when his city had recovered from her financial exhaustion, Thebes and Athens together might form a joint resistance to the aggrandisement of Macedonia. In consequence of this irreconcilable division, which broke out in most unseemly quarrels among the ambassadors, nothing more was done than the administration of the oath. The envoys accompanied the king into Thessaly, and at Pherae the oath was administered to the Thessalians, his allies. A peace was then arranged with Halonnesus, and the envoys returned to Athens, leaving Philip to proceed on his own way.

*Embassy
returns to
Athens,
June
346 B.C.*

It now remained to be seen whether Eubulus would carry the Assembly with him in favour of a rational policy of co-operation with Macedon, or would be defeated by the brilliant oratory of his younger rival. Philip's course of action would depend on the decision of the Assembly.

It was a calamity for Athens that at this critical moment there was no strong man at the helm of the state. The Assembly was swayed between the opposite counsels of Demosthenes, whose oratory was irresistible, and of Eubulus, whose influence had been paramount for the past eight years. When the ambassadors returned, Demosthenes lost no time in denouncing his colleagues, as having treacherously intrigued with Philip against the interests of the city. His denunciation was successful for a moment, and the usual vote of thanks to the embassy was withheld. But the success was only for a moment; Aeschines and his colleagues defended their policy triumphantly before the Assembly; and it was clear that the programme which they had discussed with Philip would have been satisfactory to the people. The Assembly decreed that the treaty of peace and alliance should be extended to the posterity of Philip. It further decreed that

Athens should formally call upon the Phocians to surrender Delphi to the Amphictions, and should threaten them with armed intervention if they declined. Demosthenes appears to have made no opposition to this measure against the Phocians; and it seemed that the policy of co-operation with Philip was about to be realised.

Thermopylae opened to Philip, July.

Philip in the meantime advanced southward. The pass of Thermopylae was held by Phalaecus, who had been reinforced by some Lacedaemonian troops; but Phalaecus had opened secret negotiations with Pella some months before; and the hostile vote of the Athenians decided him to capitulate on condition of departing unhindered where he would.

Before he reached Thermopylae, Philip had addressed two friendly letters to Athens, inviting her to send an army to arrange the affairs of Phocis and Boeotia. Indisposed as the Athenian citizens were to leave Athens on military service, they lent ready ears to the absurd terrors which Demosthenes conjured up, suggesting that Philip would detain their army as hostages. Accordingly they contented themselves with sending an embassy (on which Demosthenes declined to serve) to convey to Philip an announcement of the decree which they had passed against the Phocians. Thus swayed between Eubulus and Demosthenes, the Athenians had done too much or too little. They had abandoned the Phocians, and at the same time they resigned the voice which they should, and could, have had in the political settlement of northern Greece.

Fate of the Phocians.

As it was clear that Philip could not trust Athens, owing to the attitude of Demosthenes, he was constrained to act in conjunction with her enemy, Thebes. The cities of western Boeotia, which had been held by the Phocians, were restored to the Boeotian confederacy. The doom of the Phocians was decided by the Amphictionic Council which was now convoked. If some of the members had had their way, all the men of military age would have been cast down a precipice; but Philip would not have permitted this, and the sentence was as mild as could have been expected. The Phocians were deprived of their place in the Amphictionic body; and all their cities (with the exception of Abae) were broken up into villages, so that they might not again be a danger to Delphi. They were obliged to undertake to pay back, by instalments of

sixty talents a year, the value of the treasures which they had taken from the sanctuary. The Lacedaemonians were also punished for the support which they had given to Phocis, by being disqualified to return either of the members who represented the Dorian vote. The place which Phocis vacated in the Council was transferred to Macedonia, in recognition of Philip's services in expelling the desecrators of the temple.

The Athenian declaration against Phocis exempted Athens from the penalty which was inflicted on Sparta at this Amphictionic meeting. But this was small comfort, and when the Athenians realised that they had gained nothing and that Thebes had gained all she wanted, they felt with indignation that the statesmanship of their city had been unskilful. The futility of their policy had been mainly due to Demosthenes, who had done all in his power to thwart Eubulus; and he now seized the occasion to discredit that statesman and his party. He encouraged his fellow-countrymen in the unreasonable fear that Philip would invade Attica, and the panic was so great that they brought their families and movable property from the country into the city. The fear was soon dispelled by a letter from Philip himself; but Demosthenes had succeeded in creating a profound distrust of Philip, and there was soon an opportunity of expressing this feeling.

An occasion offered itself to Philip almost immediately to display publicly to the assembled Greek world the position of leadership which he had thus won. It so happened that the celebration of the Pythian games fell in the year of the Peace. ^{Pythian games, 346 B.C.} It will be remembered how the despot of Pherae, when he had ^{Philip president.} made himself ruler of Thessaly, was about to come down to Delphi and assume the presidency of the Pythian feast, when he was cut down by assassins. The ambitions and plans of Pherae had passed to Pella, and Greece, which had dreaded the claims of the Thessalian tyrant, had now to bend the knee before the Macedonian king. Athens sulked; she sent no deputy to the Amphictionic meeting which elected Philip president for the festival, no delegates to the festival itself. This marked omission was a protest against the admission of Macedonia to the Amphictionic League, and Philip understood it as such. But he did not wish to quarrel with Athens; he hoped ultimately to gain her good-will; and instead

Inconsistency of Athens. Demosthenes' speech on the Peace.

of marching into Attica, whither his Thessalian and Theban friends would have only too gladly followed him, he contented himself with sending an embassy to notify to the Athenian people the vote which made him a member of the Amphictiony and to invite them to concur. The invitation was in fact an ultimatum. Eubulus and his party had lost their influence in the outburst of anti-Macedonian feeling which Demosthenes had succeeded in stirring up. But the current had gone too far, and Demosthenes had some difficulty in allaying the spirits which he had conjured up. The Assembly was ready, on the slightest encouragement, to refuse its concurrence to the Amphictionic decree, and Demosthenes was forced to save the city from the results of his own agitation by showing that it would be foolish and absurd "to go to war now for the shadow at Delphi." Rarely had Athens been placed in such an undignified posture—a plight for which she had to thank the brilliant orator whom a malignant fate had sent to guide her on a futile path. From this time forward Demosthenes was the most influential of her counsellors.

The political insight and foresight of Isocrates.

Neither Demosthenes, the eloquent speaker, nor Eubulus, the able financier, saw far into the future. The only man of the day perhaps who grasped the situation in its ecumenical aspect, who descried, as it were from without, the place of Macedonia in Greece and the place of Greece in the world, was the nonagenarian Isocrates. He had never ventured to raise his voice in the din of party politics; he had kept his garments unspotted from the defilement of public life; and when he condescended to give political advice to Greece, it was easy for the second-rate statesman as well as the party hack to laugh at a mere man of study stepping into a field where he had no practical experience. But Isocrates discerned the drift of events, where the orators who madly declaimed in the Pnyx were at fault; and the view which he took of the situation after the conclusion of the Peace of Philocrates simply anticipated the decrees of history. He explained his view in an open letter to king Philip. He had, long since, seen the endless futility of perpetuating that international system of Greece which existed within the memory of men: a number of small sovereign states, which ought by virtue of all they had in common to form a single nation, divided and constantly

at feud. The time had come, he thought, to unite Greece, now that there had arisen a man who had the brains, the power, and the gold to become the central pivot of the union. Sovereign and independent the city states would of course remain; but they might be drawn together into one fold by a common hope and allegiance to a common leader. And under such a leader as Philip there was a great programme for Greece; and not a mere programme of ambition, undertaken for the sake of something to do, but an enterprise which was urgently needed to meet a pressing social danger. We have already seen how Greece was flooded for many years past with a superfluous population who went about as armed rovers, attached to no city, hiring themselves out to any state that needed fighting men, a constant menace to society. A new country to colonise was the only remedy for this overflow of Greece, as Isocrates recognised. And the new country must be won from the barbarian. The time had come for Hellas to take the offensive against Persia, and the task appointed for Philip was to lead forth the hosts of Hellas on this splendid enterprise. If he did not destroy the whole empire of the Great King, he might at least annex Asia Minor "from Cilicia to Sinope" to the Hellenic world and appropriate it to the needs of the Hellenic folk.

Ten years later the fulfilment of this task which Isocrates laid upon Philip was begun, not indeed by Philip himself, but by his successor. We shall see in due time how the fulfilment surpassed the utmost hopes of the Athenian speculator. But it is fair to note how justly Isocrates had discerned the signs of the times and the tendency of history. He saw that the inveterate quarrel between Europe and Asia, which had existed since the "Trojan war," was the great abiding fact; he foresaw that it must soon come to an issue; and throughout the later part of his long life he was always watching for the inevitable day. The expedition of Cyrus and the campaign of Agesilaus were foreshadowings of that day; and it had seemed for a moment that Jason of Pherae was chosen to be the successor of Agamemnon and Cimon. Now the day had come at last; the choice of destiny had fallen upon the man of Macedonia. And Isocrates knew that this expansion of Greece would meet Greece's chief practical need. It is instructive to

contrast his sane and practical view of the situation of Greece with the chimerical conservatism of some of his contemporaries. This conservatism, to which the orator Demosthenes gave a most noble expression, was founded on the delusion that the Athens of his day could be converted by his own eloquence and influence into the form and feature of the Periclean city. That was a delusion which took no account of the change which events had wrought in the Athenian character; it was a noble delusion which could have misled no great statesman or hard-headed thinker. It did not mislead Isocrates; he appreciated the trend of history, and saw the expansion of Greece, to which the world was moving.

SECT. 7. INTERVAL OF PEACE AND PREPARATIONS FOR WAR
(346-1 B.C.)

*Philip
elected
archon of
Thessaly;
four
tetrarchies
of
Thessaly.*

Having gained for Macedonia the coveted place in the religious league of Greece, Philip spent the next year or two in improving his small navy, in settling the administration of Thessaly, and in acquiring influence in the Peloponnesus. It may fairly be said that Thessaly was now joined to Macedonia by a personal union. The Thessalian cities elected the Macedonian king as their *archon*—the old name of tagus with its Pheraean associations was avoided,—and he set four governors over the four great divisions of the country. South of the Corinthian isthmus, Philip adopted the old policy of Thebes, offering friendship to those states which needed a friend to stand by them against Sparta. His negotiations gained him the adhesion of Messenia and Megalopolis, Elis and Argos. In Megalopolis they set up a bronze statue of Philip, while Argos had a special tie with Macedon, since she claimed to be the original home of the Macedonian kings.

*The Peace-
party at
Athens.*

Nor did Philip yet despair of achieving his chief aim, the conciliation of Athens. No one knew how to bribe better than he, and we may be sure that he gave gold without stint to his Athenian supporters. The Athenians naturally preferred peace to war; and the political party which was favourable to friendly relations with Philip was still strong and might at any moment regain its power. The influence of the veteran Eubulus, who seems to have withdrawn somewhat

from public affairs, was on that side; there were Aeschines and Philocrates who had been active in the negotiation of the Peace; and there was the incorruptible soldier Phocion, who was a remarkable figure at Athens, although he had no pretensions to eminence either as a soldier or as a statesman. He was marked among his contemporaries as an honest man, superior to all temptations of money; and, as the Athenians always prized this superhuman integrity which few of them attempted to practise, they elected him forty-five times as strategos, though in military capacity he was no more than a respectable sergeant. But his strong common-sense, which was impervious to oratory, and his exceptional probity made him an useful member of his party.

There was one man in Athens who was firmly resolved that the peace should be no abiding peace, but a mere interval preparatory to war. Demosthenes, supported by Hyperides, Lysurgus, and others, spent the time in inflaming the wrath of his countrymen against Philip and in seeking to ruin his political antagonists. These years are therefore marked by a great struggle between the parties of war and peace; the influence of Demosthenes being most often in the ascendancy and ultimately emerging victorious.

After Philip's installation in the Amphictionic Council, Demosthenes lost no time in striking a blow at his opponents. He brought an impeachment against Aeschines for receiving bribes from the Macedonian king and betraying the interests of Athens in the negotiations which preceded the Peace. Men's minds were irritated by the triumph of Thebes, and Demosthenes might have succeeded in inducing them to make Aeschines a scapegoat, if he had not committed a fatal mistake. He associated with himself in the prosecution a certain Timarchus, whose early life had been devoted to vices which disqualified him from the rights of a citizen; and thus Aeschines easily parried the stroke by bringing an action against Timarchus and submitting his private life to an annihilating exposure. The case of Demosthenes was thereby discredited, and he was obliged to let it drop for the time.

A year or so later we find Demosthenes going forth on a mission to the cities of the Peloponnesus, to counteract by his oratory the influence of Philip. But his oratory roused no

Phocion.

The War-party.

Demosthenes impeaches Aeschines, 346-5 B.C.

Aeschines against Timarchus.

Demosthenes in the Peloponnesus, 344 B.C.

*The Second
Philippic.*

echoes, and Philip had good reason to complain of invectives which could hardly be justified from the lips of the representative of a power which was at peace and in alliance with Macedonia. An embassy came from Pella to remonstrate with the Athenians on their obstinate misconstruction of Macedonian motives, and Demosthenes seized the occasion to deliver one of his uncompromising anti-Macedonian harangues. The basis of his reasoning in this Philippic, and in the political speeches which followed it during the next few years, is the proposition that Philip desired and purposed to destroy Athens. It was a proposition of which he had no valid proof; and it was actually untrue, as the sequel showed.

*Halus—
island.*

We are not told what answer Athens sent to Pella, but it would seem that she complained of the terms of the recent Peace as unfair, and specially mentioned her right to Halus. This island off the coast of Thessaly, a place of no value whatever, had belonged to the Athenian Confederacy, but it had been seized by pirates, and the pirates had been expelled by Philip's soldiers. Philip sent an embassy with a courteous message, requesting Athens to propose emendations in the terms of the Peace, and offering to give her Halonnesus. But the place was of so little consequence to Athens or any one, that it served as an excellent pretext for diplomatic wrangling, and Demosthenes could persuade the people to refuse Halonnesus as it was offered, and demand that it should not be "given" but "given back." Besides the "restoration" of this worthless island, Athens made the proposal that the basis of the Peace should be altered, and that each party should retain, not the territories which were actually in its possession when the treaty was concluded, but the territories which lawfully belonged to it. This proposal was preposterous; no peace can be made on a basis that leaves open all the debated questions which it is the object of the treaty to settle. Athens also complained of the Thracian fortresses which Philip captured and retained after the negotiation had begun. On this question Philip was legally in the right, but he offered to submit the matter to arbitration. Athens refused the offer on the plea that suitable arbiters could not be found. She thus showed that she was not in earnest; her objection was as frivolous as her proposal. Demosthenes was responsible for

the attitude of the city, and his intention was to keep up the friction with Macedonia and prevent any conciliation.

The ascendancy which Demosthenes and his fellows had now won emboldened them to make a grand attack upon their political opponents, and thereby deal Philip a sensible blow. Hypereides brought an accusation of treachery against Philocrates, whose name was especially associated with the Peace, and so formidable did the prospect of the trial seem, in the present state of popular opinion, that Philocrates fled, and he was condemned to death for contempt of court. Encouraged by this success, Demosthenes again took up his indictment against Aeschines, but Aeschines stood his ground; and one of the most famous political trials of antiquity was witnessed by the Athenian public. We can still hear the two rivals scurrilously reviling each other and vying to deceive the judges; for they published their speeches after the trial, to instruct and perplex posterity. It is in these documents, burning with the passions of political hatred, that the modern historian, picking his doubtful way through lies and distortions of fact, has to discover the course of the negotiations which led to the Peace of Philocrates.

The speech of Demosthenes, in particular, is a triumph in the art of sophistry. No politician ever knew better than he how short is the memory of ordinary men for the political events which they have themselves watched and even helped to shape by their votes and opinions; and none ever traded more audaciously on this weakness of human nature. Hardly four brief years had passed since the Peace was made, and Demosthenes, confident that his audience will remember nothing accurately, ventures lightly to falsify facts which had so lately been notorious in the streets of Athens. Disclaiming all responsibility for a peace which he had himself worked hard to bring about but now seeks to discredit, he discovers that the Phocians were basely abandoned and imputes their fate to Aeschines. Against Aeschines there was in fact no case; the charge of receiving bribes from Philip was not supported by any actual evidence. The reply of Aeschines, which as an oratorical achievement is not inferior to that of his accuser, rings less falsely. Eubulus and Phocion, men of the highest character, supported Aeschines, but the public feeling

Impeachment and flight of Philocrates, 343 B.C.

Impeachment of Aeschines, 343 B.C.

Demosthenes on the malversation of the embassy

Aeschines acquitted.

was so hostile to Philip at this juncture, that the defendant barely escaped.

That Aeschines and many others of his party received money from Philip we may well believe—though the reiterations of Demosthenes are no evidence. But to receive money from Philip was one thing and to betray the interests of Athens was another. It must be proved that a politician had sacrificed the manifest good of his country, or deserted his own political convictions, for a sackful of silver or gold, before he could be considered unconditionally a traitor. Public opinion in Greece thought no worse of a man for accepting a few talents from foreigners who were pleased with his policy; although those few public men—Demosthenes was not among them—who made it a rule never to accept an obol in connexion with any political transaction were respected as beings of superhuman virtue. Philip, who unlocked many a city by golden keys, was doubtless generous to the party whose programme was identical with his own interests; and it may be that Aeschines and others, who were not in affluent circumstances, would have been unable to devote themselves to public affairs if the king had not lined their wallets with gold.

*Alliances
of Athens
with
Megara
and
Chalcis,
343-2 B.C.
Philo-
Mace-
donian
oligarchies
in Euboea.*

Meanwhile Philip was seeking influence and intriguing in the countries which lay on either side of Attica,—in Megara on the west, and Euboea on the north-east. An attempt at a revolution in Megara was defeated, and the city allied itself with its neighbour and old enemy Athens. But in Euboea the movements supported by Macedonia were more successful. Both in Eretria and in Oreus oligarchies were established, really dependent on Philip. But in Chalcis, which from its strategic position was of greater importance, the democracy held its ground, and sought an equal alliance with Athens, to which Athens gladly consented.

Events in another quarter of Greece now caused a number of lesser Greek states to rally round Athens, and so bring within the field of near possibilities a league such as it was the dream of Demosthenes to form against Macedonia. By his marriage with an Epirot princess, it naturally devolved upon Philip to intervene in the struggles for the Epirot throne which followed her father's death. He espoused the cause of

*Philip in
Epirus.*

her brother Alexander against her uncle Arybbas, marched into the country, and established Alexander in the sovereignty. Epirus would now become dependent on Macedonia, and Philip saw in it a road to the Corinthian Gulf and a means of reaching Greece on the western side. His first step was to annex the region of Cassopia (between the rivers Acheron and Oropus) to the Epirote league of which his brother-in-law was head; and his eyes were then cast upon Ambracia, which stood as a barrier to the southward expansion of Epirus. But the place which he desired above all was doubtless Naupactus, the key to the Corinthian Gulf, now in the hands of the Achaeans. For compassing his schemes in this quarter his natural allies were the Aetolians. They too coveted Naupactus and would have held it for him; and they were the enemies of the Ambraciots and Acarnanians, whom he hoped to render dependent on Epirus. The evident designs of Philip alarmed all these peoples, and not only Ambracia, Acarnania, and Achaea, but Corcyra also, sought the alliance of Athens.

Philip, however, judged that the time had not come for further advances on this side, and some recent movements of Cersobleptes decided him to turn now to one of the greatest tasks which were imposed upon the expander of Macedonia—the subjugation of Thrace. Since the Persians had been beaten out of Europe, Thrace had been subject to native princes, some of whom—Teres, Sitalces, Cotys—we have seen ruling the whole land from the Strymon's to the Danube's mouth. It was now to pass again under the rule of a foreigner, but its new lords were Europeans who would lead Thracian soldiers to avenge upon Asia the oriental yoke which had been laid upon their ancestors. Of the Thracian expedition of Philip we know as little as of the Thracian expedition of Darius. Unlike Darius, he did not cross the rivers of the north or penetrate into any part of Scythia, but his campaign lasted ten months, and he spent a winter in the field in that wintry land, suffering from sickness as well as from the cold. In war Philip never spared himself either hardship or danger. Demosthenes in later years described his reckless energy, ruthless to himself, in a famous passage: "To gain empire and power he had an eye knocked out, his collar-bone broken, his arm and his leg maimed; he abandoned to fortune any part of

Thracian expedition of Philip, summer, 342 B.C.; spring, 341 B.C.

his body she cared to take, so that honour and glory might be the portion of the rest."

*Philippopolis
founded.*

The Thracian king was dethroned, and his kingdom became a tributary province of Macedon. There is still in the land a city which bears Philip's name, and is the most conspicuous memorial of that great and obscure campaign. Philippopolis on the Hebrus was the chief of the cities which the conqueror built to maintain Macedonian influence in Thrace.

This conquest was not an infringement of the Peace, for Cersobleptes had not been admitted to the treaty as an ally of Athens. But it affected nearly and seriously the position of Athens at the gates of the Black Sea. The Macedonian frontier was now advanced to the immediate neighbourhood of the Chersonese, and Athens had no longer Thracian princes to wield against Philip. The prospect did not escape Demosthenes, and he resolved to force on a war,—though both his own country and Philip were averse to hostilities. Accordingly he induced Athens to send a few ships and mercenaries under a swashbuckler named Diopieithes, to protect her interests in the Chersonese. There had been some disputes with Cardia touching the lands of the Athenian outsettlers, and Diopieithes lost no time in attacking Cardia. Now Cardia had been expressly recognised as an ally of Philip in the Peace, and thus the action of Diopieithes was a violation of the Peace. The admiral followed up this aggression by invading some of Philip's Thracian possessions, and Philip then remonstrated at Athens. Their admiral was so manifestly in the wrong that the Athenians were prepared to disown his conduct, but Demosthenes saved his tool and persuaded the people to sustain Diopieithes. He followed up his speech on the Chersonese question, which scored this success, by a loud call to war—the harangue known as the Third Philippic. The orator's thesis is that Philip, inveterately hostile to Athens and aiming at her destruction, is talking peace but acting war; and, when all the king's acts have been construed in this light, the perfectly sound conclusion is drawn that Athens should act at once. The proposals of Demosthenes are to make military preparations, to send forces to the Chersonese, and to organise an Hellenic league against "the Macedonian wretch."

*Demosthenes'
speech on
the Chersonese,
341 B.C.*

*Third
Philippic.*

Envoys were sent here and there to raise the alarm. Demosthenes himself proceeded to the Propontis and succeeded in detaching Byzantium and Perinthus from the Macedonian alliance. At the same time Athenian troops were sent into Euboea; the governments in Oreus and Eretria were overthrown, and these cities joined an independent Euboeic league, of which the Synod met at Chalcis. The island was thus liberated from Macedon without becoming dependent on Athens.

Demosthenes at Byzantium, 341 B.C.
The Euboeic Federation, 341 B.C.

All these acts of hostility were committed without an overt breach of the Peace between Athens and Philip. But the secession of Perinthus and Byzantium was a blow which Philip was not prepared to take with equanimity. When he had settled his Thracian province, he began the siege of Perinthus by land and sea. There was an Athenian squadron in the Hellespont which barred the passage of the Macedonian fleet, but Philip caused a diversion by sending land troops into the Chersonese, and by this stratagem got his ships successfully through. The siege of Perinthus marks, for eastern Greece, the beginning of those new developments of the art of besieging, which in Sicily had long since been practised with success. But all the engines and rams, the towers and the mines of Philip failed to take Perinthus on its steep peninsular cliff. His blockade on the sea-side was inefficient, and the besieged were furnished with stores and men from Byzantium. The Athenians were still holding aloof. They had addressed a remonstrance to Philip for violating the Chersonese and capturing some of their cruisers. Philip replied by a letter in which he rehearsed numerous acts of Athenian hostility to himself. But the decisive moment came when the king suddenly raised the siege of Perinthus and marched against Byzantium, hoping to capture it by the unexpectedness of his attack. Athens could no longer hold aloof when the key of the Bosphorus was in peril. The marble tablet on which the Peace was inscribed was pulled down; it was openly war at last. A squadron under Chares was sent to help Byzantium, and Phocion presently followed with a second fleet. Other help had come from Rhodes and Chios, and Philip was compelled to withdraw into Thrace, baffled in both his undertakings. It was the first triumph of Demo-

Philip lays siege to Perinthus, 340 B.C.
then to Byzantium.

sthenes over the arch-foe, and he received a public vote of thanks from the Athenian people.

*The naval
reform of
Demo-
sthenes.*

But one wonders that the naval power of Athens had not made itself more immediately and effectively felt. The Macedonian fleet was insignificant; it could inflict damage on merchant-vessels or raid a coast, but it had no hold on the sea. The Athenian navy was 300 strong and controlled the northern Aegean; and yet it seems that in these critical years there was no permanent squadron of any strength stationed in the Hellespont. Naval affairs had been by no means neglected. Eubulus had seen to the building of new ship-sheds and had begun the construction of a magnificent arsenal, close to the harbour of Zea, for the storage of the sails and rigging and tackle of the ships of war. But these luxuries were vain, if the ships themselves were not efficient, and the group-system on which the ships were furnished worked badly. Demosthenes had long ago desired to reform this system, which had been in force for seventeen years. The 1200 richest citizens were liable to the trierarchy—each trireme being charged on a small group, of which each member contributed the same proportion of the expense. If a large number of ships were required, the group might consist of five persons; if a small, of fifteen. This system bore hardly on the poorer members of the partnership, who had to pay the same amount as the richer, and some were ruined by the burden. But the great mischief was that these poorer members were often unable to pay their quota in time and consequently the completion of the triremes was delayed. The influence of Demosthenes was now so enormous that he was able, in the face of bitter opposition from the wealthy class, to introduce a new law, by which the cost of furnishing the ships should fall on each citizen in proportion to his property. Thus a citizen whose property was rated as exceeding thirty talents would henceforward, instead of having to pay one-fifth or perhaps one-fifteenth of the cost of a single trireme, be obliged to furnish three triremes and a boat.

So popular was Demosthenes, by the successes of Euboea and Byzantium, that he was able to accomplish a still greater feat. Years before he had cautiously hinted at the expediency of devoting the Festival Fund to military purposes; he now

persuaded the Athenians to adopt this highly disagreeable measure. The building of the arsenal and ship-sheds was interrupted also, in order to save the expenses.

Philip in the meantime had again withdrawn into the wilds of Thrace. The Scythians near the mouth of the Danube had rebelled, and he crossed the Balkan range to crush them. In returning to Macedon through the land of the Triballi, in the centre of the peninsula, he had some sore mountain warfare and was severely wounded in the leg. But Thrace was now safe, and he was free to deal with Greece.

*Philip in
Thrace.
340-339
B.C.*

SECT. 8. BATTLE OF CHAERONEA

Philip had no longer the slightest prospect of realising the hope, which he had cherished both before and after the Peace of Philocrates, of establishing friendly relations with Athens. The influence of the irreconcilable orator was now triumphant; through the persistent agitation of Democritus, coldness and quarrelling had issued in war; and Macedonia had received a distinct check. There was nothing for it now but to accept the war and bring the Macedonian cavalry into play. There were two points where Athens could be attacked effectively, at the gates of her own city, and at the gates of her granary in the Euxine. But a land-power like Macedonia could not operate effectively in the Propontis, unless aided by allies which possessed an effective navy; and Philip had experienced the truth of this when he laid siege to Perinthus and Byzantium. And in that quarter he had now to reckon not only with the Athenian sea-power but with the small navies of the Asiatic islands, Rhodes, Cos, and Chios, which had recently come to the rescue of the menaced cities. For these island states calculated that, if Philip won control of the passage between the two continents, he would not only tax their trade, but would soon cross over to the conquest of Asia Minor, and their fleets would then be appropriated to form the nucleus of a Macedonian navy. Now that Athens had been awakened from her slumbers, it was abundantly evident that the only place where Macedonia could inflict upon her a decisive blow was Attica.

*Philip
makes up
his mind
to the war
with
Athens.*

On her side Athens had lightly engaged in a war, for

*Dangerous
position of
Athens.*

which she had not either fully counted the cost or meditated an adequate programme. In truth the Athenians had no craving for the war; and they were not driven to it by an imperious necessity, or urged by an irresistible instinct, or persuaded by a rational conviction of its expediency. The persistent and crafty agitation of Demosthenes and his party had drawn them on step by step; their natural feeling of irritation at the rise of a new great power in the north had been sedulously fed and fostered by that eloquent orator and his friends, till it had grown into an unreasoning hatred of the Macedonian king, whose character, aims, and resources were totally misrepresented. But now that war was declared, what was to be the plan of action? Athens had not even an able general who could make an effective combination. She controlled the sea, and it was something that Euboea had shaken off the Macedonian influence. In Chalcis, Athens had a point of vantage against Boeotia, and from Oreus she could raid the Thessalian coast and operate in the bay of Pagasae. But when Philip advanced southward, and passed Thermopylae, which was in his hands, the Athenian superiority at sea was of no use, for his communications were independent of the sea. There was no means of offering serious opposition if he marched on Attica; and the citizens were hardly likely at the bidding of Demosthenes to ascend their ships as they had done at the bidding of Themistocles. If events fell out according to the only probable forecast which could be made—on the assumption of Demosthenes that the invasion of Attica and ruin of Athens were the supreme objects of Philip—the Athenians had to look forward to the devastation of their country and the siege of their city. How was this peril to be met? They were practically isolated; for they had no strong continental power to support them; what could Megarians or Corinthians, Ambraciots or Achaeans, do for them against the host of Philip and his allies? “Ah, if we were only islanders!” many an Athenian must have murmured in these critical years. It was the calamity of Athens, as it has been the calamity of Holland, that she was solidly attached to the continent. Now that the crisis approaches nearer, it is borne in upon us more and more how improvident the policy of Athens had been. If she had

accepted Macedonian friendship and kept a strong naval force permanently in the Propontis, assuring herself of undisputed control of her own element, she would have been perfectly safe. The constant presence of a powerful fleet belonging to a predominant naval state may be in itself a strategic success equivalent to a series of victories. But, though we have almost no notices of the movements of the Athenian galleys at this time, we cannot help suspecting that the naval power of Athens was inefficiently handled.

Demosthenes had never had a free hand until the siege of Byzantium; till then, he could do little more than agitate. When at length he became in the full sense of the word the director of Athenian policy, his energy and skill were amazing. But we cannot help asking with what hopes he was prepared to undertake the responsibility of bringing an invader into his country and a besieger to the walls of his city. The answer is that he rested his hope on a single chance. From the beginning of his public career Demosthenes had a strong leaning to Thebes; it has been already mentioned that he was Theban proxenos at Athens. This was a predilection which it behoved him to be very careful of airing; for the general feeling in his city was unfriendly to Thebes. The rhetorical tears which Demosthenes shed over the fate of the Phocians were not inconsistent with his attachment to the enemies of Phocis; for he never raised his voice for the victims of Theban hatred until their doom was accomplished. The aim of his policy was to unite Athens in alliance with Thebes. It was a difficult and doubtful game. Could Thebes be induced to turn against her Macedonian ally, who had recently secured for her the full supremacy of Boeotia, and who, she might reasonably reckon, would continue to support her as an useful neighbour to Attica? On this chance, and a poor chance it seemed, rested the desperate policy of Demosthenes. If Thebes joined Philip, or even gave him a free passage through Boeotia, the fate of Attica was sealed. But if she could be brought to desert him, her well-trained troops, joined with those of Athens, might successfully oppose his invasion.

*Theban
leanings of
Demo-
sthenes.*

The invasion was not long delayed; and it came about in a curious way. During the recent Sacred War, the

*Meeting of
the Amphic-
tionic
Council,
autumn,
340 B.C.*

Athenians had burnished anew and set up again in the sanctuary of Delphi the donative which they had dedicated after the victory of Plataea, being gold shields with the inscription, "From the spoils of Persians and Thebans, who fought together against the Greeks." Such a re-dedication, while Delphi was in the hands of the Phocians, who had been condemned as sacrilegious robbers, might be regarded as an offence against religion; at all events, the Thebans and their friends had an excellent pretext to revenge themselves on Athens for that most offensive inscription, which had perpetuated the shame of Thebes for a century and a half. The Thebans themselves did not come forward, but their friends of the Locrian Amphissa arranged to accuse the Athenians at the autumn session of the Amphictionic Council and propose a fine of fifty talents. At this session Aeschines was one of the Athenian deputies and he discovered the movement which was afoot against his city. He was an able man and he forestalled the blow by dealing another. The men who had been incited to charge Athens with sacrilege had been themselves guilty of a sacrilege far more enormous. They had cultivated part of the accursed field which had once been the land of Crisa. Aeschines arose in the assembly and, in an impressive and convincing speech which carried his audience with him, called upon the Amphictions to punish the men who had wrought this impious act. On the morrow at break of day the Amphictions and the Delphians, armed with pickaxes, marched down the hill to lay waste the places which had been unlawfully cultivated, and, as they did so, were assaulted by the Amphissians, whose city is visible from the plain. The Council then resolved to hold a special meeting at Thermopylae, in order to consult on measures for the punishment of the Locrians, who, to their former crime, had added the offence of violating the persons of the Amphictionic deputies.

*Speech of
Aeschines,
who retorts
sacrilege
on the
Locrians.*

By his promptness and eloquence the Athenian orator had secured a great triumph. He had completely turned the tables on the enemies, Amphissa and Thebes, who must have been prepared to declare an Amphictionic war against Athens, in case she declined, as she certainly would have done, to pay the fine. They calculated of course on the support of Philip

of Macedon. But it was now for Athens to take the lead in a sacred war against Amphissa; and it was a favourable opportunity for her to make peace with Philip—so that the combination should be Philip and Athens against Thebes, instead of Philip and Thebes against Athens. It was not to be expected that this advantage which Aeschines had gained would be welcome to Demosthenes; for it was the object of Demosthenes to avoid an embroilment with Thebes. Accordingly he persuaded the people to send no deputies to the special Amphictionic meeting and take no part in the proceedings against Amphissa. He upbraided Aeschines with trying to “bring an Amphictionic war into Attica”: a strange taunt to the man who had prevented the declaration of an Amphictionic war against Athens.

*Athens
does not
follow up
the stroke of
Aeschines.*

Thus, although the attack upon Athens must have been prepared at Theban instigation, the incident was converted, through the policy of Demosthenes, into a means of bringing Athens and Thebes closer together. Athens and Thebes alike abstained from attending the special meeting. The Amphictionics, in accordance with the decisions of that meeting, marched against the Amphissians, but were not strong enough to impose the penalties which had been decreed. Accordingly, at the next autumn session, they determined to invite Philip to come down once more to be leader in a sacred war.

*The Amphictionics
proceed
against
Amphissa,
339 B.C.
The Amphictionics
call in*

Philip did not delay a moment. An Amphictionic war, from which both Athens and Thebes held aloof, was a matter which needed prompt attention. When he reached Thermopylae, he probably sent on, by the mountain road which passes through Doris to Amphissa, a small force to occupy Cytinion, the chief town on that road. Advancing himself through the defile of Thermopylae into northern Phocis, he seized and re-fortified the dismantled city of Elatea. The purpose of this action was to protect himself in the rear against Boeotia, and preserve his communications with Thermopylae, while he was operating against Amphissa. But while he halted at Elatea, he sent ambassadors to explore the intentions of Thebes. He declared that he intended to invade Attica, and called upon the Thebans to join him in the invasion, or, if they would not do this, to give his army a free passage through Boeotia. This was a diplomatic method of forcing Thebes to declare

*Philip,
338 B.C.,
spring.*

herself; it does not prove that Philip had any serious intention of marching against Attica, and his later conduct seems to show that he did not contemplate such a step.

Alarm at Athens.

But in Athens, when the news came that the Macedonian army was at Elatea, the folk fell into extreme panic and alarm. It would seem that Philip's rapid movements had brought him into central Greece far sooner than was expected; and the news of his arrival, which must have been transmitted by way of Thebes, was accompanied by the rumour that he was about to march on Athens. And thus the Athenians in their fright connected the seizure of Elatea with the supposed design against themselves, although Elatea had no closer connexion than the pass of Thermopylae with an attack on Athens. For a night and a day the city was filled with consternation, and these anxious hours have become famous in history through the genius of the orator Demosthenes, who in later years recalled to the people the scene and their own emotions by a picturesque description which no orator has surpassed.

Athens sends ten envoys to Thebes.

On the advice of Demosthenes, the Athenians dispatched ten envoys to Thebes; everything depended on detaching Thebes from the Macedonian alliance. And it seemed at least possible that this might be effected. For, though there were probably few in Thebes who were inclined to be friendly to Athens, there was a party of some weight which was distinctly hostile to Macedonia. Moreover, there was a feeling of soreness against Philip for having seized Nicaea, close to Thermopylae, and replaced its Theban garrison by Thessalians. The envoys, of whom Demosthenes was one, were instructed to make concessions and exact none.

The ambassadors of Athens and Macedon met in the Boeotian capital, and their messages were heard in turn by the Theban assembly. It would be too much to say that the fate of Greece depended on the deliberations of this assembly, but it is the mere truth that the Theban vote not only decided the doom of Thebes itself, but determined the shape of the great event to which Greece had been irresistibly moving.

Situation of Thebes.

In considering the situation which the rise of Macedon had created we have hitherto stood in Pella or in Athens; we must now for a moment take our point of view at Thebes. The inveterate rivalry and ever-smouldering hate which

existed between Thebes and Athens was a strong motive inducing Thebes to embrace an opportunity for rendering Athens harmless. But it would require no great foresight to see that, by weakening her old rival, Thebes would gravely endanger her own position. So long as Philip had a strong Athens to reckon with, it behoved him to treat Thebes with respect, but, if Athens were reduced to nothingness, Thebes would be absolutely in his power, and probably his first step would be to free the cities of Boeotia from her domination. To put it shortly, the independent attitude which Thebes had hitherto been able to maintain towards her friend Macedonia depended on the integrity of Athens. Thus the positions of Thebes and Athens were remarkably different. While Athens could with impunity stand alone as Philip's enemy, when Thebes was Philip's friend, Thebes could not safely be Philip's friend unless Athens were his enemy. The reason of this difference was that Athens was a sea-power.

To a Theban statesman then, possessing any foresight, the subjugation of Athens would have been feared as the prelude to the depression of Thebes; and it would have seemed wiser to join in a common resistance to Philip. This sound reasoning was quickened by the eloquence of Demosthenes and the offers of Athens. The Athenians were ready to pay two-thirds of the expenses of the war; they abandoned their claim to Oropus, and they recognised the Boeotian dominion of Thebes—a dominion which they had always condemned before as an outrage on the rights of free communities. But professing now, through the mouth of Demosthenes, to be the champion of Hellenic liberty, Athens scrupled little to sacrifice the liberties of a few Boeotian cities. By these concessions she secured the alliance of Thebes, and Demosthenes won the greatest diplomatic success that he had yet achieved—the consummation to which his policy had been directed for many years.

The first concern of Philip was to do the work which the Amphictions had summoned him to perform; but he is completely lost to our sight in this campaign. We only know that the allies followed him into Phocis and gained some advantages in two engagements, but that he ultimately captured not only Amphissa, cutting up a force of mercenaries

Thebes forms an alliance with Athens against Philip, 338 B.C., spring.

Philip captures Amphissa, summer, 338 B.C.

that Athens had sent thither, but also Naupactus, thus gaining a point of vantage against the Peloponnesus. He then turned back to carry the war into Boeotia, and when he entered the great western gate of that country close to Chaeronea, he found the army of the allies guarding the way to Thebes and prepared to give him battle. He had 30,000 foot soldiers and 2000 horse, perhaps slightly outnumbering his foes.

*Battle of
Chaeronea,
August
(Metageitnion 7),
338 B.C.*

Their line extended over about three and a half miles, the left wing resting on Chaeronea and the right on the river Cephissus. The Theban hoplites, with the Sacred Band in front, under the command of Theagenes, did not occupy the left wing, as when Epaminondas led them to victory at Leuctra and at Mantinea, but were assigned the right, which was esteemed the post of honour. In the centre were ranged the troops of the lesser allies, Achaeans, Corinthians, Phocians, and others, whom Demosthenes boasted of having rallied to the cause of Hellenic liberty. On the left stood the Athenians under three generals, Chares, Lysicles, and Stratocles, of whom Chares was a respectable soldier with considerable experience and no talent, while the other two were incompetent. Demosthenes himself was serving as a hoplite in the ranks.

Of the battle we know less perhaps than of any other equally important engagement in the history of Greece. But we can form a general notion of the tactics of Philip. The most formidable part of the adverse array was the Theban infantry; and accordingly he posted on his own left wing the phalanx, with its more open order and long pikes, to try its strength against the most efficient of the old-fashioned hoplites of Greece. On the flank of this wing he placed his heavy cavalry, to ride down upon the Thebans when the phalanx had worn them out. The cavalry was commanded by Alexander, now a lad of eighteen, and, many hundred years after, "the oak of Alexander" was shown on the bank of the river. The right wing was comparatively weak, and Philip planned that it should gradually give way before the attack of the Athenians, and draw them on, so as to divide them from their allies. This plan of holding back the right wing reminds us of the tactics of Epaminondas; but the use of cavalry to decide the combat is the characteristic feature of Philip's battles.

The Athenians pressed forward, fondly fancying that they

were pressing to victory, and Stratocles in the flush of success cried, "On to Macedonia!" But in the meantime the Thebans had been broken by Alexander's horsemen: their leader had fallen, and the comrades of the Sacred Lochos were making a last hopeless stand. Philip could now spare some of his Macedonian footmen, and he moved them so as to take the Athenians in flank and rear. Against the assault of these trained troops the Athenians were helpless. One thousand were slain, two thousand captured, and the rest ran, Demosthenes running with the fleetest. But the Sacred Band did not flee. They fought till they fell, and it is their heroism which has won for the battle of Chaeronea its glory as a struggle for liberty. When the traveller, journeying on the highway from Phocis to Thebes, has passed the town of Chaeronea, he sees at the roadside the tomb where those heroes were laid, and the fragments of the lion which was set up to keep a long ward over their bones.

An epitaph which was composed in honour of the Athenian dead suggested the consolation that God alone is sure of success, men must be prepared to fail. It is true, but in this case the failure cannot be imputed to the chances of war. When the allies opened the campaign the outlook was not hopeless; if they had been led by a competent general they might have reduced the Macedonian army to serious straits amid the valleys of Phocis and the hills of Locris. But to oppose to a Philip, the best they had was a Chares. The war was really decided in Locris by the strategical inferiority of the Athenian and Theban generals; and the inevitable sequel of the blunders there was the catastrophe in Boeotia. The advantage in numerical strength with which the allies started had been lost, and when they stood face to face with the advancing foe at Chaeronea, all the chances were adverse to any issue save defeat, in a battle in the open against a general of such pre-eminent ability. Men must be prepared to fail when they have no competent leader.

If the chances of another issue to the battle of Chaeronea have been exaggerated, the significance of that event has been often misrepresented. The battle of Chaeronea belongs to the same historical series as the battles of Aegospotami and Leuctra. As the hegemony or first place among Greek states

*Signifi-
cance of
battle of
Chaeronea:
(1) mili-
tary*

*(2) politi-
cal.*

had passed successively from Athens to Sparta, and to Thebes, so now it passed to Macedon. The statement that Greek liberty perished on the plain of Chaeronea is as true or as false as that it perished on the field of Leuctra or the strand of the Goat's River. Whenever a Greek state became supreme, that supremacy entailed the depression of some states and the dependency or subjection of others. Athens was reduced to a secondary place by Macedon, and Thebes fared still worse; but we must not forget what Sparta, in the day of her triumph, did to Athens, or the more evil things which Thebes proposed. There were, however, in the case of Macedonia, special circumstances which seemed to give her victory a more fatal character than those previous victories which had initiated new supremacies.

*Greek
feelings
towards
Macedon.*

For Macedon was regarded in Hellas as an outsider. This was a feeling which the southern Greeks entertained even in regard to Thessaly when Jason threatened them with a Thessalian hegemony; and Macedonia, politically and historically as well as geographically, was some steps further away than Thessaly. If Thessaly was hardly inside the inner circle of Hellenic politics, Macedonia was distinctly outside it. To Athens and Sparta, to Corinth and Argos and Thebes, the old powers, who, as we might say, had known each other all their lives as foes or friends, and had a common international history, the supremacy of Macedonia seemed the intrusion of an upstart. And, in the second place, this supremacy was the triumph of an absolute monarchy over free commonwealths, so that the submission of the Greek states to Macedon's king might be rhetorically branded as an enslavement to a tyrant in a sense in which subjection to a sovereign Athens or a sovereign Sparta could not be so described. For these reasons the tidings of Chaeronea sent a new kind of thrill through Greece. And the impression that there was something unique in Philip's victory might be said to have been confirmed by subsequent history, which showed that the old Greek commonwealths had had their day and might never again rise to be first-rate powers.

SECT. 9. THE SYNEDRION OF THE GREEKS. PHILIP'S DEATH

Isocrates just lived to hear the tidings of Chaeronea, and died consoled for the fate of his fallen fellow-citizens by the thought that the unity of Hellas was now assured. But a Greek unity, such as he dreamed of, was by no means assured. The hegemony of Macedonia did as little to unite the Greek states or abolish the separatist tendency as the hegemony of Athens or of Sparta. But we must see how Philip used his victory.

He treated Thebes just as Sparta had treated it when Phoebeidas surprised the citadel. He punished by death or confiscation his leading opponents; he established a Macedonian garrison in the Cadmea, and broke up the Boeotian league, giving all the cities their independence, and restoring the dismantled towns of Orchomenus and Plataea. But, if his dealing with Thebes did not go beyond the usual dealing of one Greek state with its vanquished rival, his dealing with Athens was unusually lenient. The truth was that Athens did not lie defenceless at his feet. He might invade and ravage Attica, but when he came to invest Athens and Piraeus, he might find himself confronted by a task more arduous than that which had thwarted him at Perinthus and Byzantium. The sea-power of Athens saved her, and not less, perhaps, the respect which Philip always felt for her intellectual eminence. Now, at last, by unexpected leniency, he might win what he had always striven for, the moral and material support of Athens. And in Athens men were now ready to listen to the voices which were raised for peace. The policy of Demosthenes had failed, and all desired to recover the 2000 captives and avert an invasion of Attic soil. There was little disposition to hearken to the advice of Hyperides, who proposed to enfranchise and arm 150,000 slaves. Among the captives was an orator of consummate talent, named Demades, who belonged to the peace party and saw that the supremacy of Macedon was inevitable. An anecdote was noised abroad that Philip, who spent the night after the battle in wild revelry, came reeling drunk to the place where his prisoners were and jeered at their misfortune, making merry, too, over

*Philip
harsh to
Thebes;*

*lenient to
Athens.*

Demades.

the flight of the great Demosthenes. But Demades stood forth and ventured to rebuke him : " O king, fortune has given you the rôle of Agamemnon, and you play the part of Thersites ! " The words stung and sobered the drunken victor ; he flung away his garlands and all the gear of his revel, and set the bold speaker free. But, whether this story be true or not, Demades was politically sympathetic with Philip and was sent by him to negotiate peace at Athens.

*Terms
of Peace
between
Athens
and Mace-
donia.*

Philip offered to restore all the prisoners without ransom and not to march into Attica. The Athenians on their side were to dissolve what remained of their confederacy, and join the new Hellenic union which Philip proposed to organise. In regard to territory, Oropus was to be given to Athens, but the Chersonesus was to be surrendered to Macedonia. On these terms peace was concluded, and the Athenian people thought that they had come off well. Philip sent his son and two of his chief officers to Athens, with the bodies of the Athenians who had been slain. They were received with great honour, and a statue of the Macedonian king was set up in the market-place, a token of gratitude which was probably genuine. Demosthenes himself afterwards confessed with a snarl that Philip had been kind.

*Philip in
the Pelo-
ponnese.*

It was now necessary for Macedonia to win the recognition of her supremacy from the Peloponnesian states. Philip marched himself into Peloponnesus, and met with no resistance. Sparta alone refused to submit, and the conqueror bore down upon her, with the purpose of forcing on her a reform of the constitution and the abolition of her peculiar kingship, which seemed to him like a relic of the dark ages. But something mysterious happened which induced him to desist from his purpose, and a poet of Epidaurus, who was at that time a boy, told in later years how the god Asklêpios had intervened to save the Spartan state—

*Isyllus of
Epi-
daurus.*

What time king Philip unto Sparta came,
Bent on abolishing the royal name.

But Sparta, though her kings were saved, had to suffer at the hands of Philip what she had before suffered at the hands of Epaminondas, the devastation of Laconia and the diminution of her territory. The frontier districts on three sides were

given to her neighbours, Argos, Tegea, Megalopolis, and Messenia. Having thus displayed his arms and power in the south, the Macedonian king invited all the Greek states within Thermopylae to send delegates to a congress at Corinth; and, with the sole exception of Sparta, all the states obeyed.

*Synedrion
at Corinth,
338 B.C.*

It was a Federal congress: the first assembly of an Hellenic Confederacy, of which the place of meeting was to be Corinth, and Macedonia the head. The aim of the Confederacy was understood from the first; but it would seem that it was not till the second meeting, a year later, that Philip announced his resolve to make war upon Persia, in behalf of Greece and her gods, to liberate the Greek cities of Asia, and to punish the barbarians for the acts of sacrilege which their forefathers had wrought in the days of Xerxes. It was the formal announcement that a new act in the eternal struggle between Europe and Asia was about to begin, and Europe, having found a leader, might now have her revenge for many a deed of insolence. The federal gathering voted for the war and elected Philip general with supreme powers. It was arranged what contingents in men or ships each city should contribute to the Panhellenic army; the Athenians undertook to send a considerable fleet.

*Second
Synedrion
at Corinth,
337 B.C.*

The league which was thus organised under the hegemony of Macedon had the advantage of placing before its members a definite object to be accomplished, and, it might be thought, a common interest. But if Themistocles found it hard to unite the Greek states by a common fear, it was harder still for Philip to unite them by a common hope; and the idea which Macedon promulgated produced no Panhellenic effort, and awakened but small enthusiasm. Yet the Congress of Corinth has its significance; it is the counterpart of that earlier congress which met at the Isthmus, when Greece was trembling at the thought of the barbarian host which was rolling towards her from the east. She had so long since ceased to tremble that she had almost forgotten to remember before the day of vengeance came; but with the revolution of fortune's wheel, that day came duly round, and Greece met once more on the Isthmus to concert how her ancient tremors might be amply avenged. The new league did not unite the Greeks in the sense in which Isocrates hoped for their union.

*Comparison
of the
Synedrion
of the
Isthmus of
480 B.C.
with that
of 338 B.C.*

*Unity of
Greece not
achieved.*

*Philip's
garrisons
in Greece.*

There was a common dependency on Macedon, but there was no zeal for the aims of the northern power, no faith in her as the guide and leader of Greece. Each state went its own private way; and the interests of the Greek communities remained as isolated and particular as ever. A league of such members could not be held together, the peace which the league stipulated could not be maintained, without some military stations in the midst of the country; and Philip established three Macedonian garrisons at important points: at Ambracia to watch the west, at Corinth to hold the Peloponnesus in check, and at Chalcis to control north-eastern Greece.

*Parmenio,
Amyntas,
and
Attalus
invade
Asia
Minor,
336 B.C.*

The designs of Philip probably did not extend beyond the conquest of western Asia Minor, but it was not fated that he should achieve this himself. In the spring after the congress, his preparations for war were nearly complete, and he sent forward an advance force under Parmenio and other generals to secure the passage of the Hellespont and win a footing in the Troad and Bithynia. The rest of the army was soon to follow under his own command.

*Philip
divorces
Olympias
and
marries
Cleopatra.*

But Philip, as a frank Corinthian friend told him, had filled his own house with division and bitterness. A Macedonian king was not expected to be faithful to his wife; but the proud and stormy princess whom he had wedded was impatient of his open infidelities. Nor was her own virtue deemed above suspicion, and it was even whispered that Alexander was not Philip's son. The crisis came when Philip fell in love with a Macedonian maiden of too high a station to become his concubine—Cleopatra, the niece of his general Attalus. Yielding to his passion, he put Olympias away and celebrated his second marriage. At the wedding feast, Attalus, bold with wine, invited the nobles to pray the gods for a *legitimate* heir to the throne. Alexander flung his drinking-cup in the face of the man who had insulted his mother, and Philip started up, drawing his sword to transpierce his son. But he reeled and fell, and Alexander jeered, "Behold the man who would pass from Europe to Asia, and trips in passing from couch to couch!" Pella was no longer the place for Alexander. He took the divorced queen to Epirus, and withdrew himself to the hills of Lyncestis, until Philip invited

him to return. But the restless intrigues of the injured mother soon created new debates, and when a son was born to Cleopatra, it was easy to arouse the fears of Alexander that his own succession to the throne was imperilled. Philip's most urgent desire was to avoid a breach with the powerful king of Epirus, the brother of the injured woman. To this end he offered him his daughter in wedlock, and the marriage was to be celebrated with great pomp in Pella, on the eve of Philip's departure for Asia. But it was decreed that he should not depart. Olympias was made of the stuff which does not hesitate at crime, and a tool was easily found to avenge the wrongs of the wife and assure the succession of the son. A certain Pausanias, an obscure man of no merit, had been grossly wronged by Attalus, and was madly incensed against the king, who refused to do him justice. On the wedding day, as Philip, in solemn procession, entered the theatre a little in advance of his guards, Pausanias rushed forward with a Celtic dagger and laid him a corpse at the gate. The assassin was caught and killed, but the true assassin was Olympias; and it was Alexander who reaped the fruits of the crime. Willingly would we believe that he knew nothing of the plot, and that a man of such a generous nature never stooped to thoughts of parricide. Beyond dark whispers, there is no evidence against him; yet it would be rash to say that his innocence is certain.

*Murder of
Philip,
336 B.C.
(summer).*

To none of the world's great rulers has history done less justice than to Philip. This failure in appreciation has been due to two or perhaps to three causes. The overwhelming greatness of a son greater than himself has overshadowed him and drawn men's eyes to achievements which could never have been wrought but for Philip's lifetime of toil. In the second place, we depend for our knowledge of Philip's work almost entirely on the Athenian orators, and especially on Demosthenes, whose main object was to misrepresent the king. And we may add, thirdly, that we possess no account of one of the greatest and most difficult of his exploits, the conquest of Thrace. Thus through chance, through the malignant eloquence of his opponent, who has held the ears of posterity, and through the very results of his own deeds, the maker and expander of Macedonia, the conqueror of Thrace and Greece,

*Injustice
done to
Philip by
posterity.*

has hardly held his due place in the history of the world. The importance of his work cannot be fully understood until the consequences which it devolved upon his son to carry out have been studied. The work of Alexander is the most authentic testimony to the work of Philip.

*The
Philippic
Histories
of Theo-
pompus.*

But there was one notable man of the day whose imagination grasped the ecumenical importance of the king of Macedon. A pupil of Isocrates, Theopompus of Chios—who played some part in the politics of his own island—was inspired by the deeds of Philip to write a history of his own time, with Philip as its central figure. In that elaborate work, the loss of which is irreparable, Theopompus exposed candidly and impartially the king's weaknesses and misdeeds; but he declared his judgment that Europe had never produced so great a man as the son of Amyntas.

*Demosthenes as
an orator.*

It is part of the injustice to Philip that the history of Greece during his reign has so often been treated as little more than a biography of Demosthenes. Only his political opponents would deny that Demosthenes was the most eloquent of orators and the most patriotic of citizens. But that oratory in which he excelled was one of the curses of Greek politics. The art of persuasive speech is indispensable in a free commonwealth, and, when it is wielded by a statesman or a general,—a Pericles, a Cleon, or a Xenophon,—is as noble as well as useful instrument. But once it ceases to be a merely auxiliary art, it becomes dangerous and hurtful. This is what had happened at Athens. Rhetoric had been carried to such perfection that the best years of a man's youth were absorbed in learning it, and when he entered upon public life he was a finished speaker, but a poor politician. Briefly, orators took the place of statesmen, and Demosthenes was the most eminent of the class. They could all formulate striking phrases of profound political wisdom; but their school-taught lore did not carry them far against the craft of the Macedonian statesman. The men of mighty words were as children in the hands of the man of mighty deeds. The Athenians took pleasure in hearing and criticising the elaborate speeches of their orators; and the eloquence of Demosthenes, though it was thoroughly appreciated, imposed far less on such connoisseurs than it has imposed upon posterity. The

common sense of a plain man could easily expose his sophistries; he said himself that the blunt Phocion was the "chopper" of his periods.

Demosthenes used his brilliant gift of speech in the service of his country; he used it unscrupulously according to his light—the light of a purblind patriotism. He could take a lofty tone; he professed to regard Philip as a barbarian threatening Hellas and her gods. There is no need to show that, judged from the point of view of the history of the world, his policy was retrograde and retarding. We cannot fairly criticise him either for not having seen, even as fully as Isocrates, *The policy of Demosthenes.* that the day for the expansion of Greece had come, and that no existing Greek commonwealth was competent to conduct that expansion; or if he did vaguely see it, for having looked the other way. All he saw, or at least all he cared, was that the increase of Macedonia meant the curtailment of Athens; and his political life was one long agitation against Macedonia's resistless advance. But it was nothing more than a busy and often brilliant agitation, carried on from day to day and from month to month, without any comprehensive plan. A fervent patriot does not make a great statesman. Demosthenes could devise reforms in special departments of the administration; he could admonish his fellow-citizens to be up and doing; but he did not grapple seriously with any of the new problems of the day; he did not originate one fertile political idea. A statesman of genius might conceivably have infused fresh life into Athens by effecting some radical change in her constitution and finding for her a new part to play. The fact that no such statesman arose is perhaps merely another side of the fact that her part as a chief actor was over. It has often been said that the Demosthenic Athenians were irreclaimable. They certainly could not have been reclaimed by Demosthenes; for Demosthenes, when all is said, was a typical Demosthenic Athenian.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONQUEST OF PERSIA

SECT. 1. ALEXANDER'S FIRST DESCENT ON GREECE

*Alexander
sur-
rounded
by foes.*

ON his accession to the throne of Macedon, Alexander found himself menaced by enemies on all sides. The members of the Confederacy of Corinth, the tributary peoples of the province of Thrace, the inveterately hostile Illyrians, all saw in the death of Philip an opportunity, not to be missed, for undoing his work; and in Asia, Attalus, the father of Cleopatra, espoused the claim of Cleopatra's infant son. Thus Alexander stood within a belt of dangers like that by which his father, at the same crisis in *his* life, had been encompassed; and the difference of the means which sire and son adopted to deal with the jeopardy showed the difference in temperament between the two men. If Alexander had followed the slow and sure methods of his father, he would have bought off the barbarians of the north, effected a reconciliation with Attalus, and deferred the Greek question till he had thoroughly established his power in Macedonia; then, by degrees, he could have recovered in a few years the dominion which Philip had won, and undertaken the expedition against Persia which Philip had planned. But such cautious calculation did not suit the bolder genius of Philip's son. He refused to yield to any of his foes; he encountered the perils one after another, and overcame them all.

*His
methods
unlike
Philip's.*

First of all, he turned to Greece, where the situation looked serious enough. Athens had hailed the news of Philip's death with undisguised joy, and at the instance of Demosthenes had

passed a decree in honour of his murderer's memory. Trumpets were sounding for war; messengers were flying to Attalus and to Persia; and Greece was incited to throw off the Macedonian yoke. Ambracia expelled her garrison, and Thebes attempted to expel hers.

But the insurrection of Thessaly was of far greater importance than the hostile agitations in the southern states. The Thessalian cavalry was an invaluable adjunct to the Macedonian army, and it was of more material consequence to a Macedonian king to be the archon of the Thessalian Federation than to be acknowledged as general of the Confederacy of Corinth. Yet it was hardly altogether the need of quickly securing Thessaly that urged Alexander to deal with Greece before he dealt with any other portion of his empire. He wished above all things to save Greece from herself. His timely appearance, before the agitation could develop into a fully declared rebellion, might prevent the cities from committing any irreparable action, which would necessitate a condign punishment, or even harsh measures. He would march south, not to chastise or judge the Greeks, but to conciliate them and obtain recognition as successor to his father's place in the amphictiony of Delphi and in the league of Corinth.

He advanced to the defile of Tempe, but found it strongly held by the Thessalians. Instead of attempting to carry a position which was perhaps impregnable, he led his army farther south along the coast, and cutting steps up the steep side of Ossa he made a new path for himself over the mountain and descended into the plain of the Peneus behind his enemy. Not a drop of blood was shed. A Thessalian assembly elected Alexander to the archonship, and he guaranteed to the communities of the land the same rights and privileges which they had enjoyed under his father. The conciliation of Thessaly led, without a blow, to the adhesion of its southern neighbours, Malis and Dolopia. At Thermopylae the young king was recognised by the amphictiony, and as he marched southward not a hand was raised against him; he had swooped down so quickly that nothing was ready to resist. The Athenians sent a repentant embassy, which the king received kindly without any reference to the public jubilations over his

*Importance
of Thessaly.*

336 B.C.,
late summer.

father's murder; and the Congress of the Confederacy met at Corinth to elect Alexander general in his father's place.

*Alexander
elected
General of
the Greeks.*

Alexander was chosen supreme general of the Greeks for the invasion of Asia; and it was as head of Hellas, descendant and successor of Achilles, rather than as Macedonian king, that he desired to go forth against Persia. But his election by the Greek Confederacy at Corinth had more of historical fitness than political significance. The contingents which the Greek states furnished as members of the league were small, and the idea of the expedition failed to arouse any national feeling. Yet the welcome, though half-hearted and hypocritical, which was given to Alexander at Corinth, and the vote, however perfunctory, which elected him leader of the Greeks, were the fitting prelude to the expansion of Hellas and the diffusion of Hellenic civilisation, which destiny had chosen him to accomplish. He was thus formally recognised as what he in fullest verity was, the representative of Greece. Of all those who thronged at Corinth round the royal youth, to observe him with curious gaze or flatter him with pleasant words, some may have foreseen that he would be a conqueror of many lands, but none can have suspected how his conquests would transform the world; for few realised that the world was waiting to be transformed. Outside the gates of Corinth, according to a famous story, the king found the eccentric philosopher Diogenes, sitting in the barrel, which served him as a home, and asked him to name a boon. "Stand out of the sun," was the brief reply of the philosopher. "Were I not Alexander," said the king to his retinue, "I should like to be Diogenes." The incident may never have happened, but the anecdote happily brings face to face the enthusiast who carried individual liberty to the utmost verge of independence and the enthusiast who dreamed of making his empire conterminous with the globe. For the individualism which Diogenes caricatured was sister to the spirit of cosmopolitanism which Alexander's empire was to promote.¹

Meanwhile some domestic dangers had been cleared violently out of his path. His stepmother, her father, and her child had all been done away with. Attalus had been murdered in Asia, in accordance with the king's commands.

¹ Cp. above, pp. 141-2.

But Alexander was not responsible for the death of Cleopatra and her infant. This was the work of Olympias, who, thirsty for revenge, caused the child to be slaughtered in its mother's lap, and forced Cleopatra to hang herself by her own belt.

SECT. 2. ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGNS IN THRACE AND ILLYRIA

There were symptoms of disquietude in Thrace; there were signs of a storm brewing in the Illyrian quarter; and it would have been impossible for the young king to invade Asia, with Thrace ready to revolt in his rear, and Macedonia exposed to attack from the west. It was indispensable to teach the Thracians a lesson, and especially the Triballi, who had never been chastised for the check which they had inflicted on Philip. The Triballi lived beyond the Haemus, and when Alexander, having crossed Mount Rhodope, reached the foot of one of the western passes of Mount Haemus, he found the steep defile defended by mountaineers. They had hauled up a multitude of their war-chariots to the top of the pass, in order to roll them upon the Macedonians and then, rushing down themselves, to fall upon the disordered array. There was no other way of crossing the mountain, and the mountain must be crossed. Alexander showed here again the same temper and the same resource which he had shown at Tempe; when he had made up his mind that an object must be attained, he never hesitated to employ the boldest or most novel means. He ordered the infantry to advance up the path, opening the ranks when possible to let the chariots roll through, but when that was impossible, he directed them to fall on their knees and, holding their shields locked together, to form a roof on which the chariots could fall and roll harmlessly away. The device was successful. The volleys of the cars rattled over the locked shields, and notwithstanding the shock not a man was killed. When the barbarians had exhausted these ponderous missiles, the pass was easily taken, and the Macedonians descended into the country of the Triballi. At the news of Alexander's approach the Triballi had sent their wives and children to an island named Peuce, in the Danube; and then, waiting until he advanced into their land, stole behind him to seize the mountain passes in his rear. Learning of this

*Alexander
marches
against the
Triballi,
335 B.C.*

*Shipka
Pass.*

*On the
Danube.
May.*

movement, Alexander marched rapidly back, forced the enemy to fight and dispersed them with great loss. He then proceeded on his way to the bank of the Danube. He had foreseen that it might be necessary to operate on that river, perhaps to make a demonstration in the country of the Getae on the northern bank; and he had prepared for this emergency by adopting the same plan as Darius in his famous Thracian expedition. He instructed his ally Byzantium to dispatch ships to sail up the river. The garrison in the island of Peuce were supported by a host of Scythian friends on the left bank of the stream, and Alexander saw that with his few Byzantine galleys it would be hopeless to attack the island until he had secured the Scythian shore. The problem was to throw his troops across the river without the enemy's knowledge, and this must be done in the darkness of one night. The ships were too few in number; but all the fishing-boats in the neighbourhood were collected, and tent-skins filled with hay were tied firmly together and strung across the stream. Landing on the other bank, led by the king himself, a large band of horse and foot advanced under the cover of the long corn at dawn of day, and the barbarian host arose to see the Macedonian phalanx unfolded before them. Startled as much by the terrible promptitude of their foe as by the formidable array which faced them, they withdrew into their poorly fortified town, and when Alexander followed them at the head of his cavalry, they fled with all their horses could carry into the wilds of the north. Empire beyond the Danube was not sought by Alexander, and he did not pursue. He marked the term of his northern conquest by sacrificing solemnly on the banks to Zeus Soter, Heracles, and the river-god himself.

*The
embassy
of the Celts.*

This exploit led to the surrender of the Triballi in the island, and all the neighbouring tribes south of the river hastened to assure the king of their submission. There came also from unknown homes far up the river, or perhaps in the Dalmatian mountains, an embassy of Celts, huge-limbed, self-confident men, who had heard of Alexander's deeds and were fain to be his friends. Curious to know what impression the Macedonian name had made upon that distant folk, Alexander asked them what they feared most. "We fear nothing," they said, "if it be not lest the sky fall." "Braggarts!" said

Alexander afterwards. But before two generations had passed away these men of mighty limbs and mighty words were destined to roll down in a torrent upon Greece and Asia, and to wrest for their own habitation a part of Alexander's conquests. (Subsequent settlement of Celts in Galatia.)

Alexander's work was done in Thrace, but as he marched homewards he learned that the Illyrians were already in the gate of Macedonia, and that not a moment must be lost if the country was to be saved from an invasion. Philip had secured the Macedonian frontier on the Illyrian side by a number of fortresses, near the sources of the Haliacmon and Apsus; and Pelion, which was the strongest of these strongholds, the key-fortress of the mountain gate, had now fallen into the hands of Clitus, the Illyrian chief. To reach Pelion as quickly as possible, before the arrival of the Taulantines, a folk in alliance with Clitus, was the object of Alexander. His march was threatened by the Autariats, another hostile folk, whom Clitus had engaged to waylay him; but this danger was prevented by the friendly king of the Agrianes, who invaded the Autariat territory and fully occupied the fighting-men. Marching rapidly up the valley of the Erigonus, Alexander encamped near Pelion. The heights around were covered with Illyrians, and Clitus, as was the custom of his people before a battle, sacrificed three boys, three maidens, and three black rams. But before they came to the actual attack, the hearts of the Illyrians failed them, and, deserting all their points of vantage and leaving their sacrifice incomplete, they retired into the fastness. Alexander intended to blockade the place next day by a circumvallation, but the Taulantines arrived in a large force, and he saw that his men were too few to deal at once with the foes within and the foes without the walls, nor were his provisions sufficient for a protracted siege. It was absolutely necessary to withdraw from his present position; but it was a task of extreme peril to retreat in these defiles, with hostile Pelion in the rear and Taulantine troops occupying the slopes and heights. This task, however, was carried out successfully, through the amazingly swift and skilful manœuvring of the highly drilled Macedonian soldiers; the enemy were driven from their flanking positions, and the river was crossed with much trouble yet without the loss of a man. At the other side of the river, Alexander's communications were safe; he

The Illyrian danger.

Alexander marches to Pelion.

The Macedonian troops celebrate themselves from a dangerous position.

*Macedonian
victory.*

could obtain provisions and reinforcements as he chose, and might wait, at his ease, for an opportunity to strike. The moment soon came. The enemy, seeing in Alexander's retreat a confession of fear, neglected all precautions and formed a camp without rampart or outpost before the gates of the fortress. Taking a portion of his army and bidding the rest follow, Alexander set out at night and surprised the slumbering camp of the barbarians. A carnage followed and a wild flight, and the Macedonians pursued to the Taulantine mountains. At the first alarm, Clitus rushed into the gates of Pelion and set the town on fire, before he joined the flight.

This discomfit of the Illyrians was a no less striking proof of Alexander's capacity than his exploits in Thrace. These months of incessant toil had earned him a rest, but there was to be no rest for the young monarch. Even as the tidings of the Illyrian danger had reached him before he left Thrace, so now, while he was still at Pelion, the news came that Thebes had rebelled. He must now speed to Greece as swiftly as seven days ago he had sped to the Illyrian hills. No need was more pressing than to crush this revolt before it spread.

SECT. 3. ALEXANDER'S SECOND DESCENT ON GREECE

*(Greek
cities
negotiating
with
Persia
against
Macedonia.*

The agitation against Macedon had not ceased during the past year in the cities of Greece, and it was now fomented by the gold and the encouragement of Persia. Five years before, at the outbreak of the war, Athens had sent ambassadors to Susa begging for subsidies from Artaxerxes, but the Great King would not break with Philip then, and sent them away with "a very haughty and barbarous letter" of refusal. The Phrygian satrap, however, perhaps on his own responsibility, sent useful help to Perinthus in its peril, and Persia gradually awoke to the fact that Macedonia was a dangerous neighbour. The new king, Darius, saw the necessity of embarrassing Alexander in Europe, so as to keep him as long as possible from crossing into Asia, where the Macedonian forces under Parmenio were holding their own. For this purpose he stirred up thoughts of war in Greece and sent subsidies to the Greek states. To many cities these overtures were welcome, but especially to Thebes, under the shadow of the Macedonian

garrison. Three hundred talents were offered to Athens and publicly declined; but Demosthenes privately accepted them, to be expended in the interests of the Great King. It is not probable that any city entered into a formal contract with Persia, but the basis of the negotiations was the King's Peace, of fifty years ago, the Greeks admitting the rights of the Persian empire over their brethren in Asia, who on their part were awaiting with various feelings the approach of the Macedonian deliverer.

As the patriots had often prayed for the death of Philip, so now they longed for the death of his youthful son, an event which might have hurled back Macedon into nothingness for ever. Rumours soon spread that the wish was fulfilled. Alexander was reported to have been slain in Thrace; Demosthenes produced a man who had seen him fall; and the Theban fugitives in Athens hastened to return to their native city and incite it to shake off the Macedonian yoke. Two captains of the garrison were caught outside the Cadmea and murdered, and the Thebans then proceeded to blockade the citadel by a double rampart on the south side, where there was no city-wall outside the wall of the citadel. Greece responded to the Theban leading, which Demosthenes, Lyncurgus, and the other Athenian patriots had prompted and encouraged. There were movements against Macedon in Elis and Aetolia; the Arcadians marched forth to the Isthmus; and the Athenians sent arms to Thebes, though they sent no men. The hopes of the patriots ran high; the fall of the Cadmea seemed inevitable.

Suddenly a report was whispered in Thebes that a Macedonian army was encamped a few miles away at Onchestus. As Alexander was dead, it could only be Antipater—so the Theban leaders assured the alarmed people. But messengers soon came, affirming that it was certainly Alexander. Nay, then, said the leaders, since King Alexander is dead, it can only be Alexander of Lyncestis.

But it was indeed the king Alexander. In less than two weeks he had marched from Pelion to Onchestus, and on the next day he stood before the walls of Thebes. He halted first on the north-eastern side of the city, near the sanctuary of the Theban hero, Iolaus; he would give the citizens time to make


their submission. But they were in no mind to submit, and some of their light-armed troops, rushing out of the gates, attacked the outskirts of the Macedonian camp. On the morrow Alexander moved his whole army to the south side of the city, and encamped close to the Cadmea, without making any attack on the walls, still hoping that the city would surrender. But the fate of Thebes was precipitated by one of his captains, by name Perdiccas, who was in charge of the troops which guarded the camp on the side of the Cadmea.

*Capture of
Thebes,
beginning
of Sept.
335 B.C.*

*(The
Hollow
Way.)*

Stationed within a few yards of the Theban earthworks, Perdiccas, without waiting for orders, dashed through the outer rampart and fell upon the Theban guards. He was supported by a fellow-officer; and Alexander, when he observed what had happened, sent archers and light troops to their aid. The Thebans who manned the rampart were driven along the gully, which, running along the east side of the Cadmea, passes the temple of Heracles outside the walls. When they reached this temple they rallied and turned on their assailants and routed them back along the "hollow road." But, as they pursued, their own ranks were broken, and Alexander, watching for the moment, brought his phalanx into action and drove them within the Electran gate. They had no time to shut the gate before some Macedonians pushed in along with the fugitives; and there were no men on the walls to shoot the enemy down, for the men who should have defended the walls had been sent to the blockade of the citadel. Some of the Macedonians, who thus entered, made their way to the Cadmea, and joining with the garrison they sallied out close to the Ampheion, where the main part of the Theban forces was drawn up. Others, having mounted the bastions, helped their friends without to climb the walls, and the troops thus admitted rushed to the market-place. But the gate was now in the possession of the Macedonians; the city was full of them; and the king himself was everywhere. The Theban cavalry was broken up, and fled through the streets and the open gates into the plain; the foot soldiers saved themselves as they could; and then a merciless butchery began. It was not the Macedonians who were zealous in the work of slaughter, but the old enemies of Thebes, the Phocians, the Plataeans and other Boeotian peoples, who now wreaked upon the proud city of the seven

*(Tomb of
Amphion
and
Zethus.)*



gates vengeance for the wrongs and insults of many generations. Six thousand lives were taken before Alexander stayed the slaughter. On the next day he summoned the Confederates of Corinth to decide the fate of the rebellious city. The judges meted out to Thebes the same measure which Thebes would have once meted out to Athens. The sentence was that the city should be levelled with the dust and her land divided among the Confederates; that the remnant of the inhabitants, with the women and children, should be sold into bondage, except the priests and priestesses of the gods, and those burghers who had bonds of guest-right with the Macedonians; and that the Cadmean citadel should be occupied by a garrison. The severe doom, showing how deeply the masterful city was abhorred, was carried out; and among the ruined habitations, on which the Macedonian warders looked down from the fortress walls, only one solitary house stood, making the desolation seem more desolate, the house of Pindar, which Alexander expressly spared.

The Boeotian cities were at length delivered from the yoke of their imperious mistress; Plataea and Orchomenus re-rose from their ruins. The fall of Thebes promptly checked all other movements in Greece; the Arcadian forces withdrew from the Isthmus; Elis and Aetolia hastened to retrieve their hostile attitude. The news reached Athens during the festival of the Mysteries. The solemnity was interrupted, and in a hurried meeting of the Assembly it was resolved, on the proposal of Demades, to send an embassy to welcome Alexander on his safe return from his northern campaign, and to congratulate him on the just chastisement which he had inflicted upon Thebes. The same people passed this decree who, a few days before, on the proposal of Demosthenes, had resolved to send troops to the aid of that luckless city. Alexander demanded—and it was a fair demand—that Demosthenes and Lycurgus and the other agitators who kept the hostility to Macedonia alive, and were largely responsible for the disaster of Thebes, should be delivered to him; for so long as they were at large there was no security that Athens would not entangle herself in further follies. When the demand was laid before the Assembly, Demosthenes epigrammatically expressed his own view of the situation by advising the

*The
destruction
of Thebes.*

*Athens
congrat-
ulates
Alexander
on the fall
of Thebes.*

people not to hand over their sheep-dogs to the wolf. Phocion said in downright words that Alexander must be conciliated at any cost; let the men whose surrender he demanded show their patriotism by sacrificing themselves. But it was finally decided that Demades, who had ingratiated himself with the Macedonian king, should accompany another embassy and beg that the offenders might be left to the justice of the Athenian people. Alexander, still anxious to show every consideration to Athens, withdrew his demand, insisting only on the banishment of the adventurer Charidemus, of Thracian notoriety.

With the fall of Thebes Alexander's campaigns in Europe came to an end. The rest of his life was spent in Asia. The European campaigns, though they filled little more than a year, and though they seem of small account by the side of his triumphs in the east, were brilliant and important enough to have won historical fame for any general. In his two descents into Greece, first to conciliate and afterwards to punish, in his expedition to the Danube, and in his Illyrian campaign, he had given tokens of the rare strategic capacity, the originality of conception, the boldness of resolution, the rapidity of action, and those other qualities which served Alexander's genius and soon found a more spacious sphere for their manifestation when they bore him toward the unknown limits of the eastern world.

SECT. 4. PREPARATIONS FOR ALEXANDER'S PERSIAN EXPEDITION. CONDITION OF PERSIA.

*The
scheme of
Alexander's
conquests.*

Having spent the winter in making his military preparations and setting in order the affairs of his kingdom for a long absence, Alexander set forth in spring for the conquest of Asia. Of his plans and arrangements we know almost nothing, but we may say with confidence that his scheme of conquest was well considered, and that he did not go forth as an adventurer to take whatever came in his way. His original scheme of conquest was afterwards merged in a second and larger scheme, of which he had no conception when he went forth from Macedonia, for he had not the requisite geographical knowledge of central Asia. But in the first instance his purpose was to

conquer the Persian kingdom, to dethrone the Great King and take his place, to do unto Persia what Persia under Xerxes had essayed to do unto Macedonia and the rest of Hellas. To carry out this design the first thing needful was to secure Thrace in the rear, and that had been done already. In the conquest itself there were three stages. The first step was the conquest of Asia Minor; the second was the conquest of Syria and Egypt; and these two conquests, preliminary to the advance on Babylon and Susa, would mean not merely acquisitions of territory, but strategic bases for further conquest. The weak point in Alexander's enterprise was the lack of a fleet capable of coping with the Persian navy, which was 400 strong. Here the Confederacy of Corinth should have come to his help; Athens alone could have furnished over 200 galleys. And Alexander doubtless counted on obtaining the support of Athens and the other Greek cities ultimately. But he desired aid rendered with goodwill, and he made no effort to extort ships or men. The loosely organised league of Corinth had undertaken to supply fixed contingents, but the fulfilment of these promises was not strictly exacted. *Want of a fleet.*

To secure Macedonia against her neighbours and subjects during his absence, Alexander was obliged to leave a large portion, perhaps as much as one half, of the national army behind him. The government was entrusted to his father's minister, Antipater. It is said that the king made dispositions before his departure as one who expected never to return. He divided all his royal domains and forests and revenues among his friends; and, when Perdicas asked what was left for himself, he replied, Hope. Then Perdicas, rejecting his own portion, exclaimed, "We who go forth to fight with you need share only in your hope." The anecdote at least illustrates the enthusiasm with which Alexander infected his friends and officers on the threshold of a venture, of which the conception was almost as wonderful as its success. *Provisions for the government of Macedonia.*

The Persian empire was weak and loosely knit, and it was governed now by a feeble monarch. Two generations had passed since Greece beheld its weakness memorably demonstrated by the adventures of Xenophon's Ten Thousand: and since then we have seen it, on the western side, rent and riven *State of Persia.*

Ochus
(*accessed,*
358 B.C.)
conquers
Egypt.

by revolts. Artaxerxes Ochus displayed more strength than his predecessors. He re-established his power in Asia Minor, he quelled rebellions in Phoenicia and Cyprus, and even conquered Egypt, which had long set at nought the Persian efforts to regain it. The king, Nektanebos, was driven back from Pelusium to Memphis, and from Memphis he fled to Ethiopia. The Persian king had no thought of holding the land of the Nile by kindness; as soon as he had Memphis in his power he displayed the intolerance of the fire-worshipper. He drowned the holy bull, Apis, and inaugurated the ass as the sacred animal of Egypt. This stupid outrage made the Persian rule more detested than ever. Ochus was assassinated, the victim of a palace conspiracy; and after two or three years of confusion the throne passed to a distant member of the Achaemenid house, Darius Codomannus, destined to be the last successor of his great namesake. He was a mild and virtuous prince, beloved by his followers, but too weak, both in brains and will, for the task to which fate had doomed him.

Murder
of Ochus,
338 B.C.
Accession
of Darius,
335 B.C.

Advantages on
the side of
Persia in
the ap-
proaching
struggle.

It cannot be gainsaid that, if Darius had been able and experienced in war and capable of leading men, he had some enormous advantages. In the first place, he had the advantage in the sheer weight of human bodies. Had the myriads which he could muster been divided into troops of thirty men, and a soldier of Alexander's army allotted as a cupbearer to each troop, many a company would have gone unserved. In the second place, while the coffers of Pella are said to have been emptied before Alexander set foot in Asia, the Great King commanded untold wealth. The treasury of Susa was full, and in the palace of Persepolis were hoarded inexhaustible stores of gold. In the third place, he had a navy which controlled the sea-board of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, and ought, if it had been handled ably, to have placed insuperable obstacles in the way of an invader who had no adequate sea-power. And fourthly, although there was no cohesion in the vast empire or unity of centralisation, there was, for that very reason, little or no national discontent in the provinces. Egypt was an exceptional case. The revolts which occurred from time to time were not national movements, but the disaffections of ambitious satraps. If the Persian monarch was not loved, at least he was not hated; and the warlike

barbarians of the east, from far Hyrcania or the banks of the Oxus, were always ready to follow him and glad to fight in his cause. It was quite feasible, so far as the state of feeling in the provinces was concerned, to organise an effective defence of the empire. But all these advantages were as *Fatal short-comings of Persia.* naught, for lack of a master mind and a controlling will. Multitudes were useless without a leader, and money could not create brains. Moreover Persia was behind the age in the art of warfare. She had not kept pace with the military developments in Greece during the last fifty years, and, though she could pay Greek mercenaries, and though these formed in fact a valuable part of her army, they could have no effect on the general character of the tactics of an oriental host. The Persian commanders had no notion of studying the tactics of their enemy and seeking new methods of encountering them. They had no idea of shaping strategic plans of their own: they simply waited on the movements of the enemy. They trusted, as they had always trusted, with perfect simplicity, in numbers, individual bravery, and scythed-armed chariots. The only lesson which the day of Cunaxa had taught them was to hire mercenary Greeks.

The strength of the army which Alexander led forth *Alexander's army.* against Persia is said to have been 30,000 foot and 5000 horse, thus preserving the large proportion of cavalry to infantry, which was one of the chief novelties of Philip's military establishment. We have seen how Philip organised the national army of Macedonia, in the chief divisions of the phalanx, the light infantry or hypaspists, and the heavy cavalry. Alexander led to Asia six regiments of the phalanx, *Heavy infantry.* and in the great engagements which decided the fate of Persia these formed the centre of his array. They were supported by Greek hoplites, both mercenary and confederate; the mercenary were commanded by Menander, the confederate by Antigonus. The hypaspists, led by Nicanor, son of Parmenio, *Light Macedonian infantry.* had their station on the right wing, and the first regiment of these was the royal guard, called the *agēma*. Philotas, *Cavalry.* another son of Parmenio, was commander of the heavy cavalry, in eight squadrons; one of which, the "royal squadron," under Clitus, corresponded to the *agēma* of the light armed foot. This Macedonian cavalry was always placed on the

*Light
troops.*

right, while on the left rode the splendid Thessalian cavalry under Callas, with a corps of other Greek horse attached. Both the right and the left wings were strengthened by light troops, horse and foot, accoutred according to their national habit, from Thrace, Paeonia, and other countries of the Illyrian peninsula.

SECT. 5. CONQUEST OF ASIA MINOR

*Successes of
Parmenio,
335 B.C.*

The forces which had been operating in Asia under Parmenio while Alexander was detained in Europe had been endeavouring to establish a footing in Aeolis and Mysia, and secure a base on the Propontis for further advance. The Great King had empowered Memnon of Rhodes, an able mercenary captain, who in recent years had come to the front, to oppose the van of the Macedonian invasion. The most pressing need of the Persians was to recapture Cyzicus, which was in the hands of Parmenio. In this Memnon failed; but he occupied Lampsacus, he forced the Macedonians to raise the siege of Pitane and beat them back to the coast of the Hellespont. But he could not or did not press his advantage, and the shores where Alexander's host would land were safe in Macedonian possession.

*The cross-
ing of the
Hellespont,
334 B.C.*

The fleet transported the army from Sestus to Abydos, while Alexander himself proceeded to Elaeus, where he offered a sacrifice on the tomb of Protesilaus, the first of the mythical Greeks who landed on the shore of Asia in the Trojan war, and the first who fell. Praying that he might be luckier than Protesilaus, Alexander sailed across to the "Harbour of the Achaeans," and in the mid-strait made libations to Poseidon and the Nereids from a golden dish. The first to leap upon the Mysian strand, he crossed the plain of Troy and went up to the hill of Ilion, where he performed a sacrifice in the temple of Athena, in the poor town which stood on the ruins of six prehistoric cities. It is said that he dedicated his own panoply in the shrine, and took down from the wall some ancient armour, preserved there as relics of the war of Priam and Agamemnon. He sacrificed to Priam to avert his anger from one of the race of Neoptolemus; he crowned the tomb of Achilles his ancestor; and his bosom-friend Hephaestion

*Alexander
at Troy.*

cast a garland upon the grave of Patroclus, the beloved of Achilles. He commanded that Ilion should rise again from its ruins, as a favoured city enjoying the rights of self-government and immunity from taxation. These solemnities on the hill of Troy are significant as revealing the spirit which the young king carried into his enterprise. They show how he was imbued with Greek scriptures and Greek traditions; how his descent from Achilles was part of his life, part of his inspiration; how he regarded himself as chosen to be the hero of another episode in the drama, whereof the first act had been illustrated by the deeds of that glorious ancestor.

Meanwhile the satraps of the Great King had formed an army of about 40,000 men to defend Asia Minor. If he had entrusted the command to the Rhodian Memnon, it is possible that some effective defence might have been made; but he committed the characteristic blunder of a Persian monarch, and consigned the army to the joint command of a number of generals, including Memnon and several of the western satraps. The Persian commanders were jealous of the Greek, and against his advice they decided to risk a battle at once. Accordingly they advanced from Zelea, where they had mustered, to the plain of Adrastea, through which the river Granicus flows into the Propontis, and posted themselves on the steep left bank of the stream, so as to hinder the enemy from crossing. Alexander and his army advanced eastward from Abydus, and received the submission of Lampsacus, and then of Priapus, a town near the mouth of the Granicus. It was impossible for him to avoid the combat, which the Persians desired; he could not march southward, leaving them in his rear. But he courted the combat even more than they; for the worst thing that could have befallen him (as Memnon knew well) was that the hostile army should persistently retire before him, eating up the provisions of the country as it retreated.

With his heavy infantry in two columns and his horse on the wings, Alexander marched across the Adrastean plain. The Persians had made the curious disposition of placing their cavalry along the river bank and the Greek hoplites on the slopes behind. As cavalry in attack has a great advantage over cavalry in defence, Alexander saw that the victory could

*Advance of
a Persian
army to the
Granicus.*

*Advance of
Alexander.*

*Position of
the armies.*

best be won by throwing his own squadrons against the hostile line. Parmenio advised him to wait till the following morning and cross the river at daybreak before the foe were drawn up in array. "I should be ashamed," said the king, "having crossed the Hellespont, to be detained by a miserable stream like the Granicus"; an answer such as Alexander loved to give, veiling under the appearance of negligent daring a self-confidence which was perfectly justified by his strategic insight.

*Battle
of the
Granicus
(334 B.C.,
May-
June).*

Drawing up his army in the usual way (which has been described above), with the six regiments of the phalanx in the centre, entrusting the left wing to Parmenio and commanding the right himself, Alexander first sent across the river his light cavalry to keep the extreme left of the enemy engaged, and then led his heavy Macedonian cavalry against the Persian centre. Alexander himself was in the thickest of the fight, dealing wounds and receiving blows. After a sharp mêlée on the steep banks, the Persian cavalry was broken and put to flight. The phalanx then advanced across the river against the Greek hoplites in the background, while the victorious cavalry cut them up on the flanks.

This victory, in winning which Alexander drank to the full the mad excitement of battle, cost few lives to the Macedonians and cleared out of their way the only army which was to oppose their progress in Asia Minor. But it was very far from laying Asia Minor at the conqueror's feet. There were strong places, which must be taken one by one—strong places on the coast, which could be supported by the powerful Persian fleet. Of all things, the help of the Athenian navy would have best bestd Alexander now, and he did not yet despair. After the skirmish of the Granicus, when he divided the spoil, he sent 300 Persian panoplies to Athens, as an offering to Athena on the Acropolis, with this dedication: "Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks (except the Lacedaemonians), from the barbarians of Asia." But Athens had no zeal for the cause of the Greeks and Alexander against the barbarians.

*Submission
of Lydia.*

The victor entrusted the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia to Callas, making no change in the method of the Persian administration; and marched southward to occupy the satrapy of Lydia and the rock of Sardis, girt with its threefold wall.

It was a little more than 200 years since Cyrus had overthrown the Lydian kingdom and Sardis had become the chief burg of Persian power in the west. The citadel was strong and capable of a stout defence, but it now passed with its treasures unresistingly into the hands of the Greek conqueror. For this prompt submission the Lydians received their freedom and the ancestral constitution, which had been suspended during the long period of Persian domination. Alexander resolved to build a temple to the Olympian Zeus on the citadel. It was said that a thunder-shower falling on the site of the royal palace showed him the fitting place for the sanctuary; the spot where a more famous thunder-shower had quenched the pyre of the last Lydian king.

Parmenio's brother, Asander, was appointed satrap of Lydia, and Alexander turned to deal with the Ionian cities. Here, as was to be expected, everything depended on the strength of the political parties. The Democrats welcomed the Greek deliverer; but the oligarchs supported the Persian cause, and wherever they were in power, admitted Persian garrisons. In Ephesus the oligarchy had got the upper hand, but on the approach of Alexander's army the garrison left the city and the people began to massacre the oligarchs. Alexander pacified these troubles and established a democratic constitution. He abode some time in the city, and during this sojourn the painter Apelles executed a famous picture of the king, wielding lightning in his hand, which was set up in the temple of Artemis.

The next stage in the advance of Alexander was Miletus, *Siege and capture of Miletus.* and here for the first time he encountered resistance. The Persian garrison was commanded by a Greek, who had at first meditated surrender, but learning that the Persian fleet was at hand in full force, decided to brave a siege. In an earlier episode of the struggle between Europe and Asia, we witnessed memorable operations in the Latmian gulf and the Milesian harbours, which the retreat of the sea has blotted from the map. The isle of Lade, then associated with the triumph of Asia, was now to play a part in the triumph of Europe. The Macedonian fleet, of 160 galleys, sailed into the bay and occupied the harbour of Lade, before the great fleet of the enemy arrived. When the Persian vessels came and saw that

they had been forestalled, they anchored off the promontory of Mycale. The city of Miletus consisted of two parts, an outer city which Alexander easily occupied as soon as he came up, and an inner city strongly fortified with wall and fosse. Alexander threw up a rampart round the inner city, and placed troops in the island of Lade. Miletus was easily stormed by the Macedonian siege-engines, and the fleet blocking the harbour hindered the Persian squadron from bringing help.

Parmenio had urged the king to risk a battle on the water, though the enemy's ships were nearly three to one, but Alexander rejected the advice. He had judged the whole situation, and he had made up his mind that the Persian sea-power would have to be conquered on land. If Athens had sent him naval reinforcements it might have been otherwise, but he now despaired of active help from Greece, and he decided that it was an useless drain on his treasury to maintain 160 galleys, too few to cope with the 400 of the enemy. Accordingly he disbanded the fleet, after the fall of Miletus, and proceeded to blockade the sea by seizing all the strong places on the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean. The execution of this design occupied him for the next two years, but it brought with it the conquest of Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt.

*Alexander
disbands
his fleet.*

The manifest objection to the dissolution of the naval force was that, in case a decisive defeat at the hands of the Great King should compel him to retreat, he would have no fleet to transport his army from Asia to Europe, and the fleet of the enemy, by occupying the straits at either end of the Propontis, could entirely cut him off. But Alexander trusted his own strategy; he knew that he would not be compelled to retreat.

As for Asia Minor, the next and the hardest task was the reduction of Caria and the capture of Halicarnassus. The remnant of the host which fled from the Granicus, and the Rhodian Memnon himself, had rallied here and rested their last hopes in the strong city of Mausolus, with its three mighty citadels. The Great King had now entrusted to Memnon the general command of the fleet and the coasts, and Memnon had dug a deep fosse round Halicarnassus, furnished the place with food for a long siege, and placed garrisons in the smaller neighbouring towns. Halicarnassus was to be the centre of a supreme resistance.

There had once been a chance that Alexander himself might have been, by a personal right, lord of Halicarnassus. The prince Pixodarus, one of the brothers of Mausolus, had wished to form an alliance of marriage with the house of Macedon, and Alexander had thought of offering himself as a bridegroom for his daughter. But Philip would not hear of such a match and Pixodarus had given the maiden to a Persian noble, who had succeeded to the dynasty after his father-in-law's death. There was indeed another claimant to the dynasty, Ada, wife and sister of Idrieus. She had succeeded her husband as ruler, and had been driven out by her brother Pixodarus. She now sought the protection of Alexander, and when he captured Halicarnassus, he assigned to her the satrapy of Caria. It was destined that women should represent Caria in the two great collisions of Greece with Persia, in the days of Alexander as in the days of Xerxes; the submission of Ada atoned for the bravery of Artemisia.

Having made a futile attack on Myndus, Alexander filled up the moat with which Memnon had encompassed Halicarnassus, and brought his towers and engines against the walls. A breach was made on the north-east side near to the gate of the road to Mylasa, but Alexander, who hoped to induce the town to surrender, forbore to order an attack. His hands were almost forced by two soldiers of the phalanx, who, one day drinking together in their tent and bragging of their prowess, flushed with wine and the zeal of rivalry, put on their armour, and marching up to the wall, challenged the enemy to come out. The men on the wall seeing them alone rushed out in numbers, and the twain were hard pressed till their comrades came to the rescue, and there was a sharp fight under the walls. But even now, Alexander would not order an attack on the breach, and the besieged built a new crescent wall connecting the two points between which the wall had been broken down, and maintained themselves behind it for a time. At length they made a great excursion against the camp of the besiegers at two different places. On both sides they were driven back in confusion, and in their haste to shut the gates they left many of their fellows to perish. At this moment an assault would doubtless have carried the Macedonians within the walls, but Alexander gave the signal to retire, still intent

*The last
rulers of the
dynasty of
Mausolus.*

Ada.

*Siege of
Halicarnassus,
autumn,
334 B.C.*

on saving the city. Memnon saw that the prospect of holding out longer was hopeless, and he determined to withdraw the garrison to the citadel of Salmacis and the royal fortress on the island in the harbour. He fired the city at night before he withdrew, and the place was in flames when the Macedonians entered. Alexander destroyed what the fire spared, and left a body of mercenary soldiers under Ptolemy to blockade Salmacis and support the princess of Caria.

*Division of
the army.*

The cold season was approaching and Alexander divided his army into two bodies, one of which he sent under Parmenio to winter in Lydia, while he advanced himself with the other into Lycia. He gave leave to a few young officers who had been recently wedded to return to their Macedonian homes, charging them with the duty of bringing reinforcements to the army in spring, and appointing Gordion in Phrygia as the mustering-place of the whole host.

*Lycia
submits.
Advances
through
Pam-
phylia and
Pisidia.*

Alexander met with no resistance from the cities of the Lycian League, and he left the constitution of the confederacy intact. From the rich frontier town of Phasēlis he advanced along the coast of Pamphylia, receiving the submission of Perge and Aspendus and other maritime cities; and then he turned inland from Perge, and fought his way through the Pisidian hills, taking with some trouble Sagalassus, the chief fastness of the Pisidian mountaineers. He descended to Celaenae, the strong and lofty citadel of the Phrygian satrapy, and leaving a garrison there, he marched on to Gordion on the Sangarius, the capital of the ancient kingdom of Phrygia.

*Trans-
actions in
the Aegean.*

While he was winning the Lycian and Phrygian satrapies, he lost, for the moment, some points in the Aegean. Memnon, appointed commander of the Persian fleet, had taken Chios, reduced the greater part of Lesbos, and laid siege to Mytilene. He died during the siege, but Mytilene soon surrendered, and then Tenedos was compelled to recognise the "Peace which the king sent down." The great danger for Alexander was that these successes might encourage the Greeks to revolt, and ten Persian ships sailed as far west as Siphnos for the purpose of exciting a movement in Hellas. But eight of these vessels were captured by some Macedonian triremes which ran over from Chalcis, and the project of a Greek rising was not carried out.

*At
Gordion,
333 B.C.*

At Gordion, the appointed mustering-place, Alexander's

army reunited, and new troops arrived from Macedonia to replace those who had been left to garrison the subjugated countries and cities. On the citadel of Gordion stood the remains of the royal palaces of Gordius and Midas, and Alexander went up the hill to see the chariot of Gordius and the famous knot which fastened the yoke. Cord of the bark of a cornel-tree was tied in a knot which artfully concealed the ends, and there was an oracle that he who should loose it would rule over Asia. Alexander vainly attempted to untie it, and then drawing his sword cut the knot and so fulfilled the oracle. From Gordion Alexander marched by Ancyra into Cappadocia. Having received the submission of Paphlagonia and asserted rather than confirmed his authority over the Cappadocian satrapy, he marched southward to Tyana and the Cilician gates. It was well that Alexander should show himself for a moment in the centre of Asia Minor, but the reduction of these wild regions and of the southern coast of Pontus was a task which might safely be postponed. The Cilician gates might have easily been defended by the garrison which the satrap Arsames had posted in the pass. Alexander, with the hypaspists and other light troops, leaving the rest of his army in camp, marched up at night to surprise the station. As soon as the guards heard the footfalls of the approachers they fled; and then Alexander at the head of his cavalry moved so rapidly on Tarsus that Arsames, amazed at his sudden appearance, fled without striking a blow.

*Advance
to Cilicia.*

Here a misadventure happened which well-nigh changed the course of history. After a long ride under a burning sun, the king bathed in the cool waters of the Cydnus, which flows through Tarsus. He caught a chill which resulted in violent fever and sleepless nights, and his physicians despaired of his life. But Philip of Acarnania, who was eminent for his medical skill, recommended a certain purgative. As he was preparing the draught in the king's tent, a letter was placed in Alexander's hands. It was from Parmenio, and was a warning against Philip, alleging that Darius had bribed him to poison his master. Alexander taking the cup, gave Philip the letter to read, and, while Philip read, Alexander swallowed the medicine. His generous confidence was justified, and under the care of Philip he soon recovered from his sickness.

At Tarsus.

SECT. 6. BATTLE OF ISSUS

The Great King had already crossed the Euphrates at the head of a vast host. He had let the invader subjugate Asia Minor, but he now came in person to bar his further progress. Alexander did not hurry to the encounter, and his delay, as we shall see, turned to his profit in an unexpected manner. Sending forward Parmenio with part of the army to secure the passes from Cilicia into Syria, Alexander himself turned to subdue western Cilicia. He first visited Anchialus, noted for the statue of the Assyrian king Sardanapalus, and the famous inscription: "Sardanapalus founded Anchialus and Tarsus on the same day. But thou, O stranger, eat, drink, and sport; all else is worthless." Having seen this comment on his own ambitious dreams, Alexander went on to Soli, the city of "solecisms," an ultimate Greek outpost, where men had almost forgotten Greek institutions and Greek speech. From here he made an excursion against the Cilician hill-folks, and reduced the whole district in seven days. He then returned eastward, and advanced to Issus under Mount Amanus.

*Reduction
of Cilicia.
At
Anchialus.*

At Soli.

*At Issus,
333 B.C.,
Oct.*

*At Myri-
ander.*

*Advance
of the
Persians
to Issus,*

Darius was on the other side of the mountains, in the plain of Sochoi, on ground which was highly favourable for deploying his host. There were two roads from Issus into Syria. One led directly over difficult mountain-passes, while the other wound along the coast to Myriandros and then crossed Mount Amanus. The second road, along which we formerly accompanied Cyrus and Xenophon, was now chosen by Alexander. Leaving his sick at Issus, he marched forward to Myriandros, but was detained there by a violent storm of rain, for it was already the beginning of winter. The Great King, informed by Arsames of the rapid approach of Alexander, expected every day to see him descending from the mountains. And when he came not, owing to the delays in Cilicia, it was thought that he held back through fear, and did not venture to desert the coast. Accordingly Darius and his nobles decided to seek Alexander. The Persian army crossed the northern passes of Amanus and reached Issus, where they tortured and put to death the sick who had been left behind. Alexander cannot be blamed for this disaster, for he could not

foresee that his enemies would commit such an incredible military error as to abandon the open position in which their numerical superiority would tell for a confined place where the movements of a multitude would be cramped. To Alexander the tidings that Darius was at Issus was too good to be true, and he sent a boat to reconnoitre. When he was assured that the enemy had thus played into his hands, he marched back from Myriandros through the sea-gates into the little plain of Issus.

*and return
of Alex-
ander.*

The plain of Issus is cut in two by the stream of the Pinarus, which was to play the same part in the coming battle as the Granicus had played in the plain of Adrastea. Here, as in that first skirmish, it fell to Alexander to attack the Persians, who had themselves no plan of attack; and here as there the Persians were defended by the natural entrenchment of a steep-banked river. The Macedonian columns defiled into the plain at dawn, and when Darius learned that they were approaching he threw across the river 50,000 cavalry and light troops to cover the rest of the army while it arrayed itself for battle. As his host was numbered by tens of thousands and the plain was only three miles broad, it is clear that most of his troops were forced to remain behind as reserves. The whole front was composed of hoplites—30,000 Greek mercenaries, and regiments of orientals called *Kardakes*; the left wing touched the lower slopes of the mountains and curved round, following the line of the hill, so as to face the flank of the enemy's right wing. When the array was formed, the cavalry was recalled to the north of the river, and posted on the right wing, near the sea, where the ground was best adapted for cavalry movements.

*Position of
the armies
at Issus.*

Alexander advanced, his army drawn up on the usual plan, the phalanx in the centre, the hypaspists on the right. At first he placed the Thessalian as well as the Macedonian cavalry on the right wing, in order to strengthen his own cavalry attack, but when he saw that all the Persian cavalry was concentrated on the sea side, he was obliged to transfer the Thessalians to their usual position on his own left. In order to meet the danger which threatened the flank and rear of his right wing from the Persian forces on the slope of the mountain, he placed a column of light troops on the extreme

*Arrange-
ment of
Alex-
ander's
troops.*

right, to form a second front. As in the engagement on the Granicus, the attack was to be made by the heavy cavalry on the left centre of the enemy's line. But it was a far more serious and formidable venture. Those who had read the story of the battle of Cunaxa might despise an Asiatic multitude, but Darius had 30,000 Greek mercenaries who




FIG. 4.

knew how to stand and to fight. And if Alexander was defeated, his retreat was cut off.

Battle.

The Persian left did not sustain Alexander's onset at the head of his cavalry. The phalanx followed more slowly, and in crossing the stream and climbing the steep bank the line became dislocated, especially at one spot, and the Greek hoplites pressed them hard on the river-brink. If the phalanx had been driven back, Alexander's victorious right wing would

have been exposed on the flank and the battle lost; but the phalangites stood their ground obstinately, until the hypaspists were free to come to their help by taking their adversaries in the flank. Meanwhile Alexander's attack had been directed upon the spot where the Great King himself stood in his war-chariot, surrounded by a guard of Persian nobles. There was a furious mellay, in which Alexander was wounded in his leg. Then Darius turned his chariot and fled, and this was the signal for an universal flight on the left. On the sea side the Persian cavalry crossed the river and carried all before them; but in the midst of their success the cry that the king was fleeing made them waver, and they were soon riding wildly back, pursued by the Thessalians. The whole Persian host was now rushing northward towards the passes of Amanus, and thousands fell beneath the swords of their pursuers. Darius did not tarry; he forgot even his mother and his wife who were in the camp at Issus; and when he reached the mountain he left his chariot, his shield, and his royal cloak behind him, and mounting a swift mare rode for dear life.

*Flight of
Darius.*

Having pursued the Great King till nightfall and found his relics by the wayside, Alexander returned to the Persian camp. He supped in the tent of Darius, and there fell upon his ears a noise and the wailing of women from a tent hard by. He asked who the women were, and why they were lodged so near, and learned that it was the mother and wife and children of the fugitive king. They had been told that Alexander had returned with the shield and cloak of Darius, and, supposing that their lord was dead, had broken out into lamentation. Alexander sent one of his companions to comfort them with the assurance that Darius lived, and that they would receive, while they were in Alexander's power, all the respect and consideration due to royal ladies; for Alexander had no personal enmity against Darius. No act of Alexander, perhaps, astonished his contemporaries more than this generous treatment of the family of his royal rival. His ideal hero Achilles would not have resisted the charm of the captive queen Statira, the most beautiful of women. But the charms of love had no temptation for Alexander; and his behaviour to the captives was prompted not only by his natively humane and generous feelings, but by the instinct

and policy of a royal invader to display respect for royalty as such.

*Founda-
tion of
Alex-
andria at
Issus
(Alex-
andretta).*

Thus was the Persian host, which had come to "trample down" Alexander and his little army, annihilated on the plain of Issus. A city, which still retains the name of Alexander, was built in commemoration of the battle, at the northern end of the sea-gates. The road was now open into Syria; this was the immediate military result of the battle of Issus. Just as the small fight on the Granicus had cleared the way for the acquisition of Asia Minor, so the fight on the Pinaros cleared the way for the conquest of Syria and Egypt. The rest of the work would consist in tedious sieges. But the victory of Issus had, beyond its immediate results, immense importance through the prestige which it conferred on the victor. He had defeated an army ten times as great as his own, led by the Great King in person, whom he had driven back over the mountains in ignominious flight; he had captured the mother of the Great King, and his wife and his children. Darius himself unbent his haughty Persian pride, when he had reached safety beyond the Euphrates, so far as to make the first overtures to the conqueror. He wrote a letter, in which he complained that Alexander was an unprovoked aggressor, begged that he would send back the royal captives, and professed willingness to conclude a treaty of friendship and alliance. It was much for a Persian king to bring himself to write this, but such a condescending appeal required a stern reply. We are fortunate enough to possess the text of Alexander's answer, which seems to have been published as a sort of manifesto to Europe as well as Asia. It was to this effect:—

*A state
document
of Alex-
ander:
letter to
Darius,
333 B.C.*

"Your ancestors invaded Macedonia and the rest of Greece, and without provocation inflicted wrongs upon us. I was appointed leader of the Greeks, and crossed over into Asia for the purpose of avenging those wrongs; for ye were the first aggressors. In the next place, ye assisted the people of Perinthus, who were offenders against my father, and Ochus sent a force into Thrace, which was part of our empire. Further, the conspirators who slew my father were suborned by you, as ye yourselves boasted in your letters. Thou with the help of Bagoas didst murder Arsēs [son of Ochus] and seize the

throne unjustly and contrary to the law of the Persians, and then thou didst write improper letters regarding me to the Greeks, to incite them to war against me, and didst send to the Lacedaemonians and others of the Greeks, for the same purpose, sums of money (whereof none of the other cities partook, but only the Lacedaemonians); and thine emissaries corrupted my friends and tried to dissolve the peace which I had brought about in Greece. Wherefore I marched forth against thee, who wert thus the aggressor in the quarrel. I have overcome in battle, first thy generals and satraps, and now thyself and thine host, and possess thy land, through the grace of the gods. Those who fought on thy side and were not slain, but took refuge with me, are under my protection, and are glad to be with me, and will fight with me henceforward. I am lord of all Asia, and therefore do thou come to me. If thou art afraid of being evilly entreated, send some of thy friends to receive sufficient guarantees. Thou hast only to come to me to ask and receive thy mother and wife and children, and whatever else thou mayest desire. And for the future, whenever thou sendest, send to me as to the Great King of Asia, and do not write as to an equal, but tell me whatever thy need be, as to one who is lord of all that is thine. Otherwise I will deal with thee as an offender. But if thou disputest the kingdom, then wait and fight for it again, and do not flee; for I will march against thee wherever thou mayest be."

The treasures which Darius had brought with him into Syria had been sent for safety to Damascus when he crossed the passes of Mount Amanus. Accordingly Alexander sent Parmenio to take possession of them. Parmenio found at Damascus some Greek envoys who had arrived at the camp of Darius a short time before the battle—one Spartan, one Athenian, and two Thebans. Alexander detained the Spartan as a prisoner, kept the Athenian as a friend, and let the Thebans go free. His clemency to the Thebans was due to a certain compunction which he always felt for the hard measure dealt out to their city; while a personal motive dictated his favour to the Athenian, Iphicrates, son of the great general of the same name, whose memory was highly esteemed in Macedonia. The incident showed that Greece, which had openly chosen Alexander for her leader, was secretly intriguing with

*Greek
intrigues
with the
Persian
king.*

*Persian
squadron
at Siphnos.
Activity of
Agis.*

*Disap-
pointment
in Greece
at the news
of Issus.*

Persia. When it was known that Darius was crossing the Euphrates, men were hoping and praying at Athens that the Macedonians would be trodden down by the Persian host. A hundred fast-sailing Persian ships appeared at Siphnos, and Agis the Spartan king visited the commanders, asking for money and galleys to carry out a project of rebellion against Macedonia. At Athens, Hypereides agitated for open war, but Demosthenes prudently counselled his fellow-citizens to wait until the expected catastrophe of Alexander had become an accomplished fact. Then the news came that the leader of the Greeks had won a brilliant victory, and Greece had to cloak her disappointment. The Persian squadron hurried back to save what could be saved on the Asiatic coast, and only thirty talents and ten vessels could be spared to Agis, who used them to secure the island of Crete.

SECT. 7. CONQUEST OF SYRIA

*Strategic
plan of
Alex-
ander's
conquest.*

It might seem that the course plainly marked out for the victor of Issus was to pursue and overwhelm Darius before he should have time to collect another army; and this is what Darius himself would have done if he had been Alexander. But it would have been a strategical error to plunge into the heart of the Persian empire, leaving Syria and Egypt unsubdued behind him and a Persian fleet controlling the coast. The victory of Issus did not seduce Alexander into swerving from his inevitable course; the strategic value of that victory was simply that it opened the gates to Syria and Egypt. As the subjugation of Asia Minor was the strategic condition of subjugating Syria and Egypt, so the conquest of Syria and Egypt was the strategic condition of conquering Mesopotamia and Iran. It was the more imperative to follow this logical order of conquest, since Phoenicia supplied the main part of the hostile navy, and nothing but the reduction of the Phoenician towns would effectually break down the sea-power of Persia. No one could swoop more swiftly than Alexander when it was the hour to swoop; but never did he display his superior command of the art of war more signally than when he let the royal prey escape him and quietly carried out the plan of conquest which he had predestined.

The Persian kings had allowed the Phoenician traders to ^{condition} go on their own way, and meddled little with their prosperous ^{of} cities, so long as the Phoenician navy was at the disposal of Persia. If these strong and wealthy semi-insular cities of the coast, cut off as they were from the inner country by the high range of Lebanon, had formed a solid federal union, they might have easily succeeded in winning complete independence in the days of Persian decadence. But, though Tyre, Sidon, and Aradus were bound together by a federal bond, their commercial interests clashed and their jealousies hindered a hearty national effort. This had been illustrated by a recent experience. When Sidon revolted from Persia, in the reign of Artaxerxes Ochus, her two sister cities promised at a federal meeting to stand by her. But both Tyre and Aradus selfishly calculated that, if Sidon were crushed and punished, her trade would come to themselves, and they left her to maintain the struggle alone. She succumbed to the power of Ochus, her town was burnt down, and she lost her rights as a city.

The divisions, which prevented the Phoenicians from becoming a nation, were profitable to Alexander. If their united fleet, which was now acting ineffectually in Aegean waters, had acted energetically in defence of their own coast against the Macedonian, their cities would have been impregnable even to Alexander. But those cities could not trust each other. Byblus, which had in some measure taken the place of Sidon, and Aradus sent their submission to the conqueror of Issus; while dismantled Sidon, which still contributed some ships to the fleet, hoped to be reinstated in her old position by the favour of Persia's foe. Her hope was not disappointed. Alexander restored to Sidon her constitution and her territory.

It cannot have been long after this that a kingling of Sidon ^{The sarcophagus} was laid in a resting-place worthy of the great conqueror ^{(commonly called of Alexander).} himself. His sculptured sarcophagus, recently dug up in a burying-ground of the Sidonian kings, is one of the most beautiful achievements of Greek art. But we may well associate this monument with Alexander, rather than with the obscure Phoenician for whose ashes it was made. For in two of the vivid scenes which are represented in coloured relief

policy was to await the event, and avoid compromising themselves by a premature adhesion to Macedonia. They felt secure on their island rock, which was protected by eighty ships, apart from the squadron which was absent in the Aegean. Accordingly they invited Alexander to sacrifice in Old Tyre on the mainland, but refused to "receive either Persian or Macedonian into the city."

To subdue Tyre was an absolute necessity, as Alexander explained to a council of his generals and captains which he called together. It was not safe to advance to Egypt, or to pursue Darius, while the Persians were lords of the sea; and the only way of wresting their sea-power from them was to capture Tyre, the most important naval station on the coast; once Tyre fell, the Phoenician fleet, which was the most numerous and strongest part of the Persian navy, would come over to Macedon, for the rowers would not row or the men fight when they had no habitations to row or fight for. The reduction of Cyprus and Egypt would then follow without trouble. Alexander grasped and never let go the fact that Tyre was the key to the whole situation.

It was easy to say that Tyre must be captured; but it was not easy to say how, without a powerful navy, its capture could be achieved. This was perhaps the hardest military task that Alexander's genius ever encountered. The city, girt by walls of great height and magnificently strong masonry, stood on an island severed from the continent by a sound of more than half a mile in width. On the side which faced the mainland were the two harbours: the northern or Sidonian harbour with a narrow mouth, and the southern or Egyptian. It might seem utterly hopeless for an enemy, vastly inferior at sea, to attempt a siege of the island Rock. And in truth there was only one way for a land-power to set about the task. Those thousand yards of water must be bridged over and the isle annexed to the mainland. Without hesitation Alexander began the building of the causeway. The first part of the work was easy, for the water was shallow; but when the mole approached the island, the strait deepened, the workmen came within range of the walls, and the difficulties of the task began. Triremes issued from the havens on either side to shoot missiles at the men who were at work. To protect them

*Siege of
Tyre, Jan.
to July,
332 B.C.*

Alexander erected two towers on the causeway, and mounted engines on the towers to reply to the missiles from the galleys. He attached to these wooden towers curtains of leather to screen both towers and workmen from the projectiles which were hurled from the city-walls. But the men of Tyre were ingenious. They constructed a fire-ship filled with dry wood and inflammables, and choosing a day on which a favourable wind blew, they towed it close to the dam and set it on fire. The device succeeded; the burning vessel soon wrapt the towers and all the engines in flames, and the triremes which had towed it up discharged showers of darts at the Macedonians who attempted to extinguish the fire. The Tyrians too rowed across from their island in boats and tore up the stakes at the unfinished part of the mole.

Undismayed by this disaster, which seemed to show the hopelessness of the enterprise, Alexander only went to work more vigorously. It was necessary to take Tyre, and he was determined that Tyre should be taken. He widened the causeway throughout its whole length, so that it could accommodate more towers and engines, before he attempted to complete it. He saw that it would be needful to support his operations from the causeway by operations from shipboard; and he went to Sidon to bring up a few galleys which were stationed there. But at this moment the aspect of affairs was suddenly changed by the accession to Alexander of naval forces which enabled him to cope with Tyre at an advantage on her own element. The squadrons of Aradus and Byblus which were acting in the Aegean, learning that their cities had submitted to Alexander, left the fleet and sailed to Sidon, which the Macedonians had chosen as their naval station. These Phoenician ships were about eighty; and at the same time there came nine galleys from Rhodes and ten from Lycia and Cilicia. The adhesion of the kings of Cyprus presently followed, and reinforced the fleet at Sidon by 120 ships. With a fleet of about 250 triremes at his command, Alexander was now far stronger at sea than the merchants of Tyre, and though the siege of the mighty stronghold was still a formidable task, it was no longer superhuman.

While the fleet was being made ready in the roads of Sidon, and the engineers were fabricating new siege-engines to batter down the walls of Tyre, Alexander made an expedition,

at the head of his light troops, to punish the native brigands who infested the hills of Antilibanon, and made the traffic between the coast and the "hinterland" unsafe. Perhaps it was now that he received an embassy from the Great King, offering an immense ransom for the captives of the royal house, and the surrender of all the lands west of the Euphrates; proposing also that Alexander should marry the daughter of Darius and become his ally. The message was discussed in a council, and Parmenio said that if he were Alexander he would accept the terms. "And I," said the king, "would accept them if I were Parmenio." Alexander was resolved to carry out his plan of conquest to the end; he would agree to no compromise. He bade the ambassadors say that he would receive neither money nor provinces in lieu of the whole empire of Darius, for that all the land and possessions of Darius were his; he would marry the daughter of Darius if he chose, whether Darius willed it or not; and if Darius wished for any boon he must come himself and ask it.

*Embassy
from
Darius.*

From Sidon Alexander bore down upon Tyre with his whole fleet, hoping to entice the Tyrians into an engagement. He commanded the right wing, while the left was committed to the charge of Craterus, and Pnytagoras the king of Cypriote Salamis. When the fleet hove in sight, the men of Tyre were astonished and dismayed. Before, they would gladly have given battle, but they saw that they had no chance against so many, and they drew up their triremes in close array to block the mouths of their harbours. Alexander set the Cyprian vessels on the north side of the mole to blockade the Sidonian harbour, and the Phoenician on the south side to blockade the Egyptian harbour. It was opposite this harbour, on the mainland, that his own pavilion was placed.

The mole had now been carried up to the island, and engineers, the best that Phoenicia and Cyprus could furnish, had prepared the engines of war. All was ready for a grand attack on the eastern wall. Some of the engines were placed on the mole, others on transport ships or superannuated galleys. But little impression was made on the wall, which on this side was 150 feet high and enormously thick; and the besieged replied to the attack with volleys of fiery missiles from powerful engines, which were mounted on their lofty

battlements. Moreover, the machine-bearing vessels could not come close enough to the walls for effective action; huge stones lying under the water hindered their approach. Alexander decided that these must at all cost be removed; and galleys with windlasses were anchored at the spot in order to drag the boulders away. It was a slow task, and was thwarted by the Tyrians. Covered vessels shot out of the havens and cut the anchor-ropes of the galleys, so that they drifted away. Alexander tried to meet this by placing boats similarly decked close to the anchors; but even this failed, since Tyrian divers swam under water and cut the cables. The only resource was to attach the anchors with chains instead of ropes, and by this means the stones were hauled away and the ships could approach the wall.

The Tyrians now resorted to a last device. They spread the sails of all the ships which were riding at the entrance of the northern harbour, and behind this curtain of canvas, which screened them from the observation of the enemy, they manned seven triremes, three five-oared and three four-oared boats, with the coolest and bravest of their seamen, and waiting for the hour of noon, when the sailors of the besieging vessels used generally to disembark and Alexander himself used to retire to his tent, they rowed noiselessly towards the Cyprian squadron, which was taken completely by surprise, sank some of the vessels at once, and drove the rest on the strand. It happened that on this day Alexander remained for a shorter time than usual in his pavilion; and when he returned to his station with the Phoenician ships on the south side of the mole, discovering what had happened, he stationed the main part of these ships close to the Egyptian harbour to prevent the enemy from making any movement on this side, and taking with him some five-oared boats and five swift-sailing galleys he sailed round the island. The men in the city saw Alexander and all that he did, and signalled to their own crews who were engaged in battering the stranded Cyprian vessels; but the signals were not seen or heard until Alexander was close upon them. When they saw him coming, they desisted from their work and made all speed for the haven, but the greater number of their boats were disabled by Alexander's vessels before they reached the harbour mouth. Henceforward the

ships of Tyre lay useless in the harbours, unable to do anything for the defence of the island.

It was now a struggle between the engineers of Tyre and the engineers of Alexander. The wall opposite to the mole defied all machines of battery and methods of assault, and the northern part of the same eastern wall, though the big stones had been cleared away from the water below it, proved equally impracticable. Accordingly the efforts of the besiegers were united upon the south side near the Egyptian harbour. Here at length a bit of the wall was torn down, and there was fighting in the breach, but the Tyrians easily repelled the attack. It was an encouragement for Alexander, it showed him the weak spot, and two days later he prepared a grand and supreme assault.

The vessels with the siege-engines were set to work at the southern wall, while two triremes waited hard by, one filled with hypaspists under Admetus, the other with a phalanx regiment, ready as soon as the wall yielded to hurl their crews into the breach. Ships were stationed in front of the two havens, to force their way in at a favourable moment, and the rest of the fleet, manned with light troops and furnished with engines, were disposed at various points round the island, to embarrass and bewilder the besieged and hinder them from concentrating at the main point of attack. A wide breach was made, the two triremes were rowed up to the spot, the bridges were lowered, and the hypaspists, Admetus at their head, first mounted the wall. Admetus was pierced with a lance, but Alexander took his place, and drove back the Tyrians from the breach. Tower after tower was captured; soon all the southern wall was in the hands of the Macedonians, and Alexander was able to make his way along the battlements to the royal palace, which was the best base for attacking the city. But the city had already been entered from other points. The chains of both the Sidonian and the Egyptian harbours had been burst by the Cyprian and Phoenician squadrons; the Tyrian ships had been disabled; and the troops had pressed into the town. The inhabitants made their last stand in a place called the Agenorion. Eight thousand are said to have been slain, and the rest of the people, about 30,000, were sold into slavery, with the exception of the king, Azemilco, and a few men of high position, who were set at liberty.

*Capture of
Tyre,
August
332 B.C.*

The siege had been long and wearisome, but the time and the labour were not too dear a price. The fall of Tyre gave Alexander Syria and Egypt, and the naval supremacy in the eastern Mediterranean. He performed the sacrifice to Heracles in the temple to which the Tyrians had refused him access, and celebrated the solemnity with a torch procession and games.

*Southward
advance of
Alexander.*

The communities of Syria and Palestine, that had not submitted, like Damascus, after the victory of Issus, submitted now after the capture of Tyre, and he encountered no resistance in his southern march to Egypt, until he came to the great frontier stronghold, Gaza, the city of the Philistines.

*Siege
of Gaza,
Oct.-Nov.
332 B.C.*

Girt with a stout wall Gaza stood on a high rising-ground, and more than two miles of sand lay between the city and the seashore, so that a fleet was no help to a besieger. The place had been committed by Darius to the care of Batis, a trusty eunuch, and had been well furnished with provisions for a long siege. Batis refused to surrender, trusting in the strength of the fortifications, and at the first sight the engineers of Alexander declared that the wall could never be stormed on account of the height of the hill on which it stood. But Alexander was now accustomed to overcome the insuperable, and the conqueror who sacked Tyre was not ready to turn away from the walls of Gaza. He could not leave such an important post on the line from Damascus to Egypt in the hands of the enemy. He ordered ramparts to be thrown up round the city, in order that the siege-engines mounted on this elevation might be on a level with the wall. The best chance seemed to be on the south side, and here the work was pushed on rapidly. When the engines were placed in position, Alexander offered a sacrifice, and a bird of prey flying over the altar dropped a stone on the king's garlanded head. The soothsayer interpreted the meaning of the sign: "O king, you will take the city, but you must take good heed for your own safety on this day." Alexander was cautious for a while, but when the besieged sallied forth from the gates and attacked the Macedonians who were working the engines on the rampart, and pressed them hard, he rushed to their aid, and was wounded in the shoulder by a dart from a catapult. Thus part of the sign had come true; the other part was in time fulfilled. The engines which had been used in the siege

of Tyre arrived by sea ; the rampart was widened and raised to a greater height ; and underground mines were dug beneath the walls. The walls yielded in many places to the mines and the engines, but it was not till the fourth attack that the Macedonians succeeded in scaling the breaches and entering the city. The slaughter was greater than in Tyre ; the women and children were sold into bondage ; and the place became a Macedonian fortress.

SECT. 8. CONQUEST OF EGYPT

Egypt was now absolutely cut off from Persia ; the gate to that sequestered land was open, and Alexander had only to march in. The Egyptians had not the vigour to offer any national resistance to the Greek invader ; and Mazaces the Persian satrap, seeing Phœnicia and Syria in Alexander's power, the Macedonian navy in the roadstead of Pelusium, and no help at hand, thought only of making his submission and winning the conqueror's grace. Sending his fleet up the Pelusiac branch of the Nile to meet him at Memphis, Alexander journeyed thither by way of Heliopolis. In the capital of the Pharaohs, where he was probably proclaimed king, he sacrificed to Apis and the other native gods, and thereby won the goodwill of the people, who contrasted his piety with the bigotry of the Persian monarch Ochus, who had killed the sacred bull. But while the new king showed that he would treat the native religion and customs with respect, he also made it clear that Greek civilisation was now to pour into the exclusive regions of the Nile. He held athletic games and a poetical contest at Memphis ; and the most famous artists from Greece came to take part in it.

From Memphis he sailed down the river to Canopus, and took a step which, if he had never performed another exploit in his life, would have made his name memorable for ever. He chose the ground, east of Rhacotis, between Lake Mareotis and the sea, as the site of a new city, over against the island of Pharos, famous in Homeric song, and soon to become more famous still as the place of the first lighthouse, one of the seven wonders of the world. The king is said to have himself traced out the ground plan of *Alexandria*—the market-place

Alexander enters Egypt, c. Nov. 332 B.C.

At Memphis.

Foundation of Alexandria, 331 B.C. Jan. (?)

and the circuit of the walls, the sanctuary of Isis and the temples of the Hellenic gods. He joined the mainland with the island by a causeway seven stades (nearly a mile) in length, and thus formed two harbours. The subsequent history of Alexandria, which has held its position as a port for more than 2000 years, proves that its founder had a true eye in choosing the site of the most famous of his new cities. The greatness of the place as a mart of the world far surpassed any purposes or hopes that Alexander could have formed; but his object in founding it can hardly be doubted. Alexandria was not intended to supersede Memphis as the capital of Egypt; it was intended to take the place of Tyre as the commercial centre of Western Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. And there was a good reason for diverting the lines of traffic from the Phœnician to the Egyptian coast. For it was naturally the policy of Alexander to transfer the trade of the world, so far as might be, into the hands of Greeks; but any new emporium rising on the ruins of Tyre or Sidon would have soon become predominantly Phœnician, owing to the Phœnician genius for trade; whereas on the Egyptian coast Greek traders would encounter no such rivalry. It was thus with a view to the commercial interests of his own race that Alexander founded the port of Egypt.

Amen Ra. In the official style of the Egyptian monarchy the Pharaohs were sons of Ammon, and as the successor of the Pharaohs Alexander assumed the same title. It was therefore necessary in order to regulate his position that an official assurance should be given by Ammon himself that Alexander was his son. To obtain such a declaration and satisfy fully the formalities required by the priests, Alexander undertook a journey to the oracular sanctuary of Ammon in the oasis of Siwah. And this motive is alone sufficient to explain the expedition. But it may well be that in Alexander's mind there was a vague notion that there was something divine about his own origin, something mystical in his mother's conception, and that, like Achilles, he was somewhat more than an ordinary man. Proceeding along the coast to Paraetonion, he was there met by envoys who conveyed the submission of Cyrene. By this acquisition the western frontier of the Macedonian empire extended to the border of

the Carthaginian sphere of rule. Alexander then struck across the desert to visit that Egyptian temple which was most famous in the Greek world, the temple as it was always called of Zeus Ammon. There were no tracks to guide the travellers, for the south wind had ploughed up the sand and obliterated the road-marks; and stories were told in the camp of miraculous guidance vouchsafed to the favourite of the god. Ptolemy, son of Lagus, who was destined hereafter to rule over Egypt and Libya, recorded in his Memoirs that two snakes moved in front of the troops and showed the way; while Aristobulus, another companion of the king, spoke of the guidance of two crows. A certain mystery enveloped this expedition. It is said that Alexander told no man what he asked the god or what the god replied, save only that the answer pleased him. But it is certain that the priests had made such dispositions that Ammon spoke and recognised him as his son. The very route by which Alexander returned to Memphis is uncertain, for the same two companions differ; Ptolemy stating that he fared direct across the desert, and Aristobulus that he returned by Paraetonion.

At Memphis he organised the government of Egypt, entrusting it to two native nomarchs, and appointing separate Greek governors for the adjoining districts of Arabia and for Libya. But the control of the finances was placed in the hands of a special minister, Cleomenes of Naucratis. Several military commanders were also appointed, and it would seem that Alexander instituted this divided command as a safeguard against the danger of a rebellion. For, geographically situated as Egypt was, an ambitious commander might have a fair prospect of holding the country against his lord; and its recent history as a Persian province had illustrated the difficulty of dealing with it. If this be so, Alexander inaugurated a policy which was followed, in later days and in another form, by his Roman successors.

SECT. 9. BATTLE OF GAUGAMELA, AND CONQUEST OF BABYLONIA

The new lord of Egypt and Syria returned with the spring to Tyre. The whole coastland was now in his possession, and

*Alexander's
visit to
temple of
Zeus
Ammon
(first
months of
331 B.C.).*

*Organisation
of
Egypt.*

*Alexander
crosses the
Euphrates
and
marches to
the Tigris.*

he controlled the sea; the time had come to advance into the heart of the Persian empire. Having spent some months in the Phoenician city, busied with various matters of policy and administration, as well as with plans for his next campaign, he set forth at the head of 40,000 infantry and 7000 horse, and reached Thapsacus on Euphrates at the beginning of August. The building of two bridges had been already begun, but the Persian Mazaeus, who was stationed with troops on the further shore, had hindered their completion. When Alexander arrived, he withdrew; the bridges were finished, and the army passed over. The objective of Alexander was Babylon. At that time of year it would have been mad to follow the direct route down the Euphrates which was traversed by Cyrus and the Ten Thousand. Alexander chose the other road, across the north of Mesopotamia and down the Tigris on its eastern bank. Throughout the Asiatic campaigns of Alexander we are struck by the perfect organisation of his transports and supplies; but we are struck even more by the certainty of his movements through strange lands, as if he had a map of the country before him. His intelligence department must have been excellent, and, though our records give us no intimations on the subject, it has been supposed with much plausibility that here the invader received help from the Jews, who ever since the Captivity were scattered about Media and Babylonia. It is certain that Alexander had shown special favour to the race of Israel at the foundation of Egyptian Alexandria; he had invited a Jewish colony to settle there, enjoying the rights of citizens, and yet living in a separate quarter and keeping their own national customs.

*Eclipse of
the moon,
Sept. 20,
331 B.C.
Alexander
reaches the
plain of
Gaugamela.*

From some Persian scouts who were captured it was ascertained that Darius, with a yet larger multitude than that which had succumbed at Issus, was on the other side of the river, determined to contest the passage. Alexander crossed the Tigris, not at Nineveh, the usual place of crossing, but higher up at Bezabde. On the same night the moon went into eclipse, and men anxiously sought in the phenomenon a portent of the issue of the coming struggle for the lordship of Asia.

Marching southward for some days, Alexander learned that Darius was encamped in a plain near Gaugamela on the river

Bumōdus. The numbers of the army were reported at 1,000,000 foot and 40,000 horse. Having given his men four days' rest, Alexander moved on by night and halted on a hill looking down on the plain where the enemy lay prepared for battle. A council of war was held, and the question was discussed whether the attack should be made immediately; but Parmenio counselled a day's delay, for the purpose of reconnoitring fully the enemy's position and discovering whether perchance covered pits had been dug or stakes laid in the ground. Parmenio's counsel was followed, and the troops pitched their camp in the order in which they were to fight. Alexander rode over the plain and found that the Persians had *Sept. 30.* cleared it of all bushes and obstacles which might impede the movements of their cavalry or the effect of their scythed chariots.

The following night was spent by the Persians under arms, *Night before the battle.* for their camp was unfortified and they feared a night attack. And a night attack was recommended by Parmenio, but Alexander preferred to trust the issue to his own generalship and the superior discipline of his troops, and not to brave the hazards of a struggle in the dark. He said to Parmenio, "I do not steal victory," and under the gallantry of this reply he concealed, in his usual manner, the prudence and policy of his resolve. A victory over the Persian host, won in the open field in the light of day, would have a far greater effect in establishing his prestige in Asia than an advantage stolen by night.

The Great King, according to wont, was in the *centre* of the *Battle of Gaugamela, Oct. 1, 331 B.C. The Persian order of battle.* Persian array, surrounded by his kinsfolk and his Persian bodyguard. On either side of them were Greek mercenaries, Indian auxiliaries with a few elephants, and Carians whose ancestors had been settled in Upper Asia. The centre was strengthened and deepened by a second line, composed of the Babylonian troops, and the men from the shores of the Persian Gulf, and the Uxians who dwelt east of Susa, and the Sītacenes. On the *left* wing, the Cadusians from the shores of the Caspian and the men of Susa were nearest the centre; next came a mixed host of Persian horse and foot; and at the extreme left were the troops from the far east, from Arachosia and Bactria. This wing was covered by 1000 Bactrian cavalry, 100 scythe-

armed chariots, and the Scythian cavalry from the desert districts of Lake Aral. On the *right* were the contingents of the Caucasian folks; the Hyrcanians and Tapurians from the south-eastern shores of the Caspian; the Parthians, who were destined in the future to found a new oriental monarchy; the Sacae from the slopes of the Hindu-Kush; the Medes, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia and northern Syria.

The Macedonian order of battle.

Against this host, of which the cavalry alone is said to have been as numerous as all the infantry of the enemy, Alexander descended the hill in the morning. On his *left* wing—commanded as usual by Parmenio—were the cavalry of the Thessalian and confederate Greeks; in the *centre* the six regiments of the phalanx; and on the *right*, the hypaspists, and the eight squadrons of the Companions, the royal squadron of Clitus being at the extreme right. Covering the right wing were some light troops, spear-throwers and archers. The line was far outflanked on both sides by the enemy, and the danger which Alexander had most to fear, as at the battle of Issus, was that of being attacked in rear or flank; only that, whereas in the plain of Issus his right alone was threatened, here both wings were in peril. He sought to meet these contingencies by forming behind each wing a second line, which by facing round a quarter or half circle could meet an attack on flank or rear. Behind the *left* wing was placed Thracian foot and horse, some Greek confederate cavalry, and Greek mercenary cavalry; behind the *right*, the old Greek mercenaries under Cleander, the Macedonian archers, some of the Agrianian spear-throwers, the mounted pikemen, the light Paconian cavalry; and, at the extreme right, to bear the brunt of a flank assault, the new Greek mercenaries under Menidas.

As he advanced, Alexander and his right wing were opposite to the centre of the enemy's line, and he was outflanked by the whole length of the enemy's left. He therefore bore obliquely to the right, and, even when the Scythian horsemen riding forward came into contact with his own light troops, he continued to move his squadrons of heavy cavalry in the same direction. Darius saw with anxiety that this movement would soon bring the Macedonian right outside the ground which he had carefully levelled and prepared for the action of his scythed chariots, and, as he had set no small part

of his hopes in the deadly effect of these chariots, he commanded the Scythian and Bactrian cavalry to ride round and deliver a flank-charge, in order to hinder any further advance towards the right. The charge was met by the new mercenaries of Menidas; but they were too few, they were driven back, until the Paeonians and the old mercenaries were bidden to come to their support. Then the barbarians gave way, but in a short while, reinforced by more troops, they returned to the charge. The battle raged, and it was well if the Macedonians, far outnumbered, could hold their ground.

*Cavalry
battle on
the extreme
right.*

Meanwhile Darius had loosed his scythed cars, to whirl destruction into the ranks of the Companions and the hypaspists. But the archers and the Agrianian spear-throwers received them with showers of spears and arrows; some of these active hillsmen seized the reins of the horses and pulled the drivers from their seats, while the hypaspists, swiftly and undismayed, opened their ranks, and the terrible chariots rattled harmless down the intervals.

*The attack
of the
scythe-
chariots
frustrated.*

The whole Persian line was now advancing to attack, and Alexander was waiting for the moment to deliver his cavalry charge. He had to send his mounted pikemen to the help of the light cavalry, who were being hard pressed on the right by the Scythians and Bactrians; and as a counter-check to this reinforcement, squadrons of Persian cavalry were dispatched to the assistance of their fellows. By the withdrawal of these squadrons a gap was caused in the left wing, and into this gap Alexander plunged at the head of his cavalry column and split the line in two. Thus the left side of the enemy's centre was exposed, and turning obliquely Alexander charged into its ranks. Meanwhile the bristling phalanx was moving forward and was soon engaged in close combat with another part of the Persian centre. The storm of battle burst with wildest fury round the spot where the Persian king was trembling, and what befell at Issus befell again at Gaugamela. The Great King turned his chariot and fled. His Persians fled with him, and swept along in their flight the troops who had been posted in the rear.

*Charge of
Alexander.*

*Flight of
Darius.*

Thus the Persian centre and the neighbouring part of the left wing were cut down or routed by the phalanx, the hypaspists, and the Companions. And in the meantime, the

severe struggle of the light cavalry on the uttermost left had also ended in victory for the Macedonians.

*Gap in the
phalanx.*

The regiments of the phalanx in their rapid advance had failed to keep abreast, and it would seem that when the regiment of Craterus, on the extreme left, was already far forward in the thick of the fight, the regiment commanded by Simmias, second from the left, was considerably in the rear. From his position Simmias saw that the Thessalian cavalry on the left wing were pressed hard by their adversaries, and he halted his regiment, in order apparently to make a movement to assist them. But the Indian and Persian cavalry of the hostile centre rushed through the gap in the phalanx and rode straight onward to the Macedonian camp, unhindered by the rear line of the left wing who did not expect an enemy on that side. The captives in the camp burst out and helped their friends to murder the Thracians who had been set to guard it. The Greek mercenaries and Thracians of the rear line soon perceived what had happened; they turned round, attacked the plunderers in the rear, and overcame them.

*Attack on
the Mace-
donian
camp.*

Meanwhile Parmenio was hard bested. The Mesopotamians and Syrians of the extreme Persian right had attacked his cavalry in the flank or rear. Parmenio sped a messenger to Alexander entreating aid, and Alexander desisted from the pursuit of his fleeing rival, to restore the battle on his left wing. Riding back with his Companions he encountered a large body of cavalry, Persians, Parthians, and Indians, in full retreat, but in orderly array. A desperate conflict ensued, perhaps the most fearful in the whole battle, the Persians fighting not for victory but for life. Sixty of the Companions fell, but Alexander was again victorious and rode on to the help of Parmenio. But Parmenio no longer needed his help. Not the least achievement of this day of great deeds was the brilliant fighting of the Thessalian cavalry, who not only sustained the battle against the odds which had wrung from Parmenio the cry for aid, but in the end routed their foemen before Alexander could reach the spot. The battle was won, and the fate of the Persian empire was decided.

*Victory on
the Mace-
donian
right.*

*Pursuit of
Darius as
far as
Arbela.*

Alexander did not tarry on the field. He lost not a moment in resuming the chase which he had abandoned, and, riding eastward throughout the night on the tracks of the

Persian king, he reached Arbela on the morrow. It befell now as it had befallen after Issus. He did not take the king, but found at Arbela his chariot, his shield, and his bow. Darius fled into the highlands of Media, and Ariobarzanes with a host of the routed army hastened southward to Persia. Alexander did not follow either king or satrap, but pursued his way to Babylon.

It might have been expected, and Alexander seems to have expected, that the men of Babylon, trusting in their mighty walls, would have offered to the victor of Gaugamela the same defiance which the men of Tyre offered to the victor of Issus. He was disappointed. When he approached the city, with his army arrayed for action, the gates opened and the Babylonians streamed out, led by their priests and their chief men. The satrap Mazaeus, who had fought bravely in the recent battle, surrendered the city and citadel. In Babylonia, Alexander followed the same policy which he had already followed in Egypt. He appeared as the protector of the national religions which had been depressed and slighted by the fire-worshippers. He rebuilt the Babylonian temples which had been destroyed, and above all he commanded the restoration of the marvellous temple of Bel, standing on its eight towers, on which the rage of Xerxes had vented itself when he returned from the rout of Salamis. The Persian Mazaeus was retained in his post as satrap of Babylonia.

*Babylon
submits to
Alexander.*

SECT. 10. CONQUEST OF SUSIANA AND PERSIS

Having rested his army in the luxurious and wonderful city of the Euphrates, the conqueror advanced south-eastward to Susa, the summer residence of the Persian court. Susa had been already secured for him by Philoxenus, whom he had dispatched thither from Arbela with some light troops. In the citadel he found enormous treasures of gold and silver and purple. Among other precious things at Susa was the sculptured group of the tyrant-slayers, Harmodius and Aristogiton, which Xerxes had carried off from Athens; and Alexander had the pleasure of sending back to its home this historical monument, now more precious than ever through its own strange history.

*Alexander
at Susa,
Dec. 331
B.C.*

*Statue-
group of
Harmodius
and Aristogiton.*

Though it was mid-winter, Alexander soon left Susa to accomplish one of the most arduous adventures that he ever undertook. He had won the treasures of Susa, but there were immense treasures still in the palaces of Cyrus and Darius in the heart of the Persian highlands, and these were guarded not only by the difficulties of the mountainous approaches, but by the army which Ariobarzanes had rescued from the overthrow of Gaugamela. Perhaps the reason for Alexander's haste in pressing on to Persis was the fear that Darius might descend with a new force from Media, if time were given him before Ariobarzanes was crushed. But, whatever were his reasons, it seemed to him of the greatest moment to secure Persis immediately. His road lay south-eastward, and when he had crossed the river Pasitigris, the first obstacle that he encountered was the independent tribe of the Uxian hillsmen, on whom the Persian kings themselves were accustomed to bestow gifts for their goodwill. The barbarians held the passes through which the road lay, but a night march by a difficult mountain path enabled Alexander to surprise them, and the Uxians henceforward were forced to pay yearly gifts to the lord of Asia—a hundred horses, five hundred draught oxen, and thirty thousand sheep.

(*Kārān.*)

*The Uxian
pass.*

The Macedonian army was now in the midst of a region which was unknown to Greek charts. Alexander's advance is a march not only of conquest but of discovery, and opens a new epoch in the history of geographical science by revealing Central Asia to the knowledge of Europe.

*Storming
of the
Persian
Gates, Jan.
330 B.C.*

Leaving half of his army with Parmenio to proceed more slowly along the main road, Alexander led the other half (including the Macedonians, both horse and foot) by a shorter path through the hills to the narrow defile which formed the entrance to Persis and was called the Persian Gates. Ariobarzanes was posted there with 40,000 foot and 700 horse, guarding the rocky pass which he had fortified by a wall. An attack, easily repelled, showed Alexander that the pass was impregnable; yet it must be carried, for this was the only road to the royal cities of Persia. For a moment Alexander was baffled; never perhaps—not even before Tyre—was he encountered by a problem more desperate to all seeming. But he learned from a prisoner of some extremely

perilous paths leading round, through the forests which covered the mountains, to the back of the pass. At this season the snow made these paths more dangerous than ever, and they might well seem hopeless to men weighed down with heavy armour; but they were the only hope and Alexander did not hesitate. He left Craterus with part of the troops in front of the pass, with orders to attack as soon as he heard the Macedonian trumpets sounding from above on the other side. With the rest of his force, including most of the cavalry, three regiments of the phalanx, the hypaspists, and other light troops, he set forth at night, and marched quickly eleven miles along the precipitous snowy track, intersected frequently by deep gullies. When the point was reached at which he was to turn in order to descend on the Persian camp, he again divided his forces, and sent one division forward to bridge the river Araxes and cut off the Persian retreat. Taking the hypaspists, the royal squadron of the Companions, one regiment of the phalanx, and some light troops, he raced down upon the camp and destroyed or routed three successive sets of outposts before the day dawned. Instead of raising the alarm, the sentinels scattered on the mountain, and when the Macedonian trumpets pealed on the brink of his entrenchments, Ariobarzanes was taken completely by surprise. Attacked on both sides, in front by Craterus who stormed up the wall of rock, and in the rear by Alexander, the Persians were cut to pieces or fell over precipices in their flight. Ariobarzanes with a small band escaped into the mountains.

The royal palaces of Persia, to which Alexander now hurried with the utmost speed, stood in the valley of Mervdasht, fertile then but desolate at the present day, and close to the city of Istachr, which the Persians deemed the oldest city in the world. In Istachr itself there was a royal house too, but the great palaces stood some miles away, close beneath the mountain, upon a lofty platform against a background of black rock. The platform was mounted by magnificent staircases, and it bore, besides massive propylaea, four chief buildings, the small palace of Darius, the larger palace of Xerxes, and two great pillared halls. The impressive ruins tell a trained eye how to reconstruct the general plan of the royal abode, and there can be no question that Achaemenian

*The palaces
of Persia
(Perse-
polis).*

architecture had wrought here its greatest achievements, greater than the palace of Susa which Alexander had seen, greater than that of Ecbatana which he was soon to see. This cradle of the Persian kingdom, to which, city and palace together, the Greeks gave the name of *Persepolis*, was "the richest of all the cities under the sun." It is said that 120,000 talents were found in the treasury; an army of mules and camels were required to remove the spoils. This store of gold, so long withdrawn from use, was now suddenly to be restored to circulation and perturb the markets of the world.

Pasargadae.

Not far off, two days' journey northward up the winding valley of the Murghab, was Pasargadae, the city of Cyrus. The maker of Persia built it close to the field where he had shattered the host of the Median king; and the place is still marked by his tomb, and the stones of other buildings, on some of which the traveller may read the words "I am Cyrus the king, the Achaemenian." In Pasargadae too Alexander found a store of treasure.

*Jan.-
April, 330
B.C.*

*Burning of
the palace
of Xerxes.*

For four months he made the Persian palaces his headquarters, during which time he received the submission of Caramania or Kirman, and made some excursions to punish the robbers who infested the neighbouring mountains. But the most famous incident connected with the sojourn at Persepolis is the conflagration of the palace of Xerxes. The story is that one night when Alexander and his companions had drunk deep at a royal festival, Thais, an Attic courtesan, who was of the company, mindful of her country and all the wrongs which Xerxes had wrought, flung out among the tipsy carousers the idea of burning down the house of the malignant foe who had burned the temples of Greece. The mad words of the woman inspired a wild frenzy, and whirled the revellers forth, armed with torches, to accomplish the barbarous deed. Alexander hurled the first brand, and the cedar wood-work of the palace was soon in flames. But before the fire had done its work the king's head was cool, and he commanded the fire to be quenched. It is folly to attempt to read into this act a deliberate policy; it was the wild freak of a moment, repented the next.

SECT. 11. DEATH OF DARIUS

In the meantime king Darius remained in Ecbatana, surrounded by the adherents who were faithful to him, chiefly the satraps of those lands which were still unconquered—Media itself and Hyrcania, Areia and Bactria, Arachosia and Drangiana. It is probable that after the Gaugamela battle Alexander hoped to receive some proposal from his defeated foe, more submissive and acceptable than that which had been sent after Issus. He would have been ready perhaps to leave to Darius the eastern part of his dominions, with the royal title, though as a dependent vassal, and to content himself for a while with the empire which he had won, including Susa and Persepolis. It may have been with the hope of receiving overtures that he tarried so long in Persis. But Darius gave no sign. Media was defensible; he had a large army from the northern satrapies; and he had Bactria as a retreat, if retreat he must.

The spring was advanced when Alexander left Persis for Ecbatana. The direct road did not lie by Susa, but much farther east through the land of Paraetacene. He made all speed, when the news reached him by the way, that Darius was at Ecbatana with a large army, prepared to fight. But when after a succession of forced marches he drew nigh to the city, he found that Darius had flown eastward, following the women and heavy baggage which had been sent on to the Caspian Gates, and taking the treasures with him. It is said that the reason of this retreat was the default of some Cadusian and Scythian troops which had failed to arrive in time. When he reached the Median capital, Alexander was detained by the need of arranging certain matters before he pursued his rival into the northern wilds. He paid off the Thessalian troops and the other Greek confederates, giving them a handsome donative and a conduct to the Aegean; but any who chose to enrol themselves anew in his service and share in his further course of conquest might stay, and not a few stayed. Parmenio was entrusted with the care of seeing that the treasures of Persis were transported and safely deposited in the strong keep of Ecbatana, where they were to

*Alexander
at
Ecbatana.*

remain in charge of the treasurer Harpalus and a large body of Macedonian troops. Parmenio was then to proceed northward to Cadusia, and along the shores of the Caspian Sea, where he was to meet the king.

(Rayg.) With the main part of the army Alexander hurried on, merciless to men and steeds, bent on the capture of Darius. His way lay by Ragae, and when he reached that place, a little to the south of the modern capital of Persia, he found that the fugitive was already well beyond the Caspian Gates, which lie a long day's journey to the east. Despairing of overtaking him, Alexander rested some days at Ragae before he advanced towards Parthia through the Caspian pass. But meanwhile doom was stealing upon Darius by another way. His followers were beginning to suspect that ill-luck dogged him, and when he proposed to stay and risk another battle instead of continuing his retreat to Bactria, none were willing except the remnant of Greek mercenaries, who were still faithful to the man who had hired them, and perhaps dreaded punishment as recusants to the Greek cause. Bessus, the satrap of Bactria, was a kinsman of the king, and it was felt by many that he might be able to raise up again the Achaemenian house, which Darius had been unable to sustain. A plot was formed; Darius was seized and bound in the middle of the night, set in a litter, and hurried on as a prisoner along the road to Bactria. This event disbanded his army. The Greek mercenaries went off northwards into the Caspian mountains, and many of the Persians turned back to find pardon and grace with Alexander. They found him encamped on the Parthian side of the Caspian Gates, and told him the new turn of events. When he learned that his old rival was a prisoner and that Bessus was now his antagonist, Alexander resolved on a swift and hot pursuit. Leaving the main body of the army to come slowly after, he set forth at once with his cavalry and some light foot, and sped the whole night through, not resting till next day at noon, and then another evening and night at the same breathless speed. Sunrise saw him at Thara. It was the place where the Great King had been put in chains, and it was ascertained from his interpreter, who had remained behind ill, that Bessus and his fellows intended to surrender Darius if the pursuit were pressed,

*Darius
seized by
Bessus.*

*The
pursuit
of Darius.*

There was the greater need for haste. The pursuers rode on throughout another night; men and horses were dropping with fatigue. At noon they came to a village where the pursued had halted the day before, and Alexander learned that they intended to force a march in the night. He asked the people if there was no short way, and was told that there was a short way, but it was waterless. Alexander instantly dismounted five hundred of his horsemen and gave their steeds to the officers and the strongest men of the infantry who were with him. With these he started in the evening, and having ridden about forty-five miles came up with the enemy at break of day. The barbarians were straggling, many of them unarmed; a few who made a stand were swept away, but most of them fled when they saw that it was Alexander. Bessus and his fellow-conspirators bade their prisoner—no longer, seemingly, in chains—mount a horse; and when Darius refused, they stabbed him and rode their ways, wounding the litter-mules too and killing the drivers. The beasts, sore and thirsty, strayed about half a mile from the road down a side valley, where they were found at a spring by a Macedonian who had come to slake his thirst. The Great King was near his last gasp. If he could have spoken Greek, or if the stranger had understood Persian, he might have found words to send a message of thanks to his conqueror for the generous treatment of his wife and mother who were then assuredly in his thoughts; afterwards men had no scruple in placing appropriate words in the mouth of the dying monarch. It is enough to believe that he had the solace of a cup of water in his supreme moments and thanked the Macedonian soldier by a sign. Alexander viewed the body, and is related to have thrown his own cloak over it in pity. It was part of his fair luck that he found Darius dead; for if he had taken him alive, he would not have put him to death, and such a captive would have been a perpetual embarrassment. He sent the corpse with all honour to the queen-mother, and the last of the Achaemenian kings was buried with his forefathers at Persepolis.

SECT. 12. SPIRIT OF ALEXANDER'S POLICY AS LORD OF ASIA

*Change
in Alex-
ander's
aims.*


Before we follow Alexander on his marches of conquest and discovery into the regions which were then in European eyes the Far East, we may pause to observe his attitude as ruler and king; for the months which passed between the battle of Gaugamela and the pursuit of Darius were a critical period, which witnessed a remarkable change in his conception of his duty and in his political aims.


*His
tolerant
policy.*

From the very beginning he had shown to the conquered provinces a tolerance, which was not only prompted by generosity but based on political wisdom. He had not attempted to apply an artificial scheme to all countries, but had permitted each country to retain its national institutions. One general principle, indeed, he did adopt—the division of power; and this was a notable improvement on the Persian method. Under the Persian kingdom the satrap was usually sole governor, controlling not only the civil administration, but the treasury and the troops. Alexander in most cases committed only the internal administration to the governor, and appointed beside him, and independent of his authority, a financial officer and a military commander. This division of authority was a security against rebellion. We have already seen, in Egypt and Babylonia, how in matters of religion Alexander was, like all the Greeks, broad-minded and tolerant.

*His policy
as successor
of the Great
King.*

But the Macedonian king, the commander-in-chief of the Greek confederates, had set forth as a champion of Greeks against mere barbarians, as a leader of Europeans against effeminate Asiatics, as the representative of a higher folk against beings lower in the human scale. All the Greeks and Macedonians who followed him regarded the east as a world to be plundered and rifled by their higher intelligence and courage, and considered the orientals as inferiors meant by nature to be their own slaves. "Slaves by nature" they seemed to the political wisdom of Aristotle himself, Alexander's teacher; and the victories of Issus and Gaugamela were calculated to confirm the Europeans in their sense of unmeasured superiority. But, as Alexander advanced, his view expanded, and he rose to a loftier conception of his own





position and his relation to Asia. He began to transcend the familiar distinction of Greek and barbarian, and to see that, for all the truth it contained, it was not the last word that could be said. He formed the notion of an empire, both European and Asiatic, in which the Asiatics should not be dominated by the European invaders, but Europeans and Asiatics alike should be ruled on an equality by a monarch, indifferent to the distinction of Greek and barbarian and looked upon as their own king by Persians as well as by Macedonians. The idea begins to show itself after the battle of Gaugamela. The Persian lords and satraps who submit are received with favour and confidence; Alexander learns to know and appreciate the fine qualities of the Iranian noblemen. Some of the eastern provinces are entrusted to Persian satraps, for example Babylonia to Mazaeus, and the court of Alexander ceases to be purely European. With oriental courtiers, the forms of an oriental court are also gradually introduced; the Asiatics prostrate themselves before the lord of Asia; and presently Alexander adopts the dress of a Persian king at court ceremonies, in order to appear less a foreigner in the eyes of his eastern subjects. The idea which prompted this policy was new and bold, and it harmonised with the great work of Alexander,—the breaking down of the barriers between west and east; but it was accompanied by a certain imperious self-exaltation, which we do not find in the earlier part of Alexander's career, and it involved him in troubles with his own folk. The Macedonians strongly disapproved of their king's new paths; they disliked the rival influence of the Asiatic nobles, and their prejudices were shocked at seeing Alexander occasionally assume oriental robes. The Macedonian royalty was indeed inadequate for Alexander's imperial position; but it is unfortunate that he had no other model than the royalty of Persia, hedged round by forms which were so distasteful to the free spirit of Greece. The life of Alexander was spent in solving difficult problems, political and military; and none was harder than this, to create a kingship which should conciliate the prejudices of the east without offending the prejudices of the west.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONQUEST OF THE FAR EAST

SECT. I. HYRCANIA, AREIA, BACTRIA, SOGDIANA

Conquest of Hyrcania (Tabaristan and Mazenderan), 330 B.C.

THE murderers of Darius fled, Bessus to Bactria, Nabarzanes to Hyrcania; and the direction of their flight determined the course of Alexander's advance. He could not pursue Bessus while there was an enemy behind him in the Caspian region, and therefore his first movement was to cross the Elburz chain of mountains which separate the south Caspian shores from Parthia, and subdue the lands of the Tapuri and Mardi. The Persian officers who had retreated into these regions submitted, and were received with favour; the life of Nabarzanes was spared. The Greek mercenaries who had found refuge in the Tapurian mountains capitulated. All who had entered the Persian service, before the Synedrion of Corinth had pledged Greece to the cause of Macedon, were released; the rest were compelled to serve in the Macedonian army for the same pay which they had received from Darius. The importance of the well-wooded southern coast of the Caspian was understood by Alexander, and he sent orders to Parmenio to go forth from Ecbatana and take possession of the Cadusian territory on the south-western side of the sea. He himself could not tarry. Having rested a fortnight at Zadracarta and held athletic games, he marched eastward to Susia, a town in the north of Areia, and was met there by Satibarzanes, governor of Areia, who made his submission and was confirmed in his satrapy. Here the news arrived that Bessus had assumed the style of Great King with the name of Artaxerxes, and was wearing his turban

(Astrabad.) (Near Meshed.)

"erect." Alexander started at once on the road to Bactria. His way would have lain by Merv; in the wilds of Central Asia the beaten ways of traffic remain the same for thousands of years. But he had not gone far when he was overtaken by the news that Satibarzanes had revolted behind him. There was nothing to be done but to return and secure the province of Areia; for this province did not stand alone; it would certainly be upheld in its hostility by the neighbouring countries of Arachosia and Drangiana, which formed the satrapy of Barsaentes, one of the murderers of Darius. Hurrying back in forced marches with a part of his army, Alexander appeared before Artocoana, the capital of Areia, in two days; *Alexandria Areion* Satibarzanes galloped away to seek Bessus in Bactria, and his troops who fled to the mountains were pursued and overcome. *(Herat). Occupation of Drangiana.* There was no further resistance, and the conqueror marched southwards to Drangiana. His road can hardly be doubtful—the road which leads by Herat into Seistan. And it is probable that Herat is the site of the city which Alexander founded to be the capital and stronghold of the new province, Alexandria of the Areians. The submission of Drangiana was made without a blow; the satrap, who had fled to the Indians, was given up by them and put to death. *Execution of Barsaentes.*

At Prophthasia, the capital of the Drangian land, there *(? Farah in Seistan.)* occurred a tragedy, whereof we know too little to judge the rights and wrongs of the case. It came to Alexander's ears that Philotas, the son of Parmenio, was conspiring against his life. The king called an assembly of the Macedonians and stated the charges against the general. Philotas admitted that he had known of a plot to murder Alexander and said nothing about it; but this was only one of the charges against him. *The conspiracy of Philotas.* The Macedonians, although many of them were ill-content with the developments of their king's policy in the east, found Philotas guilty, and he was pierced by their javelins. The son dead, it seemed dangerous to let the father live, whether he was involved or not in the treasonable designs of Philotas. A messenger was dispatched with all speed to Media, bearing commands to some of the captains of Parmenio's army to put the old general to death. *Fate of Parmenio.* If the guilt of Philotas was assured—and we have no reason to doubt it—we can hardly, so far as Philotas is concerned, blame Alexander for his rigorous

measures, which it must have been painful for him to adopt. A crime which might have been pardoned in Macedonia could not be dealt with gently in a camp in distant lands, where not only success but safety depended on loyalty and discipline. But the death of Parmenio was an arbitrary act of precaution against merely suspected disloyalty; there seem to have been no proofs against him, and there was certainly no trial.

In the meantime Alexander had changed his plans. Instead of retracing his steps and following the route to Bactria, which he had originally intended to take, he resolved to fetch a circle, and marching through Afghanistan, subduing it as he went, he would cross the Hindu-Kush mountains and descend on the plain of the Oxus from the east. First he advanced southwards to secure Seistan and the north-western regions of Baluchistan, then known as Gedrosia. The Ariaspae, a peaceful and friendly people whom the Greeks called "Benefactors," dwelt in the south of Seistan. Alexander passed part of the winter among them, and gratified them by a small increase of territory, and made them free, subject to no satrap. The neighbouring Gedrosians volunteered their submission, and a Gedrosian satrapy was constituted with its capital at Pura. When spring came, Alexander pushed north-eastward up the valley of the Halmand to Candahar. And in pronouncing the name of Candahar, we are perhaps pronouncing the name of the great conqueror; for the chief city which he founded in Arachosia was probably on the site of Candahar, which seems to be a corruption of its name, Alexandria. The way led on over the mountains, past Ghazni, into the valley of the upper waters of the Cabul river, and Alexander came to the foot of the high range of the Hindu-Kush. The whole massive complex of mountains which diverge from the roof of the world, dividing southern from central, eastern from western Asia—the Pamirs, the Hindu-Kush, and the Himalayas—were grouped by the Greeks under the general name of Caucasus. But the Hindu-Kush was distinguished by the special name of Paropanisus, while the Himalayas were called the Imaus. At the foot of the Hindu-Kush he spent the winter, and founded another Alexandria to secure this region, somewhere to the north of Cabul; it was distinguished as Alexandria of the Caucasus. While he was in these parts he learned that Satibarzanes was

*Alexander
winters in
Seistan,
330-29 B.C.*

*Alex-
andria in
Arachosia.*


*Alex-
andria
of the
Caucasus
(perhaps
Houpiat),
329-3 B.C.*

still abroad in Areia, inflaming a rebellion; some forces were sent to crush him; a battle was fought and Satibarzanes was killed.

The crossing of the Caucasus, undertaken in the early spring, was an achievement which, for the difficulties overcome and the hardships of cold and want endured, seems to have fallen little short of Hannibal's passage of the Alps. The soldiers had to content themselves with raw meat and the herb of silphion as a substitute for bread. At length they reached (*? Kun-* Drapsaca, high up on the northern slope—the frontier fortress *duz.*) of Bactria. Having rested his way-worn army, Alexander went down by the stronghold of Aornus into the plain, and (*Tash-* marched through a poor country to Bactra, the chief city of *kuryan.*) the land, which has preserved its old site but has changed its name to Balkh.

The pretender, Bessus Artaxerxes, had stripped and wasted (*Occupation* eastern Bactria up to the foot of the mountains, for the purpose of checking the progress of the invading army; but he fled across the Oxus when Alexander drew near, and his native cavalry deserted him. No man withstood the conqueror, and another province was added without a blow to the Macedonian empire. Alexander lost no time in pursuing the fugitive into Sogdiana. This is the country which lies between the streams of the Oxus and the Jaxartes. It was called Sogdiana from the river Sogd, which flows through the land and, passing near the cities of Samarcand and Buchará, loses itself in the sands of the (*of Bactria.*) desert before it approaches the waters of the Oxus. Bessus had burned his boats, and when Alexander, after a weary march of two or three days through the hot desert, arrived at the banks of the Oxus, he was forced to transport his army by the primitive vehicle of skins, which the natives of Central Asia then used and still use to-day. Alexander's soldiers, however, instead of inflating the sheep-skins with air, stuffed them with rushes. They crossed the river at Kilif, where its banks contract to the width of about two-thirds of a mile, and advanced on the road to Maracanda, the chief city of the country, easily recognised as Samarcand. (*R. Sarav-* *slum.*)

Bessus had no support north of the Oxus. He had some Sogdian allies, at the head of whom were Spitamenes and Data- phernes; but these men had no intention of sacrificing their



country to the cause of the pretender. Thinking that Alexander's only object was to capture Bessus, and that he would then withdraw from Sogdiana and fix the Oxus as the northern boundary of his dominion, they sent a message to him, offering to surrender the usurper. The king sent Ptolemy, son of Lagus, with 6000 men to secure Bessus, whom they found in a walled village, deserted by his Sogdian friends. By Alexander's orders he was placed, naked and fettered, on the right side of the road by which the army was marching. Alexander halted as he passed the captive, and asked him why he had seized and murdered Darius, his king and benefactor. Bessus replied that he had acted in concert with other Persian nobles, in the hope of winning the conqueror's favour. He was scourged and sent to Bactra to await his doom.

But Alexander did not arrest his march; he had made up his mind to annex Sogdiana. Not the Oxus but the Jaxartes was to be the northern limit of his empire. The children of the waste called this river the Tanais. It is said that the Greeks were deceived into imagining that it was the same river as the familiar Tanais, which discharges its waters into the Maeotic lake, and hence regarded it as the boundary between Asia and Europe, and thought that the herdsmen of the north, who dwelt beyond it, were "the Scythians of Europe." But they can hardly have fallen into this error, for they imagined that the Caspian Sea was a gulf of the ocean, and the two errors are inconsistent. Having seized and garrisoned Samarcand, the army pushed on north-eastward by the unalterable road which nature has marked out, and occupied seven strongholds which the Sogdians had built as defences against invaders from the north. The road reaches the Jaxartes where that river issues from the chilly vale of Fergana and deflects its course to flow through the steppes. It was a point of the highest importance; for Fergana forms the vestibule of the great gate of communication between south-western Asia and China—the pass over the Tian-shan mountains, which descends on the other side into the land of Kashgar. Here Alexander, with strategic insight, resolved to fix the limit of his empire, and on the banks of the river he founded a new city which was known as Alexandria the Ultimate. There is no doubt about the situation; it is the later Khodjend.

*River
Jaxartes
(Syr
Darya).*

(Don.)

*Alex-
andria
Eschate
(Khod-
jend),
328 B.C.*

*Sogdiana
rises
against
Alexander.*

*Summer,
328 B.C.*

(Urušûc.)

The conqueror, judging from the ease with which he had come and conquered Arachosia and Bactria, seems not to have conceived that it might be otherwise beyond the Oxus. But the chiefs of Sogdiana were not as the Persian grandees; they were ready to dare greatly for their freedom against the European invader. As he was designing his new city, Alexander received the news that the land was up in arms behind him. Spitamenes was the leader of the movement, and was supported by Oxyartes and other leading Sogdians. The few Macedonian soldiers left in the seven strongholds had been overpowered, and the garrison of Samarcand was besieged in the citadel. A message had gone forth into the western wastes, and the Massagetae and other Scythian tribes were flocking to drive out the intruder. It was a dangerous moment for Alexander. He first turned to recover the fortresses, and in two days he had taken and burned five of them. Cyropolis, the largest and strongest, caused more trouble; but Alexander, with a few companions, contrived to creep under the wall by the bed of a dry stream, and threw open a gate to the troops. The resistance of the inhabitants was furious, and the king was wounded in the mellay. The fall of Cyropolis was followed by the capitulation of the seventh town, and the remnant of the indwellers of all these places were led in chains to take part in peopling the new Alexandria.

The next task should have been the relief of Samarcand, but Alexander found himself confronted by a new danger, and could send only a few thousand troops to succour the besieged garrison. The herdsmen of the north were pouring down to the banks of the Jaxartes, ready to cross the stream and harass the Macedonians in the rear. It was impossible to move until they had been repelled and the passage of the river secured. The walls of Alexandria were hastily constructed of unburnt clay and the place made fit for habitation in the short space of twenty days. Meanwhile the northern bank was lined by the noisy and jeering hordes of the barbarians, and Alexander determined to cross the river. The offerings were not favourable; they betokened, said the seer, personal danger to the king; but Alexander would be mocked no longer. Bringing up his missile-engines to the shore, he dismayed the shepherds,

who, when stones and darts began to fall among them from such a distance and unhorsed one of their champions, retreated some distance from the bank. The army seized the moment to cross; the Scythians were routed, and Alexander, at the head of his cavalry, pursued them far into the steppes. Parched by the intense summer heat, the king was tempted to drink of the foul water of the desert, and he fell dangerously ill. Thus was the presage of the offerings fulfilled.

Luckily Alexander soon recovered, for ill tidings came from the south. When the relieving force approached Maracanda, Spitamenes had fled westward to the town of Sogdiana, which probably answers to Bucharâ. The Macedonians marched after him, hoping to drive him utterly out of the land, but they were indiscreet, and the whole detachment was cut off. Learning of this disaster, Alexander hurried to Samarcand with cavalry and light troops, covering the distance, it is said, in three days,—a forced march of between fifty and sixty miles a day, which seems almost impossible for foot soldiers, however lightly equipped, in the heat of a Sogdian summer. At his coming, Spitamenes, who had returned to the siege of Samarcand, again darted westward, and Alexander followed in pursuit. Visiting the spot where the unlucky corps had been cut down on the banks of the Sogd, the king buried the dead; then crossing the river, he pursued the fugitive chieftain and his Scythian allies to the limits of the waste. He swept on to Sogdiana, ravaging the land; then marching south-westward to the Oxus, he crossed into western Bactria and spent the winter at Zariaspa. The Bactrian cities of Zariaspa and Bactra bore somewhat the same relation to one another as the Sogdian cities of Maracanda and Sogdiana.

*Alexander
in western
Sogdiana;
winters,
328-7 B.C.,
at Zari-
aspa
(Charjui).*

At Zariaspa, Bessus was formally tried for the murder of Darius, and was condemned to have his nose and ears cut off and be taken to Ecbatana to die on the cross. The Greeks, like ourselves, regarded mutilation as a barbarous punishment, and it is not pleasant to find Alexander violating this sentiment. But the adoption of oriental punishments in dealing with orientals must be judged along with the adoption of other oriental customs. Every conqueror of an alien race finds himself in a grave embarrassment. Is he to offend his ideals and fall away from his convictions by acquiescing in outlandish

*Plot of
Bessus.*

*Oriental
policy of
Alexander;*

usages antagonistic to his own? Or is he, stiffnecked and inflexibly true to the principles of his own civilisation, to remain out of touch with his new subjects? Is he to adopt the policy which will be most effective in administering the conquered land, or is he to impose a policy which works and is approved in his home-country, but may be useless or fatal elsewhere? Alexander did not adopt the second method. It was the task of his life to spread Greek civilisation in the East. But he saw that this could not be done by an outsider—a general of Hellas or basileus of Macedonia,—he must meet the orientals on their own ground; he must become their king in their own way. The surest means of planting Hellenism in their midst was to begin by taking account sympathetically of their prejudices. Alexander therefore assumed the state of Great King, surrounded himself with Eastern forms and pomp, exacted self-abasement in his presence from oriental subjects, and adopted the maxim that the king's person was divine. He was the successor of Darius, and he regarded the murder of that monarch as a crime touching himself, inasmuch as it was a crime against royalty. It was therefore an act of deliberate policy that he punished the king-slayer in Eastern fashion, as an impressive example to his Eastern subjects.

*unpopular
with the
Macedon-
ians.*

The misfortune was that Alexander's assumption of oriental state and the favour which he showed to the Persians were highly unpopular with the Macedonians. It was hard always to preserve a double face, one for his Companions, another for his Persian ministers. Nor was it Alexander's policy to maintain this difference for ever. He hoped ultimately to secure uniformity in the relations of Macedonians and Persians to their common king. Meanwhile, in the intervals of rest between military operations, discontent smouldered among the Macedonians. Though they were attached to their king, and proud of the conquests which they had helped him to achieve, they felt that he was no longer the same to them as when he had led them to victory at the Granicus. His exaltation over obeisant orientals had changed him, and the execution of his trusted general Parmenio was felt to be significant of the change.

These feelings of discontent accidentally found a mouth-piece about this time. Rebellious movements in Sogdiana

brought Alexander over the Oxus again before the winter was ^{327 B.C.} over, and he spent some time at Samarcand. One of the most ^{(first months).} unfortunate consequences of the long-protracted sojourn in the ^{Alexander at Samarcand.} regions of the Oxus was the increase of drunkenness in the army. The excessively dry atmosphere in summer produces an intolerable and frequent thirst; and it was inevitable that the Macedonians should slake it by wine—the strong wine of the country—if they would not sicken themselves by the brackish springs of the desert or the noisome water of the towns. Alexander's potations became deep and habitual from this time forth. One night in the fortress of Samarcand the carouse lasted far into the night. Greek men of letters, who accompanied the army, sang the praises of Alexander, exalting him above the Dioscuri, whose feast he was celebrating on this day. Clitus, his foster-brother, flushed with wine, suddenly sprang up to denounce the blasphemy, and, once he had begun, the current of his feelings swept him on into a denunciation and disparagement of Alexander. It was to the Macedonians, he said—to men like Parmenio and Philotas—that Alexander owed his victories; he himself had saved Alexander's life at the Granicus. These were the two sharpest stings; and they stirred Alexander's blood to fury. He started to his feet and called in Macedonian for his hypaspists; none obeyed his drunken orders; Ptolemy and other banqueters forced Clitus out of the hall, while others tried to restrain the king. But presently Clitus made his way back and shouted from the doorway some insulting verses of Euripides, signifying that the army does the work and the general reaps the glory. The king leapt up, snatched a spear from the hand of a guardsman, and hurled it against his foster-brother. Drunk though he ^{Murder of Clitus.} was, the aim was sure—Clitus sank dead to the ground. An agony of remorse followed. For three days the murderer lay in his tent, without sleep or food, cursing himself as the assassin of his friends. The army sympathised with his grief; they tried the dead man and resolved that he had been justly slain. The tragedy was attributed to the anger of Dionysus, because the day was his festival and the Dioscuri had been celebrated instead.

The tragic issue of this miserable drunken brawl is a lurid spot in Alexander's life, but it was a slight matter compared

*The town
of the
Branchidae
(near
Kithj).*

with an act which is said to have marked his invasion of Sogdiana. When we saw him first cross the Oxus in pursuit of Bessus, we did not pause to witness his treatment of a remarkable town which lay on his way. The Branchidae, who had charge of the temple and oracle of Apollo twenty miles from Miletus, are charged with having betrayed the treasures of the sanctuary. Their lives were not safe from the anger of the Milesians, and they were transported into Central Asia, where no Greek vengeance could pursue them. They were established in Sogdiana, not far from the place where Alexander crossed,—a solitary little settlement, which, though severed so long from Hellas, preserved its Greek religion and Greek customs, and had not forgotten the Greek speech. It is easy to imagine what excitement was stirred there by the coming of a Greek army. The folk come forth joyously to bid Alexander welcome and offer him their fealty. But Alexander remembered only one thing—the ancestors of this people had committed a heinous crime against Apollo, and had sided with Persia against Greece. That crime had never been forgotten by the men of Miletus, and the king called upon the Milesians in his army to pronounce sentence upon the Branchidae. The Milesians could not agree, and Alexander himself decided the fate of the town. Having surrounded it with a cordon of soldiers, he caused all the inhabitants to be massacred and the place to be utterly demolished. Few of the children of the children's children of the original transgressors can have been still alive; most of the victims belonged to the fifth degree of descent. We cannot imagine a fouler enforcement of the savage principle that the crimes of the fathers should be visited to distant generations. If the record is true, it is small wonder that Ptolemy and Aristobulus omitted this disgraceful page from their records of the campaigns of their king. There are other deeds of Alexander which cannot be excused; but none so black, none so cruel, as the murder of the Branchidae, none for which some extenuating circumstance cannot be urged.

There were more hostilities in western Bactria and western Sogdiana, until at last, overawed by Alexander's success, the Scythians, in order to win his favour, slew Spitamenes. With this chieftain the resistance expired, and it only remained to

reduce the rugged south-eastern regions of Sogdiana, which were called Paraetacene. The Sogdian Rock, which commands the pass into these regions, was occupied by Oxyartes, and a band of Macedonian soldiers captured it by an arduous night-climb. Among the captives was Roxane, the daughter of Oxyartes; and the love of Alexander, who had been always indifferent to women, was attracted by the beauty and manners of the Sogdian maiden. It was characteristic of him that, notwithstanding the adverse comment which such a condescension would excite among the proud Macedonians, he resolved to make her his wife, and, on his return to Bactra after subjugating other fortresses in Paraetacene, he divided a loaf of bread with his bride according to the fashion of the country, and celebrated the nuptials. There was policy in this marriage as well as inclination. It was symbolic of the union of Asia and Europe, of the breaking down of the barrier between barbarian and Hellene, and of Alexander's position as an oriental king.

*Reduction
of Paraetacene
(Hissar).
Marriage
of Alexander with
Roxane,
327 B.C.*

About this time an attempt seems to have been made to render uniform the court ceremonial. The Persian nobles were not well pleased that, whereas they were compelled to abase themselves to the ground before the divinity of the king, the Macedonians and Greeks were excused from the obeisance. Most of the Greeks would have been pliant enough, but there was one prominent man of letters who stood out against the usage and drew upon himself displeasure by the utterance of bold truths. This was Callisthenes, a nephew of Aristotle. He was composing a history of the campaigns of Alexander, whose exploits he ungrudgingly lauded; he had joined the army, he used to say, to make *him* famous, not to win fame himself. It is related that Hephaestion and a number of others arranged a plan for surprising the king's guests at a banquet into making the obeisance. Alexander, raising his golden cup, drank to each guest in order,—first to some of those who were privy to the plan; each arose and prostrated himself and was then kissed by the king. Callisthenes, when his turn came, drained the cup and went to receive the kiss, without doing obeisance; Alexander would not kiss him; and he turned away, saying, "I go the poorer by a kiss!" Incidents of this kind created a coolness between the king and his historian.

*Callisthenes of
Olynthus,*

*refuses
to do
obeisance.*

*Conspiracy
of the pages*

*Calli-
sthenes
charged
with
treason and
executed.*

*Alex-
ander's
position
among
western
conquerors
of Asia.*

One of the duties of Callisthenes and the other philosophers and literary men who accompanied Alexander's progress was to educate the pages, the noble Macedonian youths who attended on the king's person; and over some of these Callisthenes had great influence. One day at a boar-hunt a page named Hermolaus committed the indiscretion of forestalling the king in slaying the beast; and for this breach of etiquette he was flogged and deprived of his horse. Smarting under the dishonour, Hermolaus plotted with some of his comrades to slay Alexander in his sleep. But on the appointed night Alexander sat up carousing till dawn, and on the next day the plot was betrayed. The conspirators were arrested, and put to death by the sentence of the whole army. Callisthenes was also handfasted on the charge of being an accomplice, and was afterwards hanged. Hermolaus was indeed one of his warmest admirers, but it is not clear what the evidence against the historian was. On the one hand, Ptolemy and Aristobulus asserted independently that the pages declared under torture that Callisthenes had incited them; on the other hand, Alexander is said to have stated in a letter that the torture had failed to elicit the name of any accomplice. The deeper cause may be that Alexander suspected Callisthenes as an agent of the anti-Macedonian party in Greece.

Before the end of summer, Alexander bade farewell to Bactria and set forth to the conquest of India. Three years had passed since the death of Darius, three unique years in the annals of the world. In that time the western conqueror, disarranging the cycles of Asiatic history, had subdued Afghanistan, and cast his yoke over the herdsmen of the north as far as the river Jaxartes. He was the first and last western conqueror of Afghanistan; he was the first but not the last invader. He was the first European invader and conqueror of the regions beyond the Oxus, anticipating by more than two thousand years the conquests which have been achieved by an European power within the memory of the present generation. His next enterprise forestalled our own conquest of north-western India. But England made her conquests from the south, Russia hers from the north; Alexander was the only European conqueror who marched straight from the west to the Indus and the Oxus.

The Macedonian monarch's work in Bactria and Sogdiana was an unavoidable sequel of his succession to the Persian empire. He had to set up a barrier against the unsettled races of the waste, who were a perpetual menace to the civilisations of the south. He founded a number of settlements in these regions, not only for the purpose of military garrisons, but also probably with the hope of gradually training the herdsmen to more settled ways of life. If so, it was a vain hope. History has shown that there is only one means of forcing the shepherd races to become reluctant tillers of the soil. Not until they have been encompassed on all sides by civilisation, and driven within a narrow geographical area, will they adopt, under the stress of necessity, the regular and laborious life of agriculture. The iron pressure of Russia's embrace is gradually narrowing the grounds of the nomads in Central Asia; but in the days of Alexander they had endless space behind them and an indefinite future before them.

SECT. 2. THE CONQUEST OF INDIA

In returning to Afghanistan, Alexander seems to have followed the main road from Balkh to Cabul, crossing the Hindu-Kush by a pass more westerly than that by which he had come. Reaching Alexandria in ten days, he went on to *Hali at Nicaea (Cabul or Bagram?)*, 327 B.C., another town, which, if he had not refounded, he had at all events renamed, Nicaea, and which is possibly to be sought in Cabul itself. Here he stayed till the middle of November, finding much to do both in organising the province and in preparing for further advance. He had left a large detachment of his army in Bactria, but he had enrolled a still larger force—30,000—of the Asiatics of those regions,—Bactrians, Sogdians, Dahae, and Sacae. The host with which he was now to descend upon India must have been at least twice as numerous as the army with which he had crossed the Hellespont seven years before. It had increased as it rolled on, and the augmentations far more than counterbalanced the reductions caused by leaving detachments in each new province, and the losses due to warfare or disease.

During these years Alexander's camp was his court and capital, the political centre of his empire,—a vast city rolling *Alexander's camp*.




FIG. 7.

Walker & Howland

along over mountain and river through Central Asia. Men of all trades and callings were there, some indispensable for the needs of the king and his army, others drawn by the prospect of making profits out of the spoil-laden soldiers: craftsmen of every kind, engineers, physicians, and seers; cheapmen and money-changers; literary men, poets, musicians, athletes, jesters; secretaries, clerks, court attendants; a host of women and slaves. In many of the halting-places athletic and musical contests were held, serving both to cheer the Greeks by reminding them of their home country and to impress the imagination of the barbarians. A Court Diary was regularly kept—in imitation of the court journal of Persia—by Eumenes of Cardia, who conducted all the political correspondence of Alexander.

Alexander had no idea of the shape or extent of the Indian ^{State of} peninsula, and his notion of the Indian conquest was probably ^{India.} confined to the basins of the Ganges and the Indus. He was ^(R. G. G. G.) not the first invader speaking an Aryan language who went down through the north-western hills into the plains of India. Centuries and centuries before, Aryan herdsmen had flowed down in successive waves and found an abiding home there. From Central Asia, from the regions of the Hindu-Kush, bringing with them their old hymns, some of which we still possess, they came down into the lands of the Indus, "the glorious giver of wealth," and turned to a settled agricultural life. Strangely different was the civilisation which grew up in northern India among the men who called upon *Dyaus pitar* from that of their speech-brethren who worshipped *Zeus patér* on the shores of the Aegean. The castes of the Brahmans and the warriors, the inhuman asceticism of the Brahman's life, the political influence of these religious men, must have seemed repulsive and outlandish to the free and cheerful temper of the Greeks. The great Darius had partially annexed the lands of the Indus, and they constantly supplied troops to his successors. Scylax of Caryanda had sailed down the Indus by his orders and probably published an account of the voyage. The stories that were told about the wonders of India excited the curiosity of the Greek invaders. It was a land of righteous folks, of strange beasts and plants, of surpassing wealth in gold and gems. It was supposed to be the ultimate

country on the eastern side of the world, bounded by Ocean's stream.

Omphis.

(*Takik
gila.*)
(*The
Paurava.*)
(*Asikni.*)

At this time north-western India was occupied by a number of small heterogeneous principalities and village communities. The northern districts of the land between the Indus and the Hydaspes—the stream which we now call the Jhelum—were ruled by Omphis, a prince whose capital was at Taxila near the Indus. His brother Abisares was the ruler of Hazara and the adjacent parts of Cashmir. Beyond the Hydaspes was the powerful kingdom of Porus, who held sway as far as the Acesines or “dark-hued,” which we know as the Chenab, the next of the “Five Rivers.” East of the Chenab, in the lands of the Ravee and the Beas, were other small principalities, and also free “kingless” peoples, who owned no master. These principalities and free communities differed much in manners and religion; they had no tendency to unity or combination; the free tribes feared and hated the princes; the princes strove with one another. And these states were not all of the same race. Most perhaps were Aryan; but some, like the Malli, belonged to the old “Dravidian” stock, whom even in the Punjab the Aryans had not entirely dispossessed or subdued. An invader, therefore, had no common resistance to fear; he had to deal with the states one by one; and he could be assured that many would welcome him out of hatred for their neighbours. The prince of Taxila hoped great things from the Macedonian conquerer, especially the downfall of his rival Porus. He visited Alexander at Nicaea, laid himself and his kingdom at the great emperor's feet, and promised his aid in subduing India. Other chiefs on the hither side of the Indus also made submission.

*Aryans,
and Dra-
vidians.*

Alexander's direct road from the high plain of Cabul into the Punjab lay along the right bank of the Cophen or Cabul river, through the great gate of the Khyber Pass. But it was impossible to advance to the Indus without securing his communications, and for this purpose it was needful to subjugate the river-valleys to the left of the Cabul, among the huge western spurs of the Himalaya mountains.

*Nysa
(Nanghen-
har).*

It was perhaps not far from Jelalabad that the army came to a city which was called Nysa. The name immediately awakened in the minds of all the Greeks the memory of their

god Dionysus. For Mount Nysa was the mythical place where he had been nursed by nymphs when he was born from the thigh of Zeus. The mountain was commonly supposed to be in Thrace; but an old hymn placed it "near the streams of Nile"; it had no place on the traveller's chart. But here was an actual Nysa; and close to the town was a hill whose name resembled *mēros*, the Greek word for "thigh," and whose slopes were covered with the god's own ivy. Therefore Nysa, they said, was founded by Dionysus; the god had fared eastward to subdue India; and now Alexander was marching on his tracks. Everywhere on their further march the Greeks and Macedonians were alert to discover traces of the progress of the bacchic god.

For the purposes of this campaign Alexander divided his army. Hephaestion, taking three regiments of the phalanx, half the Macedonian cavalry, all the mercenary cavalry, advanced by the Khyber Pass, with orders to construct a bridge across the Indus. The king, with the rest of the army, including the light troops, plunged into the difficult country north of the river; and the winter was spent in warfare with the hardy hill-folks, especially the Aspasiens and Assacenes, (Agrakos.) and in capturing their impregnable fortresses, in the district of the Kunar, in remote Chitral, and in the Panjkar and Swat valleys. It would be interesting to follow the exploits of the Macedonian army in these wilds, but we cannot identify the places with certainty. Massaga, of the Assacene people, in the Swat valley, was one of the most important strongholds that Alexander captured; we cannot point it out on the map, but Dyrta, another fortress of the same people, may be fairly sought in Dir. The most wonderful exploit of all was the scaling and taking of the rock of Aornus, which has been recognised in the hill of Mahaban, on the right bank of the Indus, about sixty miles above the confluence of that river with the Cabul. When by a miracle of boldness and patience he captured this fortress, Alexander had to return on his steps as far as Dir to suppress a revolt of the Assacenes.

After this severe winter campaign the army rested on the hither bank of the Indus until spring had begun, and then, with the solemnity of games and sacrifices, crossed the river and marched a three days' journey eastward to Taxila. The

Alexander's campaigns in Chitral, etc.

Aornus.

Crossing of the Indus near Attock, 326 B.C.

rich country of these Aryan husbandmen was a striking and pleasant contrast to the barren abodes of the shepherds of Bactria and Sogdiana. The prince of Taxila met Alexander with obsequious pomp, and other lesser princes assembled at the city to do him homage. The administration of the recent conquests was now arranged. A new satrapy, embracing the lands west of the Indus, was established and entrusted to Philip, son of Machatas; Macedonian garrisons were placed in Taxila and some other places east of the Indus, and Philip was charged with the general command of these troops. This shows the drift of Alexander's policy. The Indus was to be the eastern boundary of his direct sway; beyond the Indus, he purposed to create no new provinces, but only to form a system of protected states, over which the governor of the frontier province would have a general supervision.

Alexander then marched by a southward road to the Hydaspes, where he was to meet the only power in the land which could hope to resist his progress. Prince Porus had sent a defiance, and, having gathered an army from thirty to forty thousand strong, was encamped on the left bank of the river, to contest the crossing. Moreover, Abisares of Cashmir promised him aid, although he had sent marks of homage to Alexander. The boats which had been constructed on the Indus for transporting the troops were, by Alexander's orders, sawn in two or three pieces according to their size and conveyed on carts to the Hydaspes. After a march, which was made slow and toilsome by the heavy tropical rain, the invaders encamped on the right bank of the river, near Jalalpur, and saw the lines of Porus on the opposite shore, protected by a multitude of elephants, his most formidable weapon of war. It was useless to think of crossing in the face of this host; for the horses, who could not endure the smell and noise of the elephants, would certainly have been drowned; and the men would have found it almost impossible to land, amid showers of darts, on the slimy, treacherous edge of the stream. All the fords in the neighbourhood were watched. Alexander adopted various measures to deceive and puzzle the enemy. He collected large stores of corn, as if he had made up his mind to remain for many days where he was; he spread the rumour that he intended to wait till the season

*Alexander
and Porus
encamped
on the
Hydaspes.*

of rains was over; and he kept his troops in constant motion, sending detachments hither and thither. Then one night his trumpets blew, his cavalry rode down to the edge of the water, and to the eyes of the enemy it seemed that the whole army was about to cross. Porus moved his elephants up to the bank and set his host in array. But it proved to be a false alarm. The same feint was repeated again and again. Each night the Macedonian camp was in motion as if for crossing; each night the Indians stood long hours in the wind and rain. But when he saw that the noise was never followed by action, Porus became weary of these useless nightly watches and disregarded the alarms of a faint-hearted foe. Alexander meanwhile was maturing a plan which he was able to carry out when he had put Porus off his guard.

About sixteen miles upwards from the camp, the Hydaspes makes a bend, changing its course from south to westward, and opposite the jutting angle a thickly wooded island rose amid the stream, while a dense wood covered the right shore. Here Alexander determined to cross. He caused the boats to be conveyed thither and remade in the shelter of the wood close to a deep ravine; he had prepared skins stuffed with straw, such as he had used in passing the Oxus. When the time came, he led a portion of his troops to the wooded promontory, marching at a considerable distance from the river in order to avoid the observation of the enemy. A sufficient force was left in the camp under the command of Craterus, with orders not to cross, unless Porus either moved his entire army from its present position or was defeated and routed. Other forces were posted at points between the camp and the island, to cross and help at the right moment. The king arrived at the appointed spot later in the evening, and throughout the wet stormy night he directed the preparations for passing the swollen stream. Here, on the right bank, he posted the regiments of heavy infantry which he had brought with him,—a precaution, probably, against the possible arrival of Abisares.

The wind and rain, which had effectually concealed all the noise from the ears of hostile outposts on the bank, abated before dawn, and the passage began. Alexander led the way in a barque of thirty oars; and the island was safely passed;

but land was hardly reached before they were descried by Indian scouts, who galloped off at full speed to warn their chieftain. The king, who was the first to leap ashore, waited till the cavalry had been disembarked and marshalled, but on advancing he discovered that he had landed not on the bank but on an island which was parted from the bank by a small channel now swollen with rain. It was some time before a passage for wading could be found, and the water was breast-high. At last the whole force was safely landed on the bank, and Alexander ordered his men for the coming battle—the third of the three great battles of his life. It was to be won without any heavy infantry; he had with him only 6000 hypaspists, about 4000 light foot, 5000 cavalry, including 1000 Scythian archers. Taking all the cavalry with him, he rode rapidly forward towards the camp of Porus, leaving the infantry to follow. If the whole host of Porus should come out to meet him, he would wait for the infantry, but if the enemy showed symptoms of retreating, he would dash in among them with his superior cavalry. Presently he saw a troop coming; it was the son of Porus at the head of 1000 horsemen and sixty war-chariots, too late to impede the landing of the Macedonians. As soon as he perceived the small number of the foe, Alexander charged and easily drove them back, slaying the prince and four hundred of his men.

*Battle
of the
Hydaspes.*

But Porus himself was advancing with his main army, having left a small force to guard the river-bank against Craterus. When he reached sandy ground, suitable for the movements of his cavalry and war-chariots, he drew up his line of battle. In front of all he arranged two hundred elephants at intervals of 100 feet, and at some distance behind them his infantry, who numbered 20,000 if not more. On the wings he placed his cavalry—perhaps 4000. Alexander waited for the hypaspists, and drew them up opposite to the elephants. It was impossible to attack in front, for neither horse nor foot could venture in between these beasts which stood like towers of defence, the true strength of the Indian army. The only method was to begin by a cavalry attack on the flank; and Seleucus and the other captains of the infantry were bidden not to advance until they saw that both the horse and the foot of the foe were tumbled into confusion by

the flank assault. Alexander determined to concentrate his attack on the left wing; perhaps because it was on the river-side and he would be within easier reach of his troops on the other bank. Accordingly he kept all his cavalry on his right wing. One body was entrusted to Coenus, who bore well to the right, and was ready to strike in the rear, and to deal with the body of horse stationed upon the enemy's right wing,




FIG. 8.

in case they should come round to assist their comrades on the left. The mounted Scythian archers rode straight against the front of the enemy's cavalry—which was still in column formation, not having had time to open out—and harassed it with showers of arrows; while Alexander himself, with the rest of the heavy cavalry, led the charge upon the flank. Porus—who had committed the fatal mistake of allowing the enemy to take the offensive—brought up his remaining squadrons from the right wing as fast as he could. Then Coenus, who had ridden round close to the river-bank, fell upon them in the rear. The Indians had now to form a

*The
Indian
rally.*

double front against the double foe. Alexander seized the moment to press hard upon the adverse squadrons; they swayed backwards and sought shelter behind the elephants. Then those elephant riders who were on this side of the army drove the beasts against the Macedonian horses; and at the same time the Macedonian footmen rushed forward and attacked the animals which were now turned sideways towards them. But the other elephants of the line were driven into the ranks of the hypaspists, and dealt destruction, trampling down and striking furiously. Heartened by the success of the elephants, the Indian cavalry rallied and charged, but beaten back by the Macedonian horse, who were now formed in a serried mass, they again sought shelter behind the elephantine wall. But many of the beasts were now furious with wounds and beyond control; some had lost their riders; and in the mellay they trampled on friends and foes alike. The Indians suffered most, for they were surrounded and confined to the space in which the animals raged; while the Macedonians could attack the animals on side or rear, and then retreat into the open when they turned to charge. At length, when the elephants grew weary and their charges were feebler, Alexander closed in. He gave the order for the hypaspists to advance in close array shield to shield, while he, re-forming his squadrons, dashed in from the side. The enemy's cavalry, already weakened and dislocated, could not withstand the double shock and was cut to pieces. The hypaspists rolled on upon the enemy's infantry, who, though they had hitherto taken no serious part in the fight, soon broke and fled. Meanwhile the generals on the other side of the river, Craterus and the rest, discovering that fortune was declaring for Alexander, crossed the river without resistance and arrived in time to consummate the victory by pursuing the fugitives. Porus, who had shown himself a mediocre general but a most valiant soldier, when he saw most of his forces scattered, his elephants lying dead or straying riderless, did not flee—as Darius had twice fled—but remained fighting, seated on an elephant of commanding height, until he was wounded in the right shoulder, the only part of his body unprotected by mail. Then he turned round and rode away. Alexander, struck with admiration at his prowess, sent

messengers who overtook him and induced him to return. The victor, riding out to meet the old prince, was impressed by his stature and beauty, and asked him how he would fain be treated. "Treat me like a king," said Porus. "For my own sake," said Alexander, "I will do that; ask a boon for thy sake." "That," replied Porus, "containeth all."

And Alexander treated his captive royally. He not only gave him back his kingdom, henceforward to be a protected state under Macedonian suzerainty, but largely increased its borders. This royal treatment, however, though it pleased the generous impulses of Alexander, was inspired by deep policy. He could rest the security of his rule beyond the Indus on no better base than the mutual jealousy of two moderately powerful princes. He had made the lord of Taxila as powerful as was safe; the reinstatement of his rival Porus would be the best guarantee for his loyalty. But on either side of the Hydaspes, close to the scene of the battle, two cities were founded, which would serve as garrisons in the subject land. On the right hand, the city of Bucephala, named after Alexander's steed, which died here—probably shortly before the battle—of old age and weariness; on the left, Nicaea, the city of victory.

Alexander's cities on the Hydaspes.

(Mong.)

Leaving Craterus to build the cities, Alexander marched northwards to subdue the Glausae, a hill-folk on the border of Cashmir, and at the same time to intimidate Abisares. Then keeping near the skirts of the hills, he crossed the Acesines, more than a mile and a half broad, with great peril and some loss, into the territory of a namesake and nephew of Porus. This Porus was at enmity with his uncle, who probably claimed overlordship over him; he had sent messages of submission to Alexander before the battle; but, disappointed and frightened at the favour which the conqueror had shown his uncle, he fled eastward. Alexander himself hastened in pursuit, crossing the Hydraotis, which, unlike the Acesines, was easily passed, but he left Hephaestion to march southward and subdue the land of the younger Porus, as well as the free communities between the two rivers,—all this northern portion of the "doab" or interfluvial tract to be added to the realm of the elder Porus. The news that the Cathaeans, a free and warlike people, whom Porus and Abisares had, some time

Alexander's advance through the Punjab.

(Ravee.)

Capture of Sangala.

before, failed to conquer, were determined to give him battle, diverted Alexander from the pursuit. He advanced against their chief town Sangala, strongly walled and protected on one side by a hill and on the other by a lake. It was probably near Amritsar, to the north-west of Lahore. The Cathaeans, supported by some neighbouring tribes, had made a stockade with a triple line of waggons round the hill. After a severe struggle the entrenchment was carried and the defenders retreated into the city. They tried to escape through the lake under the cover of night, but Alexander discovered the plan and lined the shores with soldiers. Then the place was stormed, and slighted; the neighbouring peoples submitted; and all this land was likewise placed under the lordship of Porus. Thus of the four river-bounded tracts which compose the Punjab, the largest, between Indus and Jehlum, belonged to Omphis of Taxila, while the three others, between Jehlum and Bēas, were assigned to Porus.

The term of Alexander's march.

Alexander now advanced to the Hyphasis, or Bēas, and reached it higher up than the point where it joins the Sutlej to form the Çatadru or "Hundred Streams." It was destined to be the landmark of his utmost march. He wished to go farther and explore the lands of the Ganges, but an unlooked-for obstacle occurred. The Macedonians were worn out with years of hard campaigning, and weary of this endless rolling on into the unknown. Their numbers had dwindled; the remnant of them were battered and grown old before their time. The terrible rains which had beaten incessantly upon them since the crossing of the Indus and had made their labours doubly laborious were the last weight in the scale. Their gear was worn out; the hoofs of their horses, as one of the campaigners described, were rubbed away by the long rough journeys; their arms were blunted and broken in hard combats; the bodies of the veterans were enveloped in Indian rags, for their Greek clothes were worn out. All yearned back to their homeland in the west. They had won glory enough; why heap up toil on toil and peril upon peril? On the banks of the Hyphasis the crisis came; the men resolved to go no farther, and their resolution was strengthened by the information that they would have to cross the Indian desert, a journey of eleven days, before they reached the fertile regions of the

The army refuses to advance.

Ganges. At a meeting of the officers which Alexander summoned, Coenus was the spokesman of the general feeling. The king, not a little vexed, dismissed them, and summoning them on the morrow, declared that he purposed to advance himself, but would constrain no man to follow him; let the Macedonians go back to Macedonia and tell how they abandoned their king in a hostile land. He retired to his tent, and for two days refused to see any of his Companions, hoping that their hearts would be softened. But though his resentment made them unhappy, the Macedonians did not relent or go back from their purpose. On the third day, Alexander offered sacrifices preliminary to crossing the river. But the victims—and this was assuredly no freak of chance—gave unfavourable signs. Then the king yielded, and signified to the obdurate army that he had decided to return. When his will was made known, the way-worn veterans burst into wild joy; the more part of them shed tears. They crowded round the royal tent, blessing the unconquered king, that he had permitted himself to be conquered for once, by his Macedonians. On the banks of the Hyphasis Alexander erected twelve towering altars to the twelve great gods of Olympus, as a thank-offering for having strewn his wonderful path with victories and led him safely within reach of the world's end.

Within reach of the world's end, and not to reach it—this was the disappointment which befell Alexander at the Hyphasis. To understand fully the measure of this disappointment we must realise his geographical conceptions. Of the southern extension of Asia in the great Indian promontory, and Further India with its huge islands, he knew nothing; of the vastness of China, of the existence of Siberia he had not the least suspicion. He supposed that the Ganges discharged its waters into the ocean which bounded the earth on the east, as the Atlantic bounded it on the west; and he imagined that this eastern sea, washing the base of the further slopes of the Hindu-Kush and Pamir mountains, and rounding the northern shores of Scythia, was continuous with the Caspian. And just as he planned to navigate the southern ocean, from the mouth of the Indus to the Arabian Gulf, or perhaps even round Libya to the Pillars of Heracles,—plans of which we shall presently

*Alexander's
conception
of the
geography
of Asia.*

speak,—so he probably dreamed of navigating the eastern ocean from the mouth of the Ganges and winning round to the shores of Scythia and Hyrcania. On annexation or effective conquest beyond the Hyphasis the mind of Alexander does not seem to have been bent. He had only a small army with him, for he had dropped large detachments on his way from the Jehlum to the Bëas; and he expected no hostilities from the tranquil dwellers of the Ganges. His expedition would have been in the first instance a journey of exploration; circumstances might have made it a march of conquest.

Alexander is often represented as a madman, dazzled by wild and whirling visions of dominion and glory, impelled by an insatiable lust of conquest for conquest's sake. But in judging his schemes, which in themselves seem wild to us who know the configuration of the earth, we must contract our imagination to the compass of his false notions and imperfect knowledge. If the form and feature of the earth were what he pictured it to be, twenty years would have sufficed to make his empire conterminous with its limits. He might have ruled from the eastern to the western ocean, from the ultimate bounds of Scythia to the shores of Libya; he might have brought to pass in the three continents an universal peace, and dotted the habitable globe with his Greek cities. Alexander was ambitious, but ambition did not blind him; he was perfectly capable of discerning shine from substance. The advance to the Indus was no mere wanton aggression, but was necessary to establish secure routes for Indian trade, which was at the mercy of the wild hill-tribes; and the subjugation of the Punjab was a necessity for securing the Indus frontier. The solid interests of commerce underlay the ambitions of the Macedonian conqueror. It is not without significance that Phœnician merchants accompanied his army.

Alexander retraced his steps to the Hydaspes, on his way picking up Hephaestion, who had founded a new city on the banks of the Acesines. On the Hydaspes, Craterus had not only built the two cities at the scene of the great battle, but had also prepared a large fleet of transports, which was to carry part of the army down the river to reach the Indus and the ocean. The fleet was placed under the command of Nearchus, and the king's own ship was piloted by Onesicritus,

who afterwards wrote a book on Alexander's expedition. The rest of the army, divided into two parts, marched along either bank, under Hephaestion and Craterus.

As they advanced they swept the southern portions of the doabs, reducing the tribes which did not submit. The only formidable resistance that they encountered was from the free and warlike tribe of the Malli, whose territory stretched on both sides of the Ravee. Having routed a large host of these Indians on the southern bank of the river, Alexander pursued them to their chief city, which is probably to be sought at the site of the modern Multan. Since then the Ravee has changed its bed; in the days of Alexander it used to flow into the Chenab below Multan. Here he met with a grave adventure. The city had been easily taken, and the Indians had retreated into the citadel. Two ladders were brought to scale the earthen wall, but it was found hard to place them beneath the shower of missiles from above. Impatient at the delay, Alexander seized a ladder and climbed up under the cover of his shield. Peucestas, who bore the sacred buckler from the temple of Ilion, and Leonnatus followed, and Abreas ascended the other ladder. When the king reached the battlement, he hurled down or slew the Indians who were posted at that spot. The hypaspists, when they saw their king standing upon the wall, a mark for the whole garrison of the fortress, made a rush for the ladders, and both ladders broke under the weight of the crowd. Only those three—Peucestas, Leonnatus, and Abreas—reached the wall before the ladders broke. His friends implored Alexander to leap down; he answered their cries by leaping down among the enemy. He alighted on his feet. With his back to the wall he stood alone against the throng of foes, who recognised the Great King. With his sword he cut down their leader and some others who ventured to rush at him; he felled two more with stones; and the rest, not daring to approach, pelted him with missiles. Meanwhile his three companions had cleared the wall of its defenders and leapt down to help their king. Abreas fell slain by a dart. Then Alexander himself received a wound in the breast. For a space he stood and fought, but at last sank on his shield fainting through loss of blood. Peucestas stood over him with the holy shield of Troy, Leonnatus guarded him on the other

*Siege of
Multan.*

*Alexander
wounded*

side, until rescue came. Having no ladders, the Macedonians had driven pegs into the wall, and a few had clambered up as best they could and flung themselves down into the fray. Some of these succeeded in opening one of the gates, and then the fort was taken. No man, woman, or child in the place was spared by the infuriated soldiers, who thought that their king was dead. But, though the wound was grave, Alexander recovered. The rumour of his death reached the camp where the main army was waiting at the junction of the Ravee with the Chenab, and it produced deep consternation and despair. Reassuring letters were not believed; so Alexander caused himself to be carried to the banks of the Ravee and conveyed by water down to the camp. When he drew near, the canopy which sheltered his bed in the stern of the vessel was removed. The soldiers, still doubting, thought it was his corpse they saw, until the barque drew close to the bank and he waved his hand. Then the host shouted for joy. When he was carried ashore, he was lifted for a moment on horseback, that he might be the better seen of all; and then he walked a few steps for their greater reassurance.

Alexander's rashness in endangering his person.

This adventure is an extreme case of Alexander's besetting weakness, which has been illustrated in many other of his actions. In the excitement of battle, amid the ring of arms, he was apt to forget his duties as a leader. Though one of the most consummate generals that the world has seen, he took a far keener delight in fighting in the thickest of the fray, or heading a charge of cavalry, than in manœuvring an army or contriving strategical operations. His eyes and ears were ever filled

With the brilliance of battle, the bloom and the beauty, the splendour of spears.

He could not resist the temptations of danger, and he had hardly conducted a single campaign in which he had not been wounded. On the last and most flagrant occasion, when some of his intimate friends upbraided him for acting as a soldier instead of acting as a general, he was deeply hurt; for his conscience pricked him. To have endangered his own safety was a crime against the whole army.

325 B.C.

The Malli made a complete submission, and their example

was followed by the Oxydraces, their southern neighbours, who were also renowned for their warlike character. These lower parts of the Punjab were not added to the dominion of Porus, but were placed in direct dependence on the satrapy which had been committed to Philip. When Alexander had recovered from his wound, the fleet sailed downward past the junction of the Hyphasis, and the Indian tribes submitted, presenting to the conqueror the characteristic products of India—gems, fine draperies, tame lions and tigers. At the place where the united stream of the four lesser rivers joins (The Panj-nab.) the mighty flow of the Indus, the foundations were laid of a new Alexandria, to be the great trade centre between the Punjab and the territory of the lower Indus, and to be the bulwark of the southern frontier of the province of Philip. Alex-andria (Uchh). The next stage of the southward advance was the capital town of the Sogdi, which lay upon the river. Alexander refounded Founda-tion of Sogdian Alex-andria it as a Greek colony, and built wharfs; it was known as the Sogdian Alexandria, and was destined to be the residence of a southern satrapy which was to extend to the sea-coast. (? Alor, or, higher up, Sirwah.) This province was committed to Peithon, the son of Agenor.

The principalities of the rich and populous land of Sind were distinguished from the states of the north by the great political power enjoyed by the Brahmans. Under the influence of this caste, which was vehemently opposed to the intrusion of the outlanders, the princes either defied Alexander or, if they submitted at first, speedily rebelled. The spring was spent in reducing these regions, and it was nearly midsummer when the king reached Patala at the vertex of the Indus delta. On the tidings of an insurrection in Arachosia, he had dis- Patala (Hyderabad). patched Craterus with a considerable portion of the army to march through the Bolan Pass into southern Aghanistan and put down the revolt. Alexander himself designed to march through Baluchistan, and Craterus was ordered to meet him in Kirman, near the entrance of the Persian Gulf. Another division of the host was to go by sea to the mouth of the Tigris. The king fixed upon Patala to be for the Indian empire what the most famous of his Alexandrias was for Egypt. He charged Hephaestion with the task of fortifying the citadel and building an ample harbour. Then he sailed southward himself to visit the southern ocean. It was the

*Alexander
sails in
the Indian
Ocean.*

season at which the monsoons blow from the south-west, and the Macedonians, accustomed to the tideless midland sea, were at first sorely perplexed by the ebb and flow of the oceanic tide, at this time especially high and violent in the main arm of the river. Several ships were lost, but the sailors soon mastered the secret of the times and tides, and Alexander fared out into the open sea. He sacrificed to Poseidon; he poured drink-offerings from a golden cup to the Nereids and Dioseuri, and to Thetis the mother of his ancestor Achilles, and then hurled the cup into the waves. This ceremony inaugurated his plan of opening a seaway for commerce between the West and the Far East. The enterprise of discovering this seaway was entrusted to Nearchus, an officer who was an intimate companion of his own and possessed the confidence of the troops. Alexander started on his land-march in the early autumn, but Nearchus and the fleet were to wait till October, in order to be helped forward by the eastern monsoons.

SECT. 3. ALEXANDER'S RETURN TO BABYLON

No enterprise of Alexander was so useless, and none so fatal, as the journey through the desert of Gedrosia, the land which is now known as the Mekran. Of the inhospitable character of the country he must have had general information, but he had no idea of the hardships and terrors of the march which awaited him. His guiding motive in choosing this route was to make provisions for the safety of the fleet, to dig wells and store food at certain places along the coast. He had also in view the subjugation of the Oritae, a hardy warlike people who dwelled in the mountains on the eastern limit of the wilderness. But if it had been only a matter of subduing the Orites, this could easily have been accomplished by an expedition from Patala. The march through the Mekran and the voyage of Nearchus were interdependent parts of the same adventure; and so timid were the mariners of those days that the voyage into unknown waters seemed far more formidable than the journey through the waste.

With perhaps thirty thousand men, Alexander passed the mountain wall which protects the Indus delta, and crossing

the river Arbis, he reduced the Oritae to subjection. He chose their chief village Rambacia for the foundation of a colony, the Orite Alexandria; it was important to have stations on his projected ocean-route. Then he descended into the waste of Gedrosia. No resistance met him here, for there was no folk to resent his intrusion; only a few miserable villages in the hills, or more miserable fishing hamlets on the coast. The army moved painfully through the desert of rocks and sand, waterless and barren; and part of the scanty provisions that the foragers obtained had to be stored on the shore for the coming of the fleet. It was often almost impossible to step through the deep sinking sand; the pitiless heat rendered night marches necessary; and those marches were frequently of undue length, owing to the need of reaching a spring of water. Alexander himself is said to have trudged on foot and shared all the hardships of the way. It was doubtless the non-combatants and camp-followers who suffered most. At length the waste was crossed; and, leaving the coast regions, the remnant of the army marched north to Pura, the residence of the satrapy of Gedrosia. It is said that the survivors, exhausted and dishevelled, were the smaller part of the army which had set forth from India two months before; and the losses of that terrible Gedrosian journey exceeded the losses of all Alexander's campaigns. But this is probably a heightened statement of the calamities of the march.

Having rested at Pura, the king proceeded to Kirman, where he was joined by Craterus, who had suppressed the revolt in Arachosia. Presently news arrived that the fleet had reached the Kirman coast, and soon Nearchus arrived at the camp and relieved Alexander's anxiety. He too had a tale to tell of hardships and perils. The hostile attitude of the Indians, when Alexander's back was turned, had forced him to start a month before the season of the east winds; and contrary south winds kept him for twenty-four days in a haven at some distance to the west of the delta. Then a storm wrecked three of his ships near Cocala. During the rest of their voyage the seafarers were sore bestead by want of sweet water and provisions. But the king was overjoyed that they had arrived at all. Nearchus was dismissed to complete the voyage by sailing up the Persian Gulf and the Pasitigris

March of Alexander through the Mekran (August, Sept., Oct.), 325 B.C.

The voyage of Nearchus, Oct.-Dec. 325 B.C.

(? Kara-chi.)

River to Susa; Hephaestion was sent to make his way thither along the coast; while Alexander himself marched through the hills by Persepolis and Pasargadae.

Misconduct of Alexander's governors, and his dealings with them.

It was high time for Alexander to return. There was hardly a satrap, Persian or Macedonian, in any land, who had not oppressed his province by violence and rapacity; and some, in the expectation that the king would never come back from the Far East, had formed plots for establishing independent principalities. In Kirman, in Persis, and at Susa, the most pressing business of the king was to re-establish his authority by punishing without favour or mercy the governors and officers who were found guilty of treason and oppression. Many satraps were deposed or put to death; Atropates of Media was one of the few who had been faithful to his charge. But the military garrison of Media had not behaved so well; and none of Alexander's dooms at this juncture was more effective than the execution of two officers and six hundred soldiers for having plundered the temples and sepulchres of that province. Of all evil deeds, that perhaps which most vexed the king was the opening and plundering of the sepulchre of Cyrus at Pasargadae; it was more than a common sacrilege, it was an outrage against the majesty of kings. He tortured the Magians who were the guardians of the tomb, but did not discover the author of the outrage.

Flight of Harpalus.

One guilty minister fled at Alexander's approach. This was the treasurer Harpalus, who had once before been untrue to his charge, but had been forgiven and entrusted with the royal treasures of Persia. He squandered his master's money in riotous living at Babylon, and as the news of these scandals reached Alexander in India, he deemed it prudent to move westward. Taking a large sum of money, he went to Cilicia, and hiring a bodyguard of 6000 mercenaries, he lived in royal state at Tarsus with Glycera, an Athenian courtesan. On Alexander's return, Tarsus was not safe, and he fled to Greece, where we shall meet him presently.

Alexander's policy: the fusion of Greeks and Asiatics;

Having punished with a stern hand the misrule of his satraps, Macedonian and Persian alike, Alexander began to carry out schemes which he had formed for breaking down the barrier which divides the East from the West. He had unbarred and unveiled the Orient to the knowledge and

commerce of the Mediterranean peoples, but his aim was to do much more than this; it was no less than to fuse Asia and Europe into a homogeneous unity. He devised various means for compassing this object. He proposed to transplant Greeks and Macedonians into Asia, and Asiatics into Europe, as permanent settlers. This plan had indeed been partly realised by the foundation of his numerous mixed cities in the Far East. The second means was the promotion of intermarriages between Persians and Macedonians, and this policy was inaugurated in magnificent fashion at Susa. The king himself espoused Statira, the daughter of Darius; his friend Hephaestion took her sister; and a large number of Macedonian officers wedded the daughters of Persian grandees. The nuptials were celebrated on the same day and according to the Persian fashion; Alexander is said to have feasted 9000 guests. Of the general mass of the Macedonians 10,000 are said to have followed the example of their officers and taken Asiatic wives; all those were liberally rewarded by Alexander. He looked forward to the offspring of these unions as a potent instrument for the further fusing of the races. It is to be noticed that Alexander, already wedded to the princess of Sogdiana, adopted the polygamous custom of Persia; and he even married another royal lady, Parysatis, daughter of Ochus. These marriages were purely dictated by policy; they were meant as an example; for Alexander never came under the influence of women. The bridals of Susa were a lesson in political marriages on a vast scale.

But the most effective means for bringing the two races together was the institution of military service on a perfect equality. With this purpose in view, Alexander, not long after the death of Darius, had arranged that in all the eastern provinces the native youth should be drilled and disciplined in Macedonian fashion and taught to use the Macedonian weapons. In fact, Hellenic military schools were established in every province, and at the end of five years an army of 30,000 Hellenized barbarians was at the Great King's disposition. At his summons this army gathered at Susa, and its arrival created a natural, though unreasonable, feeling of discontent among the Macedonians, who divined that Alexander aimed at making himself independent of their services. His schemes of

*means for
accom-
plishing
this:*

*(1) trans-
plantation
and colon-
isation;
(2) inter-
marriage:*

*(3) equal
military
service.*

transforming the character of his army were also indicated by the enlistment of Persians, Bactrians, Areians, and other orientals in the Macedonian cavalry regiments, and the enrolling of nine distinguished Persians in the royal Agema itself. The general dissatisfaction was not allayed by the king's liberality in defraying all the debts of the soldiers—amounting perhaps to two millions.

*Macedonian
mutiny
at Opis.*

Alexander left Susa for Ecbatana in spring. He sailed down the river Pasitigris to the Persian Gulf, surveyed part of the coast, and sailed up the Tigris, removing the weirs which the Persians had constructed to hinder navigation. The army joined him on the way, and he halted at Opis. Here he held an assembly of the Macedonians, and formally discharged all those—about 10,000 in number—whom old age or wounds had rendered unfit for warfare, promising to make them comfortable for life. He fondly thought that his words would be welcomed with delight, but he was disappointed. The smouldering discontent found a voice now. The cry was raised, "Discharge us all"; and some tauntingly added, "Go and conquer with your father Ammon." The king may well have been taken aback. The men who on the banks of the Hyphasis had declared themselves worn out with war and toil and sick with yearning for their homes, were now indignant when he honourably discharged their veterans. Alexander leapt down from the platform into the shouting throng; he pointed out thirteen of the most forward rioters, and bade his hypaspists seize them and put them to death. The rest were cowed. Amid a deep silence the king remounted the platform, and in a bitter speech he discharged the whole army. Then he retired into his palace, and on the third day summoned the Persian and Median nobles and appointed them to posts of honour and trust which had hitherto been filled by Macedonians. The names of the Macedonian regiments were transferred to the new barbarian army. When they heard this, the Macedonians, who still lingered in their quarters, miserable and uncertain whether to go or stay, appeared before the gates of the palace. They laid down their arms submissively and implored admission to the king's presence. Alexander came out, and there was a tearful reconciliation, which was sealed by sacrifices and feasts. This dramatic incident possesses

no historical importance like the action of the troops on the Hyphasis, and it is only significant in so far as it marks the last futile explosion of Macedonian sentiment against the liberal policy of the king, the final protest of men who knew that they would have to acquiesce in a new order of things.

The veterans started for home under the leadership of Craterus and Polyperchon; they left behind the children whom Asiatic women had borne to them, the king promising to bring them up in Macedonian fashion. Craterus was to supersede Antipater as regent of Macedonia, and Antipater was to come out to Asia with a fresh supply of troops. This arrangement was desirable, on account of the estranged relations which existed between Antipater and the queen-mother, whose letters to Alexander were always teeming with mutual accusations.

The summer and early winter were spent at the Median capital. Here a sorrow, the greatest that could befall him, befell Alexander. Three thousand professional players or "Dionysiac artists," as they were called, had arrived from Greece; and Ecbatana was festive with revels and dramatic exhibitions. In the midst of the gaiety, Hephaestion fell ill, languished for seven days, and died. Alexander was plunged into despair at losing the friend of his bosom; he fasted three days, and the whole empire went into mourning; it is said that he crucified the miserable physician whose skill had been found wanting. Inconsolable the lonely monarch might well be. He could have other boon companions, other faithful counsellors and devoted servants; but he knew that he would never find another to whom he would be simply "my friend Alexander" and not "my lord the king." The body was sent to Babylon to be burnt; 10,000 talents were set apart for a funeral of unsurpassed magnificence.

Alexander set out for Babylon towards the end of the year, and on his way he enjoyed the excitement of hunting down the Cossaeans, a hill-folk of Luristan, who made brigandage their trade. The slaughter of these robbers, who were chased to their mountain nests, was described as an offering to the spirit of Hephaestion. As Alexander advanced to Babylon, ambassadors from far lands came to his camp. The Bruttians, Lucanians, and Etruscans, the Carthaginians and the Phoenician

Veterans sent back to Macedonia.

Alexander at Ecbatana.

Death of Hephaestion; Alexander's grief.

Subjugation of the Cossaeans, winter, 324-3 B.C.

The embassies from the west and south.

colonies of Spain, Celts, Scythians of the Black Sea, Libyans, and Ethiopians had all sent envoys to court the friendship of the monarch who seemed already to be lord of half the earth. A feeling of dread was beginning to quiver faintly through the western world that the conqueror of the East would presently turn the path of his progress to the West. Carthage might feel a tremor lest he should come against her as the champion of Hellenic Sicily and do unto her what he had done to elder Tyre. But from the city of Italy, which was destined to destroy the power of Carthage and become the partial inheritor of Alexander's empire, no ambassador came.

(No embassy from Rome.)

Arrival of Alexander at Babylon. The warning of the Chaldeans; and the temple of Bel.

When Alexander approached within sight of Babylon, he was met by a deputation of priestly star-gazers who counselled him not to enter the city, for their god Bel had revealed to them that it would not be for his profit. He replied to the Chaldeans with a verse of Euripides—"The best seer he who guesseth well," and entered at the head of his army. One of his first cares was to take measures for the rebuilding of the temple of Bel, unduly retarded by the wilful neglect of the Chaldean priests, who were unwilling to appropriate their revenues to the purpose. It has been thought that their attempt to divert the king from entering Babylon may have had a motive connected with their negligence.

SECT. 4. PREPARATIONS FOR AN ARABIAN EXPEDITION.

ALEXANDER'S DEATH

Alexander's designs on Arabia;

Ever since the successful voyage of Nearchus, the brain of Alexander was filled with maritime enterprises. He was bent on the exploration of the northern and the southern oceans. He had already sent Heraclides and a company of shipwrights to the Hyrcanian mountains, to cut wood in the forests and build a fleet to navigate the Caspian Sea and discover its supposed communication with the eastern ocean. But his more immediate and serious enterprise was the circumnavigation and conquest of Arabia. His eastern empire was not complete so long as this peninsula lay outside it. He knew of the rich spice-lands of Arabia Felix, but he had no conception of the vast extent of the desert which renders a land invasion so difficult and so unremunerative. The possession of this

country of sand, however, was not his main object; it was only an incident in the grand range of his plans. His visit to India and the voyage of Nearchus had given him new ideas; he had risen to the conception of making the southern ocean another great commercial sea like the Mediterranean. He proposed to make the seaboard of the Persian Gulf a second Phoenicia, and he sent to the Syrian coast for seamen to colonise the shores of the mainland and the islands. He hoped to establish a regular trade route from the Indus to the Tigris and Euphrates, and thence to the canals which connected the Nile with the Red Sea. If he had lived to accomplish this he might have renewed the project of king Necho and hewn a water-way through the neck of Suez. Mighty Babylon would then be in close connexion with the new oceanic trade; argosies from Alexandria or Patala could sail into her wharves. Alexander destined Babylon to be the capital of his empire, and doubtless it was a wise choice. But its character was now to be transformed. It was to become a naval station and a centre of maritime commerce. Alexander set about the digging of a great harbour, with room for a thousand keels, and designed the building of shipsteads.

The fleet of Nearchus sailed up the Euphrates and met the king at Babylon. But this fleet was not sufficient for the approaching enterprise. Orders had been sent to Phoenicia for the building of new warships: twelve triremes, three quadriremes, four quinqueremes, and thirty of the smaller thirty-oared barques. These were constructed in pieces, conveyed overland to Thapsacus on Euphrates, and there put together. Other ships, of cypress-wood, were also built in Babylonia. The expedition was to set forth in the summer, and the king occupied part of the intervening time in a voyage down the Euphrates to visit the Pallacopas canal. The snows of winter melting in the late spring-tide on the north slopes of the Armenian mountains used to swell the waters of the Euphrates and force it to overflow its banks in the Babylonian plain. About ninety miles below Babylon a canal had been dug to drain the superfluous waters into the marshes which stretched for leagues and leagues south-westward. In the autumn the canal was closed by a sluice to prevent the water leaving its bed. But the sluice was out of

working order, and Alexander devised a better place, connecting the canal with the river at a different point. He sailed up the canal, lost his way for a while among the swamps, and selected a site for a new city, whose building was immediately begun. We may guess that the city was meant to be the first of a string of fortresses stretching across the desert from Babylonia to the Red Sea.

*Reform
of the
phalanx.*

On his return to Babylon, he found some new western troops which had arrived from Caria and Lydia, and also a body of 20,000 Persians who had been recruited by Peucestas. He proceeded to carry out a sweeping military reform, at which his mind must have been working for some time past. It was nothing less than a complete transformation of his father's phalanx,—in fact, of the Hellenic hoplite system. Alexander had done much with the well-drilled phalanx; but his experience had taught him that it was far from being the ideal infantry. The advantages of its sheer weight and solid strength were more than counterbalanced by its want of mobility. Alexander invented a means of increasing the mobility with as little as possible diminution of the weight. He inserted the fresh body of 20,000 Persians into the Macedonian phalanx in the following way. The old depth of the file, namely sixteen men, was retained, but of these only four were Macedonian pikemen—the men of the first three ranks and the hindmost man of all. The twelve intervening places—the fourth to the fifteenth ranks—were filled by Persians lightly armed with their native bows and javelins. This new phalanx required a new kind of tactics, which must have consisted in opening out the ranks, so as to allow the archers and javelin-men to deploy into the intervals and discharge their missiles, and then closing up again, in order to advance in a serried mass, each file bristling with three, no longer with five, spear-points. It was a thoroughly original idea, this combination of heavy and light troops into a tactical unity; but it would need all the skill of the great master to bring it to perfection. The strange thing is to find Alexander introducing this new system, which implied a complete change in the drill, on the very eve of his setting forth on the Arabian expedition. We are tempted to think that he had already made experiments—perhaps with that army of 30,000 orientals, drilled in Mace-

donian fashion, who had come to him at Susa. The tactical reform had also its political bearings. It was another step in the direction of fusing the Macedonian and Persian together, and marrying Europe with Asia.

There was one thing, very near to the king's heart, still to be accomplished before he set out—the funeral of Hephaestion. The oracle of Ammon had been consulted touching the honours which should be paid to the dead man, and had ordained that he might be honoured as a hero. In accordance therewith, Alexander ordered that chapels should be erected to Hephaestion in Egyptian Alexandria and other cities. Never were obsequies so magnificent as those which were held at Babylon; the funeral pyre, splendidly decked with offerings, towered to the height of 200 feet.

*Funeral of
Hephaes-
tion, May
323 B.C.*

All was in readiness at length for the expedition to the south. On a day in early June a royal banquet was given in honour of Nearchus and his seamen, shortly about to start on their oceanic voyage. As Alexander was retiring to his chamber at a late hour, a friend named Medius carried him off to spend the rest of the night in a bout of hard drinking. On the morrow he slept long; in the evening he dined with Medius, and another carousal followed. After a bath and a meal in the early hours of the morning, he fell into a feverish sleep. On awaking, he insisted upon preparing the daily sacrifices according to his wont; but the fever was still on him, he could not walk, and was carried to the altar on a couch. He spent the day in bed, actively engaged with Nearchus in discussing the expedition, which he fixed for four days hence. In the cool of the evening he was conveyed to the river and rowed across to a garden villa at the other side. For six days he lay here in high fever, but regularly performing the sacrifices, and daily perforce deferring the departure of the expedition for another and yet another day. Then his condition grew worse, and he was carried back to the palace, where he won a little sleep, but the fever did not abate. When his officers came to him they found him speechless; the disease became more violent, and a rumour spread among the Macedonian soldiers that Alexander was dead. They rushed clamouring to the door of the palace, and the bodyguards were forced to admit them. One by one they

*Illness of
Alexander,
16th day of
Daesius
(June 12);*

17th;

18th;

19th-24th

25th;

27th;

filed past the bed of their young king, but he could not speak to them; he could only greet each by slightly raising his head and signing with his eyes. Peucestas and some others of the Companions passed the night in the temple of Serapis and asked the god whether they should convey the sick man into the temple, if haply he might be cured there by divine help. A voice warned them not to bring him, but to let him remain where he lay. He died on a June evening, before the thirty-third year of his age was fully told. Such is the punctilious and authentic account of the last illness of Alexander, as it was recorded in the Court Diary; but it is not sufficient to enable us to discover the precise nature of the fatal disease.

*Death of
Alexander
28th of
Daesius
(= June
13).*

*His work
and what
he might
have done.*

The untimely deaths of sovereigns at particular junctures have often exercised an appreciable influence on the course of events; but no such accident has diverted the paths of history so manifestly and utterly as the death of Alexander. Twelve years had sufficed him to conquer western Asia, and to leave an impress upon it which centuries would not obliterate. And yet his work had only been begun. Many plans for the political transformation of his Asiatic empire had been initiated,—plans which reveal his originality of conception, his breadth of grasp, his firm hold of facts, his faculty for organisation, his wonderful brain-power,—but all these schemes and lines of policy needed still many years of development under the master's shaping and guiding hand. The unity of the realm, which was an essential part of Alexander's conception, disappeared upon his death. The empire was broken up among a number of hard-headed Macedonians, capable and practical rulers, but without the higher qualities of the founder's genius. They maintained the tolerant Hellenism which he had initiated,—his lessons had not been lost upon them; and thus his work was not futile; the toils of even those twelve marvellous years smoothed the path for Roman sway in the East, and prepared the ground for the spread of an universal religion.

It is impossible to write the history of Alexander so as to produce a true impression of his work, because, in the records which we have, the general and soldier fills the whole stage, and the statesman is, as it were, hustled out. The details of administrative organisation are lost amidst the sounding of

trumpets and the clashing of spears. But it is the details of administration and political organisation which the historical inquirer craves to know, and especially the constitution of the various new-founded cities in the Far East, those novel experiments which set Macedonian, Greek, and oriental inhabitants side by side. By their silence on these matters the Companions of Alexander, who wrote memoirs about him, unwittingly did him a wrong, and hence there has largely prevailed an unjust notion that he only knew and only cared how to conquer.

It is hardly open to question that this brilliant lord of well-trained myriads would have advanced to the conquest of the West; nor can we affect to doubt that, succeeding where one (*Pyrrhus*) of his successors failed, he would have annexed Sicily and Great Hellas, conquered Carthage, and overrun the Italian peninsula. To apprehend what his death meant for Europe we need not travel farther in our speculations. To the Indies he would certainly have returned and carried out with fresh troops that project of visiting the valley of the Ganges which had been frustrated by his weary army. As it was, he had left no lasting impression upon Indian civilisation; and his successors soon abandoned their hold upon the Punjab. It is needless to add that if Alexander had lived another quarter of a century, he would have widened the limits of geographical knowledge. The true nature of the Caspian Sea would have been determined; the southern extension of the Indian peninsula would have been discovered; and an attempt would have been made to repeat the Phœnician circumnavigation of Africa. Nor could Alexander have failed, in his advanced position on the Jaxartes, to have learned some facts about the vast extension of the Asiatic continent to the east and north, and the curiosities of Chinese civilisation.

His sudden death was no freak of fate or fortune; it was a natural consequence of his character and his deeds. Into thirteen years he had compressed the energies of many lifetimes. If he had been content with the duties of a general and a statesman, laborious and wearing though those duties would have been both to body and to brain, his singularly strong constitution would probably have lasted him for many a long year. But the very qualities of his brilliant temper which most endeared him to his fellows, a warrior's valour and

a love of good fellowship, were ruinous to his health. He was covered with scars; and he had probably never recovered from that terrible wound which had been the price of his escapade at Multan. Sparing of himself neither in battle nor at the symposion, he was doomed to die young.

SECT. 5. GREECE UNDER MACEDONIA

The tide of the world's history swept us away from the shores of Greece; and, borne breathlessly along from conquest to conquest in the triumphant train of the Macedonian, we could not pause to see what was happening in the little states which were looking with mixed emotions at the spectacle of their own civilisation making its way over the earth. Alexander's victory at the gates of Issus and his ensuing supremacy by sea had taught many of the Greeks the lesson of caution; the Confederacy of the Isthmus had sent congratulations and a golden crown to the conqueror; and when, a twelvemonth later, the Spartan king Agis, a resolute man without any military ability, renewed the war against Macedonia, he got no help or countenance outside the Peloponnesus. Some hot spirits at Athens proposed to support the movement, but the people were discreetly restrained not only by Phocion and Demades but by Demosthenes himself. Agis induced the Arcadians, except Megalopolis, the Achaeans, except Pellene, and the Eleians, to join him; and having mercenary troops besides, he got together a considerable army. It was easy to gain a few successes, before the regent of Macedonia, then occupied with a rising in Thrace, had time to descend on the Peloponnesus. The chief object of the allies was to capture Megalopolis, and the federal capital of Arcadia was in the strange position of being besieged by the Arcadian federates. Antipater, as soon as the situation in Thrace set him free, marched southward to the relief of Megalopolis, and easily crushed the allies in a battle fought hard by. Agis fell fighting, and there was no further resistance; Sparta sent up hostages to Alexander, who accorded the conquered Greeks easy terms.

*Battle of
Megalopolis,
331 B.C.*

So long as Darius lived, many of the Greeks cherished secret hopes that fortune might yet turn against Alexander, and

maintained clandestine intrigues with Persia. But on the news of his death such hopes expired, and tranquillity prevailed in Hellas. It was not till Alexander's return from India that anything happened to trouble the peace. And in the meantime Greece was experiencing a relief which she had needed for two generations. A field had been opened to her superfluous children, who were pouring by thousands, or rather tens of thousands, into Asia, to find careers, if not permanent homes.

For Athens the twelve years between the fall of Thebes and *Athens*. the death of Alexander were an interval of singular well-being. The conduct of public affairs was in the hands of the two most honourable statesmen of the day, Phocion and Lycurgus. Supported by the orator Demades, Phocion was able to dissuade the people from embarking in any foolhardy enterprises; and Demosthenes was sufficiently clear-sighted not to embarrass, but, when needful, to support, the policy of peace. Phocion probably did not grudge him the signal triumph which he won over his old rival, Aeschines; for this triumph had only a personal, and not a political, significance. Shortly before Philip's death, Ctesiphon had proposed to honour Demosthenes, both for his general services to the state and especially for his liberality in contributing from his private purse towards the repair of the city-walls, by crowning him publicly in the theatre with a crown of gold. The Council had passed a resolution to this effect; but Aeschines lodged an accusation against the proposer, on the ground that the motion violated the *Graphé Paranomon*, and consequently the Council's resolution was not brought before the people. The matter remained in abeyance for about six years, neither party venturing to bring it to an issue, Aeschines by following up his indictment or Ctesiphon by forcing him to bring it into court. The collapse of the attempt of Agis to defy Macedonia probably encouraged Aeschines to face his rival at last. In a speech of the highest ability Aeschines reviewed the public career of Demosthenes, to prove that he was a traitor and responsible for all the disasters of Athens. The reply of Demosthenes, a masterpiece of splendid oratory, captivated the judges; and Aeschines, not winning one-fifth part of their votes, left Athens and disappeared from politics. It is not unfair to say that it was Demosthenes the orator, not Demosthenes the statesman, who

*Attitude
of Demo-
sthenes.*

*Speeches on
the Crown,
330 B.C.*

convinced the Athenian judges. Apart from his Speech on the Crown, which has been described as the funeral oration on Greek freedom, Demosthenes fell almost silent during these years; he saw that public action on his part would be useless; but perhaps he worked underground.

*Aeschines
on the
strange
events of
his time.*

In these two speeches in the matter of the crown, the most interesting passage is where Aeschines reflects on the changes which had recently come to pass over the face of the earth. We want to know what the Greeks thought of those startling changes, what they felt as they saw the fashion of the world passing and the things which had seemed of great weight and worth in Hellas becoming of small account. Aeschines thus utters their surprise:—

“All manner of strange events, utterly unforeseen, have befallen in our lifetime. Our extraordinary experiences will seem to those who come after us like a curious tale of marvels. The king of the Persians, who dug the canal through Athos, who bridged the Hellespont, who demanded earth and water from the Greeks, who dared in his letters to declare, ‘I am the lord of all the world from the rising to the setting of the sun,’ is at this moment struggling not for domination over other men, but to save his own life and limb. Thebes, even Thebes our neighbour, has been snatched, in the space of a single day, out of the midst of Hellas—justly, for her policy was false; but assuredly she was rather blinded by a heaven-sent infatuation than misled by human perversity. And the poor Lacedaemonians, who once lifted themselves up to be leaders of the Greeks, must now go up to Alexander as hostages and throw themselves upon the mercy of the potentate whom they wronged. Our own city, once the asylum of the Greek world, whither all men looked for help, has now ceased to strive for the leadership of the Greeks, for the very ground of her home is in danger.”

*Athenian
activity in
the west.*

The Macedonian empire had not yet lasted long enough to turn the traffic of the Mediterranean into new channels, and Athens still enjoyed great commercial prosperity. She sent a colony to some unknown place on the Hadriatic seaboard, to be a base of protection against the Etruscan rovers, the big menacing eyes of whose pirate crafts were a constant terror to traders in those seas. And, although peace was her

professed policy, she did not neglect to make provision for war, in case a favourable opportunity should come round, in the revolution of circumstance, for regaining her sovereignty on sea. Money was spent on the navy, which is said to have been increased to well-nigh 400 galleys, and on new ship-sheds. The handsome "marble storehouse for the hanging shipgear," designed by the architect Philo, was completed at the harbour of Zea. It was expressly provided that the cases which lined the walls and pillars of this cool triple-aisled arcade should be open, "in order that those who pass through may be able to see all the gear that is in the gear-store."

The man who was mainly responsible for this naval expenditure was Lycurgus. It is significant of the spirit of Athens at this time that, while Phocion and Demades were the most influential men in the Assembly, the finances were in the charge of a statesman who had been so signally hostile to Macedonia that Alexander had demanded his surrender. In recent years considerable changes had been made in the constitution of the financial offices. Eubulus had administered as the president of the Theoric Fund. But now we find the control of the expenditure in the hands of a Minister of the Public Revenue, who was elected by the people and held office for four years, from one Panathenaic festival to another. Lycurgus was entrusted with this post for twelve years; for the first period in his own name; for the two succeeding periods his activity was cloaked under the names of his son and another nominal minister. He acted, of course, in conjunction with the Council, but the influence of the more permanent and experienced minister upon that annual body was inevitably very great. The new system, it is evident, was a distinct improvement on the old. It was much better that the administration of the revenue should be managed by one competent statesman, unhampered by colleagues, and that his tenure of office should not be limited to a year. The post practically included the functions of a minister of public works, and the ministry of Lycurgus was distinguished by building enterprises. He constructed the Panathenaic stadion on the southern bank of the Ilisus. He rebuilt the Lycean gymnasium, where in these years the philosopher Aristotle used to take his morning and evening "walks," teaching his "peripatetic"

*Shewotheke
of Philo.*

*Financial
ministry
of Lycur-
gus.*

338-326
B.C.

*The
stadion;
the gym-
nasium, at
the temple
of Apollo
Lyceus;*

disciples. It lay somewhere to the east of the city, under Mount Lycabettus. But the most memorable work of Lycurgus was the reconstruction of the theatre of Dionysus. It was he who built the rows of marble benches, climbing up the steep side of the Acropolis, as we see them to-day; and his original stage-buildings can be distinguished, amidst the ruins, from the mass of later additions and improvements. He canonized, as it were, the three great tragic poets, Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides, by setting up their statues in the theatre, and by carrying a measure that copies of their works should be officially prepared and preserved by the state.

theatre ;

*canonical
copies of the
tragic
poets.*

*Working
of the
Laurion
silver
mines.*

*Xenophon,
De Vecti-
gal., 355
B.C.*

*The insti-
tution of
the ephebi,
c. 336 B.C.*

In connexion with the prosperity of Athens and her large public outlay, it is important to observe that the silver mines of Laurion, which had been closed when the Spartans occupied Decelea and had been neglected—for want of capital and enterprise—throughout the whole first half of the fourth century, had been reopened and were working vigorously. They seem to have been managed largely on a new principle, namely by private companies. The historian Xenophon had written a pamphlet on the subject of the mines as a neglected source of revenue, and it would be interesting to know whether the revival of the industry is to be ascribed directly or indirectly to the influence of his exhortations.

No sign of the times, which followed the defeat of Chaeronea, is more striking than the framing of a new system for drilling the young burghers of Athens in the duties of military life. The training began when the youth, having completed his eighteenth year, came of age and was enrolled in the register of his deme; and it lasted for two years. During these two years the young citizen was known as an *ephebos*, and might not appear either as prosecutor or defendant in the law-courts except in a few cases expressly specified. The general supervision over all the Attic ephebi was committed to a marshal (*kosmētēs*), who was elected by the Athenian Assembly; and under him were ten masters of discipline (*sōphrōnistai*), one for each tribe. The institution had a religious consecration. The first act in the service of the ephebi was solemnly to "go round the temples" under the conduct of the masters. Then they served for a year on duty in the guard-houses at Munychia and along the coast, receiving

regular military instruction from special drill-masters, who trained them in the exercises of the hoplites, and taught them how to shoot with bow and javelin and to handle artillery. The ephebi of each tribe ate together at barrack messes which were managed by the masters of discipline. At the end of the first year they appeared before an Assembly in the theatre, and when they had made a public display of their proficiency in the art of warfare, each received from the city a shield and a spear. The second year was spent in patrolling the frontiers of the land and guarding the prisons. The garrison and patrol duties had always devolved upon the young men of Attica, but they were now organised into a new and thorough scheme of discipline,—a mild Attic approach to the stern system of Sparta. It almost strikes one as a conscious effort to arrest the decline of the citizen army in the face of the encroachments of the mercenary system. The ephebi in their characteristic dress, the dark mantle and the broad-brimmed hat, are a graceful feature in Athenian life and art from this time forward.

It is significant that the whole revival, stimulated by the disaster of Chaeronea, was marked by a religious character. Lycurgus, who belonged to the priestly family of the Eteobutads, was a sincerely pious man, and impressed upon his administration the stamp of his own devotion. Never for a hundred years had there been seen at Athens such a manifestation of zealous public concern for the worship of the gods. The two chief monuments of the Lysurgian epoch—the Panathenaic stadion and the theatre of Dionysus—were, it must always be remembered, religious, not secular, buildings.

Thus Athens discreetly attended to her material well-being, and courted the favour of the gods, and the only distress which befell her was a dearth of corn. But on the return of Alexander to Susa, two things happened which imperilled the tranquillity of Greece.

Alexander promised the Greek exiles—there were more *The exiles.* than 20,000 of them—to procure their return to their native cities. He sent Nicanor to the great congregation of Hellas 324 B.C. at the Olympian festival, to order the states to receive back their banished citizens. A general reconciliation of parties

was a just and politic measure; but it could be objected that, by the terms of the Confederation of Corinth, the Macedonian king had no power to dictate orders to the Confederates in the management of their domestic affairs. Only two states objected, Athens and Aetolia; and they objected because, if the edict were enforced, they would be robbed of ill-gotten gains. The Aetolians had possessed themselves of Oeniadae and driven out its Acarnanian owners; by Alexander's edict the rightful inhabitants would now return to their own city and the intruders be dislodged. The position of Athens in Samos was similar; the Samians would now be restored to their own lands, and the Athenian settlers would have to go. Both Athens and Aetolia were prepared to resist.

*Alexander's
divinity.*

Another desire was expressed by Alexander at the same time, which was readily acquiesced in. He demanded that the Greeks should recognise his divinity. Sparta is reported to have replied indifferently, "We allow Alexander to call himself a god, if he likes." There was not a sensible man at Athens who would have thought of objecting; even the bitterest patriots would have allowed him to be "the son of Zeus or Poseidon, or whomever he chose." If the Greeks of Corinth looked up to Alexander as their chieftain and protector—and this was actually their position in regard to him—there was no incongruity in the idea of officially acknowledging his divinity. Ever since the days in which an Homeric king "was honoured as a god by the people," there was nothing offensive or outlandish to a Greek ear in predicating godhood of a revered sovereign or master. Divine honours had been paid to Lysander; and the Greeks, in complying with Alexander's desire, did not commit themselves more than the pupil of the Academy who erected an altar to his master Plato.

SECT. 6. THE EPISODE OF HARPALUS AND THE GREEK REVOLT

*Harpalus
in Greece,
spring,
324 B.C.;*

Meanwhile an incident had happened which might induce some of the patriots to hope that Alexander's empire rested on slippery foundations. Harpalus had arrived off the coast of Attica with 5000 talents, a body of mercenaries, and thirty ships. He had come to excite a revolt against his master.

A gift of corn had formerly secured him the citizenship of Athens, but the Athenians prudently refused to harbour him, coming in this guise. He sailed away to Cape Taenaron, always a refuge of adventurers, and, leaving his men and ships there, returned to Athens with a sum of about 700 talents. He was now received, since he did not come with an armed array, but after a while messages arrived both from Macedonia and from Philoxenus, Alexander's financial minister in western Asia, demanding his surrender. It would have been an act of war to protect the runaway treasurer and his stolen moneys; but the Athenians, on the proposal of Demosthenes, adopted a clever device. They arrested Harpalus, seizing his treasure, and said that they would surrender him to officers expressly sent by Alexander, but declined to give him up to Philoxenus or Antipater. It was not long before Harpalus escaped; he returned to Taenaron, and was shortly afterwards murdered by one of his fellow-adventurers.

his reception at Athens;

his death.

The stolen money was deposited in the Acropolis, under the charge of specially-appointed commissioners, of whom Demosthenes was one. It was known by report that the sum was about 700 talents, but Demosthenes and his fellows had strangely omitted to make any official entry or report of the amount. Suddenly it was discovered that only 350 talents were actually in the Acropolis. Charges immediately circulated against the influential politicians, that the other 350 talents had been received in bribes by them before the money was deposited in the citadel. Men of opposite sides were suspected; Demades, for example, as well as Demosthenes. But, apart from the suspicion of bribery, manifest blame rested upon Demosthenes for having grossly neglected his duty. He was responsible for the custody of the treasure, for which Athens was responsible to Alexander. He was bound to demand an investigation, and on his motion the people directed the Council of Areopagus to hold an inquiry. Philoxenus furnished the account-book of Harpalus, which had come into his hands. By this evidence it was proved that 700 talents had been delivered for safe-keeping in the Acropolis; the entries ceased at this point. It was also shown that certain Athenians had previously been bribed; but Demosthenes was not among them. Other evidence was

The Harpalus scandal:

bribery and peculation.

Demosthenes a receiver of twenty talents.

necessary to show how the missing half of the 700 talents had disappeared. We know not what this evidence was, but the court of Areopagus satisfied themselves that a number of leading statesmen had received considerable sums. Demosthenes appeared in their report as the recipient of twenty talents. The proofs against him were irrefutable, for he confessed the misdemeanour himself, and sought to excuse it by the paltry and transparent subterfuge that he had taken it to repay himself for twenty talents which he had advanced to the Theoric Fund. But why should he repay himself, without any authorisation, out of Alexander's money, for a debt owed him by the Athenian state? There can be little doubt that Demosthenes took the money not for personal gratifications, but for the good of his party. It was all the more necessary for his party to clear themselves from implication in such corrupt transactions. We therefore find Hypereides coming forward as a public prosecutor of Demosthenes. We possess considerable portions of his speech; and we have in its complete form another speech, written for one of the other prosecutors by a miserable hack named Dinarchus. The charges against Demosthenes were twofold: he had taken money, and he had culpably omitted to report the amount of the deposit and the neglect of those who were set to guard it. For the second offence alone he deserved a severe sentence. The judges were not excessively severe, if we consider that his behaviour had placed the city in a most embarrassing position towards Alexander. He was condemned to pay a fine of fifty talents.

Condemnation of Demosthenes.

Unable to pay it, he was imprisoned, but presently effected his escape. It was a venial offence in the eyes of Greece for a statesman to take a bribe, provided he did not take it to injure his country; and in the view of public opinion the moral character of Demosthenes was little damaged by this tortuous transaction. He was not on a level with men like Nicias and Phocion, whom millions would not have tempted; but then nobody ever supposed that he was incorruptible. Yet there were two circumstances which aggravated the case. The money of which Demosthenes partook was stolen money, which Athens was about to sequester for Alexander; and he was himself a commissioner responsible for its safety. It was far from being an ordinary case of corruption.

If Alexander had lived, the Athenians might have persuaded him to let them remain in occupation of Samos; for he was always disposed to be lenient to Athens. When the tidings of his death came, men almost refused to credit it; the orator Demades forcibly said, "If he were indeed dead, the whole world would have smelt of his corpse." The patriots had been building on the slender hopes of some disaster; and the greatest disaster of all had befallen. It had been recognised as madness to defy the power of Alexander; but it did not seem rash to strike for freedom in the unsettled condition of things after his death. Athens revolted from Macedonia; she was joined by Aetolia and many states in northern Greece, and she secured the services of a band of 8000 discharged mercenaries who had just returned from Alexander's army. One of their captains, the Athenian, Leosthenes, occupied Thermopylae, and near that pass the united Greeks gained a slight advantage over Antipater, who had marched southward as soon as he could gather his troops together. The Thessalian cavalry had deserted him, and no state in north Greece except Boeotia remained true to Macedonia. The regent shut himself in the strong hill-city of Lamia, which stands over against the pass of Thermopylae under a spur of Othrys; and here he was besieged during the winter by Leosthenes. These successes had gained some adherents to the cause in the Peloponnesus; and, if the Greeks had been stronger at sea, that cause might have triumphed, at least for a while. But the strange thing was that, notwithstanding the improvements of recent years in her naval establishment, Athens seems to have been able to set afloat no more than 170 warships against 240 of Macedon. The brave general Leosthenes was hampered by a Council of War, in which the various allies were represented—reminding us of the days of the Persian invasion; yet, if a fatal stone had not put an end to his life during the beleaguering, more would probably have been effected for the cause of the allies. In spring the arrival of Leonnatus, governor of Hellespontine Phrygia, at the head of an army, raised the siege of Lamia. The Greeks marched into Thessaly to meet the new army before it united with Antipater; a battle was fought, in which the Greeks had the upper hand, and Leonnatus was wounded to death. Antipater arrived the next day, and, joining forces

*The Greek
revolt
against
Mace-
donia,
323 B.C.*

*Antipater
besieged in
Lamia,
323-2 B.C.*

*Battle of
Crannon,
322 B.C.,
Aug.*

with the defeated army, withdrew into Macedonia, to await Craterus, who was approaching from the east. When Craterus arrived, they entered Thessaly together, and in an engagement at Crannon, in which the losses on both sides were light, the Macedonians had a slight advantage. This battle apparently decided the war, but the true cause which hindered the Greeks from continuing the struggle was not the insignificant defeat at Crannon, but the want of unity among themselves, the want of a leader whom they entirely trusted. They were forced to make terms singly, each state on its own behoof.

*Funeral
speech of
Hyper-
eides.*

Hyperæides pronounced a funeral oration, distinguished by that lucidity of which he was a perfect master, over those who had fallen in this hopeless war; and gave his due—it is not for us to say that he gave more than his due—to Leosthenes, who “succeeded in what he undertook, but not in escaping fate.” There is a fine passage which distorts indeed the historical perspective, but well displays the spirit of the patriots. “In the dark underworld—suffer us to ask—who are they that will stretch forth a right hand to the captain of our dead? May we not deem that Leosthenes will be greeted with welcome and with wonder by those half-gods who bore arms against Troy? Ay, and there, I deem, will be Miltiades and Themistocles, and those others who made Hellas free to the glory of their names.”¹

*Terms im-
posed on
Athens.*

Athens submitted when Antipater advanced into Boeotia and prepared to invade Attica. She paid dearly for her attempt to win back her power. Antipater was not like Alexander. He was an able man, warmly devoted to the royal house of Macedon; but he did not share in Alexander's sympathies with Greek culture, he had no soft place in his heart for the memories and traditions of Athens. He saw only that, unless strong and stern measures were taken, Macedonia would not be safe against a repetition of the rising which he had suppressed. He therefore imposed three conditions, which Phocion and Demades were obliged to accept: that the democratic constitution should be modified by a property qualification; that a Macedonian garrison should be lodged in Munychia; and that the agitators, Demosthenes, Hypereides, and their friends, should be surrendered.

¹ Translated by Professor Jebb.

Demosthenes had exerted eloquence in gaining support for the cause of the allies in the Peloponnesus, and his efforts had been rewarded by his recall to Athens. As soon as the city had submitted, he and the other orators fled. Hypereides with two companions sought refuge in the temple of Aeacus at Aegina, whence they were taken to Antipater and put to death. Demosthenes fled to the temple of Poseidon in the island of Calauria. When the messengers of Antipater appeared and summoned him forth, he swallowed poison, which he had concealed, according to one story, in a pen, and was thus delivered from falling into the hands of the executioner.

*Death of
Demo-
sthenes,
322 B.C.,
Oct.*

The constitutional change which was carried out at the dictation of the Macedonian general would have been judged by Aristotle an improvement. The institutions were not changed, but the democracy was converted into a "polity" or limited democracy—such as Theramenes had striven for—by a restriction of the franchise. All citizens whose property amounted to less than 2000 drachmae were deprived of their civic rights. It is said that this measure erased 12,000 names from the burgher lists, and that 9000 citizens remained. A large number of the poorer people thus disfranchised left Attica and settled in Thrace, where Antipater gave them land; perhaps these settlers included some of the outdwellers of Samos, who were now turned adrift, being obliged to quit the island and make way for the rightful possessors.

*Introduc-
tion of
property
qualifica-
tion at
Athens.*

(£80.)

SECT. 7. ARISTOTLE AND ALEXANDER

It was through an accident that Alexander was brought into contact with the one other man of his time whose genius was destined to move the world. Aristotle's father had been court physician of Amyntas II., and Aristotle was meant to follow his father's profession. At the age of seventeen he went to Athens, where he was under the guardianship of a certain Proxenus, to whose son Nicanor—the same Nicanor who made public Alexander's edict at Olympia—he afterwards betrothed his only daughter. At first Aristotle studied in the school of Isocrates, but when Plato returned from Sicily he

*Aristotle,
born 384-3.
c. 367 B.C.*

*Called to
Pella,
343-2 B.C.*

A. 335 B.C.

*Death,
322 B.C.*

*Debt of
Europe to
Aristotle.*

*Aristotle's
prejudices.*

came under the influence of that philosopher's idealism, and this decided him for the "life of speculation," which he regards—and it is the deliberate judgment of his mature years—as the only life that is perfectly happy. After Plato's death he spent some years on the north-eastern coasts of the Aegean, at Assos and Mytilene, and then received the call from Philip to undertake the education of the crown prince. As yet he had won no eminent reputation for wisdom or learning, and Philip probably chose him because his father had been connected with the Macedonian court. The instruction which Aristotle imparted to Alexander was perhaps chiefly literary and philological; he came as a tutor, not as a philosopher. We know nothing of the mutual relations between the brilliant master and his brilliant pupil; they were men of different and hardly sympathetic tempers; we may suspect that Aristotle was fainer to curb than spur the ardent straining spirit of Alexander. Certainly the episode led to no such maintenance of intimacy afterwards as it might have led to if Plato had been the teacher. On his return to Athens, Aristotle founded his school of philosophy, and the Lyceum soon took the place formerly occupied by the Academy, which ever since the discomfiting adventures in Sicily had withdrawn itself more and more from the public attention. He taught for twelve or thirteen years—and these years were doubtless the time of his most effective philosophical activity—and died not long after the death of Alexander.

Never were there more wonderful years than these in which the brains of Alexander and Aristotle were ceaselessly working. It is not an overstatement to say that there is no one to whom Europe owes a greater debt for the higher education of her peoples than to Aristotle. The science of the laws of thought is still taught mainly as he first worked it out. There are no better introductions to ethical and political speculation than his fundamental treatises on ethical and political science. Nor was it a small thing that his system controlled the acutest minds of the Middle Ages, whose reasoning faculties, though cabined by the imminence of a narrowly interpreted theology, were amazingly powerful and subtle.

But Aristotle, supreme as he was in abstract reasoning, zealous as he was in collecting and appreciating concrete facts,


was not without prejudices. As a boy, in the narrow self-satisfied community of little remote Stagira, he had imbibed the dislike which was openly or secretly felt towards Athens in all the Chalcidian regions. And, though he established his abode at Athens, he never overcame this distrust; he always remained a citizen of Stagira and lived in Athens as a stranger. This initial prejudice prevented him from ever judging with perfect impartiality the Athenian institutions, which he took as the type of democracy. He was also prejudiced against Macedonia. The Chalcidians looked upon their Macedonian neighbours as far below themselves in civilisation; and Aristotle's experience of the court of Pella, where he must have been a spectator of the scandalous quarrels between Philip and Olympias, did not create a favourable impression. He was thus disposed to hold his sympathies entirely aloof from the enterprises of Alexander. But not only did he not sympathise—he disapproved. For he was wedded to the idea of the small Greek republic; he condemned the large state. Moreover, he held firmly to the Hellenic conviction that Hellenes were superior by nature to peoples of other race, and he was thus opposed to the most original and enlightened feature of Alexander's policy—the ruling of Greeks and barbarians on an equality. Owing to this attitude of coldness and distrust towards the Macedonians, he missed a great opportunity. Alexander's expedition threw open to science a new field of discovery in natural history; and we can imagine what endless pains the king would have given himself, if Aristotle had urged him to collect extensive observations on the animal and vegetable kingdoms in the various countries and climates through which he passed.

It is a strange sensation to pass from the view of the state which Alexander was fashioning to the sketch of an ideal state which was drawn by the most thoughtful of men at the same time. Aristotle desires a little north-country city, situated in a compact, defensible territory; close to the sea and yet not on the coast, having a harbour within easy reach, but quite disconnected, so that the precincts of the city may not be contaminated and its indwellers troubled by the presence of a motley crowd of outlanders, cheapmen, and mariners, such as throng a seaport's quays. He will not have his city a centre

of trade; it is to import and export only for the purposes of its own strict needs. It is to be a tiny city, the number of the burghers so limited that each one may be able to know all about each of the others. The burghers are to have equal rights; their early manhood is to be spent on military duties; when they come to middle life they are to be eligible for political offices; in their old age they are to act as priests. Subject to this citizen aristocracy, but entirely excluded from the franchise, are to be the artisans and merchants. Part of the land is to be public—the yield to be devoted to maintaining the worship of the gods and providing the public meals of the city; part is to be the private property of the citizens; and the fields are to be tilled by slaves or labourers of non-Hellenic race. Such was the little exclusive community which Aristotle designed, while his former pupil was setting in motion schemes for world-wide commerce, shattering the barriers which sundered nation from nation, building an empire which should include millions, founding cities composed of men of divers races, hewing his way through a maze of new political problems which were beyond Aristotle's horizon. The republic of Aristotle's wish is not quickened like Plato's by striking original ideas; it is a commonplace Greek aristocracy with its claws cut, carefully trimmed and pruned, refined by a punctilious education, without any expansive vitality and like Sparta leaving no room for the free development of the individual citizens. If the cities of Hellas had been moulded and fashioned on the model of the city of the philosopher's wish, they would hardly have done what they did for European civilisation.

We may wonder whether Aristotle divined before his death that the Hellenic cities were not to have the last word in the history of men. More probably the untimely end of Alexander reassured him that the old fashion of things would soon go on again as before. The brilliant day of the Greek city states had indeed drawn to a close so suddenly that they could not be expected to grasp the fact; and no people that has ever borne the torch of civilisation has been willing, or even able, to recognise that the hour of relinquishing sovereignty has come. The Greeks may well be excused if they were reluctant to acquiesce in the vicissitude which forced them to sink into

a subordinate place. But it is thus that the austere laws of history reward the meritorious. The republics of Greece had performed an imperishable work; they had shown mankind many things, and, above all, the most precious thing in the world, fearless freedom of thought.



CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

3000 (or 3500) —2000	Early period of Aegean civilisation ; stone and copper age.
2778—2565 (?)	12th dynasty in Egypt.
2500—2000	Conjectural limits of Second City of Troy.
2000—1000	Later period of Aegean civilisation ; bronze age ("Mycenaean" in wider sense).
2000—1700	"Proto-Mycenaean" civilisation of Thera. First palace of Cnossus.
2000—1500	Conjectural limits of Third, Fourth, and Fifth Cities of Troy.
1700—1000	"Mycenaean" period, in stricter sense.
1600—1100	Limits of Sixth (Homeric) City of Troy.
1600—1300	Second palace of Cnossus. Naval power of Crete.
1600—1100	Bloom of Mycenae.
c. 1550—1500	Reign of king Thothmes (Tahutimes) III. of Egypt.
c. 1450	Reign of Amenhotep III.
13th cent.	Reign of Ramses II. (Sesostris).
c. 1200	Reign of Mernptah.
	Victory of Mernptah over Libyans and their northern allies (in his fifth year).
12th cent.	Ramses III.
1300—1000	Achaean colonisation. Fall of Troy. Beginnings of Ionian colonisation. Thessalian conquest. Boeotian conquest. Dorian conquest of Crete and islands. Dorian conquest of Eastern Peloponnesus. Colonisation of Cyprus. Beginnings of Epic poetry. The Achaean (Aeolic) "Homer" composes an Achilleid.
1000—900	Continuation of Ionian colonisation. Dorian colonisation of Asia Minor. Invention of the Greek Alphabet.
1000—700	Carians possess a sea-power. Aegean trade partly in hands of Phoenicians.
1000—900	Beginning of the supremacy of Tyre in Phoenicia.
900—800	"Homer" of Chios composes the <i>Iliad</i> . Beginnings of the city-state.
800—700	Rise of aristocracies throughout Greece.
	Beginnings of Greek colonisation.
[776	[Traditional date of First Olympiad.
735	" " foundation of Naxos (Sicily).
734	" " Coreyra.
734	" " Syracuse.
728	" " Catane and Leontini.
728	" " Megara (Hyblaeae).
721	" " Sybaris.
715	" " Zancle.
707	" " Taras.
703	" " Croton.

- B.C.
- [688 [Traditional date of foundation of Gela.
648] Himera.]
709 King Sargon of Assyria sets up stèle in Cyprus.
c. 700 Hesiod.
Midas king of Phrygia. Deiocees founds Median Monarchy.
Athenian conquest of Eleusis.
700—655 Conjectural limits of reign of Gyges king of Lydia.
683—2 List of annual archons at Athens begins.
681—68 Reign of Assarhaddon king of Assyria.
679 Assarhaddon defeats the Cimmerians under their leader Teuspa.
c. 672 Assyrian conquest of Egypt.
668—26 Reign of Assurbanipal king of Assyria.
[668 Traditional date of battle of Hysiae, in which Argos defeats Sparta.
664 Traditional date of ancient sea-battle of Corinth with Coreyra.]
664 Fortress of Defenneh (Daphnae) in Egypt built by Psammetichus I.
660—20 Conjectural limits of date of Pheidon king of Argos.
660 Foundation of Byzantium.
650—600 Age of law-givers in Greece.
Rise of tyrannies in Ionia. Foundation of tyrannies in Sicily, Corinth, and Megara.
Ardis and Sadyattes reign in Lydia. Ardis drives out the Cimmerians.
The league of Calauria.
c. 650—25 Reign of Phraortes king of Media.
648 April 6: Eclipse of the sun mentioned by Archilochus.
645 Egypt throws off yoke of Assyria.
c. 632 Cylon attempts to seize tyranny at Athens.
c. 635 Foundation of Nauclatis.
c. 630 Foundation of Cyrene.
630—600 Approximate limits of Spartan conquest of Messenia.
628 Foundation of Selinus.
625 Nabopolassar founds new Babylonian kingdom.
c. 621 Legislation of Dracon at Athens.
c. 610 Thrasybulus tyrant of Miletus.
606 Nabopolassar of Babylonia and Cyaxares of Media conquer and divide Assyria.
605 Nebucadnezar succeeds Nabopolassar.
c. 600 War of Athens and Mytilene on the coast of the Hellespont.
Sappho, Alcaeus, Pittacus, flourish at Mytilene.
Periander tyrant of Corinth.
594—89 Nubian expedition of Psammetichus II. Inscription of Greek mercenaries at Abu Simbel.
594—3 Archonship of Solon. *Seisachtheia*.
593—1 (?) Continuation of Solon's legislation.
590—89 Sacred War against Crisa.
Cleisthenes of Sicily flourishes.
c. 586. Death of Periander. Psammetichus succeeds him.
585 May 28: Eclipse of sun. Drawn battle of Cyaxares king of Media with Alyattes king of Lydia.
Thales flourishes.
583—1 Archonship of Damasias at Athens.
582 First Pythiad.
581 Foundation of Agragas.
572 Eleans win control of the Olympian games.
c. 570 Athenian conquest of Salamis.
569 Accession of Amasis to throne of Egypt.
c. 568 The *Telegony* of Egeamon of Cyrene.
562 Death of Nebucadnezar.
560 Croesus succeeds to throne of Lydia.
c. 560—50 War of Sparta with Tegea.

B.C.	
561—60	Archonship of Comeas. Pisistratus seizes tyranny.
c. 559—6	Miltiades becomes tyrant in Thracian Chersonese.
556—5	First exile of Pisistratus.
550—49	? Restoration of Pisistratus; and his second exile.
c. 550	Spartan conquest of Thyreatis.
548—7	Temple of Apollo at Delphi burnt down.
546	Cyrus king of Persia conquers Lydia, and captures Sardis.
546—5	Persian conquest of Asiatic Greeks.
540—39	Second restoration of Pisistratus.
538	Cyrus takes Babylon.
535—27	Son of Pisistratus appointed to govern Sigeum.
528—7	Death of Pisistratus.
526	Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, abandons alliance with Amasis and joins Persia.
525	Death of Amasis king of Egypt.
	Persian conquest of Egypt: battle of Pelusion.
c. 525	Spartans attack Samos.
c. 523	Death of Polycrates.
522	Death of Cambyses king of Persia.
521	Accession of Darius.
520	First capture of Babylon by Darius.
519	Second capture of Babylon by Darius.
514	Conspiracy of Harmodius and Aristogiton.
c. 512	First European expedition of Darius: conquest of Thrace.
510	Fall of the Pisistratid tyranny. Spartans in Attica. Athens joins Peloponnesian league.
	War of Sybaris and Croton.
508—7	Archonship of Isagoras. Spartans under Cleomenes invade Attica; besieged in the Acropolis. Beginning of reforms of Cleisthenes.
506	Peloponnesian army invades Attica.
	Athenians defeat (1) Boeotians, (2) Chalcidians: acquire Chalcidian plain.
506	Athens acquires Oropus (land of the Graecians).
503—2	First civil year on the Cleisthenic system.
501	Institution of the <i>Ten</i> strategoi of the tribes at Athens.
499	Outbreak of Ionic revolt.
c. 498	Athens at war with Aegina.
c. 497	Ionians and allies at Sardis: burning of Sardis.
496	(?) Revolt of Thrace; Scythians drive Miltiades from Chersonese.
494	Battle of Lade; Persians capture Miletus.
c. 494	Battle of Sêpeia (Spartans under Cleomenes defeat Argives).
493—2	Archonship of Themistocles.
c. 492	Athens coerces Aegina. Battle of the Helorus.
492	Mardonius subdues Thrace and Macedonia.
c. 491	Gelon becomes tyrant of Gela.
490	Expedition of the Persians under Datis of Greece. Destruction of Eretria. Battle of Marathon.
489	Expedition of Miltiades to Paros.
c. 489	Death of Cleomenes.
488	Victory of Gelon in chariot-race at Olympia.
487	Ostracism of Hipparchus the Pisistratid.
	War of Athens with Aegina.
487—6	Archons begin to be appointed by lot. Strategoi supersede the Polemarch.
486	Ostracism of Megacles. Pindar's 7th <i>Pythian</i> .
486—5	Egypt revolts against Persia.
485	Death of Darius. Accession of Xerxes.
484	Ostracism of Xanthippus son of Arriphron.
484—3	Persia recovers control of Egypt.
483	Persians hew canal through Mount Athos.
483—2	Discovery of a new vein of silver in mine-fields of Laurion.

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 482 Ostracism of Aristides.
 Increase of Athenian fleet. Pythian victory of Hieron in horse-race.
 481 Xerxes comes down to Sardis.
 480 Spring: Athens recalls ostracised citizens.
 August: Xerxes enters Greece. Battles of Artemisium and Thermopylae.
 September: Battle of Salamis.
 October 2: Eclipse of the sun.
 Olynthus given to the Chalcidians.
 Carthaginians invade Sicily. Battle of Himera.
 479 Mardonius in Attica. August: Battle of Plataea; and battle of Mycale. Ionians revolt from Persia.
 478 Athenians capture Sestos.
 Death of Gelon: his brother Hieron succeeds to his power.
 Pythian victory of Hieron in horse-race. *3rd Pythian Ode* of Pindar.
 478—7 Foundation of Confederacy of Delos (winter).
 478—6 Fortification of Athens.
 477—6 Pausanias at Byzantium; driven out by Cimon.
 476 Lacedaemonian expedition to Thessaly (?). Victory of Hieron in horse-race at Olympia (*1st Olymp. Ode* of Pindar; *5th Ode* of Bacchylides).
 476—5 Cimon captures Eion.
 474 Battle of Cyme.
 474—3 Cimon conquers Scyros.
 473—2 Battle of Tegea.
 472 Olympian victories of Hieron in horse-race and Theron in chariot-race. *2nd and 3rd Olympions* of Pindar. The *Persae* of Aeschylus.
 472—1 Athenians reduce Carystus. Ostracism of Themistocles.
 Death of Theron of Agragas. Synoecisms of Elis and Mantinea.
 471—70 Flight of Themistocles. Battle of Dipaea.
 War of Hieron with Thrasydaeus of Agragas.
 470 Pythian victory of Hieron in chariot-race. Pindar's *1st Pythian. 4th Ode* of Bacchylides.
 c. 469 Revolt and reduction of Naxos.
 468 Olympian victory of Hieron in chariot-race. *3rd Ode* of Bacchylides. Olympic victory of a boy of Tiryns in boxing.
 Carian and Lycian expedition of Cimon.
 Battle of the Eurymedon.
 468—7 Argos reduces Tiryns (?).
 467 Death of Hieron.
 465 Revolt of Thasos.
 465—4 Attempt to colonise the Nine Ways.
 464 Earthquake at Sparta. Revolt of helots. Siege of Ithome.
 Accession of Artaxerxes to throne of Persia.
 463 Surrender of Thasos.
 463—2 Cimon in Messenia.
 463—1 Ephialtes influential at Athens. The Areopagus deprived of its powers.
 462—60 Argos reduces Mycenae. Pay introduced at Athens for the judges of the *heliaea*. Influence of Pericles begins.
 461 Ostracism of Cimon.
 461—60 Alliance of Athens and Argos.
 459 Athens wins Megara. Long Walls of Megara built. Athenian expedition to Egypt.
 Capture of Ithome. Messenians settled at Naupactus.
 Capture of Memphis.
 459—8 Battle of Halicis. Battle of Cecryphalea.

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 458 *Oresteia* of Aeschylus. Battle of Aegina. — Battle in the Megarid.
 Building of Long Walls of Athens.
 458—7 Zeugitae admitted to archonship.
 457 Lacedaemonian expedition to Phocis and Boeotia. Battle of Tanagra.
 Athenian conquest of Boeotia (battle of Oenophyta; autumn).
 457—6 Athenian conquest of Aegina.
 456 Megabyzus arrives in Egypt with army and fleet.
 456—5 Expedition of Tolmides to Corinthian Gulf.
 454 Catastrophe of Egyptian expedition.
 454—3 Treasury of confederacy of Delos transferred from Delos to Athens.
 453 Expedition of Pericles to Corinthian Gulf.
 453—46 Inclusion of Achaean in Athenian empire.
 452—1 Thirty years' Peace between Argos and Lacedaemon. Five years' Truce between Athenians and Peloponnesians.
 451—50 Law of citizenship at Athens.
 450—49 Cimon in Cyprus. Death of Cimon.
 448 Peace with Persia. Sacred war. Athens invites the Greeks to restore the temples.
 447 Athens loses Boeotia (battle of Coronea). Cleruchies sent to the Chersonese. Euboea, etc.
 447—6 Revolt and reduction of Euboea. Athens loses Megara.
 446—5 Thirty years' Peace between Athens and Peloponnesians. Foundation of New Sybaris.
 443 Foundation of Thurii.
 443—2 Division of Athenian confederacy into five districts.
 442 Ostracism of Thucydides, son of Melesias.
 440 Revolt of Samos, and Byzantium.
 439 Reduction of Samos.
 438 Chryselephantine Athena set up in the Parthenon.
 436 Foundation of Amphipolis.
 436—5 Sedition at Epidamnus.
 435 Sea-victory of Corcyra over Corinth (spring).
 433 Defensive alliance of Athens with Corcyra. Battle of Sybota (autumn). Treaties of Athens with Rhegion and Leontini.
 433—2 Revolt of Potidaea (winter).
 432 The "Megarian decree" passed at Athens (autumn). Battle of Potidaea (c. Sept.).
 432—1 Assemblies at Sparta decide on war.
 431 *First year of the Peloponnesian War.*—Theban attack on Plataea (March). First Peloponnesian invasion of Attica (May). Athens wins Sollium and Cephallenia; takes Thronion and Atalanta; expels Aeginetans from Aegina.
 430 *Second year of the War.*—Outbreak of plague at Athens. Second invasion of Attica. Expedition of Pericles to Argolis and his failure at Epidaurus. Pericles deposed from strategia, tried, fined, and reappointed strategos. Phormio operates in the west: captures Amphiloehian Argos. Surrender of Potidaea.
 429 *Third year of the War.*—Peloponnesians besiege Plataea. Sea-victories of Phormio. Death of Pericles (autumn).
 428 *Fourth year of the War.*—Third invasion of Attica. Revolt of Mytilene.
 427 *Fifth year of the War.*—Fourth invasion of Attica. Surrender of Mytilene. Surrender of Plataea. Civil war breaks out in Corcyra. Athens captures Minoa. Expedition of Laches to Sicily.
 426 *Sixth year of the War.*—Aetolian expedition of Demosthenes. Battle of Olpae. Purification of Delos.
 425 *Seventh year of the War.*—Fifth invasion of Attica. Athenians send an expedition to Sicily. Occupation of

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- Pylos; and capture of Spartans in Sphacteria. Triumph of the democracy in Coreyra. Athens wins Anactorion, and occupies Methone. Athens raises the tribute of her allies. Introduction of the triobolon (?). *Acharnians* of Aristophanes. Antiphon's *De Choreula*. Congress of Gela.
- 424 *Eighth year of the War*.—Athens wins Oeniadae; captures Nisaea, with the Long Walls of Megara, and Cythera. Athenian invasion of Boeotia; battle of Delion. Brasidas in Thrace. Revolt of Acanthus, Amphipolis, and other cities. Banishment of Thucydides, the historian. *Knights* of Aristophanes.
- 423 *Ninth year of the War*.—Negotiations for peace. One year's truce (March). Revolt of Scione. *Clouds* of Aristophanes. Leontini annexed by Syracuse.
- 422 *Tenth year of the War*.—Battle of Amphipolis. Peace negotiations. *Wasps* of Aristophanes.
- 421 Peace of Nicias (March). *Peace* of Aristophanes. Capture of Scione.
- 421—20 Defensive alliance between Athens and Sparta.
- 420 Spartan alliance with Boeotia (Feb.). Alliance of Athens with Argos, Elis, and Mantineia (c. April). Olympic games; victory of Alcibiades in chariot-race.
- 419—8 Epidaurian war.
- 419 Alcibiades in the Peloponnesus (spring).
- 418 Peace Congress at Mantineia. Battle of Mantineia. Argos forms alliance with Sparta. Eleusinian decree.
- 417 Ostracism of Hyperbolus. Nicias in Chalcidice.
- 416 Conquest of Melos. Embassy of Segesta to Athens.
- 415 Mutilation of the Hermæ at Athens. Athenian expedition to Sicily. Recall of Alcibiades.
- 414 Spring: *Birds* of Aristophanes. Siege of Syracuse. Gylippus arrives in Sicily.
- 413 Spartans occupy Decelea. Second Athenian expedition to Sicily. Great battle in the Syracusan Harbour (Sept. 9). Disaster of the Athenians.
- 412 Revolt of Athenian allies. Treaty of Miletus (between Sparta and Persia). Alcibiades leaves Sparta.
- 411 Battle of Syme (Jan.). Revolt of Rhodes. Pisander at Athens (c. Feb.). Revolt of Abydos and Lampsacus (April). Assembly at Colonus and provision made for a new Constitution (May). Council of Four Hundred comes into office (early in June), and governs till September. Revolt of Euboea (Sept.). Four Hundred overthrown and Polity established (Sept.). Battle of Cynossema. *Lysistrata* and *Thesmophoriazusæ* of Aristophanes. Evagoras becomes king of Salamis.
- 410 Battle of Cyzicus. Restoration of Democracy at Athens. Athens recovers Thasos. [Pseudo-Lysias] *For Polystратus*.
- 409 Athens recovers Colophon; loses Pylos and Nisaea. Carthaginian invasion of Sicily. Destruction of Selinus and Himera.
- 408 Athens recovers Chalcedon and Byzantium. Gorgias at Olympia. Warfare of Hermocrates in western Sicily.
- 407 Cyrus comes down to the coast. Battle of Notion. Alcibiades at Athens. Battle of Mytilene. Death of Hermocrates. Foundation of Thermae.
- 406 Battle of Arginusæ. Trial of the Generals (c. November). Siege of Acragas.
- 406—5 Conspiracy of strawbearers at Chios.
- 405 Lysander navarch. Cyrus called to Susa. Battle of Aegospotami (end of summer).

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405	Dionysius becomes tyrant of Syracuse; and makes peace with Carthage.
405—4	Blockade of Athens.
404	Surrender of Athens. Long Walls pulled down (April). Psephism of Dracontides (summer) and rule of the Thirty. Thrasybulus seizes Phyle (Dec.). Alliance of Catane and Leontini.
404—3	First expedition of Thirty against Thrasybulus. Death of Theramenes.
403	Lacedaemonian garrison at Athens. Second expedition against Thrasybulus (May). Thrasybulus seizes Piraens. Battle of Munychia. King Pausanias at Athens. Fall of Thirty (Sept.). Recall of Lysander. Lysias' <i>Against Erastosthenes</i> . Revolt at Syracuse against Dionysius.
403—2	Archonship of Euclides.
403—400	Steel war of Dionysius. His reduction of Naxos and Catane.
401	Expedition of Cyrus. Battle of Cunaxa (summer).
400	Thimbron in Asia Minor (end of summer).
399	Dercyllidas succeeds Thimbron, and gains the Troad. War of Sparta and Elis. Death of Socrates.
398	Sparta makes truce with the satraps; sends embassy to Susa. Accession of Agesilaus. Dionysius captures Motya.
398—7	Dercyllidas in the Chersonese; takes Atarneus (397, first months).
397	Dercyllidas in Caria; makes truce with the satraps. Conon appointed commander of Persian fleet. Conspiracy of Cinadon at Sparta. Himilco's expedition to Sicily. Siege of Syracuse. Foundation of Lilybaeum.
396	First campaign of Agesilaus in Phrygia (autumn). Restoration of Messana. Acoris becomes king of Egypt.
396—3	Steel war of Dionysius.
395	Campaign of Agesilaus in Lydia. Death of Tissaphernes. Second campaign of Agesilaus in Phrygia. Revolt of Rhodes. War breaks out in Boeotia. Battle of Haliartus and death of Lysander. Accession of Agesipolis at Sparta. Athens begins to rebuild her Long Walls. Foundation of Tyndaris.
395—4	Confederation of Athens, Thebes, etc., against Sparta.
394	Battle of Corinth (July). Battle of Cnidus (Aug.). Eclipse of sun (Aug. 14). Battle of Coronea (Aug.). Foundation of Mylae.
393	Completion of Long Walls of Athens.
392	Union of Corinth and Argos. Battle of the Long Walls (of Megara). First embassy of Antalcidas to Susa. Second Punic War of Dionysius.
391	Spartans capture Lechaeon. Dionysius besieges Rhegion.
390	Agesilaus celebrates Isthmian games and captures Piraeon. Iphicrates gains a victory over Spartan hoplites. Teleutias captures an Athenian squadron. Evagoras revolts from Persia. Alliance of Athens with Evagoras and Acoris. Hecatomnus has become satrap of Caria (between 395 and 390).
390—89	Tax of $\frac{1}{4}$ th; and a war-tax introduced at Athens.
389	Successes of Thrasybulus in the Hellespont. Dionysius besieges Caulonia. Battle of the Elleporus. <i>Ecclesiastus</i> of Aristophanes.
388	Death of Thrasybulus (first months). Warfare of Anaxibius and Iphicrates in the Hellespont.
388—7	Second mission of Antalcidas to Susa.
387	Capture of Rhegion by Dionysius. Chabrias sent to help Evagoras.

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 387—6 The King's Peace.
 386 Evagoras defeated at Cition. Chabrias in Egypt.
 386—4 Persian siege of Cypriote Salamis.
 386—5 Breaking up of Mantinea.
 384 Speech of Lysias at Olympic games (July-Aug.). Orontes makes peace with Evagoras.
 384—2 Formation of the Chalcidian Confederacy.
 383—78 Third Punic War of Dionysius.
 383 Death of Acoris.
 382 Spartans seize citadel of Thebes (summer).
 382—1 Restoration of Plataea.
 381 Defeat of Spartans at Olynthus. Siege of Phlius begins. Persia concludes Peace with Evagoras. Accession of Nektanebos I. in Egypt.
 380 Accession of king Cleombrotus at Sparta. Olympic games for which Isocrates wrote his *Panegyric*.
 379 Suppression of Chalcidian League. Battles of Cabala and Cronion in Sicily.
 379—8 Spartans expelled from Theban citadel (winter). Raid of Sphodrias.
 378 Alliance of Athens with Thebes. Boeotia invaded by Agesilaus. Iphicrates in Thrace; his marriage (?). Peace of Syracuse with Carthage.
 378—7 Foundation of Second Athenian Confederacy. Property tax at Athens.
 377 Boeotia invaded by Agesilaus. Defeat of Phoebeidas. Mausolus becomes satrap of Caria.
 376 Battle of Naxos. Western expedition of Timotheus. Rebellion at Delos. Iphicrates in Persian service.
 375 Battle of Tegyra.
 375—3 Iphicrates and Pharnabazus in Egypt. Jason of Pherae a member of Athenian League.
 374 Peace between Athens and Sparta. Death of Evagoras; accession of Nicoteles.
 374—3 Peace broken. Lacedaemonians at Coreyra.
 373 Iphicrates sent to Coreyra. Trial of Timotheus. Earthquakes in Greece; destruction of temple of Delphi (?).
 372 Destruction of Plataea (first months).
 371 Peace of Callias (June). Battle of Leuctra (July). Accession of Agesipolis II. at Sparta.
 371—69 Foundation of Arcadian League, and of Megalopolis.
 370 [Epaminondas a Boeotarch.] Rebuilding of Mantinea. Death of Jason of Pherae. Accession of Cleombrotus II. at Sparta.
 370—69 First Boeotian invasion of Peloponnesus.
 369 [Epaminondas a Boeotarch.] Foundation of Messene (first months). Alliance of Athens and Sparta (spring). Second Boeotian invasion of Peloponnesus. First Thessalian expedition of Pelopidas.
 369—8 Murder of Alexander of Macedon, and intervention of Iphicrates.
 368 Heraclea and Orchomenus join Arcadian League. Congress of Delphi (summer). Tearless Battle. Euphron tyrant of Sicyon. Second Thessalian expedition of Pelopidas, and his captivity. First expedition to rescue him. Fourth Punic war of Dionysius.
 367 [Epaminondas a Boeotarch.] Greek envoys at Susa. Second expedition to rescue Pelopidas. Death of Dionysius I. Ariobarzanes revolts from Persia.
 366 Third Boeotian invasion of Peloponnesus. Thebans seize Oropus. Alliance of Athens with Arcadia. Death of Lycomedes. Timotheus in eastern Aegean. Isocrates' *Archidamus*.
 366—5 Partial peace in Peloponnesus.

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 365 Timotheus wins Samos. Murder of Macedonian regent Ptolemy. Timotheus wins Potidaea and other towns of Chalcidian region. War breaks out between Arcadia and Elis.
 364 [Epaminondas a Boeotarch.] Naval expedition of Epaminondas. Third Thessalian expedition of Pelopidas. Eclipse of sun, July 13. Battle of Cynoscephalae. Destruction of Orchomenus. Pisatans celebrate Olympian games; battle in the Altis. Athens obtains Sestos. Timotheus besieges Amphipolis.
 363 Timotheus recovers Byzantium. Nektanebos I. succeeded by Tachos.
 363—2 Timotheus again besieges Amphipolis. Revolts of satraps against Persia.
 362 [Epaminondas a Boeotarch.] Battle of Mantinea. Athenian fleet sent to Hellespont. Ariobarzanes crucified.
 361 Agesilaus in Egypt. Accession of Nektanebos II. Battle of Peparethus.
 361—60 Death of Agesilaus (?).
 360—59 Death of king Cotys, and division of Thrace.
 359 Death of Perdiccas and accession of Amyntas.
 358 Victories of Philip over Paeonians and Illyrians. Death of Artaxerxes II.; accession of Artaxerxes III. Ochus.
 357 Athens recovers the Chersonese and Euboea. Philip captures Amphipolis. Revolt of Chios, Cos, and Rhodes from Athens. Death of Chabrias. Dion returns to Sicily.
 356 Illyrian victory of Philip. Battle of Embata. Phocians seize Delphi. Revolt of Artabazus and Orontes. Arrival of Nypsius at Syracuse.
 356—5 Philip captures Pydna and Potidaea. Birth of Alexander. Composition of Xenophon's *De Vectigalibus*.
 355 Chares in Asia Minor; defeats Tithraustes. Isocrates' *De Pace*. Trial of Timotheus and Iphicrates (?).
 355—4 Peace of Athens with Rhodes, Cos, etc. Isocrates' *Areopagiticus*.
 354 Battle of Neon. Death of Philomelus. Murder of Dion.
 354—3 Demosthenes' *On the Symmories*. Tyranny of Callippus at Syracuse.
 354—50 Eubulus in charge of the Theoric Fund.
 353 Philip captures Methone. Power of Onomarchus in Thessaly. Eubulus hinders Philip from attacking Phocis. Demosthenes' *For the Megalopolitans*. Death of Mausolus. Demosthenes' *For the Freedom of the Rhodians*.
 353—1 Hipparinus tyrant of Syracuse.
 352 Cersobleptes of Thrace submits to Macedon. Demosthenes' *Against Aristocrates*. Artabazus flees to Macedonia, and Artaxerxes makes peace with Orontes.
 351 Revolt of Phoenicia against Persia; revolt in Cyprus. Demosthenes' *First Philippic*. Idrieus succeeds Artemisia in Caria. Nysaeus becomes tyrant at Syracuse.
 350 Phocion in Cyprus helping to suppress revolt.
 349 Phocion in Euboea. Philip reduces Chalcidice. Alliance of Athens with Olynthus. Demosthenes' *Olynthiacs*.
 348 Euboea acknowledged independent. Philip captures Olynthus.
 347 First Athenian embassy to Philip (end of year). Death of Plato.
 346 The Peace of Philocrates. Second embassy to Philip (spring). Philip at Thermopylae. The Phocians crushed. Philip presides at Pythian games. Demosthenes' *De Pace*. Isocrates' Letter to Philip. Second tyranny of Dionysius II.
 346—5 Demosthenes impeaches Aeschines. Aeschines' *Against Timarchus*.
 345—3 Persia recovers Egypt.

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 344 Demosthenes in the Peloponnesus. His *Second Philippic*.
 Timoleon sails for Sicily. Battle of Hadranum.
 343 Impeachments of Philocrates and Aeschines.
 King Archidamus II. sails to Italy.
 343—2 Alliance of Megara with Athens. Philip in Epirus. Aristotle
 goes to Macedonia as tutor of Alexander.
 342—1 Philip's conquest of Thrace.
 341 Athens sends Diopieithes to the Chersonese. Demosthenes'
On the Chersonese, and *Third Philippic*. Demosthenes at
 Byzantium. The Euboic League.
 340 Sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium. Naval reform at Athens.
 Violent proceedings at Amphictionic Council (autumn).
 339 Thracian expedition of Philip. Amphictions determine to make
 war on Amphissa.
 Battle of the Crimisus.
 338 Philip descends into Greece. His campaign in Phocis and
 Locris. Battle of Chaeronea (Aug.).
 Philip in the Peloponnesus. Synedriion of Corinth. Death of
 Isocrates. Battle of Mandonia.
 338—7 Murder of Artaxerxes Ochus and accession of Arsēs.
 338—4 Lycurgus minister of finance at Athens.
 337 Second meeting of Synedriion of the Greeks at Corinth.
 336 Macedonian forces sent into Asia Minor. Murder of Philip and
 accession of Alexander (summer).
 Alexander's first descent into Greece; his election as general of
 the Greeks.
 335 Alexander's campaign in Thrace and Illyria, and his second
 descent into Greece. Destruction of Thebes (Oct.). Accession
 of Darius III. Codomannus. Memnon opposes the Macedo-
 nians in Asia Minor. Aristotle begins his teaching at Athens.
 334 Alexander starts on his expedition against Persia (spring).
 Battle of the Granicus (Thargelion). Conquest of Lydia.
 Siege of Miletus. Siege of Halicarnassus. Expedition of
 Alexander of Epirus to Italy.
 334—3 Conquest of Lycia, Pamphylia, Pisidia.
 333 Alexander at Gordion. Conquest of Cilicia. Battle of Issus (Nov.).
 332 Siege of Tyre (Jan.-July). Submission of Syria and Judaea.
 Siege of Gaza (Oct.). Conquest of Egypt.
 331 Foundation of Alexandria. Submission of Cyrene. Lunar
 eclipse, Sept. 20; battle of Gaugamela (Oct. 1). Alexander
 at Babylon (Oct.); at Susa (Dec.). Battle of Megalopolis.
 331—30 Battle of Pandosia.
 330 Alexander in Persis (Jan.-April); at Ecbatana. Death of
 Darius (July). Conquest of Hyrcania, Areia, and Drangiana.
 Foundation of Alexandria Areion and Prophtasia. Execu-
 tion of Philotas and Parmenio.
Aeschines' Against Ctesiphon and Demosthenes' *On the Crown*.
Lycurgus' Against Leocrates.
 330—29 Alexander winters in Drangiana.
 329 Partial submission of Gedrosia. Conquest of Arachosia.
 Foundation of the Arachosian Alexandria.
 329—8 Alexander winters in the Cabul region. Foundation of
 Alexandria under Caucasus.
 328 Alexander comes to the Hindu-Kush; conquers Bactria and
 Sogdiana. Foundation of Alexandria Eschate.
 328—7 Alexander winters at Zariaspa.
 327 Alexander at Samarcand (first months); murder of Clitus.
 Conquest of eastern Sogdiana.
 Alexander marries Roxane. Conspiracy of the pages and
 execution of Callisthenes.
 Alexander recrosses the Hindu-Kush, and prepares for Indian
 expedition.

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327—6	Winter campaigns in the Kunar, Chitral, and Swat regions.
326	Alexander crosses the Indus. Battle of the Hydaspes. Conquest of the Punjab.
325	Conquest of the Malli. Foundation of towns on the Lower Indus. Alexander sails in the Indian Ocean. His march through Gedrosia (Aug.-Oct.). Voyage of Nearchus (Oct.-Dec.).
324	Macedonian mutiny at Opis. Alexander at Ecbatana. Death of Hephaestion. Harpalus in Greece (spring). Restoration of exiles proclaimed at Olympic games (July-Aug.). Harpalus' trial at Athens; speeches of Hypereides and Dinarchus.
324—3	Subjugation of the Cossaeans.
323	Alexander at Babylon. Funeral of Hephaestion (May). Death of Alexander (June 13). Greece revolts against Macedonia.
323—2	Siege of Lamia.
322	Battle of Crannon. Funeral oration of Hypereides. Change of the Athenian Constitution. Death of Demosthenes (Oct.). Death of Aristotle. Death of Lycurgus (?).



NOTES AND REFERENCES

VOL. I

[The following notes are partly illustrative, partly justificatory. Only in the case of the first sections of Chapter I., where the material is chiefly archaeological, is a select bibliography given. The following abbreviations are used :—

C.I.G. = Boeckh's *Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum*.

C.I.A. = *Corpus Inscriptionum Atticarum*.

Hicks = E. L. Hicks, *Manual of Greek Historical Inscriptions*.

Ditt. = W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum* (Ditt.² = 2nd ed. vol. 1).]

INTRODUCTORY

P. 3.—The Aegean: In the ice-age the Aegean and Pontic regions appear to have exhibited a form very different from that which they present now. The Black Sea and the Caspian Sea were connected, both extending further north (the Euxine into Bessarabia, and the Caspian into the Ural and Volga basins). The Bosphorus and Hellespont mark roughly the direction of a great river which carried off the water of this Ponto-Caspian Sea. The northern part of the Aegean, to the southern Cyclades, was then land, through which this river flowed. It is supposed that its course is marked by the straits between Euboea and Andros, and that it reached the sea between the Peloponnesus and the Cyclades. The beginning of the change was the intrusion northward of the Aegean (= southern half of our Aegean), gradually cutting off "North Aegaeis" (as Dr. Philippson has proposed to call the hypothetical land corresponding to the northern half of our Aegean) from Asia Minor, but leaving the Cyclades attached to Greece, which would then have been of three times its present size. The further changes would have been posterior to the ice-age, and to the appearance of "European man" upon the scene. See F. Ratzel, in the *Berichte der Kön. sächs. Ges. der Wissenschaften*, xxv., 1900, pp. 36 *sqq.* and the map appended.

P. 4.—The Sahara Desert: Northern Sahara was originally habitable: Zittel, *Die Sahara*, in *Palaeontographica*, xxx. 38 *sqq.*, Ratzel, *loc. cit.* 50 *sqq.*

CHAPTER I

P. 8, *Sect. 1.*—Sources: architectural remains *in situ* and objects in Museums.—Modern expositions and researches: Sergi, *Origine e distribuzione della stirpe mediterranea*, 1876; Perrot and Chipiez, *Histoire de l'Art: vi. La Grèce pré-historique*, 1895; S. Reinach, *Chroniques d'Orient*, 1891-6; J. L. Myres, *Prehistoric Man in the Eastern Mediterranean* (with good bibliography), in *Science Progress*, July 1896, Jan. and July 1898. For Crete, and Aegean systems of writing: A. J. Evans, *Cretan Pictographs*, 1895; and *Further Discoveries of*

Cretan and Aegean Script, in *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 1898; the Palace of Knossos, summary report of the Excavations of 1900, in *Annual of British School at Athens*, vi. (1899-1900). For Amorgos and Cyclades: Dümmler, *Athenische Mittheilungen*, xi. 1886. For Melos: Cecil Smith, *Excavations in Melos*, 1897, in *Annual of British School at Athens*, iii. (1896-97); papers by other writers, *ib.*; Hogarth, Mackenzie, and Edgar, *Excavations in Melos*, 1898, *ib.* iv. (1897-98). For Troy: Schliemann, *Ilios* 1881, *Troja* 1884; Schuchhardt, *Schliemann's Excavations* (E.T.), 1891.

P. 8.—The Aegean race = the Pelasgians. The Greeks knew of their fore-runners as the Pelasgians (Herodotus viii. 44; cp. Thucydides i. 3; Pelasgia = Greece, Herod. ii. 56); and the name has recently been revived and justified by Professor Ridgeway. We may, I think, conveniently and appropriately use the name, without committing ourselves to the view that the Aegean peoples, whom we designate by it, themselves used it as a common designation. In any case we should distinguish settlements which were Pelasgian in a special and stricter sense, namely: in Epirus (cp. *Zeῦ ἀνα Δωδωναίῃ Πελασγικῇ*, Homer, *Il.* xvi. 223), Thessaly (cp. the name *Pelasgiotis*, and the Homeric *Πελασγικὸν Ἄργος*), Attica, and Crete. I suggest that the Greek invaders, first coming in contact with the Pelasgians of Epirus and Thessaly, applied the name to all the kindred peoples of Greece and the Aegean.

While the conclusion urged in this book that the authors of Aegean (pre-Mycenaean and Mycenaean) civilisation were an "indigenous" race distinct from the "Achaean" invaders, agrees with that of Professor Ridgeway (Early Age of Greece, vol. i.), we differ as to the identity of this race, the Pelasgians, and of the Achaeans. Professor Ridgeway holds that the Pelasgians were a Greek-speaking people, and propounds the novel theory that the Achaeans were Celts. This reconstruction does away with a Greek conquest of Greece altogether, or banishes it to such a remote period of the unknown past that it has no significance for the historian. For some criticisms on Mr. Ridgeway's theory see Monro, *Homer's Odyssey*, xiii.-xxiv (1900), p. 486 *sqq.*

P. 8.—Pre-Hellenic names on both sides of the Aegean: Kretschmer, *Einleitung in die Geschichte der griechischen Sprache*, pp. 401 *sqq.*

P. 9.—Twelfth dynasty in Egypt: This dynasty, which endured about 200 years, is placed by some in the third, by others in the second, quarter of the third millennium (2778-2565 B.C.; Petrie, *History of Egypt*, vol. ii.).

P. 9.—Melos: The early importance of Melos was probably due to its production of obsidian. At Phylákopi, in the north of the island, the British excavations have explored four settlements: the earliest unwall'd; the second and third "pre-Mycenaean" fortresses; the fourth "Mycenaean." The continuity of Aegean civilisation can be studied on this site.

P. 10.—Crete: Phaestus, on the south coast of Crete, was, like Knossos, a strong fortress in the "pre-Mycenaean," as well as in the "Mycenaean" period. It is being excavated by Dr. Halbherr and Italian archaeologists. [For a short account of their discoveries see R. C. Bosanquet, in the *Journal of Hell. Studies*, xxi. pp. 337-8 (1901).]

P. 10.—For the identification of the Early Palace at Knossos with the Labyrinth, see A. J. Evans, *Palace of Knossos*, 32-3, and *Mycenaean Tree and Pillar Cult*, 8-13. *Labyr-inthos* may be most simply explained as the pre-Greek name of the palace, formed (with the local termination *-inthos* that appears in *Kor-inthos*, etc.) from *labyr*, which might be presumed as the Cretan form, corresponding to the Carian (Lydian) *labrys*, "double-axe," from which *Labraundos*, the name of the Carian Zeus, seems to be derived. In the same way the Carian seat of the worship of this god of the double axe was called *Labranda*.

P. 10.—For the Egyptian figure of diorite, and its date, see the Archaeological Report of the Egypt Exploration Fund for 1900, and A. J. Evans, *Palace of Knossos*, p. 27.

P. 11.—Jade: Compare Schliemann, *Ilios*, 240. But the circumstance that unexpected beds of jadite have been recently found in the Alps must encourage us to be cautious in admitting such inferences as certain. Compare G. Piolti, *Sulla presenza della iadite nella valle di Susa* (in the *Accad. reale della scienza di Torino*, 1899).

P. 11, *Seet. 2.*—Sources: Architectural remains on sites and objects in Museums,

especially in the National Museum at Athens. Modern expositions and researches: Schliemann, Mycenae 1878, Ithica 1879, Orchomenos 1881, Tiryns 1886; Schuchhardt, *op. cit.*; Dörpfeld, Troja, 1893; Tsuntas, *Μυκῆναι καὶ Μυκηναϊὸς πολιτισμός*, 1893; Tsountas and Manatt, *The Mycenaean Age*, 1897; Perrot and Chipiez, *op. cit.*; Furtwängler and Löschke: Myken. Thongefässe 1879, Myken. Vasen 1886; Notices in the *Ἐφημερίς ἀρχαιολογική*, the *Revue archéologique*, and other archaeological journals. Evans, the Palace of Knossos (see above), and Goulas, the city of Zeus (in *Ann. Brit. School at Athens*, ii. (1895-96). A. S. Murray, A. H. Smith, and H. B. Walters, *Excavations in Cyprus*, 1900; Myres and Richter, *Catalogue of the Cyprus Museum*, 1899. Frazer's *Pausanias*, vol. iii., in reference esp. to Tiryns and Mycenae; and various notices in other vols.; Ridgeway, *Early Age of Greece*, vol. i., 1901; H. R. Hall, *The Oldest Civilization of Greece*, 1901.

P. 14, *note*.—Baetyl-worship: see Evans, *Mycenaean Tree and Pillar Cult*, 1901.—In regard to the pre-Hellenic religion of Greece, it may be observed that at least two of the great Olympian gods of the Hellenes were of pre-Hellenic origin, Artemis and Poseidon. For Artemis, see Farnell's *Cults of the Greek States*, vol. ii. chap. 13. The worship of Poseidon is used as a test of the Pelasgian element in Ridgeway's *Early Age of Greece*.

P. 15.—The hall of the women at Tiryns: This identification—it is not quite certain—is due to Dr. Dörpfeld.

P. 16.—The round beehive tombs are found not only in Greece but in various parts of western Europe, even in its north-western extremity at Newgrange. But no certain historical inferences have yet been drawn. A map by J. L. Myres (after Sergi), showing roughly where chambered tombs have been discovered in Europe and the Mediterranean regions, will be found in *Science Progress*, July 1898.

[P. 18.—Linear Aegean signs have been found inscribed on clayware in the third settlement at Phylakopi (*Ann. of British School*, iv. p. 12).]

P. 20.—The possible significance of the hieroglyphic documents of clay is briefly discussed by Evans, *Palace of Knossos*, 62. He suggests the alternatives of Knossian overlordship over the cities of Eastern Crete (Praesus, Itannus, etc.), or the revival of the Eteocretan element at Cnossus, and rise to power of an Eteocretan sovereign.

P. 20.—Iron: in the first year's excavations at Cnossus only a single piece of iron was found, "a finely-shaped nail, with a flat ornamental top decorated with a typical Mycenaean rosette." Thus in the age of the great palace iron was only coming in for ornamental purposes. Evans, *op. cit.* 96. The iron age began in Cyprus before it began in Greece, see below, *note* on p. 29.

P. 20.—Armour: For the Mycenaean shield: Reichel, *Ueber homerische Waffen*. For the spearmen on the gravestone discovered a few years ago in the lower town of Mycenae, see Tsuntas, *Ἐφημερίς ἀρχαιολογική*, 1896, 1 *sqq.*

P. 22.—Mycenae perhaps not a centre of manufacture of pottery: cp. S. Wide, *Ath. Mittheil.* 1896.

P. 22.—The "proto-Mycenaean" civilisation of Thera: Fouqué, *Santorin* (*Arch. des Missions*, sér. 2. iv.).

P. 24, *note* 1.—Occurrence in Nubia (Kasr Ibrim and Wadi Halfa) of design of ceiling of Orchomenus tomb: oral communication of Professor Mahaffy.

P. 24.—Castle of Gla: De Ridder, *Bull. de corr. hell.* 1894, 271 *sqq.*; Noack, *Ath. Mitth.* 1894, 405 *sqq.*

P. 27.—Chronology: The scarcity of silver compared with gold is another argument for placing the Mycenaean age before 1000 B.C.: Ridgeway, *op. cit.* p. 78.

P. 28.—Mycenaean pottery in Egypt: Petrie, *Journal Hell. Studies*, xii. 199 *sqq.*

P. 28.—"Men of Aegean type": On the wall-paintings of the tombs of Rekhmara, near Thebes, belonging to the reign of Thothmes III. (16th century). The inscription states that the vases are presented to the king by "kings of the country of the Keftu and the islands" of the sea. The conjecture (see W. Max Müller, *Asien und Europa*, p. 348) that some of these Keftu are from Aegean regions has received confirmation from their close resemblance to figures in frescoes of the palace of Cnossus.

P. 28.—Egyptian evidence: (4) Scarabs of Thothmes III. have been found by Prof. Waldstein at the Herneum: Ridgeway, *ib.* p. 75.—New chronological evidence, pointing further back than the 18th dynasty, has been discovered (1901) in the palace of Minos: an Egyptian cartouche of a king of the Hyksos period, on an alabastron.

P. 28.—Strictly speaking, objects with the name of Amenhotep III. furnish only a major limit of time; and if only one such object had been found, or if all the objects had been found in one grave, we could not safely draw any further conclusion than that the area of the Mycenaean civilisation was subsequent to the accession of Amenhotep. The cogency of the chronological argument rests on the circumstance that these objects have been found in different graves, and so far apart as Mycenae, Ialysus, and Cyprian Salamis. It would be hard to account for this on the theory, say, that the Mycenaean aera did not begin till the thirteenth century.

P. 29.—Cyprus: The importance of the Mycenaean element in Cyprus (*c.* 1500-1200 B.C.) is proved by the British Museum excavations (see above, list of works to sect. 2), the significance of which has been brought out by A. J. Evans in a paper on Mycenaean Cyprus, in the *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, 30, 1900. In the tombs excavated at Curion, Enkomi, etc., iron is almost entirely absent. Now the iron age began earlier in Cyprus than in the Aegean, owing to its close relations with Syria, where the working of iron seems to have been practised in the middle of the second millennium. It has been supposed (from Assyrian evidence) that the iron age in Cyprus began about 1200 B.C. This would give a lower limit for the date of the tombs. Evans, *op. cit.* 217-9.

P. 29, note 1.—Marsh-dwellers and lake-dwellers: theory of Professor Tsuntas.

P. 32.—Leleges and Carians: Homer, *Iliad*, x. 429; Herodotus i. 171; Philip of Theangela, fr. 1 (F.H.G. iv.). Leleges in Greece: Hesiodic Catalogue, fr. 136, ed. Kinkel; Pausanias i. 44. 3, iii. 1. 1, iv. 36. 1; Paton and Myres, *Journal Hell. Studies*, 1896, 264 *sqq.*

P. 32, note.—Tyrsenes: Thucydides, iv. 109, accepts the tradition of Tyrsenian settlers in Lemnos and Attica, and identifies them as Pelasgians. For Creston (in Mygdonia in Thrace), see Herodotus, i. 57, v. 5. There is no reason to suspect his information that the inhabitants of Creston and those of Placie (and Scylace) on the Hellespont spoke the same language, which was unintelligible to their neighbours, and his inference that it was "Pelasgian"—that is, the language of a pre-Hellenic population of the Aegean regions—is perfectly reasonable, and doubtless perfectly correct. The inscription discovered in Lemnos, in a non-Greek language (which seems akin to Etruscan; Pauli, *Eine vorgriechische Inschrift auf Lemnos*, 1886), confirms the statement of Thucydides, that the Lemnians were Tyrsenians. But they must have settled in Lemnos in post-Homeric times, for in Homer the inhabitants of Lemnos are Sintians—a Thracian people (*Σιντιες*, *Iliad* i. 594, *Odyssey* viii. 294; *Σιντιοί*, Thucyd. ii. 98). If we take into account the statement of Herodotus that there were "Pelasgians" speaking the same language in the neighbourhood of Cyzicus, the most natural view seems to be that Tyrsenes from the north-west of Asia Minor occupied Lemnos (*cp.* Busolt, *Gr. Geschichte*, i.² 176). They were a people of pirates: see Homeric Hymn to Dionysus, 8.

ib.—Creston: Herod. i. 57: In my first ed. I accepted the reading of Dionysius Halic. i. 29, *Κροστία*, but now think that the *Miss.* may be right, notwithstanding E. Meyer, *Philologus*, 48, 482, and Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* i.² 173.

P. 33.—Heraeum: It has been suggested recently (by Professor Waldstein) that the Heraeum was the site of an independent settlement in the heroic age.

P. 34.—Traditions of Minos: Homer, *Il.* xiii. 449, xiv. 322; *Od.* xix. 178; Thucydides, i. 4; Plutarch, *Life of Theseus*, 15-19; Diodorus, iv. 60-62. In the *Iliad*, Idomeneus, grandson of Minos, is leader of the "Cretans": *cp.* iv. 265, xiii. 219.

P. 34.—Sea-power of Crete: Thucydides i. 4. It seems by no means improbable that there is some historical truth behind the legend which represents Attica as tributary to Minos (Sappho, in *Post. Lyr. Gr.* iii. fr. 144; Bacchylides,

15; Plato, *Phaedo*, 58; Plutarch and Diodorus *loc. cit.*). If any historical reality is hidden under the mythical figure of Theseus, he may represent the deliverer of Attica from Cretan overlordship.

P. 35.—Cave of Diete: excavated in 1900 by D. G. Hogarth. See his account in *Annual of British School*, vi.—For the cave of Zeus in Mt. Ida, with which Minos was also associated, see Halbherr and Orsi, in *Museo Italiano*, ii. 689 *sqq.* (1888). The objects found in this cave seem not to have been older than the 8th century.

P. 35.—Cnossus: For Chronology of the Cnossian palaces, see Evans, *Palace of Knossos*, 63 *sqq.*

P. 35.—Amber: West-Baltic amber, between mouths of Elbe and Oder. (East Baltic amber did not find its way to the Mediterranean till a far later date.) It was exchanged for gold and bronze, and probably reached the Mediterranean at the head of the Adriatic Sea, travelling up the Elbe and through Pannonia or Noricum. In Homer we find the Phoenicians trading in amber, and they are supposed to have imported it by sea-route direct from the North Sea. There seems also to have been an intermediate land-route by the Rhine, Liguria, and the Po. See Schrader, *Reallexikon der indogermanischen Altertumskunde*, sub Bernstein.

Pp. 23 and 35.—Influence of Egypt on Aegean civilisation: cp. A. J. Evans, *The Eastern Question in Anthropology*, address at British Association, 1896.

P. 35, *note*.—Homer, *Od.* xix. 175.

P. 35.—*πῆλεος*: Ssk. *paraçu*, Assy. *pilakku*, Kretschmer, *op. cit.* 61. Schrader thinks that this word may have already been borrowed from Mesopotamia in the Indo-Germanic period; and he finds another instance of a similar loan in Sanskrit *lōha*=Lat. *raudus*=Slavon. *ruda*, from Sumerian *urud*, copper (*Reallexikon der indogerm. Altertumskunde*, p. 55). Another alleged instance of Babylonian influence on the Indo-Germans is the partial introduction of a sexagesimal numerical system (the Babylonian system was sexagesimal), which traverses their original decimal system. See J. Schmidt, *Die Urheimat der Indogermanen und das europäische Zahlssystem*, 1890.

Sect. 4, 5, and 6.—Chief Sources: *Primary*: Homer; Hesiod's *Theogony*; fragments of Cyclic and Hesiodic poems. *Derivative*: (1) fragments of Hecataeus, Acusilaus, Charon, Pherecydes of Athens, Hellanicus; Herodotus; Thucydides i. 1-21; (2) fragments of Ephorus; Diodorus Siculus; Strabo; Pausanias.

P. 37.—It does not follow that they all came of Aryan stock.—The point here insisted on is that there is no proof that the invaders were pure Aryans. The probability is that a considerable period elapsed between the time when the "Greek" branch left the common Indo-Germanic territory (extending from the Carpathians to the Caspian) and the time when they appeared in Epirus and Thessaly; and it would be difficult to show that in that period they did not, on the stages of their journey to their ultimate homes, mingle with pre-Aryan populations, just as afterwards they mingled with the pre-Aryan population of Greece.

P. 37.—That the Greeks of history were not a pure Aryan race, but a mixture of Aryan and Aegean (or, if we choose to use the name in a wide connotation, "Pelasgian") elements, is a certain conclusion to which all the evidence points. It accords with the indications of Hellenic tradition, with the physical type of the Greeks, and with the immense social and religious influence (becoming more and more apparent) exerted by the pre-Hellenic inhabitants upon the customs and institutions of the invaders. In different parts of Greece the predominance of one element or the other varied, and the pre-Hellenic influence was accordingly greater or less. In Attica there is every reason to believe that it was exceptionally powerful, and the secret of the artistic genius of Athens is probably to be sought here.—An interesting confirmation of the view that the Greek type is to be explained by the admixture of the pre-Hellenic race has been discovered in the palace of Cnossus. It is a fresco-painting, the life-size figure of a handsome youth, bearing a vessel,—evidently a cup-bearer. His features approximate to the classical Greek type (a reproduction was published in the *Monthly Review* for Jan. 1901). The technique shows "an artistic advance which in historic Greece was not reached till the fifth century before our era, some eight

or nine centuries later than the date of this Knossian fresco" (Evans, Palace of Knossos, 16).

P. 37.—Complexion : cp. Ridgeway, *op. cit.* i. 282 *sqq.*

P. 38.—Homs of Greek invaders ; cp. Kretschmer, *op. cit.*

P. 38.—Arcadia : It has been suggested that Arcades originally meant "Bear-men" (*ἀρκτος*).

P. 40.—Autochthony : of Attica, see below, note on p. 173 ; of Arcadia : Herod. i. 146, ii. 171, viii. 73 ; inscription in Ath. Mith. xiv. p. 17 ; (no change in its inhabitants) Thuc. i. 2.

P. 41.—Greek dialects : cp. the suggestive essay of Collitz, *Die Verwandtschaftsverhältnisse der griechischen Dialekte*, 1885.

P. 42.—Aeolians of Aetolia : Thucydides iii. 102 ; Strabo x. 3. 4. But the view may also be maintained that all the Aeolians, both those who gave their name to the Aeolian colonisation and those of Aetolia, were inhabitants originally of Thessaly ; and that their name (cp. the similar fate of *Hellenes*) afterwards disappeared in that country. Aeolians in Thessaly : cp. Herod. vii. 93.

P. 42, note 2.—The etymological connexion of *Achaean* with *Aeolian* is a view of Fick.

P. 42 *sqq.*—Aeolian settlements : Herod. i. 149 ; Strabo xiii. 1. 2-4 ; 3. 3-6.

P. 43.—The historical significance of Briseis : Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Homerische Untersuchungen*, pp. 409 *sqq.*

P. 44 *sqq.*—Ionian settlements : Herod. i. 143 *sqq.* Ionians in Argolis : cp. Herod. viii. 73 ; Strabo, viii. 6. 15 ; Ionian population in Troezen : Busolt, i. 218. The statement of Herodotus that the Ionians were Pelasgians, who were driven out of Peloponnesian Achaea by the Achaeans, is accepted by Ridgeway (*op. cit.* p. 95). —For another view of the original Javones, see Bury, *English Historical Review*, April 1900.

P. 46.—The view here put forward that the Ionian colonisation began during the heroic age, and not after the Dorian invasion, is shared by E. Meyer.

P. 47.—Magnesia : On the origin of the Magnesians, Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Hermes*, 1895, 177 *sqq.*

P. 47, note 1.—Ionian dialect : cp. Hoffmann, *Der ionische Dialekt*, 1898.

P. 48.—Peoples of the north who invaded Egypt : cp. W. Max Müller, *Asien und Europa*, 354-386. (1) Among the peoples whom Ramses II. mentions as allies of the Hittites are the Ruku, the Dard-n-y, the Yeranna, the Karakiša, the Pidasa. It has been proposed to explain the first three as Lycians, Dardanians, Ionians ; the Pidasa have been brought into connexion with Pedasa, and the Karakiša, I believe, with Coracesion. There can be very little doubt that they are all to be sought in Asia Minor, and it may be admitted that the Ruku represents the Lycians, or perhaps had a wider connotation (cp. Lyc-aonia). (2) The allies of the Libyans who invaded Egypt in the fifth year of Merneptah, son of Ramses II., and were utterly defeated by him, are named as Aqayvaša, Ruku, Turuša, Šakaruša, and Sardena. They are described as "northlanders" and "from the lands of the sea" ; and the names were explained by De Rougé as Achaeans, Lycians, Tyrsenians, Sicels, and Sardinians. The identification of the Šakaruša with the Sicels has been generally condemned, but the others are upheld by many scholars. The name of the Sardena (who appear under Ramses II. as a royal bodyguard) is probably the same as that of the Sardinians, the chief argument for the identity being the curious double-horned helmet common to both. But there is no reason to believe that they came to Egypt from Sardinia ; it is rather to be supposed that at a subsequent time they gave their name to Sardinia. Their original home is presumably to be sought in Asia Minor. (3) Under Ramses III. "the islands were unquiet," and Egypt was threatened on its eastern frontier by Purasati, Takira, Šakaruša, Danona, Šardena, and Vašš of the sea. Champollion's identification of the Purasati with the Philistines is possible ; the equation of Danona with Danaoi has won some adherents ; and a connexion of the Vašš (or Uashasha) with Iasos has been suggested. H. R. Hall, who discusses the question in his *Oldest Civilization of Greece*, suggests that the Uashasha are the people of Oaxos in Crete.

P. 48.—The Homeric poems : Their Asiatic origin is assumed here. For the

view that they were composed in European Greece : D. B. Monro, in the *English Historical Review*, i. 1886 ; Ridgeway, *op. cit.* i. 635 *sqq.*

P. 48.—Comparison of the Homeric poems with Mycenaean civilisation : I have insisted upon the continuity. A sharp contrast has been drawn by Professor Ridgeway (*op. cit.* c. iii.) between the Achæan (=Celtic: Central European) features of the Homeric age and the Mycenaean culture. Treating the Homeric poems as unities, he holds that when they were composed the iron age was in full swing, "iron being in general use for all kinds of *cutting* instruments and for agricultural purposes." (Chief evidence: *Iliad* iv. 129 ; vii. 141. xviii. 84 ; xxiii. 826 *sqq.*, 850 *sqq.* ; *Odyssey* xvi. 291). Ridgeway emphasizes the facts that the Homeric Achæans despised the bow, had butt-pieces to their spears, wore bronze helmets, whereas the Mycenaean warriors used bow and arrows, had no butt-pieces to their spears, and had only leather head-gear. There is no direct evidence that the Achæans had swords of iron, but it is inferred from the fact that they preferred the stroke to the thrust, the bronze sword being better adapted for thrusting (p. 303). The Achæans wore breastplates and bronze greaves, whereas these kinds of defensive armour were unknown to the Mycenæans. [So Ridgeway ; but the statement requires modification. Bronze greaves have been found in a Mycenaean tomb at Enkomi (Excavations in Cyprus, p. 16), and representations of breastplates have been recognised by Evans (Mycenaean Cyprus, p. 213).] Further, Ridgeway makes out a good case against Reichel's identification of the Homeric with the Mycenaean shield, maintaining that only the round shield (brought by the Achæans from Central Europe) is mentioned in Homer. The round shield appeared before the end of the Mycenaean age : we see it on later monuments of Mycenæ, such as the Warrior Vase and the Painted Stèle ; (we see it represented on apparently earlier objects in Cyprus ;) so, admitting the justice of the strictures on Reichel's theory, we may hold to the view, so far as the shield is concerned, that the Homeric poems represent a later stage of Mycenaean civilisation. Similarly the safety-pin or fibula (*πρόπη*) which is regularly used by the Homeric Greeks appears only in the later strata at Mycenæ. Professor Ridgeway insists on the facts that while the Mycenaean men are represented as naked or wearing a loin-cloth, the Achæans wore the chiton and chlaina, and that the Achæans wore their hair long and unconfined, not tied up in three curls like the Mycenæans. He points out that the short, straight-horned breed of cattle, mentioned in the Homeric poems, was unknown, so far as the evidence of the monuments goes, to the Mycenæans. He emphasizes, of course, the difference in burial customs ; and he explains the practice of cremation as peculiar to the Achæan invaders, who also, he argues, brought with them from Central Europe the round shield, the fibula, and the short-horned cattle.

P. 48.—Homeric Palaces : The true plan of the palace of Odysseus has been explained by J. L. Myres in *J.H.S.* xx. 128 *sqq.* (1900).

P. 49.—Tschangli : Winter, *Athen. Mittheil.* xii. 226.

P. 51.—Aetolia illyricized : cp. Kretschmer, *op. cit.* 254 *sqq.*

P. 52.—Thessalians : Herod. vii. 176 ; Thucyd. i. 12. They are not mentioned in Homer ; but their eponymous ancestor Thessalus appears in the Catalogue.—Penestæ : cp. Theopompus, fr. 134 (F.H.G. i.) ; Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1273.

P. 53.—Perhaebians, Magnetes, Achæans, subjects of Thessalians : Thucydides iv. 78, ii. 101, viii. 3.—Four divisions (tetrarchies) : C.I.A. ii. 88 ; Hellanicus, fr. 28 (F.H.G. i.) ; Aristotle, fr. 113, ed. Rose ; cp. Herod. i. 56-7.—The influence of the different kingdoms varied at different times. The two most famous dynasties were the Aleuads of Larisa, and the Scopads of Cranon.

P. 53.—Achæan immigration into the Peloponnesus : Bury, *Journal Hell. Studies*, xi. 217 *sqq.*

P. 53.—Histiaea : Strabo ix. 5. 17 and x. 1. 4.—Eretria : Strabo x. 1. 8.

P. 54.—Boeotians from Mt. Boeon : Hoffmann, *De mixtis graecae linguae dialectis*, 34.

P. 54, note 1.—Boeotian conquest, connected with the Thessalian : Thucydides i. 12 (who gives as the date 60 years after the fall of Troy). The names Thebes and Coronea occur in both Boeotia and Phthiotis ; the worship of Athena Itonia was common to Boeotia and Thessaly.

P. 54.—Chaeronea and Coronea : Strabo ix. 2. 29 ; Plutarch, *Cimon*, 1 ;

Pausanias ix. 40. 5.—Cadmeans of Thebes: Homer, *Iliad*, iv. 285 *sqq.*, xxiii. 681, etc. Thebes is called *Hypothebae* in the Catalogue.—Orchomenus and Aspledon appear in the Catalogue apart and distinct from the Boeotian towns (*Iliad*, ii. 541).

P. 54, note 2.—Abantes: Homer, *Iliad*, iv. 464, ii. 536; Herod. i. 146; Strabo x. 1. 3.—Dryopes: Herodotus i. 56, viii. 31, 43, 73. They settled at Styra and Carystus in South Euboea: *ib.* viii. 46; Thucydides vii. 57.

Pp. 55 *sqq.*—Dorian migration and Doris: earliest source, Tyrtæus, fr. 2. (Further: Herod. viii. 31 (cp. i. 56); Thucyd. i. 107; Pindar, *Pyth.* i. 65.)—Conquest of the Peloponnesus: [the epic poem, Aegimius]; Herod. ix. 26; Pausanias iii. 2; Strabo, Book 8, *passim*.—On the course of the Dorian invasion cp. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, Euripides, *Herakles*, i.² 14 *sqq.*—Argos claimed to be the premier Dorian state of the Peloponnese; hence Temenos was the eldest of the three great-grandchildren of Hyllus, who, according to the legend (see Sect. 11 of this chapter), led the Dorian invasion. It may be held that this preserves a genuine reminiscence of the priority of the Dorian settlement of Argos.

P. 56.—Oldest evidence for Dorians in Crete: Homer, *Odyssey*, xix. 175.

P. 56.—Thera: There was no doubt in men's minds in the 5th cent. that Thera was Dorian. Cp. Herodotus iv. 147 for the relationship of Theras, the eponymous founder, with the royal Heraclid house of Sparta. Yet the story there does not suggest that the colony from Laconia was Dorian. Macan (on Herodotus v. 58) thinks the validity of the Dorian theory "extremely doubtful."

P. 56.—Conquest of Amyclæ: Pindar, *Pyth.* i. 65.

P. 57.—Dorian invasion of Argolis probably from the sea: the Temenion, or tomb of Temenos, was erected on a small hill, close to the sea-shore, which he was said to have fortified when he attacked Argos. Cp. Strabo viii. 368; Busolt, i. 208. I have adopted the view that the conquerors of Argos, like those of Laconia, set out from the shores of the Corinthian Gulf. Another view is that they and the conquerors of Corinth set out from the Malian Gulf and sailed down through the Euripus.—The *gymnêtes* of Argos (Pollux iii. 83) were probably not serfs like the Helots or Penestæ; but we have no clear information about them. Busolt suggests that they may be compared to the hektemors of Attica (i. 211).—The Argolic Dorians—including Sicyon, Corinth, Epidaurus, etc.—were bound together by the worship of Apollo Pythæus, whose sanctuary was at Argos. Cp. Busolt, *ib.* 222.

P. 57.—Dorian conquest of Corinth from the sea: indicated by the tradition that the Dorians occupied the hill of Solygios, when they were making war on Corinth, Thucyd. iv. 42. 2. Alatas and Hippotas: Pindar, *Ol.* xiii. 17; Aristotle, fr. 167, ed. Rose; Strabo viii. 8. 5.

P. 57.—Dependency of Corinth on Argos: Homer, *Iliad* vi. 158. Archias, the Corinthian founder of Syracuse, was thought to be a descendant of Temenos: Parian Marble, 31.

P. 58.—Sicyon (Σικιών, old form) founded by Phalces, son of Temenus: [Ephorus] Strabo viii. 8. 5.—Phlius, colonised by Regnidas, son of Phalces: Pausanias ii. 13. 1.—Megara: the Dorian conquest is proved by the three Dorian tribes (C.I.G. 1073); the statement that it was effected from Corinth (schol. on Pindar, *Nem.* vii. 155; schol. on Plato, *Euthydemus* 292: source, Ephorus) is doubtful.

P. 58.—Nisa: Wilamowitz-M., *Hom. Unt.* 252-3.

P. 58.—Aegina: conquered from Epidaurus: Herod. viii. 46; Epidaurus, possibly from Argos: *ib.* and ix. 73. A "Mycenaean" gold treasure discovered at Aegina seemed, in the light of the remarks of A. J. Evans (*J.H.S.* xiii. 195 *sqq.*), to suggest that the Dorian conquest of Aegina was comparatively late, and accordingly in the first edition of the book I placed it about the end of the ninth century. But Evans has since revised his opinion, and holds now that the treasure is of much earlier date. Cp. his paper on Mycenaean Cyprus, *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, 30. p. 201, 1900.

P. 59.—Leleges and Carians: Paton and Myres, *Journal Hell. Studies*, 1896, 242 *sqq.* Tombs at Assarlik: Paton, *ib.* 1887, 67 *sqq.* See above note on p. 32.

P. 60.—Alleged Carian inventions: At the best, "invent" must be explained to mean "introduce among the Greeks." The shield-handle was used, for example, by the Hittites.

P. 60.—Apollo Lykios: cp. Kretschmer, *op. cit.* p. 370.—But I cannot believe that the Trámili were first called Lycians by the Greeks. It seems far more probable that the name Lycia is not to be separated from Lycaonia, and that *Lyk-* was a name by which the peoples of south-western Asia Minor were known in the Eastern Mediterranean and in Egypt (Ruka, Ruku). It was the name Lycia which suggested to the Greeks the identification of the Trámilian god with Apollo Λύκιος.

P. 61.—Cyprus: In the third millennium, the copper age, it had been in advance of the Aegean, and the coasts of Asia Minor and Syria, and was influencing (both in metallurgy and in pottery) southern and central Europe. Cp. Myres, Prehistoric Man, in Science Progress, July 1896, 346-8. The influence of Cyprus on Syria in the copper age is shown by the excavation of the Amorite cities at Tell el Hesi (near Gaza): Bliss, A Mound of many Cities, 1894.

P. 62.—Cypriot writing: evidence for its use in the Mycenaean period: Evans, Mycenaean Cyprus, p. 216.

Sects. 7, 8, and 9.—Chief source: Homer.

P. 64.—Penelope, mother of Pan: Herodotus, ii. 145-6.

P. 64.—The Homer of the Iliad, a dweller in Chios: Fick, Die Erweiterung der Mênis, Bezenberger's Beiträge zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprachen, 1899, 20 *sqq.* The connexion of the poet of the Iliad with Chios explains, as Fick shows, the great rôle which Hector plays in the expansion of the Achilleid, a rôle which he did not play in the Achilleid: Hector was a name in the royal family of Chios, which connected itself with Hector of Troy.

P. 64.—Sun rising over the sea, Il. xxiii. 227: *κροκόπεπλος ὑπερ ἄλα κίδναται Ἡώς*; and xxiv. 13.

P. 65.—The general fact of an Ionizing of an original Aeolic epic has been shown by Fick: but it is unnecessary to suppose that the Iliad as a whole and the Odyssey as a whole were first written in Aeolic. Consequently the Ionizing may have been much earlier than Fick supposes. A transformation, such as Fick has worked out, of the original Achilleid, was sufficient to determine a mixed epic dialect, and is sufficient to explain the facts for which Fick's hypothesis accounts: the rest of the Iliad may have been composed originally in the Ionic, interspersed with Aeolisms, which such a transformation had produced.

P. 66.—Transmutation of Argos: *ἱππόβοτον Ἄργος* (and *πολύπυρον Ἄργος*, Il. xv. 372)=Thessalian Argos: Busolt, Griechische Geschichte, i.² 223, note 1; Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, i. 157; Cauer, Grundfragen der Homerkritik, 153 *sqq.*

P. 67.—The Epic Cycle: Wilamowitz-M., Hom. Unt. 328 *sqq.*; Monro, Homer's Odyssey xiii.-xiv. p. 340 *sqq.*

Pp. 67 *sqq.*—For comparison of early Greek institutions with Roman and Teutonic, cp. Freeman, Comparative Politics (2nd ed. 1896). But though I have adopted, in the text, the view which regards these institutions as characteristically Aryan, I own that I feel grave doubts as to its truth, since we find similar institutions (the Council and the assembly of the folk) among primitive non-Aryan peoples (*e.g.* in South Africa). It is, further, a question how far the Greek invaders borrowed political ideas from the pre-Hellenic Aegean peoples. Traces of the influence of pre-Hellenic customs can be discovered in historical Greece (cp. the eight-yearly kingship: below, note on p. 126); but, as yet, we have not material for drawing comparative pictures of the social life of the conquerors and the conquered. I may, however, point to one important institution, the so-called *matriarchy*, which seems to have prevailed in the Aegean countries before the Greek conquest. By this institution, a child's position in his family and society, and his right of inheritance, are derived from his mother and not from his father. Thus, when a man dies, his property passes in the first instance, not to his sons, but to his brothers; then, not to their sons, but to his sister's sons; and then to her daughter's sons. This custom existed among the Lycians (Herodotus i. 178), and there are various indications that it once prevailed over the Aegean area (in Cos: Herzog, Coische Forschungen, 1899, p. 186; at Epizephyrian Locri: Polybius, xii. 5, 6; the expression *ἰμογάλακτες* in Attica: above, p. 179, note).

P. 69.—Family property in land: P. Guiraud, *La propriété foncière en Grèce*, 1893.

P. 76, *Sect.* 10.—Chief sources: passages in Homer; Herodotus, i. 1-5, 105, and other passages; (for alphabet) early inscriptions.

P. 76.—Supposed connexion of Phoenicians with Punt: E. Glaser, *Punt und die süd-arabischen Reiche*, 1899. Glaser seeks to show that the realm of "Punt" with which the Egyptians traded had a very wide extension, including a large part of the south coast of Arabia, the isle of Socotra, Erythraea, Somali, the African coast south of Somali as far as Zanzibar, and Mashonaland. All these regions were colonised by the Pun, a branch of the Semitic race, which originally dwelled on the coasts of the Persian Gulf. The Canaanite Puns or Phoenicians were an offshoot of this stock, and when they said that they originally lived on the coasts of the Erythraean Sea, they meant the Persian Gulf.

P. 77.—The name of the town Abdera in Thrace is almost certainly Phoenician. There was a Phoenician settlement of the same name in Spain, and the coinage of the Thracian city was of the Phoenician standard. This is, then, a genuine case of a Phoenician mart. For the Phoenicians (from Tyre) in Thasos, cp. Herodotus ii. 44, vi. 47, and it has been supposed that the name of the island is Phoenician.—The Gephyraeans are alleged as an argument for Phoenicians in Boeotia. They constituted a deme in Attica (*Γεφυραῖς*, Etym. Magnum), and were said to have come from Gephyra, another name of Tanagra, having been Phoenicians and having come to Boeotia with Cadmus, from Gephyrae in Syria. See Herodotus v. 57. But the Gephyraeans themselves said that they had come from Eretria and disowned the alleged Phoenician origin.

P. 77.—For supposed Phoenician mining in Greek islands, Ardaillon, *Les Mines du Laurion*, 1899.

P. 78.—Alphabet: This is the generally received view of the origination of the Greek alphabet; but we may be prepared at any moment to discover that the Phoenicians did less than is supposed.

P. 78, *note*.—*ὅς νῦν κ.τ.λ.* This is Studniczka's reading of the inscription.

P. 78.—Writing: Wilamowitz-M. would put the reception of writing "in the tenth cent. at latest" (Hom. Unt. 287).

Sect. 11.—Chief sources: *Primary*: (1) Hesiod and "Hesiodic" fragments; (2) fragments of Hecataeus, Acusilaus, etc.; Herodotus; Thucydides i. 1-21. *Derivative*: Diodorus, Books iv. v., fragments of vi. vii.; the Bibliotheca of Pseudo-Apollodorus; Pausanias.

P. 80, *note* 1.—Grote, *History of Greece*, pt. i. cap. xvii.

P. 81.—Hellen and his sons: Earliest mention, Hesiod, *Catal.* 25, ed. Kinkel.

P. 81.—The Ionians are mentioned once in the *Iliad*, in an interpolated passage, where the Athenians are meant (xiii. 685).

Pp. 81 *sqq.*—Legend of the Return of the Heraclidae: E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, ii. pp. 247 *sqq.*

P. 82.—Oxylus: Ephorus, fr. 15 (F.H.G. i.); Pausanias, v. 4.

P. 86.—Chronology of the heroic age: for views of the Greeks in 5th and 4th centuries as to early chronology, see Herodotus ii. 145 (implying, it is supposed, 1263-2 B.C. for the fall of Troy); on the other hand, Democritus in Diogenes Laertius ix. 41 (1150-49 B.C. fall of Troy); Isocrates, Archidamus 4. Peace 32, for the Dorian conquest of Laconia (1069 B.C.). Boeotian conquest 60 years, Dorian conquest 80 years, after fall of Troy: Thucydides i. 12.—Erato-sthenes: Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, 1.

CHAPTER II

P. 89.—Influence of land system on colonisation: Guiraud (*op. cit.* Bk. i. cap. vi.), who, however, exaggerates it.

P. 91, *Sect.* 2.—Sources: scattered: largely in the works mentioned under Chap. I. *Sects.* 4-6. Add Pseudo-Seymnus and Pseudo-Scylax.

P. 91.—Legend of Argo: well known when the *Odyssey* took shape, *Od.* xii.

70 (in the Iliad, vii. 467, etc., Jason's son, Euneos, appears): Hesiod, Theog. 992 sqq.; frags. of Eumelus, Corinthiaca, in Kinkel's *Epic. Gr. Fr.*; Pindar, Pyth. iv.

P. 92.—The Euxine was also called the Axine or inhospitable (*Ἀξείνος*, Pind. Pyth. iv. 203); and it has been conjectured (by E. Meyer) that the sea was called the "Ascanian" from the (Phrygian) Ascanians, and that *Ἀξείνος* was a Greek corruption of this name.

P. 92.—Odyssey and the Euxine: Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Hom. Unt.* 163

sqq.

P. 92.—The Ister is first mentioned in Hesiod, Theog. 339.

P. 92.—Pontic colonies: An important source, no longer extant, for the early Greek exploration of the Pontic regions, was a poem entitled *The Arimaspea*, ascribed to Aristaeas, an author and traveller, whose existence and identity there seems no good reason to question. It was used by Herodotus, whose chronological indications would place the date of Aristaeas about the beginning of the 7th century. Herodotus iv. 14 (cp. Macan's note).

P. 93.—Dates of colonies in Pontus and Propontis: the dates assigned seem untrustworthy. Thus 757-6 B.C. is given for both Cyzicus and Trapezus (and in the Parian Marble for Syracuse). Sinope: 1st colony, 676 B.C., and 2nd colony of Cyzicus, 676 B.C. 2nd colony of Sinope, 631 B.C.; same year as colonisation of Cyrene. Cp. E. Meyer, *op. cit.* ii. p. 443. The dates for Chalcedon vary between 687 and 677 B.C.; the date for Byzantium is 660-59. Other dates are: Astacus, 712-11; Acanthus, Stagira, Abdera, and Lampsacus, 654; Istrus, 656; Olbia, 645; Perinthus, c. 600; Odessus, in the reign of the Median king Astyages (c. 585). These dates will be found (with slight variations) in the chronicles of Eusebius and Jerome.

P. 93.—Megarian colonies prior to Milesian: cp. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* i² 466, note 2.

P. 93.—Chalcedon (*Καλλχιδών*): Thucyd. iv. 75. Relative date of foundations of Chalcedon and Byzantium, Herod. iv. 144. See Strabo, vii. 6. 2.—Astacus was probably founded by Chalcedon: Charon, fr. 34a (Müller, F.H.G. iv. 627), not by Megara itself (Memnon of Heraclea, fr. 20, F.H.G. iii. 536).

P. 93.—Selymbria: founded before Byzantium, Pseudo-Scymnus, 715.—Heraclea: Xenophon, Anab. vi. 2. 1; Pseudo-Scymnus 973; Pausanias v. 26. 6.

P. 93.—Sinope: its foundation was brought into connexion with the Cimmerian invasion (see above, p. 116), Pseudo-Scymnus 947.

P. 93.—Cyzicus: cp. Strabo xiv. 1. 6, and xii. 8. 11.—Abydos: Thucyd. viii. 61; Strabo xiii. 1. 20, xiv. 1. 6.

P. 95.—Lampsacus: Charon of Lamps., fr. 6. Coins: Head, *Historia Numorum*, 456.

P. 95.—Parion: Strabo xiii. 1. 14, where its foundation is ascribed to Miletus, Erythrae, and Paros. Cardia: Strabo vii. fr. 52.

P. 95.—To the colonies on the Propontis mentioned here, add Perinthus, founded by the Samians, about 600 B.C. Cp. Strabo vii. fr. 56.

P. 95.—Panticapaeum: Pseudo-Scymnus 885; Strabo vii. 4. 4; Phanagorea: Pseudo-Scymnus 886; Pseudo-Scylax 72; Strabo xi. 2. 10.

P. 96.—Eretrian colonies on Pallene (especially Mende, Thucyd. iv. 123): Strabo x. 1. 8. But Scione was founded by Achaeans from Pallene, Thucyd. iv.

120.—For the small Eretrian towns of Acte, cp. Thucyd. iv. 109; Strabo x. 1. 8. —For the Andrian colonies Acanthus, Stagirus, Argilus, and Sane, see Thucyd.

iv. 84, 88, 103, 109.—Chersonesus: Strabo vii. 4. 2-3; Pseudo-Scymnus 822.—iv. 84, 88, 103, 109.—Pseudo-Scymnus 806; Strabo vii. 3. 17. [Date of Olbia: Herodotus, iv. 78-9; Pseudo-Scymnus 806; Strabo vii. 3. 17. [Date of foundation: 647-6, Jerome.]—Odessus (Varna): Pseudo-Scymnus 749; Strabo vii. 6. 1.—Istrus or Istria: Herod. ii. 33; Pseudo-Scymnus 770; Strabo, *ib.*—Mesambria: Herod. vi. 33; Pseudo-Scyl. 67; Strabo, *ib.*

P. 96, Sect. 3.—Sources: *Primary*: coins; [traditions]. *Derivative*: (1) [Antiochus of Syracuse]; (2) Thucydides vi. 1-5; fragments of Philistus and Ephorus; (3) fragments of Timaeus; Diodorus iv. v., and fragments of viii.; Strabo v. vi.; Pseudo-Scymnus.

P. 96.—"Sacred islands": the expression is preserved in the Catalogue of the Hesiodic Theogony, 1015.

P. 97.—Cyme: The statement that Cyme was older than any Greek settlement

in either Italy or Sicily seems to rest entirely on a statement of Ephorus (Strabo v. 4. 4), who was a native of the mother-city Aeolian Cyme. Taking into account the motive of local patriotism, we need not lay any stress on his statement, which can hardly be maintained. Cyme can hardly be older than the eighth century. Hellwig, *Das homerische Epos*, Exkurs 1; Busolt, *op. cit.* i. 392, note.

P. 98.—Origin of name Graius, Graecus, Greek (Busolt, *op. cit.* i. 1 44, who has since changed his view): cp. E. Meyer, *op. cit.* p. 471.

P. 99.—Position of Sicily in history: Freeman, *History of Sicily*, i. cap. 1.

P. 102.—Exact datings of Siceliot colonies uncertain: Mahaffy, *Problems of Greek History*, Appendix. The chronology given by Thucydides (doubtless derived from Antiochus) depended on the fact that Archias, the founder of Syracuse, was reckoned as the tenth descendant from Temenus, and the date of Temenus and the return of the Heraclidae was supposed to be (so Ephorus) 1069 B.C. This (ten generations being counted as 334 years) gives 735 B.C. for Archias. As it was universally admitted that Naxos was the oldest Greek foundation in Sicily, the Syracusan chronographers gave it the priority of a year over Syracuse: hence Naxos, 735 B.C.; Syracuse, 734 B.C.

P. 103.—Foundation of Taras: View that the Partheniae were pre-Dorian Greek inhabitants of the Peloponnese (whom he regards as Achaeans): Geffcken, *Jahrbh. für klass. Phil.*, B. 147, pp. 177 sqq. But perhaps they belonged to the pre-Hellenic population.—Studniczka and Busolt (*op. cit.* 408) connect them with Arcadia.—For the story, the chief sources are: Antiochus and Ephorus, in Strabo vi. 278-9; Pseudo-Heraclides 26b (P.H.G. ii. 220); Aristotle, *Politics*, v. 1306b. The oldest account seems to have been that the Partheniae were sons of Spartans who had taken no part in the war and were degraded to the condition of Helots (Antiochus).

P. 103.—Metapontion: old name, *Metabos*: Antiochus in Strabo vi. 265.—There are indications of an Aetolian element in Metapontion. Metapa was the name of an Aetolian town, and there were games in honour of Achelous at Metapontion. Cp. Busolt, *op. cit.* i. 411.

P. 110: Name Hellènes: Bury, *Journal Hell. Studies*, xvi. 217 sqq.

P. 110, *Sect.* 4.—Sources: Hesiod; Thucydides i. 13-15.

P. 110.—Family system of property: Guiraud, *op. cit.*

P. 113.—Commercial reaction of colonies on the mother-country: cp. Beloch, *Gr. Geschichte*, i. 200.

P. 114.—Shipbuilding: C. Torr, *Ancient Ships*. Significance of Briareos: *ib.*—Corinthians the first Greeks to use triremes: Thucyd. i. 13.—“The old penteconters were still generally used,” till the close of the 6th century: this is proved by the fact that the powerful fleet of Polycrates consisted mainly of penteconters (Herod. iii. 39, 41, 44); and cp. Thucyd. i. 14.

P. 114.—Battle between Corinth and Coreyra: The date has the authority of Thucydides, i. 13.

P. 115.—Maritime importance of Aegina: illustrated by Hesiod, *Catal.* fr. 96 (Ep. gr. Fr., Kinkel), where the invention of sails is ascribed to the Aeginetans.

P. 115, *Sect.* 5.—Sources: *Primary*: fragments of Callinus and Archilochus; cuneiform inscriptions of Assarhaddon and Assurbanipal; coins. *Derivative*: (1) Herodotus i. 6-15; [Xanthus, *Lydiaca*]; (2) fragments of Nicolaus of Damascus. Compare Schubert, *Geschichte der Könige von Lydien*, 1884.

P. 115.—Midas I. of Phrygia: He is identified by Winckler (*Altorientalische Forschungen*, Reihe II. Heft 3, p. 136) with Mita, with whom, according to Assyrian annals, Sargon fought in 717 and 707 B.C. But the conjecture seems highly uncertain.

P. 115.—Candaules: Xanthus called him Sadyattes (Nicolaus, fr. 49). Probably he bore a Lydian as well as a Maeonian name. (Candaules, a “Lydian” name of Hermes: Hipponax, fr. 1b, ed. Bergk).—For the story of the ring of Gyges, Plato, *Republic*, ii. 3 and x. 12.

P. 116.—Colophon:—Theognis 1103; Herod. i. 15.

P. 116.—Magnesia: Nicolaus, fr. 62. Some explain Magnesia on the Hermus.

P. 116.—Gyges and Cimmerians: Gelzer, *Das Zeitalter des Gyges*, *Rheinisches Museum*, 1875, 230 sqq.; 1880, 514 sqq.; E. Meyer, *op. cit.* i. p. 543 sqq., and ii. pp. 455 sqq. The entrance of the Bithynians from Thrace into Asia Minor and

the occupation of Bithynia seems to have taken place soon before the Cimmerian invasion. It may be regarded as a continuation of the Phrygian immigrations. Bithynia is not mentioned in the Catalogue in Iliad ii.

P. 116.—Terrians: Callinus, fr. 3-5, ed. Bergk; cp. Thucyd. ii. 96.—It was at this time that Bithynia was occupied by the Bithynians (Thynians): Arrian, Bithyniaca, fr. 37, F.H.G. iii. 593.

P. 116.—Midas: cp. Strabo i. 3. 21.

P. 117.—Sardanapalus has been identified with other Assyrian kings; but he was doubtless suggested by Assurbanipal (E. Meyer, *op. cit.* i. p. 481). But the name Sardanapalus is more than a mere accidental corruption of the name of the Assyrian king. The precise form of the corruption has a motive: the name is, in fact, a contamination of Sandan or Sardan, the name of an Asiatic god, and Assurbanipal. For the legend of the effeminate Sardanapalus, who burned himself with his concubines on a great pyre, resembles that of Heracles Sandon of Lydia, who, clad in woman's apparel, served Queen Omphale, when we remember the story that Heracles burned himself on a pyre. And the link is preserved in the legend that Cilician Tarsus was founded by Sandan=Heracles. See K. O. Müller, *Kunstarchaeologische Werke*, iii. 8 *sqq.*, and J. G. Frazer, *Golden Bough*,² iii. 167 *sqq.*

P. 117.—“It was some satisfaction to Assurbanipal to record”: The account given by Assurbanipal of the submission, the revolt, and the death of Gyges is as follows (translated from the Assyrian by G. Smith, *History of Assurbanipal*, p. 64; cp. p. 73):—Gyges, king of Lydia, a district which is across the sea, a remote place of which the kings my fathers had not heard speak of its name. The account of my grand kingdom in a dream was related to him by Assur, the God my creator: “Of Assurbanipal, king of Assyria, the beloved of Assur, king of the Gods, lord of all, his princely yoke take.” The day [he saw that] dream his messenger [he sent to pray for my friendship]. That dream [which he saw] by the hand of his envoy he sent and repeated [to me]. From the midst of the day when he took the yoke of [my kingdom], the Cimmerians, wasters of [his] people, who did not fear my fathers and me, and did not take the yoke of my kingdom, he captured, in the service of Assur and Ishtar, the Gods my lords. From the midst of the chiefs of the Cimmerians, whom he had taken, two chiefs in strong fetters of iron and bonds of iron, he bound, and with numerous presents he caused to bring to my presence. His messengers whom, to pray for my friendship, he was constantly sending, he wilfully discontinued; as the will of Assur, the God my creator, he had disregarded; to his own power he trusted and hardened his heart. His forces to the aid of Psammetichus (king) of Egypt, who had thrown off the yoke of my dominion, he sent; and I heard [of it] and prayed to Assur and Ishtar thus: “Before his enemies his corpse may they cast, and may they carry captive his attendants.” When thus to Assur I had prayed he requited me. Before his enemies his corpse was thrown down, and they carried captive his attendants. The Cimmerians, whom by the glory of my name he had trodden under him, conquered and swept the whole of his country. . . . (Ardys) his son sat on his throne, that evil work at the lifting up of my hands, the Gods my protectors in the time of the father his begetter had destroyed. By the hand of his envoy he sent [word] and took the yoke of my kingdom thus: “The king whom God has blessed art thou; my father from [thee] departed and evil was done in his time; I am thy devoted servant, and my people all perform thy pleasure.”

P. 117.—Sarcophagus with Cimmerians (sixth cent.); A. S. Murray, *Terra-cotta Sarcophagi, Greek and Etruscan*, in the British Museum, 1898.

P. 117.—Gyges and Ardis: the chronology of the Lydian kings from Gyges to Croesus, as given by Herodotus and by Sextus Julius Africanus (preserved in Syncellus, i. 445, ed. Bonn and elsewhere), is artificial. See Schubert, *op. cit.* 15 *sqq.*; H. Gelzer, *Sextus Julius Africanus*, i. 219 *sqq.* The sum of the regnal years of the five kings amounts (1) in Herodotus to 170, that is exactly 5 generations at 33½ years+3 extra years; (2) in Africanus (ultimately Xanthus?), to 153, that is 5 generations at 30 years+3 extra years. For the three extra years see Herod. i. 91.—A comparison of the two facts that the fall of Croesus occurred in 546 B.C. (in no case later than 541) and that Gyges was alive after 660 B.C. (as the Assyrian evidence shows) disproves the Herodotean chronology; the

other system might be just made to fit, if the fall of Croesus were brought down a little later than 546 B.C.—Herodotus, in accordance with his erroneous chronology, places the Cimmerian invasion and fall of Sardis in the reign of Ardys (i. 15): see next note.

P. 119.—The religious character of Greek coinage: well brought out by P. Gardner, *Types of Greek Coins*, 41 *sqq.*

P. 119, *Sect. 6.*—Sources: *Primary*: inscription of Abu Simbel; inscriptions of Naucratis; archaeological remains at Naucratis and Defenneh. *Derivative*: Herodotus ii.

P. 120.—Defenneh: Flinders Petrie, *Tanis*, Part ii. 1888.

P. 120.—Naucratis: Naukratis, Part I., by Flinders Petrie, 1886; Part II. by E. A. Gardner and F. Ll. Griffith, 1888. Solon describes Naucratis in the line (Bergk, fr. 28): Νεῖλον ἐπὶ προχοῇσι Κανωβίδος ἐγγύθεν ἀκτῆς.

P. 120.—Abusimbel inscription (Röhl, *Insc. Gr. Ant.* 482): Perhaps belongs to the time of Psammetichus I. (so Kirchhoff), but it seems more reasonable to connect it with the Ethiopian expedition of his grandson Psammetichus II., whom Herodotus calls Psammis (Her. ii. 161). The mercenaries who inscribed their names were from Colophon, Teos, and Ialysus.

P. 121, *Sect. 7.*—Sources: *Primary*: fragments of Euegammon. *Derivative*: Herodotus iv.; Pindar, *Pyth.* iv. v. ix.

P. 121.—For the Arcesilas vase which illustrates the silphion trade, see Jahn, *Berichte der sächsischen Ges. der Wiss.*, 1867, 94 *sqq.*

P. 122.—Libyan flavour in the Telegony: Wilamowitz-M., *Hom. Unt.* 186.

P. 122, *Sect. 8.*—Sources: *Primary*: fragments of Archilochus. *Derivative*: passages in Aristotle's *Politics*, iv. v.

P. 123.—Archilochus: An inscription (of the 1st century B.C.) has recently been published (by Hiller von Gärtringen, *Ath. Mitt.* xxv. pp. 1 *sqq.*, 1900) giving fragments of the work of a Parian scholar named Demeas, who (perhaps in the first half of the 3rd century B.C.), piously composed a chronology of the life of the great Parian poet, founded on his own poems and arranged in years of the Parian archons. Demeas cited the poet's own words, and thus we have won some new verses of Archilochus. The record of a victory of the Parians over Naxos is a new fact.

P. 123.—Eclipse of sun (Archil. 74, Bergk): First date in Greek history, that is, the first year designated in a contemporary document. But we may regard the archonship of Creon at Athens in 683-2 as an earlier fixed date; for it is practically certain that there existed a genuine list of archons going back to that date. The lines of Archilochus are:

Ζεὺς πατὴρ Ὀλυμπίων
ἐκ μεσημβρίας ἔθηκε νύκτ' ἀποκρίψας φάος
ἡλίου λάμποντος.

CHAPTER III

P. 125, *Sects. 1 and 3.*—Sources: *Primary*: fragments of laws quoted in Plutarch's *Lycurgus*; fragments of *Tyrtæus* and *Alcman*. *Derivative*: (1) Herodotus (i. 65, iv. 147, etc., vi. 51, etc.); Xenophon's *Polity of the Lacedæmonians*; Aristotle, *Pol.* ii. and fragments of *Polity of Lacedæmonians*; (2) Strabo viii.; Diodorus vii. (frags.); Plutarch's *Lycurgus*; Pausanias iii. (various passages).

P. 126.—Spartan kings. For the inferiority of the Proclid or Eurypontid house, as the younger, see Herodotus vi. 51. It is probable that one or both of the royal houses was of pre-Dorian ("Achaean") race; but it is a question which can hardly be decided. Cp. Busolt, *Gr. Gesch.* i. 546-7, Macan, note on Herod. *loc. cit.*

P. 126.—At Sparta we find the survival of an old pre-Hellenic custom which limited a king's reign to eight years. It is recorded in Plutarch's *Agis*, c. 11, that every ninth year the ephors, choosing a clear, moonless night, observed the sky, and if they saw a shooting star they judged that the kings had offended the gods

and deposed them until an oracle from Delphi or Olympia decided the question. That the custom was non-Aryan and pre-Hellenic is suggested by the designation of pre-Hellenic Minos of Chossus as a "nine-yearly king" in the *Odyssey* xix. 179 (*Μίνως ἐννέωρος βασιλεύς*).

Pp. 127 and 130.—Spartan royalty maintained *under conditions* as the result of a compromise. These conditions are probably meant by the phrase of Herodotus *ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τοῖς καὶ πρότερον ἦρχε* (vi. 75). For the monthly oaths, see Xenophon, *Polity of Lacedaemonians*. xv. 7.

P. 127.—Right of making war: Herodotus states that this right belonged absolutely to the kings (vi. 56; cp. v. 49 and 74). For historical times this is not borne out by other evidence, and is (as Mr. Macan observes) hardly credible. The account given by Thucydides of the proceedings preliminary to the Peloponnesian War shows that the decision did not rest with the king. And Mr. Macan points out that there is evidence pointing the other way in passages of Herodotus himself. Thus we read (v. 64) that the Lacedaemonians appointed Cleomenes general to invade Attica, and (vi. 106) Philippides, when he comes to Sparta to ask for armed succour, addresses himself to "the government" (*τοὺς ἀρχοντας*)—an expression which may include the kings, but certainly includes the ephors.—Even if the ancient right had lasted into the 6th century, it could hardly have survived the formation of the Peloponnesian Confederacy. But it is *a priori* highly improbable that such a momentous privilege was left to the kings till so late a date.

P. 127, *note*.—For the Aegidae at Sparta, see Herodotus iv. 149. They held the priesthood of the Carnean Apollo, and are also found at Thebes, Acragas, and Cyrene, as well as at Thera. Compare Pindar, *Pyth.* v. 75, *Isth.* vi. 15 (where a tradition is preserved that the Aegidae captured Amyclae).

P. 130.—The view that the importance of the Ephors was comparatively late is supported (though, of course, not proved) by the fact that they are not mentioned in the fragments of Tyrtaeus or in the old laws preserved by Plutarch (*Lyc.* 6).

P. 130, *note* 3.—Names of kings of Eurypontid house significant (Anaxidamus, Damaratus, etc.): E. Meyer, *op. cit.* ii. 562.

P. 131.—"Shave the upper lip," etc.: Aristotle, fr. 539, ed. Rose.

P. 133, *Sect.* 2.—Sources: *Primary*: fragments of Tyrtaeus. *Derivative*: (1) [Rutilius]; [Myron of Priene]; (2) Diodorus xv. 66: Pausanias iv.; Justin [=Pompeius Trogus] iii. 4, 5.

P. 133.—"First Messenian War": only early source, Tyrtaeus (fr. 5, Bergk); but it would be unsafe to regard as certain his statement that the war lasted nineteen years and was concluded in the twentieth. Nor can we press chronologically his description of its heroes as *πατέρων ἡμετέρων πατέρες* (Niese, *Hermes*, xxvi. 1 *sqq.*). It is noteworthy that in *Od.* xxi. 13-15 Messene is regarded as part of Lacedaemon.

P. 135.—Battle of the Great Foss: the Messenian defeat was ascribed to the treachery of the Arcadians under their leader Aristocrates: inscribed pillar at altar of Zeus Lycaeus, in Polybius iv. 33. Cp. Pausanias viii. 5. 13.

P. 137.—Sparta in seventh century: cp. E. Meyer, *op. cit.* ii. 562 *sqq.*

P. 143.—Lycurgus: cp. E. Meyer, *Rhein. Museum*, 42, pp. 88 *sqq.*; Wilamowitz-M., *Hom. Unt.* 284 *sqq.* There can be little doubt that the name meant wolf-driver, not light-worker; so Apollo Lykios was a wolf-god, not a light-go! The Lycaean mountain in Arcadia was possibly so called because it was infested with wolves.

P. 144.—For quoit of Iphitus, and Aristotle's view, see Plutarch, *Lycurgus*, i. and cp. Pausanias, v. 20. 1. Thucydides dated the origin of the Spartan constitution about 804 B.C. (i. 18); Isocrates about 870 B.C. (*Archidamus* iv. 12).

P. 144, *Sect.* 4.—Sources: *Primary*: (1) Laws of Gortyn; other inscriptions; (2) Aristotle, *Pol.* ii. 7; passages in Plato's *Republic* and *Laws*. *Derivative*: [Ephorus], *Strabo* x. 4; Pseudo-Plato, *Minos*.

P. 145.—Cydonia: said to have been founded by Minos (Parian Marble, 11; cp. *Strabo* x. 475). A Tegeate legend connecting the Arcadian hero Cydon with Crete suggests an Arcadian settlement (Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca*, iii. 1. 2; Busolt, *op. cit.* i. 333).

P. 145.—Cretan towns: said to be 90 in number, *Odyssey* xix. 174; for a list

of about 50 see Busolt, *op. cit.* i. 338.—The epigraphic evidence for the Dorian phylae in Cretan cities is put together by Busolt, *ib.* 347, note 2. Among the distinctly Laconian colonies Lyttus was eminent: Aristotle, *Pol.* ii. 7 (1271b).

P. 146.—No Perioeci: the *περίοικοι* in Aristotle ii. 7 are serfs. The statement of the Cretan historian Sosicrates (fr. 6, F.H.G. iv.) that there were subjects called Perioeci may possibly refer to cases of political subjection of one city to another (Busolt, *ib.* 341).

P. 147, note.—*Hetaeriae*: Dosiades in F.H.G. iv. 399; inscription of Dreros in Cauer, *Delectus*, 121c. In the Code of Gortyn we find a class of *ἀπέραιοι*, that is, men who belonged to no hetaeria, probably including foreigners (*μέτροκοι*). Cp. Busolt, *ib.* 349.

P. 148, *Secl.* 5.—Sources: *Primary*: architectural remains at Olympia. *Derivative*: Herodotus vi. 127; Ephorus (ap. Strabo viii. 3. 33); Aristotle, *Pol.* ii. 6, v. 10; *Ἀθην.* *Πολ.* 10; and frags. 480, 481; Pausanias v. and vi.

P. 148.—Argos and Sparta. The received view of a struggle between Argos and Sparta for the Cynurian border-land in the 8th century, and a Lacedaemonian victory at Thyrea won by the Spartan king Polydorus in 719-8 B.C. (Pausanias iii. 7), involves an anachronistic conception of the growth of the Spartan power, has no good authority, and can be shown to be the result of a late combination. See the convincing notes of Busolt (*op. cit.* i. 595-7), who shows that Herodotus i. 82 (as well as Thucydides v. 41) implies no record of an earlier struggle than that which occurred in the middle of the 6th century, and points out the artificiality of the date. The true battle of Thyrea was dated between 549 and 546 B.C.; and five generations (corresponding to five Spartan kings) take us back (as in the case of the Lydian kings) to 718 B.C. The generally received reconstruction of early Spartan chronology depended on the *Χρόνων ἀναγραφή* of Sosibius (whose dates were adopted by Pausanias). The motive of the reduplication of the battle of Thyrea was the desire to ascribe glorious achievements to early Spartan kings.

P. 148.—Pheidon of Argos: The traditional date of Pheidon's reign, in the first half of the eighth century, rests on late combinations. (1) Ephorus counted him as tenth in descent from Temenus, and so determined his date (on the calculation of three generations to a hundred years) as 803-770. (2) The derivation of the dynasty of the Macedonian kings, from Temenus of Argos, affected Pheidon's date. Karanos, the first in the list of these kings (he is not heard of till the fourth century B.C.), was made a brother of Pheidon, and seventh in descent from Temenus (or eleventh from Heracles). As it was believed (unhistorically) that the Median dynasty succeeded the Assyrian in 884, it seemed desirable to make the Macedonian dynasty at least as old; consequently Karanos and Pheidon were placed about 884, the older date of Lycurgus. Then, when Lycurgus, on account of the Olympian disc of Iphitus, was moved down to the time of the first Olympiad, those who adopted this system moved Pheidon also, and 798 was determined as the first year of Pheidon. Then fifty years later he celebrated the eighth Olympiad. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, i.² 612 *sqq.* (who calls attention to the chronological scheme of Argive history, on the basis of 50 and 30: 798, succession of Pheidon; 748, Pheidon's Olympiad; 718, first war for Thyreatis; 668, battle of Hysiae; 548 (= 668 - 4 × 30), second war for Thyrea). On the other hand, Herodotus implies that Pheidon ruled at Argos in the first quarter of the sixth century; for he makes his son Lacedas one of the suitors of Agarista. But we cannot lay much stress on this: his source is evidently a romantic tale, not serious history. Such a late date is inconsistent with the fact that the measures used at Athens before Solon's reform were Pheidonian; and it may be added that if he had been a contemporary of Solon we should probably have known more about him. What we know points to his having flourished about the middle of the seventh century; and this view is now winning its way into general acceptance. It has been strengthened by the careful investigation of Busolt (*loc. cit.*). To the arguments which have been urged by others I would add one more. If the traditional date (first half of eighth century) were true, it is almost inconceivable that the romance of the wooing of Agarista would have made Pheidon a contemporary of Cleisthenes of Sicyon; on the other hand, this is by no means unintelligible, if Pheidon flourished in the middle, and third quarter, of the seventh century. Story could violate chronology by bringing

Solon into relation with Croesus, but it would never have dreamed of bringing Lycurgus into relation with Croesus. I may further observe that the decline in the Argive power after Pheidon's death synchronises most happily with the Messenian war in the last quarter of the seventh century. The weakness of Argos left Sparta free to deal with Messenia.

P. 149.—Pheidonian measures: Herodotus vi. 127; Aristotle, *Ἀθην. Πολ.* 10, and frag. 480, ed. Rose; Strabo (Ephorus) viii. 3. 33. Ephorus went on to say that Pheidon also first introduced a silver coinage at Aegina, Strabo, *ib.* and 6. 13; cp. Aristotle, fr. 481, and Parian Marble, 30.

P. 149.—Pheidon at Olympia: Herodotus vi. 127; Strabo (Ephorus) viii. 3. 33; Pausanias vi. 22. 2. For the view that the importance of the Olympian festival dates from this period, see Bury, Pindar's Nemean Odes, Appendix.

P. 149.—The story of the struggle of the Eleans and Pisatans for Olympia rests on Elean tradition. The certain facts seem to be that the Elean control of the games dates from 572 B.C., and that for some years before there was a struggle. The Eleans represented this struggle as begun by the Pisatans (Pausanias vi. 22. 4), they themselves having been in possession of Olympia since the Olympiad of Pheidon. But it may be questioned whether this is true. The mere fact that the Elean control of the festival is dated from 572 B.C. (Eusebius i. 198, ed. Schöne) makes it probable that till then the festival was administered by the Pisatans, though with intervals of Elean interruption.—The institution of the *Ἑλλανογῆται*, as umpires, may be referred to 572 B.C. or shortly after.—The struggle between Elis and Pisa may probably be illustrated by a treaty, graven on a bronze tablet discovered at Olympia (now in the British Museum), between the men of Elis and the men of Arcadian Heræa. We may guess (cp. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, i. 2 706; von Scala, *Staatsverträge*, No. 27) that it belongs to a year shortly before 572 B.C.; the aid of Heræa would have been very valuable to Elis in the war with Pisa. As this is the earliest extant treaty between two Greek states, I may add a translation of it here:—

“The treaty (*syntrata*) between the Eleans and Heræeans.

“There shall be an alliance for a hundred years; this year shall be the first. If any need arise, either in word or deed, they shall help one another, both in other matters and in war. But if they do not so help, the transgressors shall pay a talent of silver to Zeus of Olympia as a fine. If any injure this writing, whether a private man (*ἴετας*) or magistrate (*τελεστὰς*) or deme, he (or it) shall be liable to the sacred penalty herein written” (Text: C.I.G. 11: Collitz, *Sammlung der Dialektinschriften*, 1149; Hicks, *Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 8).

P. 151.—The first Olympiad: Records of the Olympian victors seem to have been kept by the Eleans since the early part of the sixth century; but the Olympian list, as a whole, with the dates of the eighth and seventh centuries, seems to have been first worked out by Hippias of Elis at the very end of the fifth century. The Olympiads were first used as a system of chronological reckoning in the third century by the Siceliot Timæus. The untrustworthy character of the Olympian list and of the generally accepted early dates in Greek history was pointed out by Professor Mahaffy. See *Problems in Greek History*. 217 *sqq.* Appendix. His arguments have been reinforced by Busolt, *op. cit.* 2nd ed. i. 586 *sqq.*

P. 152.—For extent of Argive power to the south, cp. Herodotus i. 82.

P. 152.—Battle of Hysiae: Pausanias ii. 24. 7. This battle, if correctly dated, must mark the first serious struggle between Argos and Sparta. I believe that the date may be approximately correct for this reason. If it had been fought in Pheidon's reign, tradition would hardly have dissociated it from him, and would have transferred it along with him to the 8th century: therefore it occurred either before or after his reign. Since after Pheidon's death Argos declined, and was unable to embarrass Sparta in the Second Messenian War, it seems improbable that Hysiae was won then (in the days of Lacedas, Pheidon's son); and so we come back to the period before Pheidon's accession.

P. 152.—As to the end of Pheidon we are in the dark, for we cannot attach importance either to the statement of Ephorus (Strabo viii. 3. 33) that the Eleans and Spartans together overthrew him, or to the story in Nicolaus (fr. 41, F.H.G. iii.) that he was slain when interfering in domestic struggles at Corinth.

P. 153, *Sect. 6*.—Sources: *Primary*: fragments of Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho. *Derivative*: Thucyd. i. 13; Aristotle, Pol. iv. and v.

P. 153.—Zaleucus: [Ephorus=] Strabo vi. 1. 18, and Pseudo-Scymnus 315; Demosthenes, c. Timocr. 139-41; Aristotle, fr. 548, ed. Rose; Timaeus, fr. 69 (F.H.G. i.); Diodorus xii. 21. His legislation was reputed to be the oldest written Code in Greece.

P. 153.—Charondas: Aristotle, Pol. ii. 1274a and b, and iv. 1296a, 1297a; Plato, Republic, x. 599 E; Diodorus xii. 11 *seq.*; Heraclides, fr. 25 (F.H.G. ii.).

P. 155.—Development of the tyrant from the demagogue: noticed by Aristotle, Pol. v. 1305a, and illustrated by history.—*Tyrannis* in Archilochus, fr. 25; cp. Hippias of Elis, fr. 7 (F.H.G. ii.).

P. 156.—“Age of the Despots,” a misleading expression. Cp. Mahaffy, Problems in Greek History, 79.

P. 156.—Thrasylbulus: Herodotus i. 20-22. His tyranny was marked by the war with the Lydian king Alyattes.

P. 156.—Penthiidae: Aristotle, Pol. v. 1311b. Condition of Mytilene: Alcaeus, fr. 18, 19, 20, 21, 33.

P. 157.—Pittacus: Alcaeus, fr. 37a, b; Aristotle, Pol. iii. 1285a, ii. 1274b; Diogenes Laertius i. 74-6, and ix. 11-12; Strabo xiii. 2. 3; Plutarch, Solon, 14. The date of his election as *aesymnetes* is given in the last-mentioned source as shortly before Solon's archonship (594 B.C.).

P. 157.—*Aesymnetes*: there were magistrates at Megara, Selymbria, and Selinus, who bore the title *αἰσυμνᾶται* (cp. e.g. Collitz, Sammlung 3053); also at Cyme, Teos, and elsewhere. The significance of the word, implying *fair* administration, is illustrated by its use in the Odyssey (8. 258) of the umpire at games. For its political meaning in such a case as that of Pittacus, see Aristotle, Pol. iii. 1285a, and iv. 1295a.

P. 157.—Banishment of Sappho: Parian Marble, 36. An act of amnesty for the exiles was passed before Pittacus laid down his office; cp. Alcaeus, 33. Sappho returned to Lesbos; cp. Herod. ii. 135.

P. 157, *Sect. 7*.—Sources: *Primary*: fragments of Theognis. *Derivative*: (1) Herodotus iii. 48-53, v. 67-8, 92, vi. 126-130; (2) Aristotle, Pol. iv. and v.; [Ephorus]; frags. of Nicolaus of Damascus; Pausanias v. 17; Diogenes Laertius i. 7. 2.

P. 157.—The Isthmian tyrannies at Corinth and Sicyon probably represent an anti-Dorian reaction. This is indicated by the Lapith descent of Eteion, father of Cypselus (Herod. v. 92), and the story of the renaming of the Dorian tribes by Cleisthenes (*ib.* 67). See Macan, *ad loc.*

P. 158.—Story of Cypselus: Herod. v. 92; Nicolaus, fr. 53 (F.H.G. iii.).—The abolition of the kings at Corinth was dated 747 B.C.; and the Bacchiad oligarchy which followed (the yearly eponymous magistrates seem to have been entitled *βακχιδῆς*) lasted for ninety years. Cp. Diodorus, 7, fr. 9. For the duration of the Cypselid régime: Cypselus, 30—Periander, 40½—Psammetichus, 3 years: see Aristotle, Pol. v. 1315a (source probably Ephorus).—While Herodotus (in the fictitious speech of Soles, *loc. cit.*) represents the government of Cypselus as a reign of terror, Ephorus portrayed it as a benevolent despotism (Nicolaus, *loc. cit.*; Aristotle, *ib.* 1315b), and stated that Cypselus had no bodyguard, whereas the rule of Periander was harsher. He had a bodyguard (Herod. *ib.*). Cp. Diogenes Laertius, i. 98. The view of Ephorus is probably nearer the truth; the object of Soles was to paint a lurid picture of the horrors of tyranny. Busolt, *op. cit.* i. 639.

P. 159.—Coreyra's sea-power in the latter part of the seventh century is illustrated by the epitaph on Arniadas, who was slain fighting “hard by the ships” (*παρὰ ναυίων*) near the mouth of the river Arachthos (Hicks, 2).

P. 159.—Cypselid policy in Western Greece: cp. Oberhummer, Akarnanien, Ambrakia, Amphilochien, Leukas im Altertum, 1887.—Relation of Leucas to Corinth: Herod. viii. 48; Plutarch, Themistocles, 24; Nicolaus, *ib.*; canal, Strabo x. 2. 8; Polybius v. 5. 12; cp. Thucydides iii. 81, and iv. 8.—Anaetorion: Nicolaus, *ib.*; Strabo, *ib.*—Ambracia: Strabo, *ib.*, and viii. 7. 6. Apollonia: Thucydides i. 26; Strabo vii. 5. 8.—Epidamnus: Thucyd. i. 24; Strabo, *ib.* Received date, 627 or 626 B.C.=beginning of Periander's reign.—Potidaea: Thucyd. i. 56; Nicolaus, fr. 60; Strabo vii. fr. 27.

P. 159.—The Lelantine War : Theognis, 891 ; Herodotus v. 99 ; Thucydides i. 13 ; Aristotle, fr. 98, ed. Rose. Busolt (Gr. Gesch. i. 456-8), referring the passage to some later war, sets the Lelantine struggle about the beginning of the 7th century. He thinks that the verses of Archilochus (fr. 2, Bergk, P.L.G.) are an allusion to it.

P. 160.—Thrasybulus and Periander : In their friendship C. Niebuhr sees an alliance against the Lydian power (Einflüsse orientalischer Politik auf Griechenland, p. 8). See above note on p. 156.

P. 160.—Canal : of Leucas, see above ; at isthmus, Diogenes Laert. i. 99.

P. 161.—Dithyramb : developed, not invented (in spite of Herod. i. 23) ; cp. Archilochus, fr. 77. Arion : Herod. i. 23, 24 ; Pausanias iii. 25. 7 ; Aelian, Hist. Anim. xii. 45.

P. 161.—Corinthian invention of roof-tiles : Dörpfeld, Introduction to Tsountas-Manatt, Mycenaean Age.

P. 161.—Old temple of Corinth=the temple of Apollo mentioned by Pausanias. This is indicated by the orientation of Corinth determined by the American excavations.

P. 161.—The "chest of Cypselus" : Interesting restoration by Mr. H. Stuart Jones in Journal Hell. Studies, xiv. 30 *sqq.* and Plate 1.

P. 162.—Tale of Lycophron : Herodotus iii. 52 ; variant story in Nicolaus, fr. 60. There was a monument of Procles and Melissa at Epidaurus : Pausanias ii. 28. 8.

P. 162.—Psammetichus : Aristotle, Pol. v. 1315*b*, 1304*b* ; Nicolaus, fr. 60.

P. 163.—Oligarchy at Corinth after the fall of the Cypselids ; Nicolaus, *ib.*

P. 163.—Theagenes : Aristotle, Pol. v. 1305*a* ; Rhetor. i. 1357*b*. His date depends on that of Cylon, see below, note on p. 188.—His aqueduct : Pausanias i. 40. 1, and 41. 2.

P. 164.—Orthagorid dynasty : Herodotus vi. 126 *sqq.* ; [Ephorus=] Aristotle, Pol. v. 1315*b* + Nicolaus, fr. 61 + Diodorus viii. fr. 24. Orthagoras : Aristotle, Pol. *ib.* Presumably Andreas took the name Orthagoras when he became tyrant. Cp. Busolt (*op. cit.* i. 661), who calculates that the date of the foundation of the Sicyonian tyranny was about 665. The date of Cleisthenes, c. 600-570, is certain.

P. 164.—"The insulting names, Swine-ites," etc. : Mr. Macan (on Herod. v. 68) suggests that these names may not have been intended for insult, but may "represent localities and localisations of the Dorian *phylae*" (cp. such place-names as Hyam-polis, Sy-bota, Sy-agros, etc., Oneion).

P. 165.—Marriage of Agarista : Busolt dates it to 576 or 572 B.C. (*op. cit.* i. 662). Hippocleides was archon at Athens 566 B.C.

P. 165.—"The Alcmaeonid family." The Alcmaeonids originally were probably foreigners, perhaps from the Peloponnesus (Pausanias ii. 18. 9), and perhaps akin to the Pisistratids, who were also immigrants (see Herodotus v. 62, with Macan's note). Thucydides held that in early times there was a large influx of men of family and power into Attica (i. 2 *ad fin.*).

P. 166, Sect. 8.—Sources : *Primary* : Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo. *Derivative* : Aeschines, c. Ctes. 107-112 ; Marmor Parium, 37 ; Strabo ix. 3 ; Plutarch, Solon, 11 ; Pausanias x. 37 ; Hypothesis to Pindar's Pythian Odes.

P. 166.—Crisa=Cirrha : E. Meyer, *op. cit.* ii. p. 669.

P. 166.—Date of Homeric Hymn to Pythian Apollo : prior to the Sacred War, as its tenor shows.

P. 167.—List of Amphictiones : Aeschines, De falsa leg. 116 ; Herod. vii. 132 ; C.I.A. ii. 1, 551. The official name of the Assembly was *Pyliaca*.—The Enianes of some lists appear as Octaeans in others (cp. Busolt's explanation, i. 684, note 2).—As to the time of the foundation of the league, Busolt rightly emphasizes the fact that the Dryopes did not belong to it ; they were therefore no longer a power in the north when the league was established.—Oath of the members : Aeschines, *ib.* 284.

P. 167.—Sacred war : Aeschines, *ib.* 107 *sqq.* ; Parian Marble, 37 ; Strabo ix. 3. 4 ; Plutarch, Solon, 11 ; Pausanias x. 47 ; Harpocration, *sub v. Κραρυαλλίδαι*. The Craugallidae who shared in the sacrilege of the Crisaeans must have been a Phocian tribe in the vicinity.

P. 167, note.—The part ascribed to Solon in the Sacred War is very doubtful

(E. Meyer, *op. cit.* ii. p. 670), but the Athenians, probably, as an Amphictionic state, sent aid, perhaps under Alcmeon as polemarch (Plut. Sol. 11).

P. 167.—“Crisean Gulf”: the name remained in common use long afterwards; it is always used by Thucydides.

P. 167.—Two annual meetings both at Anthela and at Delphi: H. Bürgel, *Die pylaeisch-delphische Amphiktyonie*, 1877. Cp. Strabo, ix. 4. 17. The official formulae for dating the acts of the meetings were *πυλαίας ἡπιωῆς* and *πυλαίας ὀπωριῆς* (e.g. Dittenberger, 184, 185).

P. 167.—Reorganisation of Pythian agon: Parian Marble, 37; Hypothesis to Pindar's Pythian Odes.

P. 167.—First Pythiad=582 B.C. (not 586): the scholiasts on Pindar calculated the Pythiads on this assumption.

P. 168.—Old stadion in the plain below Crisa: cp. Pindar, *Pyth.* xi. 49.

P. 168.—Cleisthenes, his dedications, and games: Pausanias x. 7. 7, ii. 9. 6; schol. on Pindar, *Nem.* ix. 2.

P. 168.—Isthmian games: these games were probably very old, but they assumed a Panhellenic position at this time. Solon instituted state-prizes for Athenian victors in the Olympian and Isthmian games (Plutarch, Solon, 23).

P. 168.—Nemean games: 573 B.C.=First Nemead (cp. Inscription to Pindar, *Nem.* 7). There were probably local games at Nemea from of old; the legend was that they were founded by Adrastus and his fellow-heroes when they were marching against Thebes, in memory of a boy, Archemorus, who was killed by a serpent. The connexion with Adrastus makes it probable that the Panhellenization of the feast was due to Argive influence: we may regard it as partly a counter-manifesto on the part of Argos to the treatment of Adrastus by Cleisthenes. But the Argives left the Agonothesia in the hands of Cleonae (Pindar, *Nem.* x. 77); not till the middle of the 5th century did the Argives assume the management of the games (Strabo viii. 5. 19).

CHAPTER IV

P. 172.—Sources: *Primary*: Homeric Hymn to Demeter; fragments of Solon; [laws of Solon]; [register of Archons]. *Derivative*: (1) fragments of Pherecydes and of Hellanicus; Herodotus (various passages); Thucydides ii. 15; fragments of Cleidemus, Androtion, Philochorus, and Istrus; Aristotle, *Politics* and *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία*; Parian Marble; fragments of Polemon and others; (2) Plutarch, Theseus and Solon; Pausanias i.

P. 172.—Pallas: Plutarch, Theseus, 13; Strabo ix. 1. 6; Philochorus, fr. 36 (F.H.G. i.); Brückner, *Das Reich des Pallas*, *Ath. Mitth.* 16, 200 *sqq.* (1891).—Cephalus and Thorikos: Schol. *Enrip. Hippol.* 455; Hecataeus, fr. 94 (F.H.G. i.).—Porphyryon: Pausanias i. 14. 7.

P. 172.—Tetrapolis=Marathon, Oenoe, Tricorythus, Probalinthus: Strabo viii. 7. 1; Diodorus xii. 45; C.I.A. ii. 1324.—Tetrakomoi=Peiraeus, Phaleron, Xypete, Thymoetadae: Pollux iv. 105.

P. 173.—“The Pelasgians” and “their Greek successors”: According to the view advocated in Ridgeway's *Early Age of Greece*, the Pelasgians were Greeks, and in Attica had no successors but continued, unconquered and unexiled by invasion, throughout the history of free Greece. This theory harmonizes with the belief of the Athenians that they were autochthonous (cp. Isocrates, *Paneg.* 24; Sophocles, *Ajax*, 202, etc.), and Professor Ridgeway supports it with much learning. But those who do not accept the view that the “Pelasgian” tongue was Greek must regard it as certain that Greek-speaking conquerors or immigrants brought their language into Attica at a very early period, and founded settlements; although this new element was relatively so small that, compared with her neighbours, Attica could be considered Pelasgian. Cp. Herodotus viii. 44. At the same time the distinction of two elements in the population comes out in Herod. vi. 137 (quoting from Hecataeus), where the tradition is that the Athenians paid the Pelasgians to build the Pelargikon. (Professor Ridgeway, following Niebuhr, explains these Pelasgians as a body of refugees who had returned from another home to their kinsmen in Attica, p. 144). The statement of Thucydides (i. 2) that Attica was always inhabited by the same people

embodies the tradition of autochthony. But how far need such a tradition reach back?

P. 173.—Eridanus: Dörpfeld, *Ath. Mitth.* 1888, 211 *sgg.*

P. 173.—Cecrops (like Dolopes, Dryopes, etc.): An inference from Cecrops. Cp. E. Meyer, *op. cit.* ii. 68; Wilamowitz-M., *Aristoteles und Athen*, i. 128. This view, however, which I have provisionally accepted, is highly conjectural. Cecrops, in any case, was an earth-deity, in the form of a snake; and became a hero (Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 438), and the first king of Athens.

P. 174.—Athena and Poseidon Erechtheus; Miss Harrison, *Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*, Introduction. Erechtheus: Homer, *Il.* ii. 547; Herod. viii. 55. Poseidon Erechtheus: C.I.A. i. 387.—Hephaestus: article *s.v.* in Roscher's *Mytholog. Lexikon*. "Sons of Hephaestus": Aeschylus, *Eumen.* 13.

P. 174.—Conquest of Attica: E. Meyer, *op. cit.* ii. 340-1.

P. 175.—Synoecism: Thucydides ii. 15; Plutarch, *Theseus*, 24, 25, 32.

P. 175.—It is probable that Theseus was originally connected with Thessaly: cp. J. Töpffer, *Theseus und Peirithoos*, *Aus der Anomia*, 30 *sgg.* If the figure of Theseus contains, embedded among mythical associations, the prototype of a historical person, it does not seem probable that he represents the actual synoecist of Attica. It seems far more probable that the historical element, which was properly and originally connected with Theseus, is to be sought in the Cretan episode of the hero's career; in other words, if Theseus represents a historical person, he represents the man who delivered Attica from Cnossian overlords (between 1600 and 1200 B.C.). The synoecism must have taken place much later.

P. 175, *note*.—Kings of Athens: cp. Herod. i. 173, viii. 44; Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 568. Hellanicus reduplicated Cecrops and Pandion (fr. 69, 82, F.H.G. i.); differentiated Erichthonius from Erechtheus (fr. 65); and added kings before Cecrops (e.g. Munychus, fr. 71).

P. 177.—Neleids: J. Töpffer, *Attische Genealogie*.—Herodotus i. 147, v. 65; Hellanicus, fr. 10; Strabo xiv. 1. 3. The artificial character of this tradition is proved by the fact that there were no Nelidae, Codridae, or Melanthidae in Attica.—Melanthus and Melaenae: Töpffer, *ib.* 231.—Thymoetadae: a deme N.W. of Piraeus. Thymoetes: Pausanias ii. 18. 9; Demon, fr. in F.H.G. i. p. 378.

P. 177.—Institution of Polemarch: Aristotle, *'Aθ.* II. 3.

P. 177, *note*.—Codrus: Story of disguise first appears in Pherecydes (middle of fifth century), fr. 10; that Codrus fell in battle is the assumption of the painter of an extant red figured cylix: cp. Busolt, *op. cit.* ii. 128.

P. 178.—For kings and regents and position of the Medontids, see Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Hermes*, 1898, 126 *sgg.* Acastus and his successors beside the basilés fainéants correspond to the Pippins and Charles Martel in the days of the last Merovingian kings of Gaul.—Cp. Aristotle, *'Aθ.* II. 3; Diodorus viii. 22; Nicolaus of Damascus, fr. 51 (F.H.G. iii.); Justin ii. 7; Eusebius i. 183, 217; ii. 60, ed. Schoene. List of kings and regents: Eusebius, *ib.* 183 *sgg.* The thirteen life-regents were: Medon, Acastus, Archippus, Thersippus, Phorbas, Megacles, Diognetus, Pherecles, Arriphron, Thespius, Agamestor, Aeschylus, Alcmeon. The chronology is entirely artificial. But the tradition that there were seven ten-yearly regents may be correct; and if so, the date 753-2 B.C. for the transition to the ten-yearly system must be accepted, as the yearly regency began in 683-2 B.C. Parian Marble, 32. Creon was the first annual archon.

P. 178.—Acastus: oath of the archons: *'Aθ.* II. 3.

P. 179.—Origin of Ionic tribes in Attica: Wilamowitz-M., *Aristoteles und Athen*, i. 141. Names of tribes, Busolt, *op. cit.* ii. 103. For *Zeus Geleon*, see C.I.A. iii. 2.

P. 179.—Apollo Patroos, and Zeus Herkeios: cp. e.g. Aristotle, *'Aθ.* II. 55; Plato, *Euthydemus*, 302; Demosthenes, *Against Eubulides*, 67.

P. 179.—Phylo-basilés *'Aθ.* II. 8.

P. 179.—Homogalaktes: Philochorus, fr. 91-94 (F.H.G. i.). The ordinary name was γυνήται: *ib.*; Demosthenes, *Against Eubulides*, 23; Aristotle, fr. 385, ed. Rose.—Archon of the γένος: e.g. C.I.A. ii. 605, 19.—Orgeones: pre-Solonian: Seleucus, fr. in F.H.G. iii. p. 500; Philochorus, fr. 94. Schöll, *Über*

die kleisthenischen Phratrien, Proceedings of Bavarian Academy, ii. 1 *sqq.* (1889). Busolt, ii. 116-8.

P. 179.—Phratriæ and admission into them: Decrees of the Brotherhood of the Demotionidae (396-5 B.C.)=C.I.A. ii. 841b, and Ἐφημερίς Ἀρχαιολογική, 1889, 1 *sqq.* (ed. by Sauppe, De phratriis Atticis, ii. 1890-1); Isæus, Orations ii. and vii.; [Demosthenes], Against Neæra.—Orgeones admitted in 7th century: Busolt, ii. 123, arguing from a law of Draco (C.I.A. i. 61; Demosthenes, Against Macartatus, 57), which seems to imply that there were members of the brotherhoods who did not belong to a genos.

P. 180.—"Later misapprehension," as to clans, brotherhoods, and tribes: Aristotle, fr. 385, ed. Rose.

P. 180.—Archon's declaration and judicial competence: 'Aθ. II. 56.—Residence in the Prytaneum in early times: *ib.* 3; but in the latter part of the 5th century his official house was in the Agora: [Andocides], Against Alcibiades, 14.—Archon performed none of the παρτίαι θυσίαι: 'Aθ. II. 3.

P. 181.—Polemarch: 'Aθ. II. 3 and 58.—King-archon: *ib.* 3 and 57. βασιλεὺς σπρά: Plato Theætetus, 210 D; C.I.A. i. 61, Ditt. 45.

P. 181.—The antiquity of the Council of Areopagus cannot be doubted (though Isocrates and probably most of his contemporaries thought it was a Solonian institution: Areopagit. 37). Earliest mention: Law of Solon, in Plutarch, Solon, 19. The circumstance that the Basileus was its chairman is a surrogate of its antiquity, which was recognised by Aristotle, 'Aθ. II. 3, Polit. ii. 1274a.

P. 182.—Stone of Insolence, etc.: Pausanias, i. 28. 5.

P. 182.—As to the mode of electing magistrates in pre-Solonian days, there is room for difference of opinion. Aristotle ('Aθ. II. 3) says that they were elected ἀριστίνδην καὶ πλουτίνδην—on the ground of birth and wealth,—and he is evidently right; but he had probably no old documentary evidence on the subject. Cp. Busolt, ii. 137.

P. 182, *note*.—Suggestions respectively of Wachsmuth and Rohde.

P. 182.—The Eumolpids, who traced themselves to Poseidon, were the royal house of Eleusis, and they retained the priesthood after the incorporation in Attica. Their Thracian descent was a legend which had obtained credence as early as the fifth century. There may, however, have been Thracian settlers at Eleusis; this is an obscure question. For Thracians in Boeotia and Phocis: Hellanicus, frag. 71; Thucydides ii. 29; Ephorus, fr. 30; Aristotle, fr. 601, ed. Rose. There was a clan of Thracidae (Θρακίδαι) at Delphi: Diodorus xvi. 24. Töpffer, Att. Genealogie, 26 *sqq.*

P. 182.—Date of Eleusinian Hymn: cp. Wilamowitz-M., Aus Kydathen, 125; Hom. Unt. 208. But it need not have been composed *before* the destruction of Eleusinian independence; it may have been composed soon afterwards.

P. 182.—On the treaty between Athens and the Eleusinian dynasty—a treaty which was doubtless *written*—see Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, ii. 38 *sqq.*; R. von Scala, Staatsverträge des Altertums, i. No. 18.

P. 183.—Three classes: 'Aθ. II. 13. 2; Hesychius, s.v. ἀγροῦνται; Plutarch, Theseus, 25.

P. 183.—Pelekes, Daedalidae: Milchhöfer, Text zu den Karten von Attika, ii. 39.

P. 183.—Hektemoroi = Pelatae: 'Aθ. II. 2; Plato, Euthyphron, 4 c (cp. scholium).

P. 183, *note*.—Family of Eupatridæ: Isocrates, περὶ τοῦ εὐέλους, 25; Polemon, fr. 49 (F.H.G. iii.); Wilamowitz-M., Aus Kydathen, 119.

P. 185.—Timocracy before Solon: Three classes (τέλη), not four; Solon made the citizens who had a smaller income than two hundred medimni into a fourth class, called the Thêtes. *Pentacosimedimni* may have been a name invented officially for the highest class when the timocracy was organised; but it may also, as I suggest, have been a popular name for the rich (like our millionaire, though applied to income, not to capital). 'Aθ. II. 7; Plutarch, Solon, 18.

P. 186.—The Demiurgi: The political position both under the timocracy and under Solon's constitution is obscure. Yet that they had political rights, whether they acquired land or not, I consider certain. The mere fact that they stand out as a distinct social class, and are not simply merged in the Thêtes, shows their importance; and the probable view that one of the thesmothetes was

a demiurges implies that they had political rights.—For the thesmothetes, cp. Busolt, *op. cit.* ii. 178, and 179 note. 'Aθ. II. 3.

P. 186.—Athenian navy in second half of seventh century: That the Athenians had then a small fleet of penteconters is not only a necessary inference from the institution of the naucraries, but is implied by the Athenian operations at the Hellespont c. 600 B.C.

P. 186.—The Naucrariae were certainly local, and the name of one (Colias) has survived: Photius, *s.v.* Κωλίας.

P. 187.—The league of Calauria: Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Die Amphiktionie von Kalaurea*, in the *Nachrichten der Gött. gel. Gesellschaft*, 1896, 188 sqq.

P. 187.—Temple of Poseidon at Calauria, excavated by Wide and Kjellberg: *Ath. Mitth.* 1895, 267 sqq.

P. 188.—Cylon: The sources are: Herodotus v. 71; Thucydides i. 126; Aristotle, 'Aθ. II. 1. 1; Plutarch, Solon, 12. The account in Thucydides seems intended as a correction of the account in Herodotus. The two most important differences are: (a) Herodotus does not mention the oracle; (b) the version of Herodotus attributes to the presidents of the council of the Naucrari (οἱ πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων) the management of public affairs at the time, while in Thucydides the chief rôle is played by the nine archons. Aristotle's 'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία confirms the correction of Thucydides. All we know of the Athenian constitution makes us believe that the Prytaneis of the Naucrari could not have been superior to the archons. Macan thinks that the motive of the Herodotean version may have been to absolve the Alcmaeonid archons. (Plutarch speaks of Megacles and his fellow-archons. Megacles, we may believe, was in office; Thucydides does not mention names; but the question suggests itself, Was more than one archon an Alcmaeonid?) This is very plausible: it explains why the archons are replaced by other officers in the Herodotean story, but it does not explain why the Prytaneis were selected to do their duty. It seems probable to me that Prytaneis played some part in the episode, though naturally in subordination to the archons; and I suggest that the Naucratic organisation may have been used to collect the country population to take arms against the conspirators.—For the date: J. H. Wright, *The Date of Cylon*, 1892; Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, i. 671 and ii. 206.

P. 189.—Epimenides: an Attic hero made into a Cretan. Cp. E. Meyer, *op. cit.* ii. 748-9. Diels argues with considerable force that he was a real person, *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie*, 1891, 387. 'Aθ. II. 1; Plutarch, Solon, 12; Diogenes Laertius i. 110-1; Plato, *Laws*, i. 642 D.

P. 190.—Laws (θεσμολογία) of Dracon: C.I.A. i. 61; Demosthenes, *Against Aristocrates*; Plutarch, Solon, 17. Date: 'Aθ. II. 4.—Spurious "constitution" ascribed to Dracon (derived from an oligarchical pamphlet composed in the latter years of the 5th century): *ib.* The unhistorical character of this "constitution" is recognised by Macan, Busolt, Beloch, E. Meyer, Caer, etc.; though there is no reason whatever to regard the passage as an interpolation in the 'Aθ. II. But it has been well pointed out (E. Herzog, *Über Aristoteles*, 'Aθ. II. Kap. 4, 1892) that Aristotle has not really worked this alien element into his story of the development, so that when he comes to describe the constitution of Solon he speaks of the Council of Four Hundred (8) as if it were a new creation (as it was), whereas according to his account it had been introduced by Dracon.

P. 190.—Ephetae: acc. to Pollux (viii. 125), instituted by Dracon, but this notice is suspicious, and the view that they were pre-Draconian is not improbable. It may be questioned whether the number of the Ephetae, 51, is to be analysed as 3×17 , or whether it has anything to do with the three classes (Eupatrids, etc.). It seems more probable that it is to be analysed as $50 + 1$ (the odd man, to avoid an even division in voting).—For the courts, cp. 'Aθ. II. 57.

P. 191.—Mortgage stones: ὄροι: cp. Sandys, note on 'Aθ. II. 12. 4. Solon's words are (*ib.*):

Ἡ μέλαινα τῆς ἐγὼ ποτε
ὄρους ἀνείλων πολλαχὲ πεπηγότας.

P. 192.—Date of Solon's archonship: 594-3 B.C.: Sosicrates in Diogenes Laert. i. 62. On the other hand, the chronography of Eusebius points to 592-1 B.C., and this seems to accord with Aristotle, 'Aθ. II. 14 (source: the Atthis),

where the archonship of Comeas is placed in the 32nd year "after the giving of the laws." At the same time the legislation can hardly have been completed in one year, so that this notice in the *Atthis* might be consistent with 594-3 B.C. as the date of the archonship. Probably the true date was uncertain; it is very likely (as Busolt remarks) that the list of archons was disarranged and confused by the disturbances and "anarchic" years of the following period.

P. 193.—"Instead of making the usual declaration," etc.: Wilamowitz-M., *Aristoteles* und *Athen*, ii. 62. Solon's own description of the effect of his act, in 'Aθ. II. 12. 4.—"Limit for measure of land": Aristotle, *Politics*, ii. 1266b. —"Exportation": Plutarch, Solon, 24.

P. 194.—Monetary reform of Solon. See G. F. Hill, *Numismatic Chronicle* (3rd ser.), xvii. 284 *sqq.*

P. 194.—Archonship: it is generally, and with probability, assumed that Solon confined it to the highest class, though this is nowhere distinctly stated. The *tamiae* of Athena elected from the highest class: 'Aθ. II. 8. Offices confined to three highest classes; *ib.* 7. 3.

P. 195.—Institution of a popular court of appeal by Solon: 'Aθ. II. 9. 2, where the importance of the measure is recognised: κύριος ὢν ὁ δῆμος τῆς ψήφου κύριος γίγνεται τῆς πολιτείας. The pre-Cleisthenic origin of the *Heliaea* (not admitted by Grote, who rejected the statement in Plutarch, Solon, 18) is now generally recognised, and is guaranteed by the old law in *Lysias*, 10, 16 (Wilamowitz-M., *Aus Kydathen*, 89 *sqq.*).

P. 196.—Areopagus under Solon's system: 'Aθ. II. 8. Council of 400: *ib.*; Plutarch, Solon, 19. E. Meyer sees in this Council a development of the Council of the Naucraries (*Gesch. des Altertums*, ii. p. 659).

P. 197.—Mixed method of appointing archons: Aristotle, 'Aθ. II. 8; but *Pol.* ii. 1274a, simple election (*αἰρεσθαι*) is mentioned. But cp. Wilamowitz-M., *Aristoteles* und *Athen*, i. 72.

P. 198.—Law against neutrality: 'Aθ. II. 8; *Plut. Solon*, 20.

P. 198.—Axones in the Prytaneum: *Plut. ib.* 25. *Kyrbais*: 'Aθ. II. 7. 1. Wilamowitz-M. *ib.* i. 45.

P. 200.—The ten archons of 581-0 B.C.: There is no doubt about the number, as it is now certain that the Berlin agrees with the London papyrus in the reading of the passage in Aristotle, 'Aθ. II. 13. 2. See Kenyon, *Classical Review*, Nov. 1900, p. 413, and Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Lesefrüchte* lxxv. in *Hermes*, 53. p. 547 (1900). It seems clear that the motive of electing ten instead of nine was simply to satisfy the three classes with their proportionate representations (4: 3: 2 would not have satisfied the Eupatridae, nor 5: 3: 1 the demiurgoi, nor 5: 2: 2 the Georgoi).

P. 199.—Solon leaves Athens and travels: [Poem of Solon, whence] *Herod.* i. 29; 'Aθ. II. 11; *Plut. Solon*, 25. In Cyprus and Egypt: Solon, *frs.* 19 and 28.

P. 200.—Party strife after Solon's death: 'Aθ. II. 13; *Herod.* i. 59; *Plutarch*, Solon, 29.

CHAPTER V

P. 201.—Sources, as for Chapter IV., with a few inscriptions, architectural remains, etc.

P. 202.—Conquest of Salamis, date of: Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Aristoteles* und *Athen*, ii. 267.—A Megarian tradition ascribed the conquest to the treachery of a banished Megarian family, the Dorykleioi: *Pausanias* i. 40. 4. Cp. *Töpffer*, *Quaestiones Pisistrateae*, 56.

P. 203.—"Through the mediation of Sparta": Sparta was called in to arbitrate. Other early cases of arbitration between two states: Periander of Corinth arbitrated between Athens and Mytilene (*Herod.* v. 95), Corinth between Thebes and Athens (*ib.* vi. 108).

P. 203.—Salaminian decree: Concerns the Salaminians (not, as was hitherto supposed, the cleruchs: A. Wilhelm, *Altattische Schriftdenkmäler*, in *Ath. Mitth.* 1899, 466 *sqq.* The date cannot be determined with certainty.

P. 204.—Hillsmen and party supporting Pisistratus: cp. Aristotle, 'Aθ. II. 13; Pol. v. 1305a; Plutarch, Solon, 29, 30. The hektemors, who mainly lived in the plain, were not Hillsmen proper; the Hillsmen proper were poor peasants.—For the *coup d'état*: Herod. i. 59; Plutarch, *ib.* 30; Aristotle, 'Aθ. II. 14 (sources: Herodotus and Androton).—Date: Arist. *ib.*, cp. Wilamowitz-M. *op. cit.* i. 23.

P. 204.—Stélé of Arision from his tomb near Brauron (C.I.A. i. 464): Wilamowitz-M., *op. cit.* i. 14.

P. 204.—Last years of Solon: Plutarch: *ib.* 31; date of his death: Phanias quoted by Plutarch, *ib.* 32.

P. 205.—Chronology of the exiles of Pisistratus: C. Cichorius, Die Chronologie des Pisistratus (in Kleinere Beiträge zur Geschichte, 1894). But the dates cannot be determined with certainty.—Busolt arrived at the following dates: 1st banishment, 556-5; 1st return, 551-0; 2nd banishment, 550-49; 2nd return, 539-8. Sources: Herod. i. 60-1; Aristotle, 'Aθ. II. 14-17, and Pol. v. 1315b.

P. 205.—Phye: Said to have afterwards married Hipparchus: Cleidemus, quoted in Athenaeus, xiii. 609 c.

P. 205.—Sons of Pisistratus: Wilamowitz-M., *op. cit.* i. 109 sqq.; J. Töpffer, in Hermes, 29, 463 sqq.—Thessalus=Hegesistratus: 'Aθ. II. 17, but it is not quite certain. The difficulty is that Hegesistratus was illegitimate (Herod. v. 94) and Thessalus legitimate (Thucyd. vi. 55).

P. 206.—Battle of Pallene: see also (besides Herod. and 'Aθ. II.) Andocides, Myst. 106.

P. 206.—Constitutionalism of Pisistratus: Thucydides vi. 54; Herod. i. 59; Arist. 'Aθ. II. 16, μάλλον πολιτικῶς ἢ τυραννικῶς. Suspension of Solonian system: *ib.* 22.—Mercenaries, and hostages: Herod. i. 64. Story that Pisistratus disarmed the people by a stratagem: Arist. 'Aθ. II. 15; Polyaeus, Strateg. i. 21. 2.

P. 206.—Pisistratean settlement of the land question: Caner Parteien und Politiker in Megara und Athen, 95 sqq.; Busolt, *op. cit.* ii. 327-9.

P. 207.—Loans of money: Arist. 'Aθ. II. 16.

P. 207.—Land-taxes: thus we may reconcile Aristotle, 'Aθ. II. 16. 4 (δεκάτην) with Thucydides vi. 54 (εἰκοστήν μόνον). But possibly the statement of Aristotle is incorrect.

P. 207.—Mines of Laurion: Ardaillon, *op. cit.*

P. 207.—Thessaly (cp. p. 219): R. W. Macan (on Herod. v. 63) observes: "The connexion between Athens and Thessaly remained a permanent idea of democratic Athens."—As for the foreign policy of Pisistratids, Mr. Macan thinks that it "aimed at converting the Aegean into an Athenian lake, or at least into an Ionian lake under Athenian lead," and to this he attributes the occupation of a fortress in the Troad, the cleruchy in Salamis, the purification of Delos, etc. (note on v. 94).

P. 207.—Lygdamis: of noble birth (Arist. Pol. v. 1305a) and rich (Herod. i. 61); overthrew the oligarchy and became *σπαργηγός*: subsequently set up (not restored, as is usually stated) as tyrant by Pisistratus: Herod. *ib.* and 64; Aristotle, *ib.* and 'Aθ. II. 15, and fr. 558, ed. Rose. Cp. Busolt, *op. cit.* ii. 324.

P. 208.—Pontic corn: to injure Megara, but Athens perhaps did not yet need foreign corn herself. Busolt points out that in Herod. vii. 147, Xerxes sees at the Hellespont ships with corn for Aegina and the Peloponnesus, but not for Athens (*op. cit.* ii. 247).

P. 208.—The presence of the Athenians on the Hellespontine shores in the first (?) half of the sixth century is illustrated by an inscription found at Sigeum (now in the British Museum), in the Attic dialect and in the Attic alphabet, on a pillar which supported the sculptured portrait of a certain Phanodicius of Proconnesus—probably the tyrant of that city—who presented the city hall (πρυτανείον) of the Sigeans with a mixing-bowl, a stand for it, and a strainer. Phanodicius sent the pillar with his bust, and an Ionic inscription recording his gift; the men of Sigeum added an Attic version below (C.I.G. 8; Hicks, 7).—First capture of Sigeum (before Periander's death) and war with Mytilene, confused with second capture of Sigeum (later than 535 B.C.) in Herod. v. 94-5. For the war, and for Pittacus, see also Strabo xiii. 1. 38-9; Diogenes Laertius i. 74.—Periander acted as arbitrator: same sources, and cp. Aristotle, Rhet. i. 1375b.

—Chronology: cp. Busolt, *ib.* 250-1.—Hegesistratus installed as governor of Sigeum: Herod. *ib.* It has been objected to the identification of Thessalus with Hegesistratus, that Thessalus was at Athens in 514 B.C.: Arist. *Ἀθ.* II. 18. But we do not know how long Hegesistratus remained at Sigeum.—It is conceivable that Herodotus was mistaken in supposing Hegesistratus, the governor of Sigeum, to have been the tyrant's son; perhaps he was the archon of 560-59 B.C. who was probably a relative of Pisistratus. In that case the recapture of Sigeum could be placed at an earlier date.

P. 208.—Miltiades leads colonists to the Chersonese: Herod. vi. 34 *sqq.*; Marcellinus, *Life of Thucydides*, 7; Ephorus, fr. 72 (F.H.G. i.); Pseudo-Seymnus, 700, 711. The Athenians settled in Cardia, Crithote, and Pactye; and they, along with all the little Greek settlements of the peninsula, were formed into a Chersonite state, Miltiades being the oecist.

P. 209.—Delos. Compare the Homeric Hymn to the Delian Apollo, and Thucydides iii. 104. For an ancient trade-route connecting Delos with the north of the Adriatic, and thence to "Scythia" (that is, to central Europe and the Baltic?), probably coinciding with the route of the amber trade (*v.* above, note on p. 35), see Herodotus iv. 33, and cp. Callimachus, *Hymn* iv. 283 *sqq.*

P. 210.—Pisistratean ed. of Homer (rejected by Lehrs, Ludwig, and others): Wilamowitz-M., *Hom. Unt.* 235 *sqq.*; Cauer, *Grundfragen der Homerkritik*, 81 *sqq.*

P. 211.—Great Panathenaic festival (*Παναθήναια τὰ μεγάλα*, opposed to the yearly *Παναθήναια*): founded in 566-5 B.C.: Marcellinus, *Life of Thucydides*, 3 (on the authority of Pherecydes); inaccurately ascribed to Pisistratus: schol. Aristides, p. 323, ed. Dindorf. On the Homeric Recitations: Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates*, 102; [Plato], *Hipparchus*, 228 B.

P. 211.—Temple of Athena, Hecatompedon, excavated 1885-6: Dörpfeld, *Ath. Mitth.* 1886, 237 *sqq.* This is the temple of Athena in Herod. viii. 51, 53, and is distinct from the older temple which she shared with Erechtheus (*Iliad* ii. 547; Herod. viii. 53), and which stood on the site of the later "Erechtheum." Against this view, however, it is urged that there are no traces of an older building on that site. Cp. G. Körte, *Rhein. Museum*, 1898, 239 *sqq.*, who holds that the Hecatompedon was a double temple, of Athena and Erechtheus.—Inscription concerning the Hecatompedon temple, C.I.A. iv. 1, 138; Wilhelm, *op. cit.* 491-2.—The Gigantomachy may be post-Pisistratean (last quarter of sixth cent.): see H. Schrader, *Ath. Mitth.* 1897, 59 *sqq.*

P. 212.—Pisistratus also built a temple to the Pythian Apollo (the Pythion) S.W. of the temple of Zeus. Hippias dedicated an altar in the temenos (Thucydides vi. 54), and a fragment of the inscription has been found (C.I.A. iv. 373 E; Hicks, 9).

P. 212.—Temples and feasts of Dionysus at Athens: L. R. Farnell, in *Classical Review*, October 1900, p. 369 *sqq.*—Supposed Sanctuary of Dionysus in Limnae: Dörpfeld, *Ath. Mitth.* 1895, 161 *sqq.*; but the identification is hardly possible (Farnell, *ib.*).

P. 213.—Theseus: cp. E. Meyer, *op. cit.* ii. p. 775.

P. 213.—Aqueducts (excavated by Dörpfeld): *Ath. Mitth.* 1894, 248 *sqq.*; 1895, 161 *sqq.*; 1896, 265 *sqq.*

P. 213.—Walls of Athens: Wilamowitz-M., *Aus Kydathen*, 97 *sqq.*—That Athens had been a walled town before the time of Themistocles is clear from Thucydides i. 89, *τοῦ τε γὰρ περιβόλου βραχέα εἰσέρηκε*. But there is no proof that this pre-Themistoclean wall was the work of the despots, nor is it necessary to infer from the words of Thucydides that it was destroyed by the Persians. The story of Marathon and the story of Salamis are most intelligible on the supposition that Athens was an unwallled town. Macan observes (on Herod. v. 65): "The despotic family or dynasty would be better able to hold a citadel than a fortified city, and as likely to destroy as to build a wall of 20 stades circumference: though they might have left old gateways standing" (*e.g.* the gate on the site of the later Dipylon, leading to the outer Ceramicus, Thucydides vi. 57). It is right to add that many scholars decline to accept this view, and believe that Athens was protected by an effective wall in 490 B.C.

P. 214.—Tegeate war: Herod. i. 65 *sqq.*

P. 214.—The bones of Orestes. It was the same principle that caused

Cleisthenes of Sicyon to expel "the hero Adrastus," that is, his bones, and the Athenians to bring the bones of Theseus to Athens.

P. 215.—Tegea to harbour no Messenians: Aristotle (frag. 73 in Müller, *Fr. Hist. Graec.* ii. 134), who quotes from the stèle on which the treaty was engraved, and which was set up on the banks of the Alpheus (at Olympia?).

P. 215.—Chilon: Diogenes Laertius i. 68; Herod. i. 59, vii. 235; Diodorus ix. 8 *sqq.*

P. 215.—War for Thyreatis: Herodotus i. 82-3; Thucydides v. 41; Pausanias ii. 20, x. 9. 12; Chrysermus (in F.H.G. iv. p. 360).

P. 215.—Peloponnesian League: No direct authority for its constitution in early period: but we can fairly draw conclusions from Thucydides i. 19; Xenophon, *Hellen.* ii. 2, 20, and vi. 3. 7.—Corinth's membership: Herod. iii. 48.

P. 215.—Corinth ranged against Argos: A bronze helmet (in the British Museum) from Olympia records a victory won by the Argives over Corinth, conjecturally about 500 B.C. (C.I.G. 29; Hicks, 10).

P. 216.—Sparta's position in Greece: Owing to her power in the second half of the 6th century Sparta was spontaneously recognised by Hellenes and barbarians as the leading state of Greece, possessing a sort of informal authority over other Greek states. Croesus endorsed this view (Herodotus i. 69) and Macan (note on v. 49) points out how it was accepted by Ionians and Aeolians, Samians, Athenians, Boeotians, Scythians (*ib.* i. 142, 152, iii. 46, 148, vi. 63, 108, 84). Cp. the statement put in the mouth of Aristagoras, v. 49 (*προέειπε τῶν Ἑλλάδων*).

P. 216.—Exclusion of Attic pottery from Argos (Herod. v. 88): J. C. Hoppin, *Class. Review*, 1898, Feb., 86.

P. 216.—Hippias, eldest son, succeeds: Herod. v. 55; Thucyd. i. 20, vi. 54. Thessalus: Diodorus, x. 16; Thucyd. vi. 55.

Pp. 216-7.—Hippias, student of oracles: Herod. v. 93, cp. 90.—Patronage of literature: [Plato] Hipparchus, 228; Aristotle, *'Aθ.* ii. 18.—Lasus: Herod. vii. 6; fr. 1 in Bergk, P. Lyr. Gr. iii.; Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1410-1; schol. on *Arist.*, *Birds*, 1403.—Onomacritus: Herod. vii. 6.

P. 217.—Conspiracy of Harmodius: Herod. v. 56; Thucydides i. 20, vi. 54-8; Aristotle, *'Aθ.* ii. 18, Pol. v. 1311; [Plato] Hipparchus, 237; Diodorus x. 16.—"Hipparchus gave offence": according to another story Thessalus, Aristotle, *'Aθ.* ii. 18.

P. 217.—Change in temper and government of Hippias: Thucyd. vi. 59; Herod. v. 62; Aristotle, *'Aθ.* ii. 19 *ad inīt.* Munychia: Aristotle, *ib.*

P. 218.—Temple of Apollo: Remains of pediment sculptures, Homolle, *Bull. de corr. hell.* 1896, 650 *sqq.* Cp. Bury, in *Hermathena*, 1899, 1 *sqq.*

P. 218.—Siphnian treasury: This (the original) identification is strongly supported by the order in Pausanias; but M. Homolle now regards it as the Cnidian treasury.

Pp. 218-9.—Fall of Pisistratids: Herod. v. 62 *sqq.*; Arist. *ib.* 19; Thucyd. vi. 59; Aristophanes, *Lys.* 1150-6.

P. 219.—Archidice: Thucyd. vi. 59.

P. 219.—Anchimolius (Herodotus) is called Anchimolus in Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens*, xix. 5.

P. 219.—Pillar on the atimia of the tyrants; Thucyd. vi. 55.

P. 220.—Drinking song (skolion): Bergk, P. Lyr. Gr. iii. p. 646.—Privileges to the descendants of Harmodius and Aristogiton: Isaeus, v. 47; C.I.A. i. 8, l. 5. It was a duty of the polemarch to bring sepulchral offerings (*ἐπιταφιαία*) to them: Aristotle, *'Aθ.* ii. 58.

P. 220.—Athens a member of the Peloponnesian League: Wilamowitz-M., *Aus Kydathen*, 116; Aristoteles und Athen, ii. 78. Cp. Thucyd. vi. 82.

P. 220.—Date of accession of Cleomenes: probably 520-15 B.C. He was king when Macandrius of Samos visited Sparta c. 515 B.C. Busolt, *op. cit.* ii. 513.

P. 220.—For the story of Dorieus see Herodotus v. 42 *sqq.*; [Timaeus=] Diodorus xii. 9; *ib.* iv. 23; Pausanias iii. 9-10 and 16. The participation of Dorieus in the war between Croton and Sybaris and the destruction of Sybaris was a disputed question in ancient, and is disputed in modern, times. The men of Croton denied that any stranger had helped them. For the arguments on both sides see Herod. v. 45, with the note of Macan, who urges, with due reserve,

the case of Croton. But it is difficult to reject the case of the Sybarites, until we can discover a motive for their invention of the story. Cp. Freeman, *History of Sicily*, ii. 91.

P. 221.—The two parties: Herod. v. 68; partly represented old Coast and Plain: Curtius, *Gr. Gesch.* i. 372.—Archonship of Isagoras: Arist. *'Aθ.* II. 21; Dionysius Hal. i. 74, v. 1.

P. 221.—Chronology of the reforms of Cleisthenes: Herodotus (v. 69) represents the reform as carried out before the Spartan intervention; Aristotle, *'Aθ.* II. 20, put it after the return of Cleisthenes. The probability is that both are right,—that the reforms were begun before, and completed afterwards. Busolt, arguing for this view, urges that it must have been the Cleisthenic, not the Solonian Council, that opposed Cleomenes.—Expulsion of Alcmaeonids: Plutarch, Solon, 12, states that after the affair of Cylon the banishment of the Alcmaeonids was proposed by Μύρων Φυλείς. But this nomenclature is Cleisthenic and is unheard of before Cleisthenes. Therefore it is probable that Myron's proposal really belongs to the later occasion, 507 B.C. See Beloch, *Gr. Gesch.* i. 339. If so, this is another argument for the view that Cleisthenes had already partly carried through his projects of reform; Busolt, *ib.*

P. 222.—Siege of Spartans in Acropolis: see Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, 271 *sqq.*

P. 222.—Sources for constitution of Cleisthenes: Herod. v. 69; Aristotle, *'Aθ.* II. 21; *ib.* 42 *sqq. passim.*

P. 222.—Political reorganisation of Attica by Cleisthenes: cp. Wilamowitz-M., *Aristoteles und Athen*, ii. 145 *sqq.* Articles by Sautoy in *Hermes*, 27, 312 *sqq.*, and Loeper in *Ath. Mitth.* 1892, 318 *sqq.*

P. 222.—*Trittyes*: the term *trittys* was taken over from the older (Solonian) system, where it had a local significance: the 4 tribes consisting each of 3 trittyes and each trittys of 12 naucraries: *Aθ.* II. 8. Cp. Pollux viii. 111, and Harpocration, *s.v.*

P. 224.—Eleutheræ: C.I.A. iv. 446a, l. 49. Oropus: Thucyd. ii. 23.

P. 224.—Cleisthenic mode of electing Council: inference from Isocrates, *Panathen.* 145 (by anachronism referred to Solonian Council). It was the method introduced for the election of archons in 487 B.C. Busolt, *op. cit.* 431.—“Forty years later they were appointed entirely by lot”: C.I.A. i. 9; Busolt, *ib.*—Oath: *'Aθ.* II. 22.

P. 226.—Cleisthenic cycle: B. Keil, *Hermes*, 1894, 321 *sqq.*

P. 227.—Institution of the strategoi: *'Aθ.* II. 22.

P. 228, *Seet.* 7.—Sources: Herod. v. 74 *sqq.*; schol. on Aristophanes, *Lys.* 273.

P. 228.—The Spartan invasion of Attica in B.C. 506 is set down by Herodotus (v. 74) to the initiation of Cleomenes, who is said to have collected the Peloponnesian army without revealing the object of the muster. Cleomenes was doubtless pleased to undertake the enterprise, but the personal motive alone (which implies the highly improbable view that a Spartan king could then make war at his own discretion) cannot be accepted as its explanation. Mr. Macon points out that “the establishment of Democracy at Athens, the return of Cleisthenes, and the possibility of Athenian aggrandisement supported by Persia, were reasons sufficient to set the Spartan *Symmachy* in motion” (note *ad loc. cit.*). They were at least reasons which Cleomenes, if he wanted war, could urge with force on the Spartan Assembly.

P. 228.—“The Corinthians disapproved”: Corinthian policy was friendly to Athens till shortly before the second Persian war: cp. Herodotus vi. 108, v. 92-93, vi. 89. The development of the Athenian naval power under Themistocles changed the situation.

P. 229.—Date of alliance between Athens and Plataea (see Thucydides iii. 55): According to the text of Thucydides iii. 68, the date would be 518 B.C., which can hardly be right. Busolt proposes a slight emendation (*Gr. Geschichte*, ii. 399), which would give 519 B.C. See Herod. vi. 108, v. 74.

P. 230.—Bronze chariot: Herod. v. 77; Pausanias i. 28. 2. Base with frag. of inscription: C.I.A. iv. 2, 334a. Cp. above, vol. i. p. 394.

P. 230.—Inscription of Athenian stoa at Delphi: Dittenberger, *Sylloge*², 8 (Hicks, 20); Wilamowitz-M., *Arist. u. Athen*, ii. 287.

- P. 230.—Cleruchies of Chalcis: Aelian, *Hist. Pl.* vi. 1.
 P. 230.—History of Oropus: Wilamowitz-M., *Hermes*, 21, 97 *sqq.*

CHAPTER VI

P. 231, *Sect.* 1.—Sources: *Primary*: inscriptions of Assarhaddon and Assurbanipal. *Derivative*: (1) Herodotus, *Bk.* i.; [Xanthus]; Bacchylides, *Ode* 3; fragments of Ctesias; (2) fragments of Nicolaus of Damascus; Diodorus, fragments of *Bk.* ix.; Justin (= Pompeius Trogus), *Bk.* i.

P. 231.—Sargon stélé: Schrader, *Die Sargonstele des Berliner Museums*, in the *Abhandlungen of the Berlin Academy*, 1881.

P. 233.—The mythical queen Semiramis (cp. Diodorus ii. 7 *sqq.*) developed out of a historical Semiramis, namely, Sammuramat, who was the wife of Adadnirari III., king of Assyria (812-783 B.C.). For a full discussion of her historical significance and an interesting explanation of the notice of Herodotus (i. 184), see C. F. Lehmann, *Die historische Semiramis und Herodot*, in his *Beiträge zur alten Gesch.* i. 256 *sqq.* (1901).—The hanging garden: Diodorus ii. 10 (from Ctesias).

P. 234.—Eclipse of the sun, and battle: Herod. i. 74, 103; [Eudemus] Diogenes Laertius i. 23; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* ii. 12, 53.

P. 235.—Sepulchre of Alyattes. This has been identified with a large mound north of Sardis, beyond the Hermus, surmounted with a stone of pomegranate shape. Excavation discovered in its centre a sepulchral chamber. See Olfers, *Abhandlungen of the Berlin Academy*, 1858, p. 539 *sqq.*

P. 235.—Smyrna: Herod. i. 16; Strabo xiv. 1. 37.

P. 235.—Accession of Croesus: he is said to have reigned 14 (Herod.) or 15 (chronographers: Eusebius, etc.) years: therefore the date of his accession would be about 560 or 555 B.C., according as the fall of Sardis is placed in 546 or 541 B.C.—For his successes against the Greek cities, see Herod. i. 6, 26, 27; Strabo xiii. 601.

P. 236.—Croesus inscription at Ephesus: Hicks, 4; Dittenberger², 1.

P. 236.—Croesus and Delphi: the offerings of Croesus, seen by Herodotus, are not above suspicion. Cp. C. Niebuhr, *Einflüsse orientalischer Politik auf Griechenland*, p. 24 *sqq.*

P. 237.—*Medism*: significance of the term; cp. Mahaffy, *Hermathena*, 1879, 459.

P. 238.—546 B.C.: received date (after Sosicrates and the chronographers) of fall of Sardis, but it is far from certain. Busolt is in favour of 541 B.C., the date implied by the Parian Marble. He shows that it was probably the date recognised by Xanthus (*op. cit.* ii. 460). Büdinger (*Berichte of the Vienna Academy*, 92, 203 *sqq.*, 1898) and Töpffer (*Quaestiones Pisistratae*, 115 *sqq.*) argue for the same date.

P. 239.—The date of the red-figured vase (preserved in the Louvre), on which the pyre of Croesus is represented, might be roughly between 510 and 490 B.C. Miss Harrison, *Classical Review*, 1898, Feb. p. 84; A. H. Smith, *Journal of Hell. Studies*, 1898, 267-8.

P. 240, *Sect.* 2.—Sources: Herodotus i.; Justin and fragments as in *Sect.* 1.

P. 240.—Fate of Croesus: Ctesias, p. 130, ed. Gilmore.

P. 242.—Miletus. From Herodotus v. 28 it would seem that the early prosperity of Miletus lasted down to the beginning of the 6th century (c. 580 B.C.), and was followed by a period of decline and weakness due to internal dissensions. This lasted for about 70 years. Then the city revived (under Histiaeus apparently), and reasserted its position as the chief city of Ionia.

P. 242.—Proposals of Thales and Bias: Herod. i. 170; Diogenes Laert. i. 25.

P. 243.—Harpagus: Herod. i. 161-2.—Ionians bound to military service: *ib.* 171.—Teos: *ib.* 168.—Phocaeans: *ib.* i. 165, and Antiochus, fr. 9, F.H.G. i.

P. 243.—Appeal to Sparta: Herod. i. 152.

P. 243.—Capture of Babylon by Cyrus: date 539 B.C., J. V. Präsek, *Zur Chronologie des Kyros* (in *Forschungen zur Gesch. des Alterthums*, iii.), 1900, pp. 2-7.

P. 244, *Sect.* 3.—Sources: Herodotus iii.; Justin and fragments as in *Sect.* 1.

P. 245.—Submission of Cyrene: The story in Herodotus (iv. 203) "of the escape of Cyrene from the Persian yoke is a transparent apology for the unpatriotic attitude of that state in the Medic Wars" (Macan, Introduction to his Herodotus, p. lxxviii.).

P. 245.—Polyerates: date of his reign: Herod. i. 126; Thucyd. i. 13. Cp. Diogenes Laert. ii. 2. His story runs through the 3rd Book of Herodotus.

P. 247, Sect. 4.—Sources: *Primary*: inscription of Behistun; fragments of Hecataeus. *Derivative*: Herodotus iii. 61-96, 133 *sqq.*, v. 52. etc.

P. 247.—Date of Behistun inscription: 511 or 510 B.C., Präsek, Zur Chron. des Kyros, 37.

P. 247.—Satrapies: Herod. iii. 89 and 127.

P. 248.—Tribute: under Cyrus the tribute had been irregular (*δωπα*), *ib.* 89.—System of tyrants: cp. Herod. iv. 137.

P. 248.—Royal Road: cp. Macan's Herodotus, vol. ii. App. xiii.

P. 249.—Maps: cp. J. L. Myres, An Attempt to Reconstruct the Maps used by Herodotus, in Geographical Journal, Dec. 1896.

P. 249.—"Text of Anaximander's map": phrase of E. Meyer.

P. 250.—Democedes: Herod. iii. 131 *sqq.*

P. 251, Sect. 5.—Sources: *Derivative*: Herodotus, Bk. iv.; cp. frags. of Ctesias, and Strabo, Bk. vii. c. 2.

P. 251.—Thracian and Scythian expedition of Darius: date, 511 or 510 B.C. Präsek, *op. cit.* 35-37. (Busolt: 512 B.C.; Gutschmid: 513 B.C.) See Herodotus iv. 138 and v. 17. Busolt showed that the date 514 B.C. given in the Tabula Capitolina, C.I.G. 6855*d*, cannot be correct.

P. 252.—Miltiades, son of Cimon, was nephew of Miltiades, son of Cypselus—the first tyrant. Herod. vi. 39.

P. 253.—Macedonia: At this time Amyntas was king of Macedonia, and his reign seems to have lasted till 498 B.C. The eastern frontier at this period was probably the river Axios. Cp. Macan's note on Herodotus v. 17.

P. 253.—Byzantium and Chalcedon revolted, also Antandrus and Lamponion. This follows from the fact that Otanes, the successor of Megabazus, was obliged to reduce them, Herod. v. 26. Ctesias, however (p. 151, ed. Gilmore; from the Epitome of Photius, 17), and Polyænus (vii. 10. 5) ascribe the capture of Chalcedon to Darius himself. For Perinthus, see Herod. v. 1 and 2.

P. 254.—Scythian expedition of Darius: cp. Macan, Herodotus, vol. ii. App. ii. iii.; Bury, Classical Review, July 1897. The story was first seriously criticised by Grote.

P. 254.—Herodotus had himself probably visited the Black Sea. We may be certain that he got as far as Byzantium, and it is probable that he visited Olbia (=Borysthenes). See iv. 81 and 89. But there is not the slightest evidence for supposing that he made anything like a periplus of the Euxine. See Macan, Introduction to ed. of Herodotus, xcv. *sq.* The date would have been soon after 444 B.C., if we accept Duncker's specious theory that his visit was suggested by the expedition of Pericles.

P. 254.—The story of the conduct of Miltiades on the Danube (Herodotus iv. 137) was acutely criticized by Thirlwall, History of Greece, ii. Appendix 2. It was probably, as he pointed out, part of the defence of Miltiades, when he was put on his trial for the crime of tyranny on his return to Athens, shortly after the end of the Ionic revolt (Herod. vi. 104). We may regard the speech for the defence on that occasion as the ultimate source of the incident on the Danube. Whether there were any written abstracts of such speeches in existence, when Herodotus was at Athens and might have had access to them, is another question. Macan is inclined to think that copies or abstracts may have been preserved (Introduction, *op. cit.* p. lxxxvi.), and he gives a number of instances where the material of Herodotus ultimately depends on the proceedings of a trial. At all events, we may consider it certain that forensic speeches in these cases seriously affected and shaped oral traditions. It is important to observe that Herodotus tells us (vi. 136) that the battle of Marathon and the acquisition of Lemnos were part of the defence which the friends of Miltiades made for him at his second trial.

P. 255, Sect. 6.—Sources: *Primary*: [Hecataeus]. *Derivative*: Herodotus, Bks. v. and vi. 1-42.

P. 255.—Chronology of Ionian revolt: in many respects uncertain: see Macan, Herodotus, vol. ii. Appendix v.

P. 258.—Hecataeus. It is to be observed that though he expressed his own independent judgment, which disapproved of the revolt, Hecataeus threw in his lot with Aristagoras.

P. 258.—Athens appointed Melanthius to command her forces, Herod. v. 97. Was he one of the tribal *stratēgoi* of the year, specially elected, with a view to this expedition, on account of Ionian connexions? For Macan (*ad loc.*) well suggests a Codrid descent (Melanthus was father of Codrus), and Codrids were said to have founded Miletus.

P. 258.—The circumstance that the Persians were besieging Miletus is not mentioned by Herodotus, but is preserved in Plutarch, *De malignitate Herod.* 24, and is doubtless genuine. It explains the circumstance that the Greek march on Sardis (designed to relieve Miletus) was unopposed (*οὐδενὸς σφί ἀντιθέτος*, Herod. v. 100). Cp. Macan, *ad loc.*

P. 259.—“Met by a Persian force and defeated”: Herod. v. 102. But Charon of Lampsacus seems to have said nothing of the defeat; fr. 2 ap. Müller, *Fragm. Hist. Graec.* vol. i.

P. 259.—In regard to the Athenian withdrawal from the rebellion, Macan observes (*ad v. 103*): “It may be conjectured that the question for the Athenians was not one of staying in Ionia or going home, but of staying at home, or returning, next year, to Ionia. The Athenians hardly sent out their ships with a permanent or unlimited commission. The ships would return to Athens at the end of the season.” We must remember that a change in party influence at Athens might hinder the Athenians from following up the success of the first campaign in the following year. During this period party politics at Athens are quite obscure; but we may be sure that there was a party against, as well as for, co-operation with the Ionians.

P. 259.—“Who are the Athenians?” So Cyrus had asked “Who are the Spartans?” (Herod. i. 143); so Artaphrenes, too, asked about the Athenians (v. 73), and Darius about the Paeonians (v. 13). “The formula is a standing one” (Macan).—“As has been well observed”—by Grote.

P. 259.—Why the Greeks operated south of Ionia. Cp. Macan’s good note on Herod. v. 103. “A regular and necessary preliminary to the liberation of the Hellespont was an Hellenic victory in the Southern Levant; otherwise Ionia was at the mercy of the king’s ships. So Pausanias heads for Kypros before blockading Byzantium in 478-7 B.C., Thuc. i. 94, and the same strategy is pursued by Kimon and the Athenians again and again.”

P. 259.—Cyprus. For the nine states of Cyprus (Amathus, Cerynea, Citium, Curion, Lapithus, Marion, Paphus, Salamis, Soli) see Head, *Historia Numorum*, 620.

P. 259.—Reduction of Cyprus: probably winter 498-7 B.C.: Herod. v. 116; Busolt, ii. 547.

P. 260.—On the Greek contingents at Lade, see Macan’s note to Her. vi. 8. The number of the Persian ships has been suspected. “It is exactly the number of the fleet of Datis and Artaphrenes” (Macan); but that is rather what we should expect. There may be errors in the statements as to the particular contingents, but I am disposed to think that the total may be near the truth.

P. 260.—The Ionians at Lade. I cannot forbear to quote Macan’s admirable criticism of the Herodotean account of the Ionian revolt. The story, he says (Introduction, *op. cit.* lxvii.), “looks, in part, like a justification of the Athenian hegemony and empire. The Athenians could insist upon their ‘metropolitan’ relation to the Ionians, when it suited them. Grote, in his politic way, drew a parallel and contrast between the battle of Lade and the battle of Salamis, and pointed the moral, that it justified the subsequent overlordship of Athens: he forgot, however, to ask how far this moral had already been at the making of the story [cp. note on vi. 12]. Of a truth the moral of the three enslavements of Ionia was that the Ionians were incapable of liberty, and had but a choice of masters. This judgment is historically verified; but the particular stories which illustrate it may have been affected in the telling by the foregone conclusion.” This conclusion is part of that “anachronistic spirit” which pervades the whole story of the Persian wars (cp. Macan, p. lxx.). For the

unfriendly attitude of Herodotus towards the Ionians, cp., for instance, i. 143, iv. 95, and the account of Lade, vi. 11-13.

P. 260.—The Samians deserted: Herodotus, vi. 13, attempts to whitewash their treachery (cp. Macan's note).

P. 261.—Capture of Miletus. This city never recovered her prosperity; Samos, which had been so treacherous at Lade, steps into her place as chief city of Ionia. In the later revolt from Xerxes, Samos played chief part.

P. 261.—The temple of the Branchidae: it was the shrine specially favoured and consulted by the Lydian kings. Cp. C. Niebuhr, *op. cit.* 23.

P. 261.—Inscription of Chares: Hicks, 6. There was also a dedication of one Histiaeus in this temple (Hicks, 5): he *may* be the tyrant of Miletus.

P. 261.—Letter of Darius to Gadates, an Atticized copy of 2nd cent. A.D., preserved on a stone: Dittenberger, *Sylloge*², 2; Kern, *Die Inschriften von Magnesia am Maeander*, 115.

P. 261.—Was the Ionian revolt a mistake? Herodotus, though no admirer of Hecataeus, agreed with Hecataeus that it was. Cp. v. 98 and 124. The truth seems to be that the enterprise would have had good prospects of success if all the cities had acted with harmonious zeal and patriotism. Hecataeus probably knew that it was useless to expect this. It is important to observe that Ephesus stood entirely aloof.

P. 262.—Play of Phrynichus. It has been suggested that the indignation which this drama aroused among the Athenians was not for tears it made them shed, but for reproaches the poet may have levelled against Athens for deserting the Ionian cause. This conjecture is very plausible. It is quite incredible that a poet should have been tried and condemned for producing a pathetic drama on the fall of Miletus. On the other hand, it would have been natural for Phrynichus to reflect upon the policy of Athens in regard to Ionia, if, as we may confidently divine, Athenian opinion was divided. The condemnation of Phrynichus would then have been a triumph for the party which had advocated non-interference.—E. Meyer (*Gesch. des Altertums*, iii. pp. 312-3) conjectures that the drama of Phrynichus was intended to serve the policy of Themistocles, who was already bent on making Athens a naval power, and, with this in view, was seeking to impress his countrymen with the danger involved for Greece in the Persian command of the sea. Though Phrynichus was fined, Themistocles produced the effect he desired and was elected archon in 493 B.C.

P. 262, Sect. 7.—Sources: *Primary*: inscriptions. *Derivative*: (1) Herodotus vi. 43 *sqq.*; (2) Plato, Menexenus; [Lysias] Epitaphios; frags. of Otesias; Justin ii.; Nepos, Miltiades; Plutarch, Aristides 5, Parallels 305; De malign. Herod.; Pausanias i. 15 and 32.

P. 262.—Democracies established in Ionia by Mardonius: Herodotus vi. 43. The powers of these democracies must have been limited: but the position of Greek cities under the arrangement of Mardonius was probably much the same as their position in later times, under Persian domination in the 4th century. The Persian power acted only through the satrap of the province, and he was quite outside the constitutions of the cities.

P. 263.—The success of Mardonius appears in Herodotus vii. 108; in curious contrast with the assertion in v. 45, that his expedition was a disgraceful failure (*αἰσχρὸς ἀγώνισμα*), which cannot be explained or justified by the unlucky storm off Mt. Athos.

P. 266.—Decree to march to Marathon: τὸ Μαραθῶν ψήφισμα. The source is Demosthenes, De fals. leg. 303, with Schol., and Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 10.

P. 268.—Battle of Marathon, reconstruction of: Macan, *op. cit.* vol. ii. Appendix x.; Review of Macan's work in Athenaeum, 21st Dec. 1895; cp. Bury, *Class. Review*, March 1896.—For a new and very acute treatment of the Marathonian problem, see the article by J. A. R. Munro, J.H.S. xix. 1899.—He makes it probable that the object of the Persians in luring the Athenians to Marathon was to gain possession of Athens in their absence. This they might hope to effect in consequence of their immense numerical superiority. They could detach a large force to Athens, and yet remain sufficiently strong at Marathon to molest the Greeks if they attempted to withdraw. As for gaining possession of the city when they reached it, Hippias and the Persians relied on treachery, and the traitors were the Alcmaeonids. The view that the

Alcmaeonids were responsible for the Shield-incident fits in with this theory.—An article by T. M. Hughes (Classical Review, March 1901) throws light on the uselessness of the Persian cavalry at Marathon. The plain must have been under cultivation, and then, as now, drained by deep trenches, which would have seriously interfered with manœuvres of cavalry. Thus "agriculture helped the Greeks," and they recognised it by paying honour to the hero Echetlaeus or Ploughtail (Pausanias i. 32. 4: source, local tradition).

P. 270.—Callimachus inscription: C.I.A. iv. 153, 350: Köhler, Hermes, 1896, .150. Two other epigrams on battle of Marathon, C.I.A. i. 333; ep. Wilhelm, Ath. Mitth. 1899, 489 *sqq.*

P. 271.—Shield incident: A guess as to its significance, Bury, Class. Review, Feb. 1896. The doubt of Herodotus would, of course, be explained, if Alcmaeonids were his informants.

P. 273.—Paros had, doubtless, profited by the fall of Naxos (as Macan points out, on Herod. v. 23 and vi. 133). The Archilochus inscription referred to above (note on p. 123) throws new light on the early rivalry of these islands.

Sect. 8.—Sources: Herodotus, passages in Bks. v. and vi.

P. 274.—Athens and Aegina: Wilamowitz-M., Aristoteles und Athen, ii. 280 *sqq.*; Macan, *op. cit.* vol. ii. App. viii.

P. 274.—Athenian appeal to Sparta, implying recognition of Spartan *prostatia*: Herod. v. 49. Was it prompted by Themistocles (as Macan conjectures)?

P. 275.—Argive war: Herodotus vi. 76 *sqq.* and 19, vii. 148; Plutarch, Virt. Mul. 4.; Pausanias ii. 207-8 (source: Herodotus), iii. 4. 1. For the date *cp.* Busolt, Gr. Gesch. ii.² 561, and Macan's note on Herod. vi. 76.

P. 275.—Cleomenes conspired in Arcadia: at Nonacris in the Azanian district, Herod. vi. 74.

Sects. 9, 10.—Sources: Pindar, Pyth. 7 (486 B.C.); Herodotus viii. 104, and other passages; Thucydides i. 93; Aristotle, *'Αθηναίων Πολιτεία*; Plutarch's Themistocles and Aristides.

P. 278.—Ostracism: ascribed to Cleisthenes: Arist. *'Αθ. Πολ.* 22. Its object: Politics, iii. 1284*a*.—Annual Procheirotonia whether an "ostrakophoria" should be held: Arist. *'Αθ. Πολ.* 43.

P. 279.—Ostracism of Megacles and of Xanthippus: ostraka used on these occasions, with their names, C.I.A. iv. 3, 569 (Megacles); *ib.* 570 and 571 (Xanthippus). See *'Αθ. Πολ.* 22.

P. 279, *note.*—Solon's law against neutrality—ostracism—Graphe Paranomon: Mahaffy, Hermathena, 1881, 87.

P. 280.—Archonship of Themistocles: Thucyd. i. 93; Dionysius Hal. vi. 34. His plans at this time opposed by Miltiades: [Stesimbrotus] Plutarch, Themist. 4.

P. 281.—Increase of the fleet: Thucyd. i. 14; Herod. vii. 144; *'Αθ. Η.* 22.

P. 281.—Maronea identified with Camareza: Ardaillon, Les Mines du Laurion. *'Αθ. Πολ.* 22.

CHAPTER VII

Sects. 1-8.—*Primary*: a few inscriptions; Aeschylus, Persae; contemporary epigrams (ascribed to Simonides); passages in Pindar. *Derivative*: (1) Herodotus vii.-ix.; a few fragments of Hellanicus; fragments of Ctesias; (2) Aristotle, *'Αθ. Πολ.*; [Ephorus]; Diodorus xi.; [Pompeius Trogus=] Justin ii. 10-14; Nepos, Themistocles and Aristides; Plutarch, Themistocles and Aristides. [Mr. G. B. Grundy has recently published (1901) an important work, The Great Persian War, based on careful topographical investigations.]

P. 282.—For the extent and chronology, of the travels of Herodotus, see Macan, Introduction to his ed. of Bks. iv. v. and vi. pp. xci. *sqq.* That the visit to Egypt preceded the visit to Pontus would be a possible, but not certain, inference from the reference to Egypt in the description of the Scythian rivers, iv. 47; but there are other reasons for this order. The visit to Egypt probably fell between 449 and 443 B.C.; the visit to Pontus after 444 B.C. (Macan, *ib.* xcii.-iii.).

P. 288.—Sparta's "acknowledged headship": due to her headship of the Peloponnesian League. The Synedrion of the Isthmus may be said to have grown out of the Peloponnesian League, whereof Athens was a member.—The chief members of the Synedrion may be deduced from the tripod inscription of Delphi (below, note on Sect. 7), and the inscription of Olympia (Pausanias v. 23. 1), and notices in Herodotus, as follows: Sparta, Athens, Corinth, Tegea, Sicyon, Aegina, Megara, Epidaurus, Orchomenus, Phlius, Troezen, Hermione, Tiryns, Plataea, Thespieae, Mycenae, Ceos, Eretria, Chalcis, Styra, Elis, Leucas, Anactorion, Cythnus, Siphnus, Ambracia, Lepreon, Mantinea, Scirphus, Melos, Paleis. On these lists cp. Domaszewski's paper, in *Heidelberger Jahrbücher*, i. 181 *sqq.* (1891).

P. 289.—Apology for Thebes: Thucydides iii. 62; cp. Plutarch, *De Her. malign.* 31.

P. 290.—Athenian amnesty for the exiles (with certain exceptions): Andocides, *Mysteries*, 107 *sqq.*; cp. psephisma, *ib.*; 'Αθ. Ηολ. 22; Plutarch, *Arist.* 8.

Pp. 291 *sqq.*—Thermopylae and Artemisium: criticism of the account of Herodotus, Bury, in *Annual of the British School at Athens*, vol. ii.

P. 297.—That a Persian force attacked Delphi and was repelled seems proved by the fact that the Delphians dedicated a trophy in the temple of Athena Pronaea, with an epigram preserved by Diodorus, xi. 14.

P. 298.—Oracle of the wooden wall: Acropolis not left without a garrison; Bury in *Classical Review*, Dec. 1896.

P. 298.—Numbers of Greek fleet: 310 (Aeschylus, *Pers.* 339); 378 (Herod. viii. 48); about 400, Thucyd. i. 74.—Athenian ships: 200 (Herod.); nearly $\frac{3}{4}$ of 400 (Thucyd.); 100 (Ctesias, *Pers.* fr. 26).

P. 301.—Aristides at Salamis: Bury, *Class. Review*, *loc. cit.*

P. 302.—Battle of Salamis: cp. papers of Goodwin in *Journal Arch. Inst. of America* 1888; and Grundy, in *J.H.S.* xvii. 1897.

P. 305.—Prize of wisdom: The anecdote that each general wrote his own name first and that of Themistocles second cannot, of course, be taken seriously; but even the statement that a prize for wisdom was offered at all may be rejected. In fact, the story carries with it its own refutation: *no prize was awarded*,—because none was offered. It seems possible that the shrine of Artemis Aristobule (see vol. i. p. 360) was connected with the origin of the story.

P. 305.—The epitaphs: Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, *Simonides der Epigrammatiker*, in *Nachrichten der K. Ges. der Wiss. zu Göttingen*, 1897, 307 *sqq.* Stone with the Corinthian epitaph: Dragumés, *Ath. Mitth.* 1897, 52.

P. 306.—Temple of Athena: this must no longer be so called, as Professor Furtwängler's excavations on the site have uncovered an inscription which shows that the temple was dedicated to the goddess Aphaea (in honour of whom Pindar wrote an ode: Pausanias ii. 30. 3). See R. C. Bosanquet's archaeological report in *J.H.S.* xxi. pp. 345-6 (1901).

P. 307.—Policy of Athens: cp. Nitzsch's paper in *Rheinisches Museum*, 27. 258 *sqq.* (1872).

P. 308.—Alexander of Macedon (succeeded Amyntas, 498 B.C.): Herodotus represents him in a favourable light, but, as Maean warns us (*ad* v. 17), Herodotus probably derived his information from Athenian sources, and in the middle of the 5th century the Athenians may have been prone to lay more stress on the friendship of Alexander than history warranted, and to give him credit for more Hellenic patriotism than he displayed. It is certain that he betrothed his sister Gyguæa to a Persian noble Bubares (son of Megabazus), Herod. v. 21; and Maean shows reason for questioning the story (*ib.* 18-20) that Alexander murdered a Persian embassy.

Sect. 7.—Besides sources mentioned above, inscription on base of Delphic tripod (most recent ed.: Dittenberger, *Syll.* 27).

P. 312.—Battle of Plataea: G. B. Grundy, *The Topography of the Battle of Plataea*, 1894; Woodhouse, *Journal of Hell. Studies*, 1898, 33 *sqq.* (who well brings out the Athenian bias of the account in Herodotus). Date of battle: cp. Busolt, *op. cit.* ii. 726.

P. 317.—"Distressed in soul": *καίπερ ἀχνόμενος θυμόν*, Pindar, *Isth.* vii. 5.

P. 318.—Stone of Tantalus: Pindar, *ib.* 10.

Sects. 9-11.—Sources: *Primary*: some inscriptions; Sicilian Odes of Pindar

and Bacchylides. *Derivative*: (1) Herodotus vii. 153-167; (2) Pindaric scholia [chief source: Timaeus]; Diodorus xi.; Xenophon's Hiero; Justin xix. 1-2.

P. 320.—Carthage allied with Etruria: Herodotus i. 166; Aristotle, Politics, iii. 9.

P. 321.—Pentathlus: Antiochus, fr. 2 (F.H.G. i.). Lipara, *ib.*; Thucydides iii. 88; Diodorus v. 9. Th. Reinach, in *Revue des études grecques*, 3, 86 *sqq.* (1890).

P. 321.—Malchus: Justin xviii. 7. Phalaris: Pindar, Pyth. i. 95; Aristotle, Politics, v. 10, and Rhetoric, ii. 20; Polyaeus v. 1-4; Philistus, fr. 15 (F.H.G. i.).

P. 321.—"In the days of Cambyes": Thucydides i. 13.

P. 322.—Battle of Alalia: Herodotus, i. 166. Corsica: Diodorus v. 13. Sardinia: cp. Polybius iii. 22, and Strabo xvii. 1. 19.

P. 322.—Anaxilas of Rhegium (cp. Aristotle, Politics, v. 12): he took Zancle from the Samians who were in possession of it: Thucydides vi. 4. 5 (cp. Herod. vi. 24 and vii. 164); Pausanias iv. 23. Thucydides connects the change of name to Messana with Anaxilas (a Messenian), while Herodotus ascribes it to Cadmus, a tyrant of Cos who went to Sicily. Freeman (History of Sicily, ii. 484 *sqq.*) conjectures that the naming of Messana may have been of later date, and due to Messenians who emigrated from the Peloponnesus after the Third Messenian War (459 B.C.).—Cp. the coins of Anaxilas: Head, *Historia Numorum*, 134-5.

P. 323.—Hippocrates: Herodotus vii. 154-5. Battle of the Helorus: Pindar, Nem. ix. 95 (cp. frags. of Timaeus in schol. *ad loc.*). Camarina: Thucydides, vi. 5; Philistus, fr. 17 (F.H.G. i.).

P. 323.—Gelon: cp. (besides sources mentioned above to sect. 9) Aristotle, Politics, v. 3 and 4.—Gamoroi: Herod. v. 155; Diodorus viii. 9; Parian Marble, 36.

P. 323.—Position and title of the Syracusan tyrants: *στρατηγὸς αὐτοκράτωρ*? Freeman, History of Sicily, ii. 499 *sqq.*; Bury, *Class. Rev.*, March 1899.

P. 325.—Synchronism of Himera and Salamis: Aristotle, Poetic, 23.

P. 329.—Bronze helmet of Hiero (British Museum): the inscription is *Ἱέρων ὁ Δεωμένεος καὶ τοὶ Συρακοῖται τῷ Διὶ Τυρᾶν ἀπὸ Κόμης*, "Hiero, son of Deinomenes, and the Syracusans (dedicated) to Zeus Etruscan spoils won at Cyme" (Inscr. Graec. Ant. 510; Hicks, 15); cp. Pindar, Pyth. i. 72.

P. 330.—Hieron's victories in the games were: Horse-races at Pytho, 482, 478 B.C.; horse-races at Olympia, 476 and 472 B.C.; chariot-race at Pytho, 470 B.C.; chariot-race at Olympia, 468 B.C. The dates of the victories of 476 and 472 are now absolutely determined by a List of Olympian Victors (Oxyrhynchus Papyri, ii. pp. 87-8).

P. 330.—Acragas, "finest of the cities of men": Pindar, Pyth. xii. 1.

P. 332.—Himera independent: Pindar, Olymp. 12 (to Ergoteles, victory in 472 B.C.): date of Ode, end of 470 B.C.

P. 332.—For Thrasybulus cp. Aristotle, Politics, v. 10.

P. 334, *Sects.* 12, 13.—Homeric Hymn to Demeter; Orphica (ed. Abel); material collected in Lobeck's *Aglaophamus* [cp. Kern, *De Orphei, Epimenidis, Pherecydis theogniis*; Rohde's *Psyche*; and Gruppe's art. on Orpheus in *Roscher's Lexikon*].

P. 338.—Orphic Theology: cp. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, i. 65 *sqq.*; E. Meyer, *op. cit.* pp. 727 *sqq.* The dangers of the Orphic movement, and philosophy as an antidote: cp. E. Meyer, *ib.* pp. 749 *sqq.*

P. 340.—Orphic interpolation in *Odyssey*: Wilamowitz-M., *Hom. Unters.* 199 *sqq.*

P. 341.—War of Croton and Sybaris: Herod. v. 44; Diodorus xii. 9-10; Strabo vi. 1. 13.—The destruction of Sybaris was a great blow to her friend Miletus, for through Sybaris the Milesian merchandise had access to the western sea. The wares unshipped at Sybaris were carried across the peninsula and shipped again at her dependency Laos. The Milesian put on mourning at the news of her fall (Herod. vi. 21).

P. 341.—Pythagoras at Metapontion: Aristoxenus, fr. 11, and Dicaearchus, fr. 31 (F.H.G. ii.); Justin xx. 4.—Suppression of Pythagoreans: Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus, *ib.*; Justin, *ib.*; Polybius ii. 89.

P. 342, *Sect.* 14.—Sources: *Primary*: fragments of early philosophers. *Derivative*: their lives in Diogenes Laertius.

P. 342.—Xenophanes: ep. sympathetic portrait in Gomperz, *op. cit.* 127 *sqq.*

CHAPTER VIII

Sources: *Primary*: inscriptions; scattered notices in Herodotus; Thucydides, i. 89-117, 128-133; fragments of Timocreon, Ion, Stesimbrotus, Cratinus, Eupolis; [Hellanicus]. *Derivative*: (1) [Cleidemus]: [Ephorus]; [Theopompus]; [Androton]; [Craterus, collection of psephismata]; (2) Aristotle, *Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία*; Diodorus xi. 37-xii. 28; Plutarch: Themistocles, Aristides, Cimon, Pericles; Nepos: Themistocles, Aristides, Pausanias, Cimon. [The sources are collected in G. F. Hill's Sources for Greek History, 478-431 B.C., where particular references can easily be found.]

Pp. 348-52.—For Sparta after the Persian war, and her treatment of her kings, cp. Macan's note on Her. vi. 72.—It is possible that Sparta considered Thessaly, not Athens, the chief danger, after the Persian war. Cp. C. Niebuhr, *op. cit.* p. 38.

P. 349.—It is very difficult to fix the chronology of the years 478-445. In most cases I concur with Busolt.

P. 350.—Cimon's capture of Sestus and Byzantium: [Ion=] Plutarch, Cimon, 9.—E. Meyer, accepting a statement in Justin ix. 1, holds that Pausanias remained in possession of Byzantium till 472 B.C. (*Gesch. des Altertums*, iii. p. 519).

P. 351.—Spartan expedition to Thessaly: Herodotus vi. 72; Plutarch, Themist. 20, Aristid. 22, De malign. Herod. 21; Pausanias iii. 7, 8. Date: cp. Wilamowitz-M., *Aristoteles und Athen*, i. 147; Busolt, *op. cit.* iii. 83.—Attempt on Amphictionic league: Plutarch, Them. 20.

P. 352.—Argos recovers Tiryns: Date seems to be later than Aug. 468, for in the recently discovered List of Olympian Victors (Oxyrhynchus Papyri, ii. p. 89) we find that in that year the Boys' boxing-match was won by a Tirythian (. . . *ἦν Τυρὶνθίος παῖδων πρῶτος*). The conclusion is not indeed quite certain: the victor might have been an exile.

P. 352.—Battle of Tegea: epitaph: Poet. Lyr. Gr., ed Bergk, iii. p. 460, n. 102. Chronology: see Busolt, iii. 121-2.

P. 352.—Synoecism of Elis. It is possibly to this time that we should refer the notice of Herodotus iv. 148, who states that in his own days the Eleans ravaged the Triphylian hexapolis (Lepreon, Macistus, Phrixæ, Pyrgus, Epion, and Nudion). See Macan's note.—The new Elean constitution betrays Athenian (Themistoclean?) influence.

P. 353.—Revolt of Ionians and formation of Delian league: written 478-7 B.C.—that is, first months of 477 B.C.: the date is determined by the date of the capture of Byzantium (Thucyd. i. 94 and 128), autumn 478 B.C., which depends on the improbability that Pausanias would have travelled through Thrace (Thucyd. i. 130) in the middle of winter (Busolt, *op. cit.* iii. 65); the formation of the league followed (Thucyd. *ib.*).

P. 353.—Ionian and Aeolian cities of Asia: that they were included in the League from the beginning is certain. Cp. Herodotus ix. 104, where it is expressly stated that Ionia revolted at the time of Mycale. Ephesus (as Busolt remarks, ii. 1. 74, note) was perhaps an exception.—The remarkable statement of Herodotus that the Ionians were paying tribute to Persia up to his time (that is, to the time when he wrote the passage vi. 42), on the old assessment made by Artaphrenes (493 B.C.), has not yet been satisfactorily explained. Macan thinks it probable that the passage was written after 454 B.C.

P. 354.—Probable basis of total amount of tribute: 100 ships: Busolt, *op. cit.* iii. 82, note (cp. Plutarch, Arist. 21, and Diodor. xi. 60).—460 talents: Thucyd. i. 96.—Ten Hellenotamiae (number determined by number of the tribes): C.I.A. i. 259, 260.—Equal votes and consequent Athenian control: Thucydides, iii. 10 and 11.

P. 356.—Traces of haste in Themistoclean walls: Use of inscribed stones: C.I.A. i. 479, etc.; Hicks, 13, 14.

P. 356.—Heights of the Pnyx: The name Pnyx was given to the whole complex of hills S.W. of Athens (Nymph Hill, Pnyx, and Museum): Plato, Critias, 112A.

P. 357.—Relation of Athens to Lacedaemon after the Persian war, and at the time of the building of her walls: The significance of the interference of Satrap in the matter of the walls is clearer, if Athens was still regarded as a member of the Peloponnesian League,—and it seems to me that Wilamowitz-Möllendorff is right in insisting on this. It is a point which Athenian writers would naturally ignore. Thus by building her walls in spite of Lacedaemonian protests, Athens withdrew from the League and declared herself the peer of Sparta.

P. 357.—Harbours of the Munychian peninsula: I have followed the current view as to the identity of the harbours; but I must note that this has recently been called in question by Angelopoulos, *Περὶ Πειραιῶς καὶ τῶν λιμένων αὐτοῦ*, 1898, whose arguments I cannot test.

P. 358.—Proposal of Themistocles to build twenty triremes yearly: Diodorus xi. 93; cp. Andocides, Peace, 5, 7.—For the career of Themistocles, cp. A. Bauer, Themistokles, 1891.

P. 359.—The oarsmen: Thucyd. i. 143 *ad init.*—Ten epibatae: Thucyd. ii. 23; C.I.A. ii. 959.—Gilbert, Griech. Staatsaltertümer, ed. 2, i. p. 363 *sqq.*

P. 359.—Strategia: this seems the most probable dating for the change (so Busolt, iii. 56).—Taxiarchs: earliest mention, Aeschylus, Palamedes, fr. 182 (ed.² Nauck in T.G.F.): Wilamowitz-M., Arist. u. Ath. ii. 88.

P. 361, *note*.—Ostracism: The Themistocles sherd reads: Θεμιστοκλῆς Φρεάριος: R. Zahn, Ath. Mitth. 1897, 345.

P. 361.—Themistocles accused of treason: by an *eisangelia* brought (by Leobotes, son of Alcmeon) before the Assembly (or the Council of 500): Plutarch, Them. 32.—The date (471-0 B.C.) in the chronographers and Diodorus is probably right; for a psephisma, bearing on the case, was extant and was incorporated in a collection of psephismata by Craterus. E. Meyer (Gesch. des Altertums, iii. p. 519) refers this date to the ostracism. It has been argued by Wilamowitz-M. that the reference to Themistocles in the *Persae* of Aeschylus proves that at that time (spring 472 B.C.) he had not been impeached for treason; but the same argument is used by E. Meyer to prove that he could not have been ostracised then.—The account of Thucydides (i. 135 *sqq.*) of the flight and last years of Themistocles may be compared with that of Plutarch (Them. 24 *sqq.*), which partly depends on the contemporary Charon of Lampsacus.

P. 362.—Themistocles lay hidden in Asiatic towns: Busolt, iii. 131.—The story that he was driven by a storm to Naxos (Thuc. i. 137) when the Athenian fleet was blockading the town is rejected by Wilamowitz-M. and Beloch as an anecdote. It may, however, be reconciled with the chronology.—Accession of Artaxerxes: date: Diodorus xi. 69.

P. 362.—Death of Themistocles: Thucydides i. 138; tomb at Magnesia, *ib.*; Plutarch, Them. 32; Diodorus xi. 58; Cornelius Nepos, 10. Legend: Aristophanes, Knights, 84; Aristodemus, Poliorcet. (ed. Wescher) 360.12; cp. Athenaeus xii. 533c. Origin of story of suicide, Rhusopulos, Ath. Mitth. 1896, 18 *sqq.*; P. Gardner, Class. Review, Feb. 1898, 21.

P. 363.—Capture of Eion: date, schol. on Aeschines, De fals. leg. 31;—Scyrus: soon after (*ἔπειτα*)=Thucyd. i. 98.—Doriscus: cp. Köhler, Hermes, 24, p. 92 (1889).

P. 364.—Battle of the Eurymedon: 468-7 B.C. the chronographers. The preceding coast operations of Cimon make it probable that the battle was in autumn. That it cannot have been fought later than 467 B.C. is proved by a stone of the year 466-5 B.C. (C.I.A. i. 432) which fixes the outbreak of the Thasian revolt and Cimon's expedition to the Chersonesus to that year; Köhler, Hermes, 24, p. 85. (We have thus to choose between 468 B.C. and 467 B.C.; and, as the correct date was probably known to the Attidographers, and passed thence to the chronographers, we may (though not too confidently) adopt 468 B.C., Busolt, iii. 145.) The erroneous date in Diodorus xi. 60 is explained by Busolt, *ib.*—For the battle: [Callisthenes=] Plutarch, Cimon, 12-13; Diodorus xi. 60-1; Pseudo-Simonides, 105 (in Bergk, P.L.G. iii.). Klussmann, Die Kämpfe am Eurymedon, 1891.

P. 364.—Carystus: soon after Scyrus: Thuc. i. 98.

P. 365.—Naxos: date: uncertain: later than reduction of Carystus (Thucyd. i. 98), and therefore (to allow time for Seyrus and Carystus episodes, after the capture of Eion; see above) not before 472 B.C. If the story connecting Themistocles with the siege is founded on fact, the date must be 470 B.C. or 469 B.C., more probably the latter. Busolt, *ib.* 142.

P. 365.—Thasos: date: C.I.A. i. 432 (see above); Thucyd. iv. 102; also determined by the date of the Helot revolt, cp. below, note on p. 372.

P. 366.—Stone of treaty of Athens with Erythrae: C.I.A. i. 9 (cp. 10 and 11); Hicks, 23; Ditt.² 8. Fragments of similar treaties with Miletus and Colophon: C.I.A. iv. 22a and i. 13.

P. 366.—Military contingents required from subject allies: cp. Thucyd. ii. 9; Busolt, *op. cit.* iii. 76.

P. 367.—Treasury transferred to Athens: date determined by the quota-lists, which begin in this year. Perhaps the meetings of the Council of the Confederates ceased to be held, with the transference of the treasury.

P. 367.—Quota-lists: We have fragments, varying in length, of quota-lists for every year from 454-3 to 436-5 B.C.: C.I.A. i. 226-244 and iv. pp. 71-2. The pieces preserved from the stones of the following years up to 425-4 B.C. are very slight: *ib.* 245-258. Cp. Hill, Sources for Greek History, chap. ii.; Hicks, 30, 35.

P. 367, note.—The geographical districts: not an original part of the organisation, as Kirchhoff sought to show in his great essay on the Confederacy (Hermes, xi. 1 *sqq.*): see Busolt's note, *op. cit.* iii. 74-5. Busolt, iii. 199 *sqq.*

P. 370.—For a head, perhaps of Cimon, by Dexamenus of Chios, see A. J. Evans, in the *Revue archéologique*, 1898.

P. 372.—Revolt of Helots: Memorial at Olympia: Hicks, 17 (Pausanias v. 24. 1). Date: Plutarch, Cimon, 16 (fourth year of Archidamus: reckoned from the death of Leotychidas in 469-8 B.C., and so =) 465-4 B.C. (Lacanian year beginning in autumn: Busolt, iii. 201); Pausanias iv. 24. 5: 464-3 B.C.: hence, date; late summer 464, Busolt, *ib.*—The date of the fall of Ithome must have been known, as a psephisma must have existed for the settlement of the Messenians at Naupactus (perhaps C.I.A. iv. 22k; Busolt, iii. 300); so we may fairly accept the date 459-8 B.C. (Krüger and Busolt have given strong reasons for supposing that *δεκάτω* in Thucydides i. 103 is a textual error for *τετράτω*).—Isthmus in Messenia: Herod. ix. 35.

P. 372-3.—Cimon in Messenia and his ostracism: date of ostracism less than five years before battle of Tanagra: Theopompus, fr. 92 (F.H.G. i.). For Tanagra, see below, note on p. 386.—For this Messenian expedition from the Athenian point of view, see Aristophanes, *Lysistrata*, 1138 *sqq.*

P. 372.—Cimon's metaphors: [Ion =] Plutarch, Cimon, 16.

P. 373.—Mycenae: Temple and city-walls belong to period of her independence. Cp. Bury, *Hermathena*, 1898.—Diodorus xi. 65.

CHAPTER IX

P. 375.—Sources: see sources for Chapter VIII.

P. 375.—Pericles and Anaxagoras: cp. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 270.

P. 376.—Date of attack on Areopagus: Aristotle, *'Aθ.* II. 25.

P. 377.—Opening of archonship to third class: Aristotle, *'Aθ.* II. 26. The alleged psephisma of Aristides (in Plutarch, *Arist.* 22: source, Idomenus), opening the archonship to all Athenians, is spurious. Cp. Busolt, iii. 32, note.

P. 377.—Pay of councillors: earliest mention, Thucyd. viii. 69: but it is almost certain (though not recorded) that it was introduced by Pericles. Similarly the pay of the archons. In the second half of 4th century the archons received 4 obols, the councillors 5: Aristotle, *'Aθ.* II. 62.

P. 378.—Pay of judges: 2 obols acc. to schol. Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 88; but cp. Clouds, 863, and Boeckh, *Staatsh. Athens*, i. 296 (ed. 3).—Pericles is also said to have introduced the *theorikon*, a payment of a drachma to the poorer citizens to enable them to pay the entrance money to the theatre at the great Dionysia. The sole authority is Plutarch, Pericles, 9 (source supposed to be Theopompus; Busolt, iii. 255, note 3).

P. 380.—Liturgies: duties for which the state had no organs and which therefore devolved upon individual citizens. Cp. E. Meyer, Art. on (Griechische) Finanzen, in *Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 940, where it is luminously shown that the Greek (compared with the modern) state was in some respects little more than the sum of the citizens. Thus the Greeks had no notion of a permanent and professional state official, and there was no organisation for managing state property: hence the system of farming. The revenue was conceived as belonging to the citizens, not to the state; there was no treasury in the modern sense. Hence, when the money which the citizens voted for public purposes was expended, there was no means of carrying over the balance into the next financial year; the residue belonged to the citizens and it was distributed among them. Thus the Laureote silver-mines yielded dividends to the Athenians, till Themistocles induced them to devote the produce of a new mine to building ships. Siphnos supplies another instance; its gold-mines furnished yearly dividends to the citizens (Herod. iii. 57). To meet imminent dangers, a reserve fund might be formed; but there was no automatic means of forming it; it could be created only by a special decree of the people.

P. 382.—Halicis: had been founded by the Tirynthians, when reduced by Argos. Herod. vii. 137; Ephorus, fr. 98 (F.H.G. i.).

P. 383.—Egyptian expedition: the capitulation of the Messenians and settlement at Naupactus being fixed to 459 B.C., it follows from Thucyd. i. 103 that the Athenians sailed to Egypt towards end of same year.

P. 384.—Erechtheid inscription: C.I.A. i. 433; Hicks, 19; Dittenberger², 9. Date: cp. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, iii. 305. *ἐνιαυτός* in this document is certainly the civil year 459-8 B.C.

P. 386.—Battle of Tanagra: valour of Athenian cavalry who lost heavily: this feature of the battle is preserved in an epigram recently interpreted by A. Wilhelm, *Oesterreich. archaeol. Instit.* ii. 221 sqq. (1899). A fragment of the original stone was extant (no longer to be found), and is published C.I.A. ii. 1677; the entire epigram is preserved in Anth. Pal. vii. 254. From it we learn that the *κούροι Ἀθηναίων ἔξοχοι ἐπιοσύνην*, on the desertion of the Thessalians, bore the brunt in the face of *πλείστοις Ἑλλάνων*. The men of Cleonae fought on this occasion for Athens; for their losses see C.I.A. i. 441, iv. 1, pp. 107, 132. For the triumphant dedication of the Lacedaemonians and their allies: Pausanias v. 10. 4.—Date: 61 days between Tanagra and Oenophyta, Thucyd. i. 108; Tanagra in 458-7 and Oenophyta in 457-6, Diodorus xi. 79: hence Tanagra towards end of first half, Oenophyta towards beginning of second half, of 457 B.C. Other considerations confirm this: Busolt, iii. 253-9.—Oenophyta made Athens mistress of Boeotia: "except Thebes" acc. to [Ephorus=] Diodorus ii. 83, but this is probably an error (E. Meyer, *op. cit.* iii. 593).

P. 387.—Capture of Troezen (Thucyd. i. 115) placed plausibly in 456 B.C. by Busolt (iii. 325, note); who conjectures that the mysterious "battle of Oenoe" in Argolis, in which the Spartans were defeated by Athenians and Argives, belongs to the same year. This battle, the subject of a painting in the Poecile Stoa, and only known from Pausanias i. 15. 1, and x. 10. 3, was referred by C. Robert to 460-59 B.C.; and so E. Meyer, *Gesch. des. Altertums*, iii. 585-9.

P. 388.—Expedition of Tolmides: 456-5 B.C., schol. Aeschines, *De fals. leg.* 75, from which we may infer, spring 455.—Expedition of Pericles: 453-2 B.C., Diodorus xi. 88; and if the three vacant years—between this and the Five Years' Peace—in Thucyd. i. 112 are 452, 451, 450, we get late summer 453 B.C.; Busolt, iii. 329.—In 454 B.C. Athens sent a fruitless expedition to Thessaly, Thuc. i. 111.

P. 389.—Women at Athens: I adapt the observation of Wilamowitz-M. (Aristoteles und Athen, ii. 100, note), "Es ist kein kleines Zeichen von der Würde der attischen Geschichte, dass nur ein Weib in ihr vorkommt, das aber beherrscht sie: die Jungfrau von der Burg."

P. 390.—Peace of Callias: cp. Bury, *Hermathena*, 1898.

P. 392.—March of Andocides: Köhler, *Hermes*, 1889, 92 sqq. (C.I.A. ii. 1675).

P. 393.—Treaty with Chalcis: C.I.A. iv. 27a; Hicks, 28; Dittenberger², 17. The hippobotae were driven out of Chalcis: Plutarch, Pericles, 23; Aelian, *Hist. Pl.* vi. 1.

P. 394.—Marble base with a few letters of the inscribed verses: C.I.A. i. 334; Hicks, 27.

P. 395.—For the feeling in the allied cities against the great statesmen of the democracy, especially Themistocles and Pericles, the lost work of Stesimbrotus of Thasos, entitled Concerning Themistocles, Thucydides, and Pericles, may be cited as evidence. We know the tone of the work (composed c. 430 B.C.) from quotations and references; the author collected all the stories, true and untrue, that he could hear of, to the disadvantage of Pericles and Themistocles. But there is no doubt that his political views were oligarchical; and therefore he cannot be used as evidence for the sentiments of the democrats or the mass of the citizens in Thasos or anywhere else.

P. 397.—Colony to Brea: inscription: C.I.A. i. 31; Hicks, 29; Dittenberger², 19. Colony to Eretria: C.I.A. i. 339; Dittenberger², 18.

P. 398, *Secls.* 6 and 7.—Architectural sources: architectural remains and sculptures.

P. 399.—*Parthenon*, the name (which in itself might mean the chamber either of the Parthenos or of the Parthenoi): ep. Furtwängler, *Meisterwerke der griechischen Plastik*, 172.—The temple seems to have been finished so far as to be ready for use in 438 B.C., when the statue of Athena was set up; but the decorations were not complete for some years later.

P. 403.—Temple of Hephaestus: popularly called the Theseum. This temple, set on the hill of Colonos Agoraios, must have been always a conspicuous building, and no traveller could have failed to mention it in a description of Athens. Any one, standing on the Acropolis and looking westward, will convince himself of this. The only temple which can correspond to it in the description of Pausanias is that of Hephaestus. But the last doubts as to the identification would be set at rest if B. Sauer has rightly explained some of the sculptures as referring to Hephaestus (*Das sogenannte Theseion und sein plastischer Schmuck*, 1899).

P. 405.—Original design of the Propylaea: Dürpfeld, *Ath. Mitth.* 1885, 38 *sqq.*, 131 *sqq.*

P. 406.—Olympian Zeus of Pheidias: description, "Let a man sick, etc.:" Dion Chrysostom, xii. 51.

P. 408.—Middle Long Wall: ep. Andocides, Peace, 7; Plato, Gorgias, 455 E; Plutarch, Pericles, 13.

P. 409.—Population of Attica, c. 432 B.C.: Beloch, *Die Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt*, 54 *sqq.* He reckons the total population at about 235,000 (including 100,000 slaves). This is probably an under-statement. He reckons the population of the Peloponnesus, at the same period, at 350,000, and the total population of Greece (including Macedonia, Chalcidice, Crete, and the Cyclades; excluding Asiatic Greece) at upwards of 3,000,000 (including 1,000,000 slaves).—For Athens itself, with the Piraeus, he reckons about 110,000 to 115,000 (namely, 30,000 citizens, 20,000 to 25,000 metics, and 60,000 slaves: the greater part of the citizen population lived in the country).—See also E. Meyer, *Art. on Bevölkerungswesen in Handwörterbuch der Staatswissenschaften*, 631.—Population of Sicily: *ib.* 682.

P. 410.—Reoccupation of Sybaris, foundation of New Sybaris and of Thurii: Busolt, *op. cit.* iii. 518 *sqq.*

P. 413.—The friendship of Athens with the lords of Bosphorus in the fourth century is illustrated by an Attic inscription of 347-6 B.C. in honour of the sons of Leucon (who had reigned over the Bosphorane kingdom as "archon of Bosphorus and Theodosia, king of the Sindi, the Toreteis, the Dandarii, and the Psessi": see C.I.G. ii. 2134a; Ditt.² 128): C.I.A. iv. 2, 109b; Hicks, 111; Ditt.² 129.

P. 417.—Restrictions on comedy: schol. Aristophanes, *Acharnians*, 67 and 1150. Cp. [Xenophon] *Constitution of the Athenians*, 18.

P. 418, *Secl.* 11.—Cp. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, i. pp. 306-413.

P. 420.—Theory of punishment. The arguments, placed by Thucydides in the mouth of Diodotus (iii. 45), against the deterrence theory, may have been discussed on this occasion.

CHAPTER X

P. 424.—Sources: *Primary*: inscriptions; Thucydides, Books i.-v.; Aristophanes: *Acharnians*, *Knights*, *Wasps*, *Peace*. *Derivative*: [Ephorus]; Plutarch's *Pericles* and *Nicias*; Diodorus xii. 31-74.

P. 427, *note*.—Expenses of Athens in the Corcyraean Expedition: C.I.A. i. 179; Hicks, 41; Ditt.² 26.

P. 427.—Stone of those who fell at Potidaea: C.I.A. i. 442; Hicks, 42.

P. 431.—The division of Greece at beginning of Peloponnesian war: this is the statement of Thucydides (ii. 9), based (it has been pointed out by Wilamowitz-M. and others) on the text of the Thirty Years' Treaty of 445 B.C. The Thesalians are omitted in this formal statement, but appear as allies of Athens in c. 22.—The Achaeans afterwards joined Sparta, c. 9. 2.

P. 431.—Naval strength of Athens. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian war the Athenians reckoned their naval strength at 300 triremes (Thucyd. ii. 13. 8; *τριήρεις πλώμας*). But they found it practically impossible to float more than 250 at most at the same time; they could not easily provide for the manning of more; so that even when their naval activity was greatest there were about 50 warships in the arsenal. When the war began, they made arrangements, to be permanent while the war lasted, for defending their coasts (Attica, Salamis, Euboea): Thucyd. ii. 24. 1. To this purpose 100 vessels were devoted (*ib.* iii. 17); and to this number belonged the 30 vessels of Thuc. ii. 26, the 3 at Salamis (ii. 93. 4), and the 2 at Atalanta (iii. 89. 3). For the interpretation of the difficult chapter in Thucydides, iii. 17, by some supposed to be an interpolation, it is important to grasp that the defence of the coasts by 100 ships was a standing arrangement and applied to the fourth as well as to the first year of the war. In both years the number of ships (including these 100) engaged in naval war was about 250: that is the point of the passage.

P. 432.—Thucydides, son of Olorus, of the deme of Halimus: he was of Thracian descent and closely connected with the family of Cimon (Plutarch, *Cimon*, 3; cp. Marcellinus, *Vita Thucydidis*, 2); he possessed gold-mines in Thrace (Plutarch, *ib.*). Hegesipyla, the mother of Cimon, was the daughter of Olorus, a Thracian king (Herod. vi. 37); and it has been conjectured (Macan, *ad loc.*) that by a second marriage she became the mother of Olorus, father of Thucydides,—who, in that case, was step-nephew of Cimon.

P. 433.—Thucydides: For the literary art of historians and their treatment of the individual man (Thucydides does not desire to portray Pericles as he actually was in everyday life, but idealises him as Plato idealises Socrates), see the important work of J. Bruns, *Das litterarische Porträt der Griechen im fünften und vierten Jahrhundert v. C.* Geburt, 1896.—Thucydides tells his readers that they are not to take the speeches in his work literally (as *ἀληθῶς λεχθέντα*), but only as representing the general tenor (*ἡ ἑρμηνεία γνῶμη*) as nearly as possible: it is clear that such a principle lent itself to a liberal construction. Thucydides heard some of the speeches himself (the three Periclean orations, probably, and those of Cleon and Diodotus), and in these cases, we may take it, he reproduced all, or some, of the arguments actually used by the speakers, transforming them into his own style of thought and phrase. But the majority of the speeches are, at best, founded on second-hand information (*ἀλλοθεν ποθεν*), which must often have been slight and vague. See the important passage in which Thucydides explains his method, i. 22. The same principle applies to the letter of Themistocles, composed, we cannot doubt, by the historian himself.—Besides his method as an artist, and his prejudices (see below, note on p. 444), we must, in using Thucydides, remember that he was sometimes at the mercy of his sources; and that, after his banishment, the information which he procured concerning affairs in Athens might be insufficient and inaccurate, and he might be unable to control it. Thus we shall find that his account of the affairs of 411 B.C. is in many respects erroneous.—It would be difficult to believe *a priori* that Thucydides had not become acquainted with the work of Herodotus before he finished his own history, and it has been noticed that there are several passages in which he seems to criticise statements of the elder historian. The

most famous cases are: (1) the earthquake of Delos: Thuc. (ii. 8) says that the island suffered an earthquake in 431 B.C., and never before within memory; Herod. vi. 98, notices an earthquake shortly before the battle of Marathon, and asserts that it was the first and the last "till my time" (*μέχρι ἐμεῦ*—an inclusive idiom in Greek). The passage of Herodotus was doubtless written before 431 B.C., and left uncorrected (perhaps he never heard of the later event); so the question between the two writers really is whether there was an earthquake at Delos in 490 B.C. It is difficult to see how Thucydides could assure himself that there was not. (2) The votes of the Spartan kings in the Gerusia: Thuc. i. 20, combats, as a popular error, the notion that each king had two votes, and seems to have been thinking of Herod. vi. 57 (where Herodotus, however, expresses himself very obscurely). (3) The Pitane lochos at Sparta, whose existence is denied by Thucydides as another popular error, *loc. cit.*, but assumed by Herodotus ix. 53. The following cases of divergency between the two historians deserve notice, and Thucydides *may* be silently correcting his predecessor: (1) The relations of Pausanias with Megabates and Xerxes: Herod. v. 32-3; Thuc. i. 128; (2) the story of Cylon (see above, note on p. 178); (3) the foundation of Messana (see above, note on vol. i. p. 322). Macan thinks that in suggesting the danger of a united *Scythian* empire, ii. 97, Thucydides had in view the suggestion of Herodotus (v. 3) that a united *Thracian* empire would be irresistible.

P. 436.—Strategy of Pericles: H. Delbrück, *Die Strategie des Perikles erläutert durch die Strategie Friedrichs des Grossen, 1890*. He calls the strategy employed by Pericles (as explained above) "Ernährungsstrategie," as opposed to "Niederwerfungsstrategie."

P. 444.—Expedition to Epidaurus: I find it hard to escape from the conclusion that the inadequate treatment of this episode by Thucydides, his omission to explain how and why the enterprise failed—in contrast with his full accounts of events of less moment—is an instance of partiality. It seems to be one of those rare cases in which he allowed his personal prepossessions to influence his presentation of history. In his treatment of the statesmen, Cleon and Hyperbolus, he failed to control his prejudice against them. In this third case, his admiration of Pericles seems to have induced him to pass lightly over the failure at Epidaurus.

P. 445.—Athenian colonists sent to Potidaea: Record of this on a stone: C.I.A. i. 340; Hicks, 45; Ditt.² 28.

P. 446.—Aspasia: cp. Wilamowitz-Möllendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen*, ii. 99.

P. 446.—Importance of the demagogue as financier: cp. E. Meyer, *Finanzen* (*op. cit.*), 945.

P. 447.—Plataea: extent of the city: cp. Frazer, *Pausanias*, vol. v. 88 *sqq.* Mr. Grundy (*Topography of Battle of Plataea*, 53 *sqq.*) thinks the older Plataea was the N.W. corner of the later town.

P. 453.—Sending of Paches: part of the decree providing for the furnishing of transport ships for the expedition of Paches is preserved: C.I.A. iv. 2, 35c; Ditt.² 27. Cp. Busolt, *Philologus*, L. 583 *sqq.*

P. 455.—Cleon's imitation of Pericles: compare also Thuc. ii. 63. 2 with iii. 40. 4. (See Classen's notes on this speech of Cleon.) For the phrase *διὰ χειρὸς ἔχειν*, see Thuc. ii. 13. 2, of Pericles, compared with Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 597, of Cleon.

P. 456.—Mytilenaeen prisoners who were put to death: "a little more than a thousand," according to our text of Thucydides (iii. 50), which, since only the ringleaders are meant, seems to be nonsense. The difficulties are well set out by J. Steup in his note on the passage in Classen's edition. The suggestion (made independently by Mahaffy and Schütz) "a little more than thirty" (A for A) is highly probable.

P. 457.—The cleruchies of Lesbos: Fragment of the decree preserved: C.I.A. i. 96; Ditt.² 29. It is an error to suppose that the cleruchs enjoyed their lots without leaving Athens: Dittenberger, *ib.*

P. 457.—Naval victories of Phormio: Commemorated perhaps by a dedication at Dodona with the words, "the Athenians from the Peloponnesians, having conquered in a sea-fight": Ditt.² 30.

P. 458.—The "peninsula" of Leucas: The canal of Periander, which had

completely insulated it, seems to have been silted up, for Thucydides mentions that ships were hauled across the isthmus.

P. 460.—The revolutionary spirit: This was not a new thing, we meet it in the days of Theognis at Megara.

P. 464.—Aetolian campaign of Demosthenes: Woodhouse, *Aetolia*, 57 *sqq.*, 340 *sqq.* Identification of Aegition: *ib.* 363.

P. 465.—Defeat of Ambraciots and capture of Anactorion: A statue of Athena Nike was set up with spoils won on these occasions and at the capture of Istone in Corcyra in the same year: the monument was restored in the next century and a fragment of a decree relating to it has been preserved (C.I.A. iv. 2, 189c; Ditt.² 136): Behr in *Hermes*, 1895, 447.

P. 466, *Sect.* 9.—Additional sources: Pseudo-Xenophon, *Constitution of the Athenians*; Antiphon, *de Choreuta* and fragment of *Contra Philinum*.

P. 467.—*oi νεώτεροι*: Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 890.

P. 467.—Antiphon: date of his orations *Contra Philinum* and *De Choreuta* now fixed as 425 B.C. by Keil: *Hermes*, 1894, 337-9.

P. 468.—The people's dog: Aristophanes, *Knights*, 1023.

P. 469.—The "Demes" of Eupolis is generally supposed to have been brought out in one of the early years of the Peloponnesian war; but J. van Leeuwen, in his edition of Aristophanes, *Ranae* (*Prolegomena*, p. xiii.), has given noteworthy reasons for dating it 413 B.C.

P. 470.—The money borrowed from the temple treasures was paid back, after the Peace of Nicias; fragments of the accounts are preserved: C.I.A. i. 273; Hicks, 46.

P. 470.—Tribute of 425-4 B.C., not less than 960 talents: cp. Wilhelm *Epigraphischer Bericht aus Griechenland* (*supra cit.*), p. 43. Fragments are preserved both of the assessment-list (C.I.A. i. 37) and of the quota-list (C.I.A. i. 259).

P. 471.—Topography of Pylos and Sphacteria: see excellent description and accurate map of G. B. Grundy, *J.H.S.* 1896, 1 *sqq.*

P. 471.—That the bay and lagoon were continuous in 424 B.C. must be inferred from the account of Thucydides.

P. 472.—Wall on S.E. corner of Pylos: R. Burrows, *J.H.S.* 1896, 64, and 1898, 149.

P. 480.—Prehistoric wall on Mt. Elias: Burrows, *ib.* 1896, p. 59.

P. 480.—Ascent of Messenians on S.E. side of Mt. Elias: Burrows, *ib.* pp. 61 *sqq.*

P. 481.—425-4 B.C.: An inscription (imperfect) is preserved of Athenians and soldiers in Athenian service who fell during this year. One citizen fell at Pylos: C.I.A. i. 446; iv. 1, p. 46; Ditt.² 32.

P. 481.—Inscription on base of the Victory of Paeonius: Hicks, 49.

P. 488.—Decrees relating to Methone: C.I.A. i. 40; Hicks, 44; Ditt.² 33.

P. 491.—The case for Thucydides: cp. Delbrück, *Die Strategie des Perikles*, 178 *sqq.*

P. 493.—The importance of the fact that armies were not professional has been well brought out by Grote.

P. 496.—Perdiccas changed sides once more: fragments of his treaty with Athens are preserved, C.I.A. i. 42, 43, iv. 1, 141. Athens seems to have acted as mediator between him and Arrhabaeus (so the name is spelt on the stone). About the same time the Athenians concluded a treaty with the Bottiaeans, C.I.A. i. 52, 53, iv. 1, 142.—It is interesting to observe that they were also negotiating in these years with Persia, and a treaty was concluded with Darius II. See Andocides, *De pace* 29, and the decree conferring proxenia on Heraclides of Clazomenae (Aristotle, *Ἀθ. Πολ.* 41) for his services in the negotiation (Köhler, *Hermes*, 27, 68 *sqq.*).

P. 498.—*Ἀμφίπολις*, meaning of the name: Thucydides, iv. 102.

VOL. II

CHAPTER I

Sources: *Primary*: Thucydides v.-viii.; Xenophon, *Hellenica*, i. ii.; [Philistus]; Andocides, *De mysteriis* (399 B.C.), *De redivo*; Speech against Andocides (= Pseudo-Lysias, 6); Speech for Polystratus (= Pseudo-Lysias, 20); Aristophanes: *Birds*, *Lysistrata*, *Thesmophoriazusae*; Isocrates, *On the Chariot* (*de. 16*). *Derivative*: [Ephorus]; Aristotle, *Ἀθην. Πολ.*; [Timaeus]; Diodorus xii. 75, xiii. 104, xiv. 3-5, 32, 33; Plutarch, *Lives of Nicias, Alcibiades, Lysander*.

Sect. 1.—The fullest and best study of the diplomacy of the years 421-418 B.C. will be found in Busolt's *Forschungen zur griechischen Geschichte*, pp. 74 *sqq.*

P. 2.—The defensive alliance between Athens and Sparta was changed in the course of the summer of 421 B.C. into a symmachy. This is not stated by Thucydides, but is implied, v. 39. 2.

P. 5.—The ἀρχή over subject communities recognised: cp. Busolt, *op. cit.* 143-4. The subject states of Argos were Cleonae and Orneae; Elis claimed Lepreon; Mantinea may have had a couple of small Arcadian places.

P. 5.—A fragment of the stone: C.I.A. iv. 1, 466; Hicks, 52.

P. 5.—The objects of Alcibiades in his Peloponnesian expedition of spring 419 B.C. are well elucidated by Busolt, *op. cit.* 150-2. Significance of the Congress of Mantinea, *ib.* 156.

P. 7.—Battle of Mantinea: Scope = Mytika: W. Loring, J.H.S. 1895, 53.

P. 8.—Ostracism of Hyperbolus: the date is uncertain, opinion being divided between 418 B.C. and 417 B.C. A statement of Theopompus (quoted in schol. on Aristophanes, *Wasps*, 1001 = Müller F.H.G. i. Theop. fr. 103) seems to mean that six years elapsed between his ostracism and his death (411 B.C.), and therefore points to 417 B.C. Compare further the arguments of Beloch, *Attische Politik*, 339 *sqq.* Thucydides (viii. 73) mentions the ostracism of Hyperbolus, but not in its chronological connexion. He says that the Athenians banished Hyperbolus not for any political reason, but on account of his scandalously bad character. It is hard to forgive this malignant triviality, but it is far more aggravating that the historian did not insert his notice in its chronological place. See also Plutarch, *Alcib.* 13, *Nicias*, 11, *Aristides*, 7.

P. 9.—Nicias in Thrace: There was another Thracian expedition in the following year under Chaeremon, not mentioned by Thucydides, but referred to on a stone which records the payments made from the treasures of Athena for military and other purposes during the years 418-14 B.C.: the expedition to Melos is also mentioned: C.I.A. i. 180-3; Hicks, 53; Ditt.² 37.

P. 10.—Attention to religious matters: also to the worship of Hephaestus: cp. C.I.A. iv. 1, 356, p. 64; and Wilhelm, *Epigraphischer Bericht aus Griechenland* (in the *Anzeiger der Vienna Academy*, 1897, n. xxvi.).

P. 10.—Eleusinian decree, date of: A. Körte, *Ath. Mitth.* 1896, 320 *sqq.* (Foucart, Lipsius, Sauppe, and others had placed it before the Peloponnesian war.) Text in C.I.A. iv. 1, 276; Ditt.² 20.

P. 10.—Treaty with Leontini: C.I.A. iv. 1, p. 13; Hicks, 40; Ditt.² 24; with Rhegium: C.I.A. *ib.*; Hicks, 39; Ditt.² 25.

P. 12.—Laches and the cheese: Aristophanes, Wasps, 924.

P. 12.—Siceliot policy of Hermocrates, his "colonial statesmanship": Freeman, History of Sicily, iii. 50 *sqq.*

P. 13.—Athenians vote expedition to Sicily: one of the most ardent advocates was a certain Demostratus, who had influence at this time in the Assembly: Aristophanes, Lysistrata, 391-4; Plutarch, Nicias, 12.

P. 14.—Total strength of the Sicilian expedition=about 40,000 acc. to Beloch, Gr. Gesch. ii. 51, note.—Sailing of the expedition: about June: Isaeus, Philoctemon's Inheritance, 14; Thucydides vi. 30.

P. 14.—Inscriptions (414-13 B.C.) pertaining to sale of confiscated property of those who were condemned for mutilating the Hermæ: C.I.A. i. 274-281; iv. 1, p. 35; 2, p. 73; 3, pp. 176-178; Hicks, 55; Ditt.² 33-45.

P. 16.—Hermæ: Thucydides vi. 27-29, 53, 60; speeches of Andocides cited above; Pseudo-Lysias, Against Andocides (cp. Plutarch, Alcibiades, 18-21; Diodorus xiii. 2).—Motive of mutilation of the Hermæ: cp. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, ii. 113.

P. 19.—Corinth too sent ships: At this time the Athenians kept a strict guard on the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf. Their control of the gulf, in the year 413 B.C. apparently, is illustrated by the Lycon inscription: C.I.A. iv. 1, 3, n. 53b; Dittenberger², 46.

P. 32.—Athenian catastrophe: a few Athenians were rescued to Catane: Pseudo-Lysias, For Polystratus, 24-5.

P. 35.—The revived Damaratea, the Assinarian games: Evans, Syracusan Medallions, 141 *sqq.* Assinarian feast: Plutarch, Nicias, 28.

P. 36.—Gold coinage: Aristophanes, Frogs, 720-6, and frags. of Hellanicus and Philochorus in schol. *ad loc.*

P. 39.—Battle of Syme: cp. allusion in Aristoph. Thesmoph. 804.

P. 40, *Sects.* 7 and 8.—There is one original document bearing on the revolution of 411 B.C.—the (Pseudo-Lysias) Speech for Polystratus. Date 410 B.C.: see Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, ii. 356 *sqq.*

P. 41.—Father of Theramenes a Proboulos: Lysias, Against Eratosthenes, 65; the Probuloi and the revolution: Aristotle, Rhetoric, iii. 18.

P. 43.—The oligarchic revolution: For the constitutional events of 411 B.C., Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, ii. 113 *sqq.*, especially for the unrealised constitution drawn up by the Commission of a Hundred.

P. 43.—The revolution was peaceably effected. The narrative of Thucydides differs considerably from that of Aristotle (*Ἀθηναίων Πολιτεία*, 29-32), and is evidently less accurate. The account of Aristotle depends upon contemporary official documents which were not at the disposal of Thucydides, who was living in banishment (when he wrote) and probably derived his information from some citizen who was banished from Athens during the oligarchical régime. Hence I have followed Aristotle, not Thucydides. This view, which was advocated by U. Köhler in 1895 (*Sitzungsberichte* of the Berlin Academy, 451 *sqq.*), has been further established by another article of the same scholar (*ib.* 1900, 803 *sqq.*), in which he successfully contests E. Meyer's arguments for the Thucydean account (*Forschungen zur alten Geschichte*, ii. 406 *sqq.*). Köhler makes the valuable suggestion that the mysterious *Five Proedroi*, who appear in Thucydides (viii. 67. 3), but not in Aristotle, were the presiding committee of the oligarchical club-union which organised the revolution, and that the election described in that passage as having taken place in the Assembly at Colonus really took place at a meeting of the club-union. But, notwithstanding misapprehensions and inaccuracies, due to the insufficiency of the sources at his command, the story of Thucydides—corrected from Aristotle—is of high value for the glimpse it supplies of the activity of Pisander, who organised the co-operation of the oligarchical clubs.

P. 47.—Phrynichus was slain by foreign assassins. The man who struck the blow escaped; his comrade, an Argive, was caught and tortured, according to Thucydides. But on the fall of the Four Hundred, Thrasybulus of Calydon and Apollodorus of Megara claimed the glory of having slain Phrynichus, and rewards were decreed to these: Lysias, c. Agoratum, 71 (cp. *Περὶ τοῦ σηκοῦ*, 4).

A decree giving further rewards to Thrasybulus, a gold vase, and citizenship, was passed in 409 B.C. and is preserved on a stone: C.I.A. i. 59; Hicks, 56; Dittenberger², 50.

P. 49.—Fall of Antiphon: for his able speech in his defence (praised by Thucydides viii. 68), see Vita Antiphontis, pp. xxiv.-vi. ed. Blass.

P. 50.—"Our success is over," adopting the reading *ἔρρει τὰ καλά* (so Grote): *ἔρρει τὰ καλά* is the other reading: "our timber (ships) is rotting."

P. 50.—The Spartan overtures were rejected: at the instance of Cleophon: Diodorus xiii. 53. 2.

P. 50.—Restoration of democracy: that the Cleisthenic Council of 500 was restored is proved by the psephisma of Demophantus (410 B.C.), which mentions as Council *οἱ πεντακῶσιοι οἱ λαχόντες τῷ κνέμῳ* (Andocides, De Myst. 96).

P. 50.—Cleophon: lyre-maker, Andocides, De Myst. 146: his mother of Thracian origin, Plato Comicus in his play "Cleophon," produced 405 B.C. (schol. Aristoph. Frogs, 681), and Aristoph. Frogs, 681. Like Cleon and Hyperbolus he was obnoxious to Aristophanes (cp. Thesmophoriazusaë, 805; Frogs, 1502, 1534). It is highly probable that Euripides had him in view when he portrayed the demagogue in the Orestes, 903 (408 B.C.).

ἀνὴρ τις ἀθηρόγλωσσος, ἰσχύων θράσει,
Ἀργεῖος οὐκ Ἀργεῖος (allusive to Cleophon's Thracian origin).

P. 51.—Diobelia (Aristotle, *Ἀθ. II.* 28), what it was: Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Aristoteles und Athen, ii. 212. Cp. Aeschines, De falsa leg. 76, *Κλεοφῶν διεφθαρκὺς νομῇ χρημάτων τὸν δῆμον*. For payments of the diobelia in 410-9 and 407-6 B.C., C.I.A. i. 188, 189a; Dittenberger², 51.

P. 51.—Erechthenn: building-inscriptions: C.I.A. i. 321; iv. i. pp. 75, 148; Michaelis, Ath. Mitth. 1889, 349 *sqq.*

P. 52.—Capture of Selymbria by Alcibiades: Decree defining conditions of its new alliance with Athens: C.I.A. iv. i. 61a; Hicks, 58; Dittenberger, 53.

P. 52.—Nisaea: Diodorus xiii. 65.—Pylus: C.I.A. i. 188; Diodorus xiii. 64; Beloch, Gr. Gesch. ii. 80, note.

P. 54.—Freedom was promised to slaves: and the promise was fulfilled. There are several references to this in Aristophanes, Frogs, *c.g.* 693-4. These enfranchised slaves received Attic citizenship and were sent to Scione, where, after its capture in 421 B.C., the Athenians had settled as cleruchs the Plataean refugees (Thucydides v. 32. 1). This (as Kirchhoff showed) is the explanation of Aristophanes, Frogs, 694, and of the fragment of Hellanicus quoted in schol. *ad loc.*, where the slaves are said to have been *ἐγγραφέντας ὡς Πλαταιεῖς* (*sic*). For these Plataeans see Lysias, Against Panceleon, *passim*.

P. 55.—Date of Trial of Generals: c. beginning of November: Xenophon, Hell. i. 7, 8.

P. 55.—Theramenes: his conduct on this occasion must have been specially in the minds of the poet when he wrote, and of the audience when they heard, the passages in the Frogs, 534-41 and 963-70. (We may suspect that the obscure *Κεῖος*, l. 970, is an allusion to some unknown incident which occurred at Ceos, and with which Theramenes was connected, on his way back to Athens from the scene of the battle).

P. 55.—The indignation of the Athenians at the time of the trial of the Generals was inflamed by the circumstance that it was the season of the festival of the Apaturia, a time for family reunions, and the relatives of the doomed men put on black. This trial was an instructive example of the evils of having no court of revision to correct the dooms of the Assembly.

P. 56.—Rejection of Lacedaemonian offers: Cleophon: Aristotle, *Ἀθ. II.* 34.

P. 57.—Alcibiades: the passage on Alcibiades in the Frogs of Aristophanes, 1422 *sqq.* (produced in the spring of this year) is noteworthy.

1432 οὐ χρὴ λέοντος σκύμνον ἐν πόλει τρέφειν,
ἦν δ' ἐκτραφῆ τις, τοῖς τρόποις ὑπηρετεῖν.

P. 58.—Adeimantus: he was probably to blame for the unfortunate battle of Notion (cp. Xenophon, Hell. i. 4. 21). Suggestions of his treachery: Lysias,

First Or. against Alcibiades, 38; Xen. *ib.* ii. 1. 32. Conon afterwards accused him of the crime: Demosthenes, *De falsa leg.* 191. References to Adeimantus in Plato, Protagoras, 315 E; Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 1513 (cp. schol. *ad loc.*).

P. 59.—Rejection of peace-offers: Cleophon: Lysias, Against Agoratus, 8 (cp. Against Nicomachus, 10); Xenophon, *Hell.* ii. 2. 15; Aeschines, *De falsa leg.* 76 (cp. Against Ctes. 150). Was Cleophon strategos in 405-4 B.C.? Cp. schol. on Aristophanes, *Frogs*, 679.—Cleophon's death: Lysias, Against Agor. 12, Against Nicom. 10-13 (charge of evading military service is represented as only a pretext); Xenophon, *ib.* i. 7. 34. He died poor: Lysias, Property of Aristophanes, 48.

P. 59.—People were dying of famine: at this time a decree, proposed by Patroclides, was passed, restoring civic rights to all disfranchised citizens, expressly including those of the Four Hundred who survived: Andocides, *De Myst.* 78 (cp. Xenophon, *Hell.* ii. 2. 11). This idea had been ventilated after the battle of Arginusae, at all events in the *Frogs* of Aristophanes, 687-91, where Phrynichus is made a sort of scapegoat for the revolution of the Four Hundred.

P. 60.—Conditions of peace: see the *δῶγμα* of the Ephors in Plutarch, Lysander, 14, beginning *τάδε τὰ τέλη τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἔργω*; Aristotle, 'Aθ. II. xxxiv. 3; Andocides, *Peace*, 9.

P. 60.—Date of Lysander's entry into Athens: 16th Munychion: Plutarch, *Lys.* 15.

P. 60.—Samos: Attic citizenship was afterwards conferred on the Samians for their loyalty to Athens: C.I.A. iv. 2. 1b.

P. 61, *Sect.* 10.—Additional sources: Lysias, Against Eratosthenes, and *Περὶ τῆς πολυτελείας* (403 B.C.), *Δήμου καταλύσεως ἀπολογία* (c. 400 B.C.), Against Agoratus (400-398 B.C.), Against Philo (before 395 B.C.), *Περὶ δημεύσεως τῶν τοῦ Νικίου ἀδελφοῦ* (c. 396 B.C.), For Mantitheus (c. 392 B.C.); Isocrates, Against Callimachus (399 B.C.). [For the chronology of 404-3 B.C., see Busolt, Aristoteles und Xenophon, in *Hermes*, 1899.]

P. 63.—Death of Alcibiades: Isocrates, *De Big.* 40; Plutarch, *Alcib.* 38, 39; Diodorus xiv. 11. 1. Theramenes disapproved of the decree of banishment: Xenophon, *Hell.* ii. 3. 42.

P. 65.—Law passed before the execution of Theramenes: Aristotle, 'Aθ. II. 37.

P. 69.—Idea of making landed property a condition of political rights: This was proposed by Phormisius, and we have a fragment of a speech of Lysias opposing it (*Περὶ πολυτελείας*, Or. 34).

P. 69.—"Men of the Piraeus": the distinction appears in the speech of Lysias, Against Evandrus, 382 B.C.

CHAPTER II

P. 70, *Sects.* 1 and 3-6.—Sources: *Primary*: inscriptions; Andocides, *On the Peace* (391 B.C.); Lysias, Against Alcibiades I. and II. (395 B.C.), Against Ergocles and Against Philocrates (389 B.C.), Against Epierates (c. 389 B.C.), *On the Property of Aristophanes* (c. 387 B.C.), Against Evandrus (382 B.C.); Xenophon, *Hellenics*, iii. iv. and v. 1. *Derivative*: [Ephorus]; Diodorus xiv. 12-xv. 110; Plutarch, *Lives of Lysander, Agesilaus, Artaxerxes*; Nepos, *Lives of Conon, Thrasybulus, Agesilaus, Iphicrates*.

P. 73.—Spartan empire; acc. to Diodorus xiv. 10 the tribute imposed by Sparta amounted in all to 1000 talents.

P. 73, *Sect.* 2.—Sources: *Primary*: Xenophon's *Anabasis*; fragments of Ctesias. *Derivative*: Plutarch's *Life of Artaxerxes*.

P. 87.—Xenophon composed the *Anabasis*: he cloaked his authorship under the pseudonym "Themistogenes of Syracuse": Xen. *Hell.* iii. 2.

P. 92.—Conon appointed commander: Ctesias, fr. 63 (p. 189, ed. Gilmore); Diodorus xiv. 39; cp. Isocrates, *Evag.* 53 *sqq.*

P. 100.—Conon's capture of Rhodes: Pausanias vi. 7. 6; Diodorus xiv. 79; Isocrates, *Phil.* 63.

P. 100.—Battle of Cnidus: date: Lysias, Property of Aristophanes, 28; Plutarch, *Agesil.* 19.

P. 102.—Treaty stone of alliance of Boeotians and Athenians: C.I.A. ii. 6; Hicks, 65; Ditt.² 61.

P. 102.—Battle of Haliartus: date, 395-4 B.C.: Plutarch, Lysander, 29.

P. 103.—Adhesion of the Euboeans: The treaty of Athens with Eretria has been partly preserved: C.I.A. ii. 76; Ditt.² 62; cp. Hicks, 66.

P. 104.—Battle of Corinth: Besides the monument of Dexileos with the inscription (C.I.A. ii. 2084; Hicks, 69; Ditt.² 67), there is a funeral inscription enumerating the knights who fell at Corinth and at Coronea: C.I.A. ii. 1673; Hicks, 68; Ditt.² 68. Ten, besides the phylarch, fell at Corinth, one at Coronea.—Date of battle of Corinth: end of June or beginning of July, 394 B.C.: in the archonship of Diophantus (395-4 B.C.), Aristides, ii. p. 370 ed. Dindorf.

P. 107.—Building of walls had begun in the archonship of Diophantus=395-4 B.C.: cp. C.I.A. iv. 2, 830b.

P. 107.—Temple to Cnidian Aphrodite (near Eetionea): inscription, C.I.A. iv. 2, 830c; Ditt.² 64.

P. 107.—Athens recovered her control of Delos; it is uncertain at what time, but before 390-89 B.C. Delos had been freed from Athenian rule after Aegospotami: decree of Lacedaemonians probably relating thereto, Hicks, 61; Ditt.² 101.

P. 107.—Chios became her ally: see the treaty of Athens with Phaselis (between 394 and 388 B.C.), in which the alliance with Chios (Diodorus xiv. 84) is referred to: C.I.A. ii. 11; Hicks, 73; Ditt.² 72.

Pp. 107 *sqq.*—Chronology: cp. the discussion in Beloch, *Attische Politik*, pp. 347 *sqq.*

P. 109.—Capture of Lechaeon: in spring, before the feast of Hyacinthia at Sparta: Xenophon, Agesilaus, ii. 17. Cp. Stern, *Gesch. der spartanischen und thebanischen Hegemonie*, 8, note.

P. 111.—Euripides's *τὴν ῥαπαροσκή*: Aristophanes, Eccles. 823.

P. 111.—War-tax: Lysias, Property of Aristophanes, 29.

P. 112.—Exactions of Thrasybulus= $\frac{2}{3}$ th on commerce: This seems to follow from the phrase *τὴν ἐπὶ ὀρασεβοῶν εἰκοσμήν* in the Athenian decree respecting an alliance with Clazomenae (see below). Cp. Swoboda, *Ath. Mitth.* 1882, 174. —Charges against Thrasybulus: Lysias, Against Ergocles and Against Philocrates.

P. 113.—Unfortunately for Athens: the King's Peace was a blow to Athens, since she was gradually recovering a *commercial* empire. This is illustrated by the negotiations for a treaty with Clazomenae (387 B.C.), which was broken off when the Peace restored Clazomenae to Persia: inscription, C.I.A. ii. 146 (pp. 397, 423), iv. 2, 146; Ditt.² 73; cp. Hicks, 76.

P. 114.—Evagoras, an Athenian citizen: fragment of decree concerning citizenship, Hicks, 72.

P. 114.—Date of the King's Peace: spring 386 B.C. (formerly dated, by Clinton, Grote, etc., to July 387 B.C.). The Clazomenae inscription (see last note) led to the determination of the true date: Swoboda, *loc. cit.*

P. 116.—Alliance coins: Head, *Historia Numorum*, 495, 516, 540, etc.

CHAPTER III

Sects. 1-4.—Sources: *Primary*: inscriptions; Isocrates, Panegyricus, Plataeicus, Evagoras, Nicocles; Lysias, c. Exandrum (382 B.C.), Olympiacus (384 B.C.); Xenophon, Hellenica, v. 2-vi. 3; [Ephorus]. *Derivative*: Diodorus xv. 2-50; Plutarch: Agesilaus, Pelopidas, Genius Socratis; Nepos: Timotheus, Chabrias, Pelopidas.

P. 117.—Mantineia: Xenophon, Hell. v. 2; Diodorus xv. 5; Strabo viii. 387; Pausanias viii. 8. 9; Isocrates, Pan. 35.

P. 120.—Amyntas concluded an alliance with the Chalcidians: A mutilated copy of the treaty is preserved on a stone, Dittenberger², 77; Hicks, 74. Date: between 389 B.C. (when Amyntas, son of Arrhidaeus, came to the throne) and 383 B.C.—The succession of the Macedonian kings is a vexed question. There are two divergent traditions, one followed by Diodorus, the other recorded by

SynceUus; and modern critics differ in judging their respective values. Thus Swoboda has argued for the tradition of Diodorus (Arch.-Epigr. Mitth. aus Oesterreich, vii. 1 *sqq.*), while Gutschmid and Beloch give the preference to SynceUus.

P. 121.—Amyntas recovered his throne: The Athenians helped him (schol. Aesch., *De falsa leg.* 26), but it is doubtful whether the inscription relating to an alliance between Amyntas and Athens (Dittenberger², 78; *op.* Hicks, 77; C.I.A. ii. 15b) is to be referred to this occasion.

P. 123.—Lysias at Olympia: The true date is 384 B.C. (not 388 B.C.); so Grote, Freeman, and others.

P. 124.—Pelopidas and Epaminondas: a story is told that Epaminondas saved the life of Pelopidas in battle (Plutarch, *Pelop.* 4); but if this was so, it was not at the fictitious battle of Mantinea (? 384 B.C.), also mentioned in Pausanias ix. 13. But this passage in Pausanias is derived from Plutarch's lost *Life of Epaminondas* (as Wilamowitz-M. has shown, *Hermes*, viii. 439); so that it and the passage in the *Life of Pelopidas* obviously depend on the same source (Plutarch himself?). See Stern, *Gesch. der spartanischen und thebanischen Hegemonie*, 36-7.

P. 124.—The banquet at Thebes. I am not disposed to doubt the story of the disguise of the assassins as women, as told by Xenophon (*Hellenica*, v. 4. 5), though he mentions another version that they entered the hall as revellers (*ib.* 7). See also Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, 11, *ad init.* The same artifice was adopted in the story Herodotus tells (v. 18) of the slaying of Persian envoys by Alexander of Macedon. Macan (*ad loc.*) quotes other tales of such disguise. There are, I think, reasons for doubting the case of Alexander; but the circumstance that stories (whether genuine or not) of such a kind were afloat need not move us to reject the story of the Theban banquet. On the contrary, what would have been more natural than that such anecdotes should have suggested the idea to Pelopidas and his associates?—Irish history supplies us with another instance of the "snare" that was fatal to the polemarchs, but in this case demonstrably a legend. It was related that Turgesius, a Scandinavian invader of Ireland in the 9th century, was slain by youths disguised as girls; we know, however, on better authority, that Turgesius was drowned.

P. 126.—Raid of Sphodrias: its motive: Hertzberg, *Das Leben des Königs Agesilaos II.*, 1856, p. 336; Stern, *op. cit.* p. 69. False view that the Theban leaders instigated it: put forward by Xenophon (*Hell.* v. 4). Ephorus (= Diodorus xv. 29) made Cleombrotus responsible.

P. 128.—The original stone of the decree founding the Confederacy: C.I.A. ii. 17; Hicks, 81; Dittenberger², 80. The list of allies is as follows:—Chios, Tenedos, Mytilene, Methymna, Rhodes, Poessa in Ceos, Byzantium, Perinthus, Peparethus, Sciathus, Maronea, Dion, Paros, O—, Athenae Diades (in Euboea), P—, Thebes, Chalcis, Eretria, Arethusa, Carystus, Icus, Palaesciathus, . . . ; the demos of Corcyra, Abdera, Thasos, Chalcis (at Mt. Athos), Aenus, Samothrace, Diceapolis, Acarnania, Promoi in Cephallenia, Alceas, Neoptolemus, Jason (erased), Andros, Tenos, Hestiaea, Myconos, Antissa, Eresus, the Astrainsioi (?), Iulis in Ceos, Carthaea, Coresia in Ceos, Elaeus, Amorgos, Selymbria, Siphnos, Sicinos, Dion in Thrace, Neopolis in Thrace, Nello in Zacynthus.

P. 129.—The chief cities were Chios, Byzantium, etc.: Chios had already made an alliance with Athens, for the extant treaty (C.I.A. ii. 15, and iv. 2, 15c; Dittenberger², 75; Hicks, 80) must be referred, as Köhler has shown, to a year or two after the King's Peace, not to the year 378-7 B.C.; and Athens had also been already in close relations, probably in alliance, with Byzantium and Mytilene: Isocrates, *Plataicus*, 28.—Fragments of the treaty with Byzantium are extant: C.I.A. ii. 19; Hicks, 78; Dittenberger², 79.—Decree admitting Methymna to the Confederacy: C.I.A. iv. 2, 18b; Dittenberger², 82.—Treaty with Chalcis (377 B.C.): C.I.A. ii. 17b; Hicks, 79; Dittenberger², 81.—We have not the treaty with Mytilene, but we have a stone of 368-7 B.C. with an Athenian decree, in which the valuable services of Mytilene to Athens during the years of 377-1 are acknowledged: C.I.A. ii. 52c; Hicks, 85; Dittenberger², 91.

P. 129.—Several other states: Corcyra, Acarnania, and Cephallenia: decree admitting them to the League (375 B.C.): C.I.A. ii. 49; Hicks, 83; Dittenberger², 83.—The treaty with Corcyra: C.I.A. ii. 49b (and iv. 2, p. 14); Dittenberger², 84.

P. 129.—Assessment of property tax in 377 B.C. For this purpose the total amount of the property of the Athenian citizens was calculated, and found to amount to 5750 talents (about £1,550,000). Polybius ii. 62; Demosthenes, *De Symmoriis*, 19 (6000 talents). Cp. Beloch, *Hermes*, xv. 237 *sqq.*, xxii. 371 *sqq.*

P. 132.—Battle of Tegyra: 375 B.C. (probably right): Diodorus xv. 37.

P. 132.—Battle of Naxos: Xenophon, *Hell.* v. 4. 61; Diodorus xvi. 35; Plutarch, *Phocion*, 6; Demosthenes, *Against Leptines*, 17; schol. *Aristides*, *Panathen.* pp. 91, 500; Polyaeus iii. 2, 3.

P. 133.—Delian accounts (for 377-4 B.C.) preserved on a stone: "the Sandwich Marble": C.I.A. ii. 814; Hicks, 82; Dittenberger², 86.

P. 133.—Expedition of Timotheus: he received only 13 talents for it: Isocrates, *περί ἀντιδόσεως*, 109.

P. 133.—Peace of 374 B.C. The account in Diodorus xv. 38 may be left aside altogether, for he has reduplicated here the negotiations of the Peace of 371 B.C. See Stern's discussion, *op. cit.* pp. 93-9.—Athens seems to have concluded this treaty for herself, not for her Confederacy: Stern, *ib.* 100.

P. 135.—Timotheus starts for Thessaly: spring 373 B.C.: [Demosthenes], *Against Timotheus*, 6.

P. 135.—A comic poet: Anaxandrides in the *Protesilaus* (41 in *Kock's Comicorum Att. Frag. vol. ii.*).

P. 137.—Destruction of Plataea: beginning of 372 B.C.: Pausanias ix. 1. 8 (so Grote: Diodorus xv. 46 gives spring 373 B.C.).—Stern (*op. cit.* 119) conjectures that Thespieae suffered the same fate at this time: Xenophon, *Hell.* vi. 3. 1; Pausan. ix. 13. 8.

P. 138.—Peace of Callias: that the Great King also on this occasion intervened, by Sparta's wish, to suggest a peace congress is probable: Diodorus xv. 50; Aeschines, *De fals. leg.* 9.—The treaty recognised expressly the claims of Athens to the Thracian Chersonese (Demosthenes, *Third Philipp.* 16) and Amphipolis (Aeschines, *De fals. leg.* 32).

P. 139.—The Thebans and the peace: the account in Xenophon (*Hell.* vi. 3) and that in Plutarch (*Agésilas*, 28) differ and cannot be reconciled. It seems probable that the Thebans signed for themselves, as a member of the *Athenian Confederacy* (Xen. *Hell.* vi. 3. 19, ἀπογραφόμενοι ἐν ταῖς ὁμωνοκίαις πόλεσι καὶ οἱ Θηβαῖοι), and that afterwards Epaminondas, seeing that this might be prejudicial to the relations of Thebes to Boeotia, claimed as Boeotarch to sign for Boeotia: Stern, *op. cit.* 129-30. The passage of words between Epaminondas and Agésilas in Plutarch may be a genuine tradition, and I have treated it as such.

P. 140, *Sect.* 5.—Sources: *Primary*: works of Isocrates and Plato; Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and *Apologia Socratis*; Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* and *Plutus*; fragments of "Middle Comedy"; Aristotle, *Politics* and *Ethics*.

P. 142.—Athenian officers in the pay of foreign powers: Such men were often looked on with disfavour when they returned home rich, and were suspected of dishonesty and treachery. See Lysias, *On the Property of Aristophanes* (*Or.* 19; c. 387 B.C.): cp. Jebb, *Attic Orators*², vol. i. 234.

P. 145.—They might point to the ablest of the young men and say: cp. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*, ii. 75-S. An excellent impartial account of the trial of Socrates, *ib.*

P. 150.—Education at Athens: The school and aims of Isocrates: Jebb, *Attic Orators*, vol. ii.

P. 153.—On commerce, prices, banks, etc.: cp. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, ii. 336 *sqq.*

P. 153.—This decline in the number of Athenian citizens implies a decline in the free population (including metics) of about 150,000-140,000 to about 80,000. Cp. Beloch, *Bevölkerung der griechisch-römischen Welt*, 99. He assumes a large decline in the number of slaves (from 100,000 to 55,000); and it may be observed that the closing of the mines of Laurion in the Deceleic war supports the view that there was a considerable decline.—The number 21,000 is strictly recorded as the number of citizens in the last quarter of the fourth century

(Otesicles, in Athenaeus, vi. 272B); but there is no reason to suppose that there was much change during the 4th century, and we may reasonably assume 20,000 as roughly true for the end of the Peloponnesian war.

P. 154.—In regard to the high rate of interest, the great risk of trade in ancient times must be borne in mind.

P. 156.—Democratic leaders resigned claim to compensation: especially Thrasybulus and Anytus: Isocrates, Callimachus, 23.

P. 157.—Agyrrhius: for his career, see Andocides, Myst. 133; Demosthenes, Against Timocrates, 134; Harpocration, s.v. *Θεωρικά*.

CHAPTER IV

P. 159.—Sources: *Primary*: inscriptions; Xenophon, Hellenics, vi. 4–vii.; [Ephorus]. *Derivative*: Diodorus xv. 51–89; Plutarch: Pelopidas, Agesilaus; Nepos: Pelopidas, Epaminondas; Pausanias, passages in Bks. viii. and ix.

P. 159.—The name of Jason of Pherae, who had joined the Athenian League in 375 B.C., is erased on the stone (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*², 80): it must have been erased between 373 B.C. (when he was at Athens for the trial of Timotheus) and his death, 370 B.C.; perhaps in 372 B.C.

P. 162.—It may be noticed that the tactics of Delium (424 B.C.) were in some measure an anticipation of the tactics of Leuctra.

Pp. 164–5.—Another account of the events after Leuctra: I infer this account from Diodorus xv. 54; his authority was perhaps Ephorus. But Stern disputes this and sees here a Boeotian source. Xenophon certainly reproduces the Spartan version.

P. 167.—Tightening of Boeotian unity: Köhler, *Hermes*, 1889, 638 *sqq.*

P. 167, *Sect.* 2.—Additional sources: architectural remains of Mantinea, Megalopolis, and Messene.

P. 168.—Many citizens cudgelled to death: more than twelve hundred according to Diodorus xv. 58: the number seems incredible.

P. 169.—Date of foundation of Megalopolis: Niese (in *Hermes*, 1899, *Beiträge zur Geschichte Arkadiens*, 527 *sqq.*) concludes for spring 369.

P. 169.—Geography of Arcadia: cp. Mahaffy, *Rambles and Studies*, chap. xii.

P. 170.—Council of Fifty Damiorgoi: inscription: Ditt.² 106 (Hicks, 171). Date: middle of 4th century.

P. 170.—The Thersilion: cp. Excavations at Megalopolis (1892), 17 *sqq.*

P. 171.—The two parts of the city of Megalopolis: Bury, *Journal of Hell. Studies*, 1898, 15 *sqq.*

P. 174.—Decline of Sparta: cp. Pöhlmann, *Grundriss der gr. Geschichte*, 237, who thinks that the process which resulted in the concentration of the landed property in the hands of a few had begun before the 4th century. Law permitting alienation of the *κλήρος*: law of the ephor Epitadeus, Plutarch, *Agis* 5 (from the context the date of his ephorate seems to have been somewhere about 400 B.C.).

P. 174.—Foundation of Messene: Pausanias iv. 26, ix. 14. 2; Plutarch, *Pelop.* 24, *Ages.* 34; Diodorus xv. 66, 67. Many adventurers as well as the Messenian exiles took part in the settlement: Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates*, 12; Isocrates, *Archidamus*, 62.

P. 175.—Arcadian statues to Apollo, and inscription: Pausanias x. 9. 5; Pomtow, *Ath. Mitth.* xiv. 1889, 15 *sqq.*

P. 176.—Expedition of Iphicrates: the Athenian orators exaggerate its importance to Sparta: Isocrates, *Peace*, 105 *sqq.*; Demosthenes, *For the Megalopolitans*, 13.

P. 176.—Epaminondas indicted and acquitted: Pausanias ix. 14; Plutarch, *Pelop.* 25.

P. 183.—Iphicrates in Macedonia: Aeschines, *De fals. leg.* 26 *sqq.* (cp. scholl.).

P. 185.—Sestus and Crithote: Isocrates, *Antidosis*, 111; Nepos, *Timotheus*, 1.

P. 186.—The Athenian occupation of Samos and the consequent imitation there of Athenian institutions are illustrated by a stone of 346–5 B.C., giving a

list of treasures in the temple of Hera: Hicks, 90.—Cleruchs at Samos: Isocrates, *Antidosis*, 111; Demosthenes, *For the Rhodians*, 9; schol. on Aeschines, *Against Timarchus*, 53.

P. 186.—The operations of Timotheus in Chalcidice and against Amphipolis are illustrated by a stone on which honours are decreed to Menelaus, a Pelagonian who assisted him: C.I.A. ii. 55; Hicks, 92; Ditt.² 102. The inscription shows that the war in these regions was protracted into 362 B.C.

P. 187.—Ceos: C.I.A. iv. 2, 546; Hicks, 93; Ditt.² 101.

P. 189.—Destruction of Orchomenus: [Plutarch, *Life of Epaminondas*=] Pausanias ix. 15. 3; Diodorus xv. 79.

P. 191.—Arcadian occupation of Olympia: Illustrated by an inscription conferring privileges on certain Sicyonians: Ditt.² 98.

P. 192.—It is interesting to find that the treasures which the Arcadians took from Olympia were paid back: the record is an Argive inscription, *Frinkel, Sitzungsberichte of the Berlin Academy*, 1898, p. 635.

P. 194.—Text of quintuple alliance treaty: C.I.A. ii. 576 and 112; Hicks, 94; Ditt.² 105.

P. 194.—Epaminondas at Sparta: cp. Polybius ix. 8.

P. 194.—The Phocians refused to go: It is to be noted that there was a Phocian, anti-Theban party at Delphi: C.I.A. ii. 54; Hicks, 91; Ditt.² 100.

P. 195.—Battle of Mantinea: The left wing of Epaminondas was drawn up not further north than Sceppe (Mytika): W. Loring, *J.H.S.* 1895, 87-8.

P. 197.—Peace was made: cp. Diodorus xv. 89. The inscription, C.I.G. 1118, seems to be connected with this peace, for it seems to allude to the revolt of the satraps: see A. Wilhelm, *Oesterreich. Jahresh.* iii. 145 *sqq.*, and the new ed. of Hicks's *Greek Hist. Inscriptions*, 120.

P. 198, *Sett.* 5.—Sources: Diodorus xv. 90-94; Xenophon, *Agésilas*: Plutarch, *Agésilas*; Nepos, *Agésilas*. [Compare Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 161 *sqq.*]

P. 199.—Chabrias in Egypt: Ambassadors of Tachos seeking help at Athens: C.I.A. ii. 60; Hicks, 95. Inscription (near Memphis) of Greek mercenaries serving under Chabrias: C.I.G. 4702; Hicks, 96.

CHAPTER V

P. 202.—Sources: *Primary*: [Philistus]; Platonic and Pseudo-Platonic *Epistles*. *Derivative*: Diodorus xiii. xiv. and xvi.; Plutarch, *Lives of Dion and Timoleon*; Nepos, *Lives of Dion and Timoleon*; Justin (= Pompeius Trogus) xx. xxi.

P. 206.—Panormitan coinage with ZIZ. This word has been supposed to be the Phoenician name of Panormus; it might mean the "bright." It appeared on an older issue of Panormitan coins, and seems to have been originally connected specially with Panormus; but at this period it was adopted by other non-Greek towns of Sicily (both Phoenician and Elymian). It has been suggested that it was interpreted as a symbol of Sicily (possibly with a play on *Sik-*). See Holm, *Geschichte Siciliens*, iii. 646-50.

P. 213.—The constitutional position of Dionysius was probably similar to that of Gelon (cp. above, vol. i. p. 323, and note thereto).

P. 221.—Alliance of Catane and Leontini: A. J. Evans, *Numismatic Chronicle*, xvi. 1896.

P. 227.—The aversion of Dionysius to pitched battles has been pointed out by Freeman.

P. 235.—Ruler of Sicily: $\delta \Sigmaικε\lambda\alpha\varsigma \alpha\rho\chi\omega\nu$, as he is called in the Athenian decrees in his honour (preserved on stone) of B.C. 393, 363, and 363, (C.I.A. ii. 8, 51, 52=Hicks, G. *Hist. Inscr.* 71, 84, 88=Dittenberger, *Sylloge*², 66, 89, 90).

P. 240.—Extent of the Syracusan empire: cp. A. J. Evans, *Supplement i. to Freeman's History of Sicily*, vol. iv. *Hadriatic Colonies*: Supplement ii. *ib.* *Finance*: Supplement iii. *ib.*

P. 240.—Wall across the Bruttian peninsula: Strabo vi. 261.

P. 261.—"Archidamus eagerly embraced," etc.: It may be noted that in 356

B.C. Isocrates had urged Archidamus inopportunistically to lead an expedition against Persia: Isocrates, Letter 9 (to Archidamus).

P. 261.—Tarentine coins alluding to appeal to Sparta and death of Archidamus: A. J. Evans, *Horsemen of Tarentum* (cp. Pl. v. 1; Pl. iv. 9 and 10).

P. 262.—Expedition and alliances of Alexander of Epirus: Evans, *ib.* (83-85). The influence of Timoleon's example is illustrated by the circumstance that Alexander adopted Timoleon's Syracusan type of Zeus Eleutherios for his Italian coins: Evans, in *Freeman's Sicily*, iv. p. 350.

CHAPTER VI

P. 263.—Sources: *Primary*: inscriptions; speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines, and works of Isocrates (see below under separate sections); fragments of Theopompus; [Ephorus]. *Derivative*: Diodorus xv. 95, xvi.; Plutarch, *Lives of Demosthenes and Phocion*; Justin, Bks. vii.-ix.; Pseudo-Plutarch, *Lives of Ten Orators* (viz. of Demosthenes and Aeschines).

P. 264.—Stone of Thessalo-Athenian treaty: C.I.A. iv. 2, 596; Hicks, 97; Ditt.² 108.

P. 264.—Raid of Alexander on the Piræus: [Demosthenes], *Against Polycles*, 5; Diodorus xv. 95; Polyænus vi. 2.

P. 264.—Callistratus: first trial (along with Chabrias) for high treason; on Theban seizure of Oropus (366 B.C.): Hermippus, fr. 61; Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, i. p. 1364. Second time and condemnation: Hyperides, *For Euxenippus*, 18, 23; Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates*, 93; [Demosthenes], *Against Polycles*, 48.

P. 265.—Recovery of Euboea: Decree (357-6 B.C.) regarding a rearrangement of the alliances with the Euboean towns: C.I.A. ii. 64 and iv. 2, p. 22; Hicks, 181; Ditt.² 109. The decree shows that the four chief cities, Chalcis, Eretria, Carystus, and Oreus, were loyal to Athens throughout the war and averse to Boeotian rule.—Inscription regarding an attack upon Eretria during the war: C.I.A. ii. 65; Ditt.² 110.

P. 265, *Sect. 2*.—Additional sources: *Primary*: [Thrasylbulus]. *Derivative*: Herodes Atticus, *Περὶ πολέμας*; Arrian's *Tactics*.

P. 267.—Limitation of royal power in case of a capital charge: cp. Arrian's description of the condemnation of Philotas, iii. 26.

P. 269.—Philip's capture of Amphipolis: For the proceedings against the philathenian party in Amphipolis on its capture, C.I.G. 2008; Hicks, 98; Ditt.² 113: a decree of perpetual exile against Philon and Stratocles.

P. 270, *note*.—Thracian alliances: C.I.A. ii. 66b; Hicks, 109; Ditt.² 114.

P. 270.—"A professional army with a national spirit": Hogarth, *Philip and Alexander of Macedon*, 51. In his account of the phalanx Mr. Hogarth seems somewhat to exaggerate its mobility.

P. 271, *Sect. 3*.—Special sources: Demosthenes: *On the trierarchical Crown* (359 B.C.), *Against Androtion*, and *Against Timocrates*, and *Against Leptines* (355-4 B.C.), *On the Symmories* (354 B.C.), *For the Rhodians* (353 B.C.); Isocrates: *On the Peace* (355 B.C.), *Areopagiticus* (355-4 B.C.), *Περὶ ἀντιδόσεως* (353 B.C.).

P. 272.—The fact that Carians saw much of the world in mercenary service, since the days of Psammetichus and Amasis, helped to keep the country abreast of civilisation.

P. 272.—Position of the Carian princes (like that of the Attalids of Pergamon): cp. Mahaffy, *Hermathena*, 1897, 389 *sqq.* Inscriptions illustrating the position of Mausolus at Mylasa, Iasus, etc.: Ditt.² 95, 96; Hicks, 101, etc.

P. 273.—Revolt of Athenian allies: This led to the introduction of Athenian garrisons into some of the allied cities which had not revolted, e.g. Andros: C.I.A. ii. 62; Hicks, 103; Ditt.² 111.

P. 273.—Chares, however, was successful in preventing the Byzantines from joining forces with the other hostile states. A decree bearing on this: C.I.A. ii. 69; Ditt.² 116.

P. 274.—Battle of Embata: see Polyænus iii. 9. 29.

P. 274.—Aristophan and the trial of the generals: see Dinarchus, *Against Demosthenes*, 14; Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, ii. 1398.

P. 275.—It is noteworthy that in the speech on the Symmories there is no mention of Philip; a supposed allusion does not really refer to him, as Mahaffy has shown (Greek Literature, ii. 105: cp. Butcher, Demosthenes, 39).

P. 276.—Revolutions, and Carian intervention, in Cos, Chios, Rhodes: Demosthenes, Rhodian Speech, 19; Aristotle, Politics, viii. 1302b.—Athenian embassy to Mausolus: Demosthenes, Against Timocrates (with the Hypothesis).

P. 276.—Pleadings of Demosthenes for Rhodes: The received date (on the authority of Dionysius of Halicarnassus) is 351-50 B.C.; but the difficulties of this date have been pointed out by Judeich (Kleinasiatische Studien, 186-9). There can be hardly any doubt that the true date is 353 B.C., second half of the year.

P. 277, *Sect.* 4.—Special source: Demosthenes, For the Megalopolitans (353 B.C.).

P. 277.—Thebes and Amphictiones make war: An account of moneys paid to the Thebans by their amphictionic allies for urging this war during some three years (perhaps the first three, 355-2 B.C.): Collitz, Sammlung der gr. Dialektinschriften, i. 705; Ditt.² 120.

P. 282.—Capture of Pagasae: Diodorus xvi. 31 (garrison: Demosth. Ol. i. 22); date: cp. Beloch, Gr. Gesch. ii. 326, note.—Decisive battle: Diodorus xvi. 35; Pausanias x. 2.

P. 283.—Athenians at Thermopylae: date: before end of year of Thudemus = 353-2 B.C.: Dionysius Hal., *ιστοριαι*, on Dinarchus, 13.

P. 285.—Accounts of the Council of Naopoiioi; B.C.H. 1896, 197; Sammlung der gr. Dialektinschriften, ii. 2502; Ditt.² 140. At the beginning of the war the building seems to have been interrupted for a few years: cp. Ditt. *loc. cit.* p. 217.

P. 286, *Sect.* 5.—Special sources: Demosthenes: Against Aristocrates (352 B.C.), First Philippic (351 B.C.), Olynthiacs (349 B.C.), Against Meidias (348 B.C.).

P. 286.—Philip in Thrace: Aeschines, On the Embassy, 81-2 with scholl.; (Byzantium) Demosthenes, Philipp. iii. 34; (Heraeon Teichos) Dem. Ol. iii. 4.

P. 287.—Hellenism of Philip: Attic Greek may have been introduced as the official language of Macedonia even before Philip's reign.

P. 288.—Eubulus: see Theopompus, frags. 95, 96 (F.H.G. i.); finance minister in charge of the Theoric fund: Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, 25.

P. 290.—Treaty of Chalcidians with Athens (? 351-50 B.C.): C.I.A. ii. 105; Ditt.² 121; Demosth. Ol. iii. 7; Against Aristocrates, 109. The act of the Chalcidians a violation of their treaty with Philip: cp. Hypothesis of Libanius to Olynth. i. *ποιούντες τούτο παρὰ τὰς συνθήκας τὰς πρὸς Φίλιππον*.

P. 291.—Philip's demand of Olynthus: cp. schol. on Demosth. Ol. i. 5; Justin viii. 3. 10.

P. 291.—Euboean war: Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, 86 *sqq.*; Demosth. Peace, 5; Against Meidias, 132-3, 161; In reply to Boeotus, 16; [Demosth.] Against Neaera, 4; Plutarch, Phocion, 12-13.

P. 292.—Carystus: Hegesippus, On Halonnesus, 38; Demosth. On the Embassy, 326 (Geraestus).

P. 292.—Reduction of Olynthus: Demosth. On the Embassy, 265-6; Philippic iii. 56; Hyperides, fr. 79; Philochorus, fr. 132.—Reception of Olynthian refugees at Athens: inscription (restored by Wilhelm), Hicks² 133a.

P. 293, *Sect.* 6.—Special sources: Demosthenes: On the Peace (346 B.C.), On the Embassy (343 B.C.), On the Crown (330 B.C.); Aeschines: Against Timarchus (346-5 B.C.), On the Embassy (343 B.C.), Against Ctesiphon (330 B.C.); Isocrates, Philip (346 B.C.); Hyperides, For Euxenippus, 39, 40.

P. 294.—Phalaeus: Sparta and Athens, etc: Aeschines, On the Embassy, 132 *sqq.*

P. 295.—Demosthenes, Theban proxenos: Aeschines, On the Embassy, 141.

P. 298.—Phocians obliged to undertake to pay back: Accounts of these repayments: Ditt.² 141, 142, 143.

P. 300.—Demosthenes and the Peace of Philocrates: see the sensible remarks of Holm, History of Greece (E.T.), iii. 257 *sqq.*

P. 300.—Isocrates: In 370 B.C. Isocrates seems to have looked to Dionysius of Syracuse to be the saviour of Greece: Isocrates, Letter 1 (to Dionysius).

P. 302, *Sect.* 7.—Special sources: Demosthenes: Second Philippic (344 B.C.)

On the Chersonese and Third Philippic and Fourth Philippic (341 B.C.), On the Embassy and On the Crown, as before; Hegesippus (Pseudo-Demosth.), On Halonnesus; Aeschines, as before; Letter of Philip; Isocrates, Panathenaicus (339 B.C.).

P. 302.—Reorganisation of Thessaly: Demosthenes, Philipics ii. 22 and iii. 26; Theopompus, fr. 234.—Philip *archon* of Thessaly: that *archon*, not *tagus*, was the title now may be inferred from the election of Agelaus as *archon*: C.I.A. iv. 2, 576; Ditt.² 108; Hicks² 123. *Dux universae gentis* is the title given to Alexander the Great in Justin xi. 3. 2.

P. 302.—Statue of Philip at Megalopolis: Demosth. On the Embassy, 261. For the attitude of the Peloponnesus, cp. Demosth. Philippic ii. For Elis: Pausanias iv. 28. 3, v. 4 *ad fin.*

P. 303.—Demosthenes in Peloponnesus: Demosth. On the Crown, 79; Phil. ii. 19 *sqq.*

P. 304.—“Give”; “give back”: Antiphanes, Neottis, fr. 169 (Kock); Anaxilas, Euandria, fr. 9; Alexis, Stratiotes, fr. 209. See Hegesippus, On Halonn. 5; Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, 83; Letter of Philip, 14.

P. 305.—Impeachment of Philocrates: Demosthenes, On the Embassy, 116; Aeschines, On the Embassy, 6; Hypereides, For Euxenippus, 39 (cp. fr. 200).

P. 306.—Megara: Demosth. On the Embassy, 294-5; Philipp. iii. 17-8; On the Crown, 71 (cp. 295).—Euboea: Aeschines, Against Ctes. 89; Demosth. Philipp. iii. 57 *sqq.*

P. 307.—Philip in Epirus: Hegesippus, On Halonnesus, 32 (cp. Theopompus, fr. 228); Demosth. Ol. i. 13; Justin vii. 6. 10-11, viii. 6. 4 *sqq.*

P. 307.—Philip's Thracian expedition: Demosthenes, On the Chersonesus; Philip's Letter (8-10); Diodorus xvi. 71. 1-2; no fragments of Theopompus have survived except the names of a place or two (F.H.G. i. p. 319, frags. 245-8); Satyrus, frag. 5 (F.H.G. iii. p. 161); Stephanus Byz. *sub* Φιλίππου πόλις. Compare Höck's article in *Hermes*, 26 (1891).

P. 308.—Speech on the Chersonese: Observe in what strong terms Demosthenes represents Philip as aiming at robbing and ruining Athens (44-5).

P. 308.—The Third Philippic: Demosthenes arranged for the sending of an embassy to the Persian king: Philipp. iii. 71, iv. 32: Philip complains of this in his Letter, 6.

P. 309.—The Euboean league: Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, 94, 100.

P. 309.—Perinthus and Byzantium: Philochorus, fr. 135 (F.H.G. i.); [Demosthenes], On Philip's Letter, 5; Diodorus xvi. 74-7; Pausanias i. 29. 7; Frontinus i. 4. 13.—Chares sent to Byzantium: He had already been operating in these regions: cp. C.I.A. ii. 116; Hicks, 114; Ditt.² 145: a decree (beginning of 340 B.C.) touching Elaeus, a city of the Chersonese which was throughout loyal to Athens.

P. 310.—Siege of Byzantium. Important help was given to Athens by Tenedos on this occasion: C.I.A. ii. 117; Hicks, 116; Ditt.² 146.

P. 317.—Victory at Amphissa: Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon, 146-7; Plutarch, Demosth. 18; Polyaeus, iv. 2. 8.—Naupactus: Theopompus, fr. 46; cp. Strabo ix. 4. 7.—Philip's successes before Chaeronea: Demosth. On the Crown, 216.

P. 318.—Battle of Chaeronea: an Acarnanian force fought with the Athenians: see inscription C.I.A. ii. 121=Ditt.² 147. (Honours to a taxiarach named Bularchus, who fought in the campaign of Chaeronea: C.I.A. ii. 562=Hicks, 117). Sources: Diodorus xvi. 85-6; Plutarch, Alexander, 9, and (for date) Camillus, 19; Justin ix. 3; Polyaeus iv. 2; cp. Lysurgus, Against Leocrates, 142, and *apud* Diodor. xvi. 88. 2. Epitaph on the slain, given in our texts of Demosthenes, De Cor. 289, is not genuine. For a genuine contemporary epigram see C.I.A. ii. 1680=Anthol. Palat. vii. 245.

P. 321, Sect. 9.—Special sources: *Primary*: Isocrates, Letter 3 (to Philip); Pseudo-Demosthenes, On the Treaty with Alexander (335 B.C.); Circular Letter of Philip Arrhidæus (319 B.C.), in Diodorus xviii. 56; fragments of Hypereides, In reply to Aristogeiton; Isyllus. *Derivative*: Justin, Bk. ix.

P. 321.—Treatment of Boeotia: Diodorus xvi. 87 *ad fin.*; Justin ix. 4. 6 *sqq.* Orchomenus: Pausanias ix. 37 *ad fin.*; and Plataea: *ib.* iv. 27. 10.

P. 321.—For the dealings of Philip with Athens and part played by Demades:

C.I.A. ii. 124, Ditt.² 148, Hicks, 121; C.I.A. ii. 123, Hicks, 120; Hypereides, fr. 77; Demosth. On the Crown, 282 *sqq.* For Demades, cp. Plutarch, Demosth. 10; Suidas, *sub Δημάδης*.

P. 321.—There was a panic at Athens after Chaeronea: Demosth. On the Crown, 195; Lycurgus, Against Leocrates, 40-1. Proposal of Hypereides: Hypereides, In reply to Aristogeiton, frags. 31-33 (cp. Vita Hyperidis, 9, 10).

P. 322.—Terms of Peace: Diodorus xvi. 87; (Oropus) Pausanias i. 34. 1; Polybius v. 10. 4-5.

P. 322.—Statue to Philip: Pausanias i. 9. 4.—Demosthenes confessed: On the Crown, 231.

P. 322.—Philip at Sparta: Isyllus of Epidaurus: Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, Isyllus von Epidaurus, 30 *sqq.*

The lines are:—

ἐγ κείνοισι χρόνοις ὅκα δὴ στρατὸν ἤγε Φίλιππος
εἰς Σπάρτην, ἐθέλων ἀνελεῖν βασιλεῖδα τιμῆν.

Cp. Polybius ix. 28. 6-7. See Schäfer, Demosthenes u. seine Zeit, 3², 44.

P. 322.—The frontier districts of Sparta: Polybius xvii. 14. 7, ix. 33. 8-10. Messenian side: Strabo viii. 4, 8; Tacitus, Ann. iv. 43; Stephanus Byz. *sub Δερβάλοις*. Megalopolitan side: Livy xxxviii. 24.

P. 323.—The Hellenic Confederacy under Macedonian leadership: Demosth. On the Crown, 201; [Demosthenes], On the Treaty with Alexander, *passim*; cp. Diodorus xviii. 56.—The first Synedrion: Justin ix. 5. 1-3. The second Synedrion: Diodorus xvi. 89.—A fragment of the oath taken by the members: C.I.A. ii. 160; Ditt.² 149; Wilhelm, Arch.-Epigr. Mittheilungen aus Oesterreich, 1894, p. 35. This stone relates to the renewal of the Peace by Alexander, 336 B.C. A fragment of the list of those who swore to the Peace is also preserved, as Wilhelm has shown, in C.I.A. ii. 184; Ditt.² 159. See Hicks², 154.

P. 324.—Philip's garrisons: Polybius xxxviii. 1 c. 3; Aelian, Varia historia, vi. 1; Diodorus xvii. 3.

P. 324.—Philip sends advance force into Asia: Diodorus xvi. 91. 2; Justin ix. 5. 8.

P. 324.—Quarrel of Alexander with Philip: Plutarch, Alexander, 9.

P. 325.—Circumstances of the death of Philip: Diodorus xvi. 91 *sqq.*—A son born to Cleopatra: Pausanias viii. 7.—Suspicion of Olympias: Plutarch, Alexander, 10; cp. Justin ix. 7. 1.

P. 327.—The "chopper": ἡ τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων κοπίς, Plutarch, Phocion, 5 *ad fin.*

CHAPTERS VII AND VIII

SOURCES: *Primary*: [Aristobulus], [Ptolemy], [Callisthenes], [Onesicritus], [The Court Journal of Alexander], [Journal of Nearchus], [Cleitarhus], [Chares of Mytilene], [Anaximenes of Lampsacus]. *Derivative*: Arrian's Anabasis; Plutarch's Life of Alexander (chief sources: Aristobulus, Onesicritus, Cleitarhus); Quintus Curtius; Diodorus xvii.; Justin xi. xii.; passages in Strabo (collected by A. Miller, Die Alexander Geschichte nach Strabo, 1882). (Fabulous, but containing a fact or two: Pseudo-Callisthenes.)

P. 338.—Sheep-dogs to the wolf: Plutarch, Demosthenes, 23 (Alexander a *μορόλυκος*).

P. 345.—Democratic constitution at Ephesus: The establishment of democratic constitutions by Alexander is illustrated by his decree in the form of a letter to the people of Chios: Ditt.² 150; Pridik, De Alexandri Magni epistularum commercio, p. 30 *sqq.*—For Alexander's dealings with the tyrants of Eresus: Hicks, 125; Cauer, Delectus (ed. 2), 430.—A decree of Alexander arranging the tribute, etc., of Priene: Hicks, 123; cp. Pridik, *op. cit.* pp. 28 *sq.* Dedication of a temple at Priene by Alexander: Hicks, 124; Ditt.² 158.

P. 350, Sect. 6.—Special source: *Derivative* (from Callisthenes): Polybius xii. 17-22.

P. 351.—The numbers of the Oriental troops at Issus (80,000 is stated) are probably exaggerated.

P. 352.—Battle of Issus: The resemblance of the tactics of Alexander to the tactics of Cromwell has been instructively pointed out by Mahaffy (*Greek Life and Thought*, 32). "Each of them fought most of his battles by charging with his heavy cavalry on the right wing, overthrowing the enemy's horse, and then, avoiding the temptation to pursue, charging the enemy's infantry in flank, and so deciding the issue."

P. 354.—Alexandria at Issus: cp. Scymnus, fr. 187; Herodian iii. 4.

P. 354.—Genuineness of this letter of Alexander (and of most of his letters which are quoted or referred to): Pridik, *De Alexandri Magni epistularum commercio*, 1893. The letter is given by Arrian ii. 14. 4 *sgg.*

P. 357.—The Sidonian sarcophagus: Une nécropole royale à Sidon, by Hamdy Bey and Th. Reinach. For a short account of the sculptures, see P. Gardner, *Sculptured Tombs of Hellas*, c. xv.

P. 364.—The submission of the Jews is a certain inference from the situation, though the account of his visit to Jerusalem by Josephus (*Ant.* xi. 8) is a fable.

P. 364.—Gaza: It was colonised by Alexander and became a Greek city: Arrian ii. 27; Josephus, *B.J.* ii. 6. 3.—According to Curtius (*iv.* 6. 26-29) Alexander inflicted a cruel punishment on Betis, the brave defender of Gaza, tying him to his chariot and dragging him round the city, as Achilles, his mythical ancestor, treated Hector.

P. 366.—Alexander's visit to temple of Amon: cp. Mahaffy, *History of Egypt* under the Ptolemaic dynasty, 14 *sgg.*

P. 367.—Alexander's return to Tyre: On his way back he had to suppress a revolt in Samaria: Curtius *iv.* 8, 10; and he seems to have colonised the city of Samaria: Eusebius (*Armen.*), ed. Schöne, ii. 116.

P. 368.—Intelligence department: "It has been supposed": by Professor Mahaffy, *Greek Life and Thought*, 506.

Pp. 369-70.—Persian order of battle at Gaugamela: Here Aristobulus (Arrian's source) made use of official Persian documents captured after the battle: Arrian *iii.* 11. 3.

P. 373.—Susa: For remains and excavations, see Dieulafoy, *L'acropole de Suse*, 1893.

P. 376.—Persepolis: That there was much bloodshed as well as pillage here is stated by Diodorus *xvii.* 70. 2 ("the Macedonians slaughtered all the men"), and Curtius *v.* 6. 6.

P. 376.—Burning of Persepolis: Gutschmid regarded it as a symbolic act, *Geschichte Irans*, p. 1.

P. 381.—The satrapies. But it seems to have become ultimately the policy of Alexander to appoint only Macedonian governors. At his death only three satrapies (*Media*, *Parthia*, *Paropanisadae*) were held by orientals. Cp. Gutschmid, *op. cit.* p. 7.

P. 382.—Chronology of the years 330-327: Hogarth, Philip and Alexander of Macedon, Appendix.

P. 383.—Alexandria Areiôn: Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* vi. 17, § 61, and *xxiii.* § 93.

P. 383.—Prophthasia: a foundation of Alexander: Pseudo-Plutarch, *De Alex. fortitudine* 5; Stephanus, *s.v.* *Φράδα*.

P. 383.—Philotas: There is no evidence that he was innocent of taking part in the conspiracy, while there is no doubt that he knew of it and did not reveal it. In Diodorus, Plutarch, and Curtius (*vi.* 11. 13 *sgg.*) it is stated that Philotas was tortured, while Arrian seems to imply that he was not. We cannot decide. Grote states the whole case as an advocate (c. 94). See the sensible remarks of Holm, *Hist. of Greece*, iii. 345-6 (*Eng. Tr.*).

P. 384.—Alexandria in Arachosia: see Stephanus, *s.v.* *Ἀλεξάνδρεια*, and Isidore, *Σταθμοὶ Παρθικοί* (in Müller's *Geogr. Minores*). It is distinguished by Droysen from the town of Arachotai in Strabo *xi.* 8, 9 (*Geschichte des Hellenismus*, iii. 2. 217 *sgg.*).

P. 384.—Identifications of Drapsaca and Aornus, of Cyropolis and various places in Sogdiana: F. v. Schwarz, *Alexander des Grossen Feldzüge in Turkestan* (a valuable contribution to the subject by a man who knows the ground), 1893.

P. 384.—Alexandria of the Caucasus: Arrian *iii.* 28. 4, *iv.* 22. 5; Diodorus *xvii.* 83; Curtius *vii.* 3. 23.

P. 387.—The Caspian: The view that Alexander did not suppose the Caspian

to be an inlet of the ocean, but identified the Jaxartes with the Don, seems to be less likely. Herodotus seems to have known the view that the Caspian was a gulf as well as the view that it was a lake.

P. 387.—Alexandria Eschate: Arrian iv. 4. 1.

P. 388.—The opposition to Alexander in Sogdiana was perhaps aggravated by the intensity of the Zoroastrian faith (Gutschmid, *op. cit.* 11).

P. 388.—Scythians beyond the Jaxartes: It has been thought that here we have the first trace of a Turkish people in history. The king's brother is called Carthasis (Curtius vii. 7. 1), which, Nöldeke observed, might be Turkish *kardāshy* "his brother" (Gutschmid, *op. cit.* 2).

P. 391.—Intemperance promoted by the dryness of the air, and want of good water: cp. Schwarz, *ib.* 44-5, who points out the similar experience of the Russians in these regions. Drunkenness among the Europeans in Turkestan was shocking until General v. Kauffmann introduced the use of tea in the army.

P. 392.—Doubts have been thrown on the truth of the episode of the Branchidae, because the act was so unlike Alexander, and the only source for the story is Curtius (vii. 5. 23-35). But it is difficult to understand why it should have been invented, whereas we can easily understand that, if true, it was likely to be passed over in silence both in the Court Diary and by the companions of Alexander (Ptolemy, Aristobulus, Callisthenes) who wrote the history of his campaign. Arrian's silence is explained by the silence of his sources, Ptolemy and Aristobulus.

P. 393.—Alexander's indifference to women. Little importance need be attached to the passing connexion with Barsine, daughter of Memnon, after the capture of Darnasus (Plut. Al. 22).

P. 395.—Nicaea: Arrian iv. 22. 6.

P. 397.—The extant Periplus, ascribed to Scylax, is a later work under a false name.

Pp. 398-9.—Conjectural identifications of Nysa and other places in the Cabul and Swat regions: cp. J. W. McCrindle, *Invasion of India by Alexander the Great* (2nd ed. 1896). On the ancient geography of the Punjab, see this work and Cunningham's *Geography of Ancient India*. Nysa, near Aegae in Euboea, was specially associated with Dionysus, cp. Soph. Antig. 1131, Stephanus *sub voc.*

P. 399.—Massaga: According to the account of Diodorus (xvii. 84), Alexander was guilty of gross treachery on this occasion. This does not appear in the narrative of Arrian.

P. 401.—Battle of the Hydaspes: Alexander left his heavy infantry on the right side of the river at the point where he crossed, probably a precaution against Abisares. This was seen by Rüstow and Köchly.

Pp. 402-4.—I have not mentioned the scythed chariots which Arrian places in front of each wing, because they played no part in the battle as he describes it.—My account of the engagement differs in an important point from that of Rüstow and Köchly. They and other interpreters assume that the cavalry on the right wing of Porus remained idle throughout the battle. But surely Porus, when he found that the attack was entirely on his left wing, brought round the other half of his cavalry, and did not leave it inactive throughout the battle. And this is the most reasonable interpretation of Arrian's words (v. 17): *οὐτε Ἰνδοὶ τοὺς ἱππέας πάντοθεν ξυναλίσσαντες κ.τ.λ.*

P. 412.—It seems a gross exaggeration, for instance, to compare the march through Gedrosia with Napoleon's retreat from Moscow.

P. 416.—Alexander's speech at Opis: Arrian vii. 9 and 10. Grote describes this speech as "teeming with exorbitant self-exaltation" (c. 94); Holm asks, "Is there an incorrect statement in the speech?" But how much of this oration was Alexander's? Was it not a composition of Arrian?

P. 422.—Date of Alexander's death: Court Journal (in Plutarch, Al. 77), *τῇ τρίτῃ φθινόπωρον* (Δαίσκου) = 28th (27th if a short month) of Daesius. The correspondence of the Macedonian with Roman months is uncertain; but we have a statement in a MS. of Pseudo-Callisthenes, which may well be trustworthy, and would enable us to interpret the date. According to one reading (ed. Müller, 151) Alexander "died on the 4th of Pharmuthi"; and in 323 B.C. the 4th of the Egyptian month Pharmuthi fell on the 13th of June (Unger, *Philologus*, 1882, 82 *sqq.*).

P. 423.—Seventy cities are said to have been founded by Alexander in the far East; we know only of about forty. See Droysen's study of the Städtegründungen Alexanders, in his *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, iii. 189-254. Only in a few cases are these foundations noticed in the narratives of Alexander's deeds (Arrian, Diodorus, etc.): the sources for most of them are stray notices in geographical works, etc., and there is naturally much uncertainty about them; the uncertainty about their constitutions may be illustrated by the different accounts which Diodorus and Curtius give of Alexandria under Caucasus.—Aristotle is said to have composed a work on Colonisation, for the instruction of Alexander (Diogenes Laert. v. 22; and see Arist. fr. 14, p. 1489, ed. Rose), but the statement has been doubted.

P. 424, *Sect.* 5.—Sources: *Primary*: inscriptions; Aeschines, Against Ctesiphon; Demosthenes, On the Crown; Lycurgus, Against Leocrates; Aristotle, Constitution of the Athenians; architectural remains. *Derivative*: Life of Lycurgus (in the Lives of the Ten Orators); Plutarch, Lives of Demosthenes and Phocion; Diodorus, Bk. xvii. 62, 63.

P. 424.—“By Demosthenes himself”: Plutarch's expression (Dem. 24) is ταπεινὰ δ' ἐπαρτεν ὁ Δ.

P. 424.—Enterprise of Agis and battle of Megalopolis: Diodorus xvii. 62-3; Curtius vi. 1; Justin xii. 1. Date of battle: see Niese, *Gesch. der griechischen u. makedonischen Staaten*, i. 497.—In Alexander's camp the war in Arcadia was likened to a war of mice (Plut. Ages. 15).

P. 426.—Aeschines, quotation from: Against Ctesiphon, 132-4.

P. 426.—Etruscan rovers: decree (325-4 B.C.): C.I.A. ii. 809; Ditt.² 153. Hypereides delivered a speech *Περὶ τῆς φυλακῆς τῶν Τυρρηνῶν*, and Dinarchus wrote a *Τυρρηνικός*.

P. 427.—Skeuothekē of Philo: Ditt. 352.

P. 427.—The Stadion: Decree, proposed by Lycurgus, in reference to its building: C.I.A. ii. 176; Hicks, 128; Ditt.² 151.

P. 428.—Ephebi: cp. Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen*, i. 191 *sqq.*

P. 429.—Dearth of corn from 330-325 B.C.: marble stele with honorary decrees for Heraclides of Cypriote Salamis, who during these years gave large gifts of corn to Athens: C.I.A. iv. 2, 179b; Ditt.² 152. Cp. C.I.A. ii. 808, l. 40.

P. 429.—Return of the exiles: A decree regarding the return of the Mytilenaeans: C.I.G. 2166 and add. 1022-3; Hicks, 131; Cauer, *Delectus*, ed. 2, 428.

P. 430.—Oeniadae: Plutarch, *Alex.* 49 *ad fin.*

P. 430.—Samians: For Alexander's purpose to restore Samos to the Samians, see the Samian inscription, Dittenberger, 119.


P. 430.—Deification of Alexander: Mahaffy, *Problems of Greek History*, 165 *sqq.*; Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen*, i. 337-8. The whole subject of the cults of monarchs is fully treated by E. Kornemann, *Zur Geschichte der antiken Herrscherkulte*, in the first number of Lehmann's new periodical *Beiträge zur alten Geschichte* (1901), pp. 51 *sqq.*

P. 430, *Sect.* 6.—Sources: *Primary*: Hypereides, Against Demosthenes, Epitaphios; Dinarchus: Against Demosthenes, Against Aristogiton, Against Philocles. *Derivative*: Diodorus, Bk. xvii. 108, 109, 111, xviii. 2-18; Lives of Hypereides and Demosthenes (in the Lives of Ten Orators).

P. 431.—Harpalus affair: cp. Mahaffy, *op. cit.* 146.

P. 433.—The Lamian war: The residue of the moneys stolen from Harpalus was used to support this war: Diodorus xviii. 9. 1.

Pp. 435-6.—Aristotle: Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen*, i. 311 *sqq.*



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